A Theologico-Political Treatise Pt 4
Author: Unknown
Date: 0101-01-01T00:00:00+00:00

A THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE

Part 4 of 4 - Chapters XVI to XX

Published 1670 anonymously

Baruch Spinoza

1632 - 1677

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“A Theologico-Political Treatise”, and “A Political

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[16:0] Chapter XVI

[17:0] Chapter XVII

[18:0] Chapter XVIII

[19:0] Chapter XIX

[20:0] Chapter XX

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[16:0] CHAPTER XVI - Of the Foundations of a State;
of the Natural and Civil Rights of Individuals;
and of the Rights of the Sovereign Power.

[16:1] In Nature right co-extensive with power.

[16:2] This principle applies to mankind in the state of Nature.

[16:3] How a transition from this state to a civil state is possible.

[16:4] Subjects not slaves.

[16:5] Definition of private civil right - and wrong.

[16:6] Of alliance.

[16:7] Of treason.

[16:8] In what sense sovereigns are bound by Divine law.

[16:9] Civil government not inconsistent with religion.

[17:0] CHAPTER XVII.- It is shown, that no one can or need
transfer all his Rights to the Sovereign Power. Of the

Hebrew Republic, as it was during the lifetime of Moses,
and after his death till the foundation of the Monarchy;
and of its Excellence. Lastly, of the Causes why the

Theocratic Republic fell, and why it could hardly have
continued without Dissension.

[17:1] The absolute theory of Sovereignty ideal - No one can
in fact transfer all his rights to the Sovereign power.

Evidence of this.

[17:2] The greatest danger in all States from within,
not without.

[17:3] Original independence of the Jews after the Exodus.

[17:4] Changed first to a pure democratic Theocracy.

[17:5] Then to subjection to Moses.

[17:6] Then to a Theocracy with the power divided
between the high priest and the captains.

[17:7] The tribes confederate states.

[17:8] Restraints on the civil power.

[17:9] Restraints on the people.

[17:A] Causes of decay involved in the constitution
of the Levitical priesthood.

[18:0] CHAPTER XVIII.- From the Commonwealth of the Hebrews
and their History certain Lessons are deduced.

[18:1] The Hebrew constitution no longer possible or desirable,
yet lessons may be derived from its history.

[18:2] As the danger of entrusting any authority in politics
to ecclesiastics - the danger of identifying
religion with dogma.

[18:3] The necessity of keeping all judicial power with
the sovereign - the danger of changes in the
form of a State.

[18:4] This last danger illustrated from the history of

England - of Rome.

[18:5] And of Holland.

[19:0] CHAPTER XIX - It is shown that the Right
over Matters Spiritual lies wholly with the

Sovereign, and that the Outward Forms of

Religion should be in accordance with Public

Peace, if we would worship God aright.

[19:1] Difference between external and inward religion.

[19:2] Positive law established only by agreement.

[19:3] Piety furthered by peace and obedience.

[19:4] Position of the Apostles exceptional.

[19:5] Why Christian States, unlike the Hebrew,
suffer from disputes between the civil
and ecclesiastical powers.

[19:6] Absolute power in things spiritual of modern rulers.

[20:0] CHAPTER XX - That in a Free State every man
may Think what he Likes, and Say what he Thinks.

[20:1] The mind not subject to State authority.

[20:2] Therefore in general language should not be.

[20:3] A man who disapproving of a law, submits his adverse opinion
to the judgment of the authorities, while acting in
accordance with the law, deserves well of the State.

[20:4] That liberty of opinion is beneficial, shown from
the history of Amsterdam.

[20:5] Danger to the State of withholding it. -

Submission of the Author to the
judgment of his country’s rulers.

[Author’s Endnotes] to the Treatise.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––-

[16:0] CHAPTER XVI - OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF A STATE; OF THE

NATURAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS; AND OF THE

RIGHTS OF THE SOVEREIGN POWER.

(16:1) Hitherto our care has been to separate philosophy from theology,
and to show the freedom of thought which such separation insures to
both. (2) It is now time to determine the limits to which such
freedom of thought and discussion may extend itself in the ideal
state. (3) For the due consideration of this question we must
examine the foundations of a State, first turning our attention to
the natural rights of individuals, and afterwards to religion and
the state as a whole.

(16:4) By the right and ordinance of nature, I merely mean those
natural laws wherewith we conceive every individual to be
conditioned by nature, so as to live and act in a given way.

(5) For instance, fishes are naturally conditioned for swimming,
and the greater for devouring the less; therefore fishes enjoy
the water, and the greater devour the less by sovereign natural
right. [16:1] (6) For it is certain that nature, taken in the
abstract, has sovereign right to do anything, she can; in other
words, her right is co-extensive with her power. (7) The power
of nature is the power of God, which has sovereign right over
all things; and, inasmuch as the power of nature is simply the
aggregate of the powers of all her individual components, it
follows that every individual has sovereign right to do all
that he can; in other words, the rights of an individual extend
to the utmost limits of his power as it has been conditioned.

(16:8) Now it is the sovereign law and right of nature that each
individual should endeavour to preserve itself as it is,
without regard to anything but itself; therefore this sovereign
law and right belongs to every individual, namely, to exist and
act according to its natural conditions. (9) We do not here
acknowledge any difference between mankind and other individual
natural entities, nor between men endowed with reason and those
to whom reason is unknown; nor between fools, madmen, and sane men.

(16:10) Whatsoever an individual does by the laws of its nature it
has a sovereign right to do, inasmuch as it acts as it was
conditioned by nature, and cannot act otherwise.

[16:2] (11) Wherefore among men, so long as they are considered
as living under the sway of nature, he who does not yet know
reason, or who has not yet acquired the habit of virtue, acts
solely according to the laws of his desire with as sovereign a
right as he who orders his life entirely by the laws of reason.

(16:12) That is, as the wise man has sovereign right to do all that
reason dictates, or to live according to the laws of reason, so also
the ignorant and foolish man has sovereign right to do all that
desire dictates, or to live according to the laws of desire.

(13) This is identical with the teaching of Paul, who acknowledges
that previous to the law - that is, so long as men are considered
of as living under the sway of nature, there is no sin.

(16:14) The natural right of the individual man is thus determined,
not by sound reason, but by desire and power. (15) All are not
naturally conditioned so as to act according to the laws and rules
of reason; nay, on the contrary, all men are born ignorant, and
before they can learn the right way of life and acquire the habit
of virtue, the greater part of their life, even if they have been
well brought up, has passed away. (16) Nevertheless, they are in
the meanwhile bound to live and preserve themselves as far as they
can by the unaided impulses of desire. (16:17) Nature has given them
no other guide, and has denied them the present power of living
according to sound reason; so that they are no more bound to live
by the dictates of an enlightened mind, than a cat is bound to live
by the laws of the nature of a lion.

(16:18) Whatsoever, therefore, an individual (considered as under
the sway of nature) thinks useful for himself, whether led by sound
reason or impelled by the passions, that he has a sovereign right
to seek and to take for himself as he best can, whether by force,
cunning, entreaty, or any other means; consequently he may regard
as an enemy anyone who hinders the accomplishment of his purpose.

(16:19) It follows from what we have said that the right and
ordinance of nature, under which all men are born, and under which
they mostly live, only prohibits such things as no one desires,
and no one can attain: it does not forbid strife, nor hatred,
nor anger, nor deceit, nor, indeed, any of the means suggested
by desire.

(16:20) This we need not wonder at, for nature is not bounded by the
laws of human reason, which aims only at man’s true benefit and
preservation; her limits are infinitely wider, and have reference
to the eternal order of nature, wherein man is but a speck;
it is by the necessity of this alone that all individuals are
conditioned for living and acting in a particular way. (16:21) If
anything, therefore, in nature seems to us ridiculous, absurd,
or evil, it is because we only know in part, and are almost entirely
ignorant of the order and interdependence of nature as a whole,
and also because we want everything to be arranged according to the
dictates of our human reason; in reality that which reason considers
evil, is not evil in respect to the order and laws of nature as a
whole, but only in respect to the laws of our reason.

(16:22) Nevertheless, no one can doubt that it is much better for us
to live according to the laws and assured dictates of reason, for,
as we said, they have men’s true good for their object. (23) Moreover,
everyone wishes to live as far as possible securely beyond the reach
of fear, and this would be quite impossible so long as everyone did
everything he liked, and reason’s claim was lowered to a par with
those of hatred and anger; there is no one who is not ill at ease
in the midst of enmity, hatred, anger, and deceit, and who does not
seek to avoid them as much as he can. [16:3] (24) When we reflect
that men without mutual help, or the aid of reason, must needs live
most miserably, as we clearly proved in Chap. V., we shall plainly
see that men must necessarily come to an agreement to live together
as securely and well as possible if they are to enjoy as a whole the
rights which naturally belong to them as individuals, and their life
should be no more conditioned by the force and desire of individuals,
but by the power and will of the whole body. (16:25) This end they will
be unable to attain if desire be their only guide (for by the laws
of desire each man is drawn in a different direction); they must,
therefore, most firmly decree and establish that they will be guided
in everything by reason (which nobody will dare openly to repudiate
lest he should be taken for a madman), and will restrain any desire
which is injurious to a man’s fellows, that they will do to all as
they would be done by, and that they will defend their neighbour’s
rights as their own.

(16:26) How such a compact as this should be entered into,
how ratified and established, we will now inquire.

(16:27) Now it is a universal law of human nature that no one ever
neglects anything which he judges to be good, except with the hope
of gaining a greater good, or from the fear of a greater evil;
nor does anyone endure an evil except for the sake of avoiding a
greater evil, or gaining a greater good. (28) That is, everyone will,
of two goods, choose that which he thinks the greatest; and, of two
evils, that which he thinks the least. (29) I say advisedly that
which he thinks the greatest or the least, for it does not
necessarily follow that he judges right. (30) This law is so
deeply implanted in the human mind that it ought to be counted
among eternal truths and axioms.

(16:31) As a necessary consequence of the principle just enunciated,
no one can honestly promise to forego the right which he has over
all things [Endnote 26] and in general no one will abide by his
promises, unless under the fear of a greater evil, or the hope of
a greater good. (32) An example will make the matter clearer.

(16:33) Suppose that a robber forces me to promise that I will give
him my goods at his will and pleasure. (34) It is plain (inasmuch
as my natural right is, as I have shown, co-extensive with my power)

that if I can free myself from this robber by stratagem, by assenting
to his demands, I have the natural right to do so, and to pretend to
accept his conditions. (16:35) Or again, suppose I have genuinely
promised someone that for the space of twenty days I will not taste
food or any nourishment; and suppose I afterwards find that was
foolish, and cannot be kept without very great injury to myself;
as I am bound by natural law and right to choose the least of two
evils, I have complete right to break my compact, and act as if my
promise had never been uttered. (16:36) I say that I should have
perfect natural right to do so, whether I was actuated by true and
evident reason, or whether I was actuated by mere opinion in
thinking I had promised rashly; whether my reasons were true or
false, I should be in fear of a greater evil, which, by the
ordinance of nature, I should strive to avoid by every means in
my power.

(16:37) We may, therefore, conclude that a compact is only made
valid by its utility, without which it becomes null and void.

(38) It is, therefore, foolish to ask a man to keep his faith with
us for ever, unless we also endeavour that the violation of the
compact we enter into shall involve for the violator more harm
than good. (39) This consideration should have very great weight
in forming a state. (40) However, if all men could be easily led
by reason alone, and could recognize what is best and most useful
for a state, there would be no one who would not forswear deceit,
for everyone would keep most religiously to their compact in their
desire for the chief good, namely, the shield and buckler of the
commonwealth. (16:41) However, it is far from being the case that all
men can always be easily led by reason alone; everyone is drawn
away by his pleasure, while avarice, ambition, envy, hatred, and
the like so engross the mind that reason has no place therein.

(16:42) Hence, though men make promises with all the appearances
of good faith, and agree that they will keep to their engagement,
no one can absolutely rely on another man’s promise unless there
is something behind it. (43) Everyone has by nature a right to act
deceitfully. and to break his compacts, unless he be restrained by
the hope of some greater good, or the fear of some greater evil.

(16:44) However, as we have shown that the natural right of the
individual is only limited by his power, it is clear that by
transferring, either willingly or under compulsion, this power
into the hands of another, he in so doing necessarily cedes also
a part of his right; and further, that the Sovereign right over
all men belongs to him who has sovereign power, wherewith he can
compel men by force, or restrain them by threats of the
universally feared punishment of death; such sovereign right he
will retain only so long as he can maintain his power of
enforcing his will; otherwise he will totter on his throne,
and no one who is stronger than he will be bound unwillingly
to obey him.

(16:45) In this manner a society can be formed without any
violation of natural right, and the covenant can always be
strictly kept - that is, if each individual hands over the
whole of his power to the body politic, the latter will then
possess sovereign natural right over all things; that is,
it will have sole and unquestioned dominion, and everyone
will be bound to obey, under pain of the severest punishment.

(16:46) A body politic of this kind is called a Democracy,
which may be defined as a society which wields all its power
as a whole. (47) The sovereign power is not restrained by any
laws, but everyone is bound to obey it in all things; such is
the state of things implied when men either tacitly or expressly
handed over to it all their power of self-defence, or in other
words, all their right. (16:48) For if they had wished to retain
any right for themselves, they ought to have taken precautions
for its defence and preservation; as they have not done so,
and indeed could not have done so without dividing and
consequently ruining the state, they placed themselves
absolutely at the mercy of the sovereign power; and, therefore,
having acted (as we have shown) as reason and necessity demanded,
they are obliged to fulfil the commands of the sovereign
power, however absurd these may be, else they will be public
enemies, and will act against reason, which urges the preservation
of the state as a primary duty. (49) For reason bids us choose the
least of two evils.

(16:50) Furthermore, this danger of submitting absolutely to the
dominion and will of another, is one which may be incurred with a
light heart: for we have shown that sovereigns only possess this
right of imposing their will, so long as they have the full power
to enforce it: if such power be lost their right to command is
lost also, or lapses to those who have assumed it and can keep it.

(16:51) Thus it is very rare for sovereigns to impose thoroughly
irrational commands, for they are bound to consult their own
interests, and retain their power by consulting the public good and
acting according to the dictates of reason, as Seneca says, “violenta
imperia nemo continuit diu.” (52) No one can long retain a tyrant’s
sway.

(16:53) In a democracy, irrational commands are still less to be
feared: for it is almost impossible that the majority of a people,
especially if it be a large one, should agree in an irrational
design: and, moreover, the basis and aim of a democracy is to avoid
the desires as irrational, and to bring men as far as possible
under the control of reason, so that they may live in peace and
harmony: if this basis be removed the whole fabric falls to ruin.

(16:54) Such being the ends in view for the sovereign power, the
duty of subjects is, as I have said, to obey its commands, and to
recognize no right save that which it sanctions.

[16:4] (55) It will, perhaps, be thought that we are turning subjects
into slaves: for slaves obey commands and free men live as they like;
but this idea is based on a misconception, for the true slave is he
who is led away by his pleasures and can neither see what is good for
him nor act accordingly: he alone is free who lives with free consent
under the entire guidance of reason.

(16:56) Action in obedience to orders does take away freedom in a
certain sense, but it does not, therefore, make a man a slave, all
depends on the object of the action. (57) If the object of the
action be the good of the state, and not the good of the agent,
the latter is a slave and does himself no good: but in a state or
kingdom where the weal of the whole people, and not that of the ruler,
is the supreme law, obedience to the sovereign power does not make a
man a slave, of no use to himself, but a subject. (58) Therefore,
that state is the freest whose laws are founded on sound reason,
so that every member of it may, if he will, be free; [Endnote 27]

that is, live with full consent under the entire guidance of reason.

(16:59) Children, though they are bound to obey all the commands of
their parents, are yet not slaves: for the commands of parents look
generally to the children’s benefit.

(16:60) We must, therefore, acknowledge a great difference between
a slave, a son, and a subject; their positions may be thus defined.

(61) A slave is one who is bound to obey his master’s orders, though
they are given solely in the master’s interest: a son is one who
obeys his father’s orders, given in his own interest; a subject obeys
the orders of the sovereign power, given for the common interest,
wherein he is included.

(16:62) I think I have now shown sufficiently clearly the basis of
a democracy: I have especially desired to do so, for I believe it
to be of all forms of government the most natural, and the most
consonant with individual liberty. (63) In it no one transfers his
natural right so absolutely that he has no further voice in affairs,
he only hands it over to the majority of a society, whereof he is a
unit. Thus all men remain as they were in the state of nature,
equals.

(16:64) This is the only form of government which I have treated of
at length, for it is the one most akin to my purpose of showing the
benefits of freedom in a state.

(16:65) I may pass over the fundamental principles of other forms
of government, for we may gather from what has been said whence
their right arises without going into its origin. (16:66) The possessor
of sovereign power, whether he be one, or many, or the whole body
politic, has the sovereign right of imposing any commands he pleases:

and he who has either voluntarily, or under compulsion, transferred
the right to defend him to another, has, in so doing, renounced his
natural right and is therefore bound to obey, in all things, the
commands of the sovereign power; and will be bound so to do so
as the king, or nobles, or the people preserve the sovereign power
which formed the basis of the original transfer. (67) I need add
no more.

[16:5] (68) The bases and rights of dominion being thus displayed,
we shall readily be able to define private civil right, wrong,
justice, and injustice, with their relations to the state; and also
to determine what constitutes an ally, or an enemy, or the crime of
treason.

(16:69) By private civil right we can only mean the liberty every
man possesses to preserve his existence, a liberty limited by the
edicts of the sovereign power, and preserved only by its authority:

for when a man has transferred to another his right of living as he
likes, which was only limited by his power, that is, has transferred
his liberty and power of self-defence, he is bound to live as that
other dictates, and to trust to him entirely for his defence.

(16:70) Wrong takes place when a citizen, or subject, is forced
by another to undergo some loss or pain in contradiction to the
authority of the law, or the edict of the sovereign power.

(16:71) Wrong is conceivable only in an organized community: nor can
it ever accrue to subjects from any act of the sovereign, who has
the right to do what he likes. (72) It can only arise, therefore,
between private persons, who are bound by law and right not to injure
one another. (73) Justice consists in the habitual rendering to every
man his lawful due: injustice consists in depriving a man, under the
pretence of legality, of what the laws, rightly interpreted, would
allow him. (74) These last are also called equity and iniquity,
because those who administer the laws are bound to show no respect of
persons, but to account all men equal, and to defend every man’s right
equally, neither envying the rich nor despising the poor.

[16:6](75) The men of two states become allies, when for the sake of
avoiding war, or for some other advantage, they covenant to do each
other no hurt, but on the contrary, to assist each other if necessity
arises, each retaining his independence. (76) Such a covenant is
valid so long as its basis of danger or advantage is in force: no one
enters into an engagement, or is bound to stand by his compacts unless
there be a hope of some accruing good, or the fear of some evil:

if this basis be removed the compact thereby becomes void: this has
been abundantly shown by experience. (77) For although different
states make treaties not to harm one another, they always take every
possible precaution against such treaties being broken by the stronger
party, and do not rely on the compact, unless there is a sufficiently
obvious object and advantage to both parties in observing it.

(16:78) Otherwise they would fear a breach of faith, nor would there
be any wrong done thereby: for who in his proper senses, and aware of
the right of the sovereign power, would trust in the promises of one
who has the will and the power to do what he likes, and who aims
solely at the safety and advantage of his dominion? (79) Moreover,
if we consult loyalty and religion, we shall see that no one in
possession of power ought to abide by his promises to the injury of
his dominion; for he cannot keep such promises without breaking the
engagement he made with his subjects, by which both he and they are
most solemnly bound. (80) An enemy is one who lives apart from the
state, and does not recognize its authority either as a subject or
as an ally. It is not hatred which makes a man an enemy, but the
rights of the state. (16:81) The rights of the state are the same
in regard to him who does not recognize by any compact the state
authority, as they are against him who has done the state an injury:

it has the right to force him as best it can, either to submit,
or to contract an alliance.

[16:7] (82) Lastly, treason can only be committed by subjects,
who by compact, either tacit or expressed, have transferred all
their rights to the state: a subject is said to have committed
this crime when he has attempted, for whatever reason, to seize
the sovereign power, or to place it in different hands.

(1:83) I say, has attempted, for if punishment were not to
overtake him till he had succeeded, it would often come too
late, the sovereign rights would have been acquired or
transferred already.

(16:84) I also say, has attempted, for whatever reason, to seize
the sovereign power, and I recognize no difference whether such
an attempt should be followed by public loss or public gain.

(85) Whatever be his reason for acting, the crime is treason,
and he is rightly condemned: in war, everyone would admit the
justice of his sentence. (86) If a man does not keep to his post,
but approaches the enemy without the knowledge of his commander,
whatever may be his motive, so long as he acts on his own motion,
even if he advances with the design of defeating the enemy, he is
rightly put to death, because he has violated his oath, and
infringed the rights of his commander. (87) That all citizens
are equally bound by these rights in time of peace, is not so
generally recognized, but the reasons for obedience are in both
cases identical. (16:88) The state must be preserved and directed
by the sole authority of the sovereign, and such authority and
right have been accorded by universal consent to him alone: if,
therefore, anyone else attempts, without his consent, to execute
any public enterprise, even though the state might (as we said)

reap benefit therefrom, such person has none the less infringed
the sovereigns right, and would be rightly punished for treason.

(16:89) In order that every scruple may be removed, we may now
answer the inquiry, whether our former assertion that everyone
who has not the practice of reason, may, in the state of nature,
live by sovereign natural right, according to the laws of his
desires, is not in direct opposition to the law and right of God
as revealed. (90) For as all men absolutely (whether they be less
endowed with reason or more) are equally bound by the Divine
command to love their neighbour as themselves, it may be said that
they cannot, without wrong, do injury to anyone, or live according
to their desires.

(16:91) This objection, so far as the state of nature is concerned,
can be easily answered, for the state of nature is, both in nature
and in time, prior to religion. (92) No one knows by nature that he
owes any obedience to God [Endnote 28] nor can he attain thereto by
any exercise of his reason, but solely by revelation confirmed by
signs. (93) Therefore, previous to revelation, no one is bound by a

Divine law and right of which he is necessarily in ignorance.

(16:94) The state of nature must by no means be confounded with a
state of religion, but must be conceived as without either religion
or law, and consequently without sin or wrong: this is how we have
described it, and we are confirmed by the authority of Paul.

(16:95) It is not only in respect of ignorance that we conceive the
state of nature as prior to, and lacking the Divine revealed law
and right; but in respect of freedom also, wherewith all men are
born endowed.

(16:96) If men were naturally bound by the Divine law and right,
or if the Divine law and right were a natural necessity, there
would have been no need for God to make a covenant with mankind,
and to bind them thereto with an oath and agreement.

(16:97) We must, then, fully grant that the Divine law and right
originated at the time when men by express covenant agreed to obey

God in all things, and ceded, as it were, their natural freedom,
transferring their rights to God in the manner described in speaking
of the formation of a state.

(98) However, I will treat of these matters more at length presently.

[16:8] (99) It may be insisted that sovereigns are as much bound
by the Divine law as subjects: whereas we have asserted that they
retain their natural rights, and may do whatever they like.

(16:100) In order to clear up the whole difficulty, which arises
rather concerning the natural right than the natural state,

I maintain that everyone is bound, in the state of nature, to live
according to Divine law, in the same way as he is bound to live
according to the dictates of sound reason; namely, inasmuch as it
is to his advantage, and necessary for his salvation; but, if he
will not so live, he may do otherwise at his own risk. (101) He is
thus bound to live according to his own laws, not according to
anyone else’s, and to recognize no man as a judge, or as a superior
in religion. (16:102) Such, in my opinion, is the position of a
sovereign, for he may take advice from his fellow-men, but he is
not bound to recognize any as a judge, nor anyone besides himself
as an arbitrator on any question of right, unless it be a prophet
sent expressly by God and attesting his mission by indisputable
signs. (103) Even then he does not recognize a man, but God

Himself as His judge.

[16:9] (104) If a sovereign refuses to obey God as revealed in His
law, he does so at his own risk and loss, but without violating any
civil or natural right. (105) For the civil right is dependent on
his own decree; and natural right is dependent on the laws of nature,
which latter are not adapted to religion, whose sole aim is the good
of humanity, but to the order of nature - that is, to God’s eternal
decree unknown to us.

(16:106) This truth seems to be adumbrated in a somewhat obscurer
form by those who maintain that men can sin against God’s
revelation, but not against the eternal decree by which He has
ordained all things.

(16:107) We may be asked, what should we do if the sovereign commands
anything contrary to religion, and the obedience which we have
expressly vowed to God? should we obey the Divine law or the human
law? (108) I shall treat of this question at length hereafter,
and will therefore merely say now, that God should be obeyed before
all else, when we have a certain and indisputable revelation of His
will: but men are very prone to error on religious subjects, and,
according to the diversity of their dispositions, are wont with
considerable stir to put forward their own inventions, as experience
more than sufficiently attests, so that if no one were bound to obey
the state in matters which, in his own opinion concern religion,
the rights of the state would be dependent on every man’s judgment
and passions. (16:109) No one would consider himself bound to obey
laws framed against his faith or superstition; and on this pretext
he might assume unbounded license. (110) In this way, the rights
of the civil authorities would be utterly set at nought, so that we
must conclude that the sovereign power, which alone is bound both
by Divine and natural right to preserve and guard the laws of the
state, should have supreme authority for making any laws about
religion which it thinks fit; all are bound to obey its behests on
the subject in accordance with their promise which God bids them to
keep.

(16:111) However, if the sovereign power be heathen, we should either
enter into no engagements therewith, and yield up our lives sooner
than transfer to it any of our rights; or, if the engagement be made,
and our rights transferred, we should (inasmuch as we should have
ourselves transferred the right of defending ourselves and our
religion) be bound to obey them, and to keep our word: we might even
rightly be bound so to do, except in those cases where God, by
indisputable revelation, has promised His special aid against tyranny,
or given us special exemption from obedience. (112) Thus we see that,
of all the Jews in Babylon, there were only three youths who were
certain of the help of God, and, therefore, refused to obey

Nebuchadnezzar. (113) All the rest, with the sole exception of

Daniel, who was beloved by the king, were doubtless compelled by
right to obey, perhaps thinking that they had been delivered up by

God into the hands of the king, and that the king had obtained and
preserved his dominion by God’s design. (16:114) On the other hand,

Eleazar, before his country had utterly fallen, wished to give a proof
of his constancy to his compatriots, in order that they might follow
in his footsteps, and go to any lengths, rather than allow their right
and power to be transferred to the Greeks, or brave any torture rather
than swear allegiance to the heathen. (115) Instances are occurring
every day in confirmation of what I here advance. (116) The rulers of

Christian kingdoms do not hesitate, with a view to strengthening their
dominion, to make treaties with Turks and heathen, and to give orders
to their subjects who settle among such peoples not to assume more
freedom, either in things secular or religious, than is set down in
the treaty, or allowed by the foreign government. (16:117) We may see
this exemplified in the Dutch treaty with the Japanese, which I have
already mentioned.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––-

[17:0] CHAPTER XVII - IT IS SHOWN THAT NO ONE CAN, OR

NEED, TRANSFER ALL HIS RIGHTS TO THE SOVEREIGN POWER.

OF THE HEBREW REPUBLIC, AS IT WAS DURING THE LIFETIME

OF MOSES, AND AFTER HIS DEATH, TILL THE FOUNDATION

OF THE MONARCHY; AND OF ITS EXCELLENCE. LASTLY, OF

THE CAUSES WHY THE THEOCRATIC REPUBLIC FELL, AND WHY

IT COULD HARDLY HAVE CONTINUED WITHOUT DISSENSION.

[17:1] (1) The theory put forward in the last chapter, of the
universal rights of the sovereign power, and of the natural rights
of the individual transferred thereto, though it corresponds
in many respects with actual practice, and though practice may
be so arranged as to conform to it more and more, must nevertheless
always remain in many respects purely ideal. (2) No one can ever so
utterly transfer to another his power and, consequently, his rights,
as to cease to be a man; nor can there ever be a power so sovereign
that it can carry out every possible wish. (3) It will always be
vain to order a subject to hate what he believes brings him advantage,
or to love what brings him loss, or not to be offended at insults,
or not to wish to be free from fear, or a hundred other things of
the sort, which necessarily follow from the laws of human nature.

(17:4) So much, I think, is abundantly shown by experience: for men
have never so far ceded their power as to cease to be an object of
fear to the rulers who received such power and right; and dominions
have always been in as much danger from their own subjects as from
external enemies. (5) If it were really the case, that men could be
deprived of their natural rights so utterly as never to have any
further influence on affairs [Endnote 29] except with the permission
of the holders of sovereign right, it would then be possible to
maintain with impunity the most violent tyranny, which, I suppose,
no one would for an instant admit.

(17:6) We must, therefore, grant that every man retains some part
of his right, in dependence on his own decision, and no one else’s.

(17:7) However, in order correctly to understand the extent of the
sovereign’s right and power, we must take notice that it does not
cover only those actions to which it can compel men by fear, but
absolutely every action which it can induce men to perform: for it
is the fact of obedience, not the motive for obedience, which makes
a man a subject.

(17:8) Whatever be the cause which leads a man to obey the commands
of the sovereign, whether it be fear or hope, or love of his country,
or any other emotion - the fact remains that the man takes counsel
with himself, and nevertheless acts as his sovereign orders.

(9) We must not, therefore, assert that all actions resulting
from a man’s deliberation with himself are done in obedience to
the rights of the individual rather than the sovereign: as a matter
of fact, all actions spring from a man’s deliberation with himself,
whether the determining motive be love or fear of punishment;
therefore, either dominion does not exist, and has no rights
over its subjects, or else it extends over every instance in which
it can prevail on men to decide to obey it. (17:10) Consequently,
every action which a subject performs in accordance with the commands
of the sovereign, whether such action springs from love, or fear,
or (as is more frequently the case) from hope and fear together,
or from reverence. compounded of fear and admiration, or, indeed,
any motive whatever, is performed in virtue of his submission to
the sovereign, and not in virtue of his own authority.

(17:11) This point is made still more clear by the fact that
obedience does not consist so much in the outward act as in the
mental state of the person obeying; so that he is most under
the dominion of another who with his whole heart determines to
obey another’s commands; and consequently the firmest dominion
belongs to the sovereign who has most influence over the minds
of his subjects; if those who are most feared possessed the
firmest dominion, the firmest dominion would belong to the
subjects of a tyrant, for they are always greatly feared by
their ruler. (17:12) Furthermore, though it is impossible to
govern the mind as completely as the tongue, nevertheless minds
are, to a certain extent, under the control of the sovereign,
for he can in many ways bring about that the greatest part of his
subjects should follow his wishes in their beliefs, their loves,
and their hates. (13) Though such emotions do not arise at the
express command of the sovereign they often result (as experience
shows) from the authority of his power, and from his direction;
in other words, in virtue of his right; we may, therefore, without
doing violence to our understanding, conceive men who follow the
instigation of their sovereign in their beliefs, their loves,
their hates, their contempt, and all other emotions whatsoever.

(17:14) Though the powers of government, as thus conceived,
are sufficiently ample, they can never become large enough to
execute every possible wish of their possessors. (15) This,

I think, I have already shown clearly enough. (16) The method
of forming a dominion which should prove lasting I do not,
as I have said, intend to discuss, but in order to arrive at
the object I have in view, I will touch on the teaching of

Divine revelation to Moses in this respect, and we will
consider the history and the success of the Jews, gathering
therefrom what should be the chief concessions made by
sovereigns to their subjects with a view to the security and
increase of their dominion.

[17:2] (17) That the preservation of a state chiefly depends
on the subjects’ fidelity and constancy in carrying out the
orders they receive, is most clearly taught both by reason and
experience; how subjects ought to be guided so as best to
preserve their fidelity and virtue is not so obvious. (18) All,
both rulers and ruled, are men, and prone to follow after their
lusts. (17:19) The fickle disposition of the multitude almost
reduces those who have experience of it to despair, for it is
governed solely by emotions, not by reason: it rushes headlong
into every enterprise, and is easily corrupted either by avarice
or luxury: everyone thinks himself omniscient and wishes to
fashion all things to his liking, judging a thing to be just or
unjust, lawful or unlawful, according as he thinks it will bring
him profit or loss: vanity leads him to despise his equals, and
refuse their guidance: envy of superior fame or fortune (for such
gifts are never equally distributed) leads him to desire and
rejoice in his neighbour’s downfall. (17:20) I need not go through
the whole list, everyone knows already how much crime results
from disgust at the present - desire for change, headlong anger,
and contempt for poverty - and how men’s minds are engrossed and
kept in turmoil thereby.

(17:21) To guard against all these evils, and form a dominion
where no room is left for deceit; to frame our institutions so
that every man, whatever his disposition, may prefer public
right to private advantage, this is the task and this the toil.

(22) Necessity is often the mother of invention, but she has
never yet succeeded in framing a dominion that was in less
danger from its own citizens than from open enemies, or whose
rulers did not fear the latter less than the former.

(17:23) Witness the state of Rome, invincible by her
enemies, but many times conquered and sorely oppressed
by her own citizens, especially in the war between

Vespasian and Vitellius. (24) (See Tacitus, Hist. bk. iv.

for a description of the pitiable state of the city.)

(17:25) Alexander thought prestige abroad more easy to acquire
than prestige at home, and believed that his greatness could be
destroyed by his own followers. (26) Fearing such a disaster,
he thus addressed his friends: “Keep me safe from internal
treachery and domestic plots, and I will front without fear the
dangers of battle and of war. (27) Philip was more secure in
the battle array than in the theatre: he often escaped from
the hands of the enemy, he could not escape from his own subjects.

(17:28) If you think over the deaths of kings, you will count up
more who have died by the assassin than by the open foe.”

(Q. Curtius, chap. vi.)

(17:29) For the sake of making themselves secure, kings who
seized the throne in ancient times used to try to spread the
idea that they were descended from the immortal gods, thinking
that if their subjects and the rest of mankind did not look on
them as equals, but believed them to be gods, they would
willingly submit to their rule, and obey their commands.

(17:30) Thus Augustus persuaded the Romans that he was
descended from AEneas, who was the son of Venus, and numbered
among the gods. (31) “He wished himself to be worshipped in
temples, like the gods, with flamens and priests.”

(Tacitus, Ann. i. 10.)

(17:32) Alexander wished to be saluted as the son of Jupiter,
not from motives of pride but of policy, as he showed by his
answer to the invective of Hermolaus: “It is almost laughable,”

said he, that Hermolaus asked me to contradict Jupiter,
by whose oracle I am recognized. (33) Am I responsible for
the answers of the gods? (34) It offered me the name of son;
acquiescence was by no means foreign to my present designs.

(17:35) Would that the Indians also would believe me to be a
god! (36) Wars are carried through by prestige, falsehoods
that are believed often gain the force of truth.”

(Curtius, viii,. Para, 8.) (37) In these few words he
cleverly contrives to palm off a fiction on the ignorant,
and at the same time hints at the motive for the deception.

(17:38) Cleon, in his speech persuading the Macedonians to
obey their king, adopted a similar device: for after going
through the praises of Alexander with admiration, and
recalling his merits, he proceeds, “the Persians are not
only pious, but prudent in worshipping their kings as gods:

for kingship is the shield of public safety,” and he ends
thus, “I, myself, when the king enters a banquet hall,
should prostrate my body on the ground; other men should do
the like, especially those who are wise ” (Curtius, viii.

Para. 66). (39) However, the Macedonians were more prudent -
indeed, it is only complete barbarians who can be so openly
cajoled, and can suffer themselves to be turned from subjects
into slaves without interests of their own. (17:40) Others,
notwithstanding, have been able more easily to spread the
belief that kingship is sacred, and plays the part of God
on the earth, that it has been instituted by God, not by the
suffrage and consent of men; and that it is preserved and
guarded by Divine special providence and aid. (41) Similar
fictions have been promulgated by monarchs, with the object of
strengthening their dominion, but these I will pass over,
and in order to arrive at my main purpose, will merely recall
and discuss the teaching on the subject of Divine revelation
to Moses in ancient times.

[17:3] (42) We have said in Chap. V. that after the Hebrews
came up out of Egypt they were not bound by the law and right
of any other nation, but were at liberty to institute any new
rites at their pleasure, and to occupy whatever territory
they chose. (43) After their liberation from the intolerable
bondage of the Egyptians, they were bound by no covenant to
any man; and, therefore, every man entered into his natural
right, and was free to retain it or to give it up, and transfer
it to another. (44) Being, then, in the state of nature, they
followed the advice of Moses, in whom they chiefly trusted, and
decided to transfer their right to no human being, but only to

God; without further delay they all, with one voice, promised to
obey all the commands of the Deity, and to acknowledge no right
that He did not proclaim as such by prophetic revelation.

(17:45) This promise, or transference of right to God, was
effected in the same manner as we have conceived it to have
been in ordinary societies, when men agree to divest themselves
of their natural rights. (46) It is, in fact, in virtue of a set
covenant, and an oath (see Exod. xxxiv:10), that the Jews freely,
and not under compulsion or threats, surrendered their rights and
transferred them to God. (47) Moreover, in order that this
covenant might be ratified and settled, and might be free from
all suspicion of deceit, God did not enter into it till the Jews
had had experience of His wonderful power by which alone they
had been, or could be, preserved in a state of prosperity

(Exod. xix:4, 5). (17:48) It is because they believed that
nothing but God’s power could preserve them that they
surrendered to God the natural power of self-preservation,
which they formerly, perhaps, thought they possessed,
and consequently they surrendered at the same time all
their natural right.

[17:4] (49) God alone, therefore, held dominion over the

Hebrews, whose state was in virtue of the covenant called God’s
kingdom, and God was said to be their king; consequently the
enemies of the Jews were said to be the enemies of God, and the
citizens who tried to seize the dominion were guilty of treason
against God; and, lastly, the laws of the state were called the
laws and commandments of God. (50) Thus in the Hebrew state the
civil and religious authority, each consisting solely of
obedience to God, were one and the same. (51) The dogmas of
religion were not precepts, but laws and ordinances; piety was
regarded as the same as loyalty, impiety as the same as
disaffection. (17:52) Everyone who fell away from religion
ceased to be a citizen, and was, on that ground alone, accounted
an enemy: those who died for the sake of religion, were held to
have died for their country; in fact, between civil and religious
law and right there was no distinction whatever. (53) For this
reason the government could be called a Theocracy, inasmuch as
the citizens were not bound by anything save the revelations of God.

(17:54) However, this state of things existed rather in theory
than in practice, for it will appear from what we are about to
say, that the Hebrews, as a matter of fact, retained absolutely
in their own hands the right of sovereignty: this is shown by
the method and plan by which the government was carried on,
as I will now explain.

(17:55) Inasmuch as the Hebrews did not transfer their rights
to any other person but, as in a democracy, all surrendered their
rights equally, and cried out with one voice, “Whatsoever God
hall speak (no mediator or mouthpiece being named) that will we
do,” it follows that all were equally bound by the covenant,
and that all had an equal right to consult the Deity, to accept
and to interpret His laws, so that all had an exactly equal share
in the government. [17:5] (56) Thus at first they all approached

God together, so that they might learn His commands, but in this
first salutation, they were so thoroughly terrified and so
astounded to hear God speaking, that they thought their last hour
was at hand: full of fear, therefore, they went afresh to Moses,
and said, “Lo, we have heard God speaking in the fire, and there
is no cause why we should wish to die: surely this great fire
will consume us: if we hear again the voice of God, we shall
surely die. (57) Thou, therefore, go near, and hear all the words
of our God, and thou (not God) shalt speak with us: all that God
shall tell us, that will we hearken to and perform.”

(17:58) They thus clearly abrogated their former covenant, and
absolutely transferred to Moses their right to consult God and
interpret His commands: for they do not here promise obedience
to all that God shall tell them, but to all that God shall tell

Moses (see Deut. v:20 after the Decalogue, and chap. xviii:15, 16).

(17:59) Moses, therefore, remained the sole promulgator and
interpreter of the Divine laws, and consequently also the sovereign
judge, who could not be arraigned himself, and who acted among the

Hebrews the part, of God; in other words, held the sovereign
kingship: he alone had the right to consult God, to give the

Divine answers to the people, and to see that they were carried
out. (17:60) I say he alone, for if anyone during the life of Moses
was desirous of preaching anything in the name of the Lord, he was,
even if a true prophet, considered guilty and a usurper of the
sovereign right (Numb. xi:28) [Endnote 30]. (61) We may here
notice, that though the people had elected Moses, they could not
rightfully elect Moses’s successor; for having transferred to

Moses their right of consulting God, and absolutely promised to
regard him as a Divine oracle, they had plainly forfeited the
whole of their right, and were bound to accept as chosen by God
anyone proclaimed by Moses as his successor. (17:62) If Moses had
so chosen his successor, who like him should wield the sole right
of government, possessing the sole right of consulting God,
and consequently of making and abrogating laws, of deciding on
peace or war, of sending ambassadors, appointing judges - in fact,
discharging all the functions of a sovereign, the state would have
become simply a monarchy, only differing from other monarchies in
the fact, that the latter are, or should be, carried on in
accordance with God’s decree, unknown even to the monarch, whereas
the Hebrew monarch would have been the only person to whom the
decree was revealed. (17:63) A difference which increases, rather
than diminishes the monarch’s authority. (64) As far as the people
in both cases are concerned, each would be equally subject, and
equally ignorant of the Divine decree, for each would be dependent
on the monarch’s words, and would learn from him alone, what was
lawful or unlawful: nor would the fact that the people believed
that the monarch was only issuing commands in accordance with God’s
decree revealed to him, make it less in subjection, but rather more.

[17:6] (65) However, Moses elected no such successor, but left the
dominion to those who came after him in a condition which could not
be called a popular government, nor an aristocracy, nor a monarchy,
but a Theocracy. (66) For the right of interpreting laws was vested
in one man, while the right and power of administering the state
according to the laws thus interpreted, was vested in another man

(see Numb. xxvii:21). [Endnote 31]

(17:67) In order that the question may be thoroughly understood,

I will duly set forth the administration of the whole state.

(17:68) First, the people were commanded to build a tabernacle,
which should be, as it were, the dwelling of God - that is, of
the sovereign authority of the state. (69) This tabernacle was
to be erected at the cost of the whole people, not of one man,
in order that the place where God was consulted might be public
property. (70) The Levites were chosen as courtiers and
administrators of this royal abode; while Aaron, the brother
of Moses, was chosen to be their chief and second, as it were,
to God their King, being succeeded in the office by his
legitimate sons.

(17:71) He, as the nearest to God, was the sovereign interpreter
of the Divine laws; he communicated the answers of the Divine
oracle to the people, and entreated God’s favour for them.

(72) If, in addition to these privileges, he had possessed
the right of ruling, he would have been neither more nor less
than an absolute monarch; but, in respect to government, he was
only a private citizen: the whole tribe of Levi was so completely
divested of governing rights that it did not even take its share
with the others in the partition of territory. (73) Moses provided
for its support by inspiring the common people with great reverence
for it, as the only tribe dedicated to God.

(17:74) Further, the army, formed from the remaining twelve
tribes, was commanded to invade the land of Canaan, to divide
it into twelve portions, and to distribute it among the tribes
by lot. (75) For this task twelve captains were chosen,
one from every tribe, and were, together with Joshua and Eleazar,
the high priest, empowered to divide the land into twelve equal
parts, and distribute it by lot. (76) Joshua was chosen for the
chief command of the army, inasmuch as none but he had the right
to consult God in emergencies, not like Moses, alone in his tent,
or in the tabernacle, but through the high priest, to whom only
the answers of God were revealed. (17:77) Furthermore, he was
empowered to execute, and cause the people to obey God’s commands,
transmitted through the high priests; to find, and to make use of,
means for carrying them out; to choose as many army captains as
he liked; to make whatever choice he thought best; to send
ambassadors in his own name; and, in short, to have the entire
control of the war. (17:78) To his office there was no rightful
successor - indeed, the post was only filled by the direct order
of the Deity, on occasions of public emergency. (79) In ordinary
times, all the management of peace and war was vested in the
captains of the tribes, as I will shortly point out. (80) Lastly,
all men between the ages of twenty and sixty were ordered to
bear arms, and form a citizen army, owing allegiance, not to
its general-in-chief, nor to the high priest, but to Religion and
to God. (17:81) The army, or the hosts, were called the army
of God, or the hosts of God. (82) For this reason God was called
by the Hebrews the God of Armies; and the ark of the covenant was
borne in the midst of the army in important battles, when the
safety or destruction of the whole people hung upon the issue,
so that the people might, as it were, see their King among them,
and put forth all their strength.

(17:83) From these directions, left by Moses to his successors,
we plainly see that he chose administrators, rather than despots,
to come after him; for he invested no one with the power of
consulting God, where he liked and alone, consequently, no one
had the power possessed by himself of ordaining and abrogating
laws, of deciding on war or peace, of choosing men to fill
offices both religious and secular: all these are the
prerogatives of a sovereign. (84) The high priest, indeed,
had the right of interpreting laws, and communicating the
answers of God, but he could not do so when he liked, as Moses
could, but only when he was asked by the general-in-chief
of the army, the council, or some similar authority.

(17:85) The general-in-chief and the council could consult

God when they liked, but could only receive His answers through
the high priest; so that the utterances of God, as reported by
the high priest, were not decrees, as they were when reported
by Moses, but only answers; they were accepted by Joshua and
the council, and only then had the force of commands and decrees.

(17:86) The high priest, both in the case of Aaron and of his
son Eleazar, was chosen by Moses; nor had anyone, after Moses’

death, a right to elect to the office, which became hereditary.

(87) The general-in-chief of the army was also chosen by Moses,
and assumed his functions in virtue of the commands, not of the
high priest, but of Moses: indeed, after the death of Joshua,
the high priest did not appoint anyone in his place, and the
captains did not consult God afresh about a general-in-chief,
but each retained Joshua’s power in respect to the contingent
of his own tribe, and all retained it collectively, in respect
to the whole army. (17:88) There seems to have been no need
of a general-in-chief, except when they were obliged to unite
their forces against a common enemy. (89) This occurred most
frequently during the time of Joshua, when they had no fixed
dwelling. place, and possessed all things in common.

[17:7] (90) After all the tribes had gained their territories
by right of conquest, and had divided their allotted gains,
they became separated, having no longer their possessions
in common, so that the need for a single commander ceased,
for the different tribes should be considered rather in the
light of confederated states than of bodies of fellow-citizens.

(17:91) In respect to their God and their religion, they were
fellow-citizens; but, in respect to the rights which one
possessed with regard to another, they were only confederated:

they were, in fact, in much the same position (if one excepts
the Temple common to all) as the United States of the Netherlands.

(17:92) The division of property, held in common is only another
phrase for the possession of his share by each of the owners
singly, and the surrender by the others of their rights over
such share. (93) This is why Moses elected captains of the
tribes - namely, that when the dominion was divided, each might
take care of his own part; consulting God through the high priest
on the affairs of his tribe, ruling over his army, building and
fortifying cities, appointing judges, attacking the enemies of
his own dominion, and having complete control over all civil
and military affairs. (17:94) He was not bound to acknowledge
any superior judge save God [Endnote 32] or a prophet whom God
should expressly send. (95) If he departed from the worship of

God, the rest of the tribes did not arraign him as a subject,
but attacked him as an enemy. (95a) Of this we have examples in

Scripture. (17:96) When Joshua was dead, the children of Israel

(not a fresh general-in-chief) consulted God; it being decided
that the tribe of Judah should be the first to attack its enemies,
the tribe in question contracted a single alliance with the
tribe of Simeon, for uniting their forces, and attacking their
common enemy, the rest of the tribes not being included in the
alliance (Judges i:1, 2, 3). (97) Each tribe separately made
war against its own enemies, and, according to its pleasure,
received them as subjects or allies, though it had been
commanded not to spare them on any conditions, but to destroy
them utterly. (98) Such disobedience met with reproof from the
rest of the tribes, but did not cause the offending tribe to be
arraigned: it was not considered a sufficient reason for
proclaiming a civil war, or interfering in one another’s affairs.

(17:99) But when the tribe of Benjamin offended against the others,
and so loosened the bonds of peace that none of the confederated
tribes could find refuge within its borders, they attacked it as
an enemy, and gaining the victory over it after three battles,
put to death both guilty and innocent, according to the laws of
war: an act which they subsequently bewailed with tardy repentance.

(17:100) These examples plainly confirm what we have said concerning
the rights of each tribe. (101) Perhaps we shall be asked who elected
the successors to the captains of each tribe; on this point I can
gather no positive information in Scripture, but I conjecture that
as the tribes were divided into families, each headed by its senior
member, the senior of all these heads of families succeeded by right
to the office of captain, for Moses chose from among these seniors
his seventy coadjutors, who formed with himself the supreme council.

(17:102) Those who administered the government after the death of

Joshua were called elders, and elder is a very common Hebrew
expression in the sense of judge, as I suppose everyone knows;
however, it is not very important for us to make up our minds on
this point. (103) It is enough to have shown that after the death
of Moses no one man wielded all the power of a sovereign; as affairs
were not all managed by one man, nor by a single council, nor by
the popular vote, but partly by one tribe, partly by the rest in
equal shares, it is most evident that the government, after the
death of Moses, was neither monarchic, nor aristocratic, nor popular,
but, as we have said, Theocratic. (104) The reasons for applying
this name are:

I. (17:105) Because the royal seat of government was the Temple,
and in respect to it alone, as we have shown, all the tribes
were fellow-citizens,

II. (17:106) Because all the people owed allegiance to God,
their supreme Judge, to whom only they had promised
implicit obedience in all things.

III. (17:107) Because the general-in-chief or dictator, when
there was need of such, was elected by none save God alone.

(108) This was expressly commanded by Moses in the name
of God (Deut. xix:15), and witnessed by the actual choice
of Gideon, of Samson, and of Samuel; wherefrom we may
conclude that the other faithful leaders were chosen in
the same manner, though it is not expressly told us.

(17:109) These preliminaries being stated, it is now time to
inquire the effects of forming a dominion on this plan, and to
see whether it so effectually kept within bounds both rulers
and ruled, that the former were never tyrannical and the
latter never rebellious.

(17:110) Those who administer or possess governing power, always
try to surround their high-handed actions with a cloak of legality,
and to persuade the people that they act from good motives;
this they are easily able to effect when they are the sole
interpreters of the law; for it is evident that they are thus
able to assume a far greater freedom to carry out their wishes
and desires than if the interpretation if the law is vested in
someone else, or if the laws were so self-evident that no one
could be in doubt as to their meaning. [17:8] (111) We thus see
that the power of evil-doing was greatly curtailed for the Hebrew
captains by the fact that the whole interpretation of the law was
vested in the Levites (Deut. xxi:5), who, on their part, had no
share in the government, and depended for all their support and
consideration on a correct interpretation of the laws entrusted
to them. (17:112) Moreover, the whole people was commanded to come
together at a certain place every seven years and be instructed
in the law by the high-priest; further, each individual was bidden
to read the book of the law through and through continually with
scrupulous care. (Deut. xxxi:9, 10, and vi:7.) (113) The captains
were thus for their own sakes bound to take great care to administer
everything according to the laws laid down, and well known to all,
if they wished to be held in high honour by the people, who would
regard them as the administrators of God’s dominion, and as God’s
vicegerents; otherwise they could not have escaped all the
virulence of theological hatred. (114) There was another very
important check on the unbridled license of the captains, in the
fact, that the army was formed from the whole body of the
citizens, between the ages of twenty and sixty, without exception,
and that the captains were not able to hire any foreign soldiery.

(17:115) This I say was very important, for it is well known that
princes can oppress their peoples with the single aid of the
soldiery in their pay; while there is nothing more formidable to
them than the freedom of citizen soldiers, who have established
the freedom and glory of their country by their valour, their
toil, and their blood. (116) Thus Alexander, when he was about
to make war on Darius, a second time, after hearing the advice of

Parmenio, did not chide him who gave the advice, but Polysperchon,
who was standing by. (17:117) For, as Curtius says (iv. Para. 13),
he did not venture to reproach Parmenio again after having shortly
before reproved him too sharply. (118) This freedom of the

Macedonians, which he so dreaded, he was not able to subdue till
after the number of captives enlisted in the army surpassed that
of his own people: then, but not till then, he gave rein to his
anger so long checked by the independence of his chief
fellow-countrymen.

(17:119) If this independence of citizen soldiers can restrain
the princes of ordinary states who are wont to usurp the whole
glory of victories, it must have been still more effectual
against the Hebrew captains, whose soldiers were fighting, not
for the glory of a prince, but for the glory of God, and who did
not go forth to battle till the Divine assent had been given.

(17:120) We must also remember that the Hebrew captains were
associated only by the bonds of religion: therefore, if any one
of them had transgressed, and begun to violate the Divine right,
he might have been treated by the rest as an enemy and
lawfully subdued.

(17:121) An additional check may be found in the fear of a new
prophet arising, for if a man of unblemished life could show by
certain signs that he was really a prophet, he ipso facto obtained
the sovereign right to rule, which was given to him, as to Moses
formerly, in the name of God, as revealed to himself alone;
not merely through the high priest, as in the case of the captains.

(17:122) There is no doubt that such an one would easily be able
to enlist an oppressed people in his cause, and by trifling signs
persuade them of anything he wished: on the other hand, if affairs
were well ordered, the captain would be able to make provision in
time; that the prophet should be submitted to his approval, and be
examined whether he were really of unblemished life, and possessed
indisputable signs of his mission: also, whether the teaching he
proposed to set forth in the name of the Lord agreed with received
doctrines, and the general laws of the country; if his credentials
were insufficient, or his doctrines new, he could lawfully be put
to death, or else received on the captain’s sole responsibility and
authority.

(17:123) Again, the captains were not superior to the others in
nobility or birth, but only administered the government in virtue
of their age and personal qualities. (124) Lastly, neither captains
nor army had any reason for preferring war to peace. (125) The army,
as we have stated, consisted entirely of citizens, so that affairs
were managed by the same persons both in peace and war. (126) The
man who was a soldier in the camp was a citizen in the market-place,
he who was a leader in the camp was a judge in the law courts, he who
was a general in the camp was a ruler in the state. (127) Thus no
one could desire war for its own sake, but only for the sake of
preserving peace and liberty; possibly the captains avoided change
as far as possible, so as not to be obliged to consult the high
priest and submit to the indignity of standing in his presence.

(17:128) So much for the precautions for keeping the captains
within bounds. [17:9] (129) We must now look for the restraints
upon the people: these, however, are very clearly indicated in
the very groundwork of the social fabric.

(17:130) Anyone who gives the subject the slightest attention,
will see that the state was so ordered as to inspire the most
ardent patriotism in the hearts of the citizens, so that the
latter would be very hard to persuade to betray their country,
and be ready to endure anything rather than submit to a foreign
yoke. (17:131) After they had transferred their right to God,
they thought that their kingdom belonged to God, and that they
themselves were God’s children. (132) Other nations they looked
upon as God’s enemies, and regarded with intense hatred (which
they took to be piety, see Psalm cxxxix:21, 22): nothing would
have been more abhorrent to them than swearing allegiance to a
foreigner, and promising him obedience: nor could they conceive
any greater or more execrable crime than the betrayal of their
country, the kingdom of the God whom they adored.

(17:133) It was considered wicked for anyone to settle outside of
the country, inasmuch as the worship of God by which they were
bound could not be carried on elsewhere: their own land alone
was considered holy, the rest of the earth unclean and profane.

(17:134) David, who was forced to live in exile, complained before

Saul as follows: “But if they be the children of men who have
stirred thee up against me, cursed be they before the Lord; for
they have driven me out this day from abiding in the inheritance
of the Lord, saying, Go, serve other gods.” (I Sam. xxvi:19.)

(17:135) For the same reason no citizen, as we should especially
remark, was ever sent into exile: he who sinned was liable to
punishment, but not to disgrace.

(17:136) Thus the love of the Hebrews for their country was not
only patriotism, but also piety, and was cherished and nurtured by
daily rites till, like their hatred of other nations, it must have
passed into their nature. (17:137) Their daily worship was not only
different from that of other nations (as it might well be,
considering that they were a peculiar people and entirely apart
from the rest), it was absolutely contrary. (138) Such daily
reprobation naturally gave rise to a lasting hatred, deeply
implanted in the heart: for of all hatreds none is more deep and
tenacious than that which springs from extreme devoutness or piety,
and is itself cherished as pious. (139) Nor was a general cause
lacking for inflaming such hatred more and more, inasmuch as it was
reciprocated; the surrounding nations regarding the Jews with a
hatred just as intense.

(17:140) How great was the effect of all these causes, namely,
freedom from man’s dominion; devotion to their country;
rights over all other men; a hatred not only permitted but pious;
a contempt for their fellow-men; the singularity of their
customs and religious rites; the effect, I repeat, of all these
causes in strengthening the hearts of the Jews to bear all things
for their country, with extraordinary constancy and valour, will
at once be discerned by reason and attested by experience.

(17:141) Never, so long as the city was standing, could they
endure to remain under foreign dominion; and therefore they called

Jerusalem “a rebellious city” (Ezra iv:12). (17:142) Their state
after its reestablishment (which was a mere shadow of the first,
for the high priests had usurped the rights of the tribal captains)

was, with great difficulty, destroyed by the Romans, as bears
witness (Hist. ii:4):- “Vespasian had closed the war against the

Jews, abandoning the siege of Jerusalem as an enterprise difficult
and arduous rather from the character of the people and the
obstinacy of their superstition, than from the strength left to
the besieged for meeting their necessities.” (17:143) But besides
these characteristics, which are merely ascribed by an individual
opinion, there was one feature peculiar to this state and of great
importance in retaining the affections of the citizens, and checking
all thoughts of desertion, or abandonment of the country: namely,
self-interest, the strength and life of all human action.

(17:144) This was peculiarly engaged in the Hebrew state, for
nowhere else did citizens possess their goods so securely as did
the subjects of this community, for the latter possessed as large
a share in the land and the fields as did their chiefs, and were
owners of their plots of ground in perpetuity; for if any man was
compelled by poverty to sell his farm or his pasture, he received
it back again intact at the year of jubilee: there were other similar
enactments against the possibility of alienating real property.

(17:145) Again, poverty was nowhere more endurable than in a
country where duty towards one’s neighbour, that is, one’s
fellow-citizen, was practised with the utmost piety, as a means
of gaining the favour of God the King. (146) Thus the Hebrew
citizens would nowhere be so well off as in their own country;
outside its limits they met with nothing but loss and disgrace.

(17:147) The following considerations were of weight, not only
in keeping them at home, but also in preventing civil war and
removing causes of strife; no one was bound to serve his equal,
but only to serve God, while charity and love towards
fellow-citizens was accounted the highest piety; this last
feeling was not a little fostered by the general hatred with
which they regarded foreign nations and were regarded by them.

(17:148) Furthermore, the strict discipline of obedience in which
they were brought up, was a very important factor; for they were
bound to carry on all their actions according to the set rules of
the law: a man might not plough when he liked, but only at certain
times, in certain years, and with one sort of beast at a time; so
too, he might only sow and reap in a certain method and season -
in fact, his whole life was one long school of obedience (see

Chap. V. on the use of ceremonies); such a habit was thus
engendered, that conformity seemed freedom instead of servitude,
and men desired what was commanded rather than what was forbidden.

(17:149) This result was not a little aided by the fact that the
people were bound, at certain seasons of the year, to give
themselves up to rest and rejoicing, not for their own pleasure,
but in order that they might worship God cheerfully.

(17:150) Three times in the year they feasted before the Lord;
on the seventh day of every week they were bidden to abstain from
all work and to rest; besides these, there were other occasions
when innocent rejoicing and feasting were not only allowed but
enjoined. (151) I do not think any better means of influencing
men’s minds could be devised; for there is no more powerful
attraction than joy springing from devotion, a mixture of
admiration and love. (17:152) It was not easy to be wearied by
constant repetition, for the rites on the various festivals were
varied and recurred seldom. (153) We may add the deep reverence
for the Temple which all most religiously fostered, on account
of the peculiar rites and duties that they were obliged to perform
before approaching thither. (17:154) Even now, Jews cannot read
without horror of the crime of Manasseh, who dared to place an
idol in the Temple. (17:155) The laws, scrupulously preserved in the
inmost sanctuary, were objects of equal reverence to the people.

(17:156) Popular reports and misconceptions were, therefore, very
little to be feared in this quarter, for no one dared decide on
sacred matters, but all felt bound to obey, without consulting
their reason, all the commands given by the answers of God received
in the Temple, and all the laws which God had ordained.

(17:157) I think I have now explained clearly, though briefly,
the main features of the Hebrew commonwealth. (158) I must now
inquire into the causes which led the people so often to fall
away from the law, which brought about their frequent subjection,
and, finally, the complete destruction of their dominion.

(17:159) Perhaps I shall be told that it sprang from their
hardness of heart; but this is childish, for why should this
people be more hard of heart than others; was it by nature?

[17:A] (160) But nature forms individuals, not peoples;
the latter are only distinguishable by the difference of
their language, their customs, and their laws; while from
the two last - i.e., customs and laws, - it may arise that
they have a peculiar disposition, a peculiar manner of life,
and peculiar prejudices. (161) If, then, the Hebrews were
harder of heart than other nations, the fault