A Theologico-Political Treatise Pt 2
Author: Unknown
Date: 0101-01-01T00:00:00+00:00

A THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE

Part 2 of 4 - Chapters VI to X

Published 1670 anonymously

Baruch Spinoza

1632 - 1677

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“A Theologico-Political Treatise”, and “A Political

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[6:0] Chapter VI

[7:0] Chapter VII

[8:0] Chapter VIII

[9:0] Chapter IX

[10:0] Chapter X

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[6:0] CHAPTER VI - Of Miracles.

[6:1] Confused ideas of the vulgar on the subject.

[6:2] Miracle in the sense of a contravention of
natural laws an absurdity.

[6:3] In the sense of an event, whose cause is unknown,
less edifying than an event better understood.

[6:4] God’s providence identical with the course of nature.

[6:5] How Scripture miracles may be interpreted.

[7:0] CHAPTER VII - Of the Interpretation of Scripture.

[7:1] Current systems of interpretation erroneous.

[7:2] Only true system to interpret it by itself.

[7:3] Reasons why this system cannot now be carried
out in its entirety.

[7:4] Yet these difficulties do not interfere with our
understanding the plainest and most important
passages.

[7:5] Rival systems examined - that of a supernatural
faculty being necessary - refuted.

[7:6] That of Maimonides.

[7:7] Refuted.

[7:8] Traditions of the Pharisees and the Papists rejected.

[8:0] CHAPTER VIII. - Of the authorship of the Pentateuch,
and the other historical books of the Old Testament.

[8:1] The Pentateuch not written by Moses.

[8:2] His actual writings distinct.

[8:3] Traces of late authorship in the other historical books.

[8:4] All the historical books the work of one man.

[8:5] Probably Ezra.

[8:6] Who compiled first the book of Deuteronomy.

[8:7] And then a history, distinguishing the books by
the names of their subjects.

[9:0] CHAPTER IX. - Other questions about these books.

[9:1] That these books have not been thoroughly
revised and made to agree.

[9:2] That there are many doubtful readings.

[9:3] That the existing marginal notes are often such.

[9:4] The other explanations of these notes refuted.

[9:5] The hiatus.

[10:0] CHAPTER X.- An Examination of the remaining books of
the Old Testament according to the preceding method.

[10:1] Chronicles, Psalms, Proverbs.

[10:2] Isaiah, Jeremiah.

[10:3] Ezekiel, Hosea.

[10:4] Other prophets, Jonah, Job.

[10:5] Daniel, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther.

[10:6] The author declines to undertake a similar detailed
examination of the New Testament.

[Author’s Endnotes] to the Treatise

–––––––––––––––––––––––––-

[6:0] CHAPTER VI. - OF MIRACLES.

(6:1) As men are accustomed to call Divine the knowledge which
transcends human understanding, so also do they style Divine,
or the work of God, anything of which the cause is not generally
known: for the masses think that the power and providence of

God are most clearly displayed by events that are extraordinary
and contrary to the conception they have formed of nature,
especially if such events bring them any profit or convenience:

they think that the clearest possible proof of God’s existence
is afforded when nature, as they suppose, breaks her accustomed
order, and consequently they believe that those who explain or
endeavour to understand phenomena or miracles through their
natural causes are doing away with God and His providence.

(6:2) They suppose, forsooth, that God is inactive so long as
nature works in her accustomed order, and vice versa, that the
power of nature and natural causes are idle so long as God is
acting: thus they imagine two powers distinct one from the other,
the power of God and the power of nature, though the latter is
in a sense determined by God, or (as most people believe now)

created by Him. (3) What they mean by either, and what they
understand by God and nature they do not know, except that
they imagine the power of God to be like that of some royal
potentate, and nature’s power to consist in force and energy.

[6:1] (4) The masses then style unusual phenomena, “miracles,”

and partly from piety, partly for the sake of opposing the
students of science, prefer to remain in ignorance of natural
causes, and only to hear of those things which they know least,
and consequently admire most. (5) In fact, the common people
can only adore God, and refer all things to His power by
removing natural causes, and conceiving things happening out
of their due course, and only admires the power of God when
the power of nature is conceived of as in subjection to it.

(6:6) This idea seems to have taken its rise among the early

Jews who saw the Gentiles round them worshipping visible gods
such as the sun, the moon, the earth, water, air, &c., and in
order to inspire the conviction that such divinities were weak
and inconstant, or changeable, told how they themselves were
under the sway of an invisible God, and narrated their miracles,
trying further to show that the God whom they worshipped
arranged the whole of nature for their sole benefit: this idea
was so pleasing to humanity that men go on to this day
imagining miracles, so that they may believe themselves God’s
favourites, and the final cause for which God created and
directs all things.

(6:7) What pretension will not people in their folly advance!

(8) They have no single sound idea concerning either God or
nature, they confound God’s decrees with human decrees, they
conceive nature as so limited that they believe man to be its
chief part! (9) I have spent enough space in setting forth
these common ideas and prejudices concerning nature and
miracles, but in order to afford a regular demonstration I
will show -

[6:2]

I. (6:10) That nature cannot be contravened, but
that she preserves a fixed and immutable order,
and at the same time I will explain what is
meant by a miracle.

II. (6:11) II. That God’s nature and existence, and
consequently His providence cannot be known from
miracles, the fixed and immutable order of nature.

III. (6:12) That by the decrees and volitions, and
consequently the providence of God, Scripture

(as I will prove by Scriptural examples) means
nothing but nature’s order following necessarily
from her eternal laws.

IV. (6:13) Lastly, I will treat of the method of
interpreting Scriptural miracles, and the chief
points to be noted concerning the narratives of them.

(6:14) Such are the principal subjects which will be discussed in
this chapter, and which will serve, I think, not a little to
further the object of this treatise. (15) Our first point is
easily proved from what we showed in Chap. IV. (I:[4:2] ) about Divine
law - namely, that all that God wishes or determines involves eternal
necessity and truth, for we demonstrated that God’s understanding
is identical with His will, and that it is the same thing to say
that God wills a thing, as to say that He understands it; hence,
as it follows necessarily from the Divine nature and perfection
that God understands a thing as it is, it follows no less
necessarily that He wills it as it is. (6:16) Now, as nothing is
necessarily true save only by Divine decree, it is plain that
the universal laws of nature are decrees of God following from
the necessity and perfection of the Divine nature. (17) Hence,
any event happening in nature which contravened nature’s universal
laws, would necessarily also contravene the Divine decree, nature,
and understanding; or if anyone asserted that God acts in
contravention to the laws of nature, he, ipso facto, would be
compelled to assert that God acted against His own nature - an
evident absurdity. (6:18) One might easily show from the same
premises that the power and efficiency of nature are in
themselves the Divine power and efficiency, and that the Divine
power is the very essence of God, but this I gladly pass over
for the present.

(6:19) Nothing, then, comes to pass in nature (N.B. I do not mean
here by “nature,” merely matter and its modifications, but infinite
other things besides matter.) in contravention to her universal
laws, nay, everything agrees with them and follows from them, for
whatsoever comes to pass, comes to pass by the will and eternal
decree of God; that is, as we have just pointed out, whatever comes
to pass, comes to pass according to laws and rules which involve
eternal necessity and truth; nature, therefore, always observes
laws and rules which involve eternal necessity and truth, although
they may not all be known to us, and therefore she keeps a fixed
and mutable order. (6:20) Nor is there any sound reason for limiting
the power and efficacy of nature, and asserting that her laws are
fit for certain purposes, but not for all; for as the efficacy and
power of nature, are the very efficacy and power of God, and as
the laws and rules of nature are the decrees of God, it is in every
way to be believed that the power of nature is infinite, and that
her laws are broad enough to embrace everything conceived by the

Divine intellect; the only alternative is to assert that God has
created nature so weak, and has ordained for her laws so barren,
that He is repeatedly compelled to come afresh to her aid if He
wishes that she should be preserved, and that things should happen
as He desires: a conclusion, in my opinion, very far removed from
reason. (6:21) Further, as nothing happens in nature which does not
follow from her laws, and as her laws embrace everything conceived
by the Divine intellect, and lastly, as nature preserves a fixed
and immutable order; it most clearly follows that miracles are only
intelligible as in relation to human opinions, and merely mean
events of which the natural cause cannot be explained by a reference
to any ordinary occurrence, either by us, or at any rate, by the
writer and narrator of the miracle.

[6:3] (22) We may, in fact, say that a miracle is an event of
which the causes cannot be explained by the natural reason through
a reference to ascertained workings of nature; but since miracles
were wrought according to the understanding of the masses, who
are wholly ignorant of the workings of nature, it is certain
that the ancients took for a miracle whatever they could not
explain by the method adopted by the unlearned in such cases,
namely, an appeal to the memory, a recalling of something
similar, which is ordinarily regarded without wonder; for most
people think they sufficiently understand a thing when they have
ceased to wonder at it. (6:23) The ancients, then, and indeed
most men up to the present day, had no other criterion for a
miracle; hence we cannot doubt that many things are narrated
in Scripture as miracles of which the causes could easily be
explained by reference to ascertained workings of nature.

(6:24) We have hinted as much in Chap. II., in speaking of the
sun standing still in the time of Joshua, and to say on the
subject when we come to treat of the interpretation of miracles
later on in this chapter.

(6:25) It is now time to pass on to the second point, and
show that we cannot gain an understanding of God’s essence,
existence, or providence by means of miracles, but that
these truths are much better perceived through the fixed
and immutable order of nature.

(8:26) I thus proceed with the demonstration. (27) As God’s
existence is not self-evident [Endnote 6] it must necessarily
be inferred from ideas so firmly and incontrovertibly true, that
no power can be postulated or conceived sufficient to impugn them.

(6:28) They ought certainly so to appear to us when we infer from
them God’s existence, if we wish to place our conclusion beyond
the reach of doubt; for if we could conceive that such ideas could
be impugned by any power whatsoever, we should doubt of their
truth, we should doubt of our conclusion, namely, of God’s
existence, and should never be able to be certain of anything.

(6:29) Further, we know that nothing either agrees with or is
contrary to nature, unless it agrees with or is contrary to these
primary ideas; wherefore if we would conceive that anything could
be done in nature by any power whatsoever which would be contrary
to the laws of nature, it would also be contrary to our primary
ideas, and we should have either to reject it as absurd, or else
to cast doubt (as just shown) on our primary ideas, and
consequently on the existence of God, and on everything howsoever
perceived. (6:30) Therefore miracles, in the sense of events contrary
to the laws of nature, so far from demonstrating to us the existence
of God, would, on the contrary, lead us to doubt it, where,
otherwise, we might have been absolutely certain of it, as
knowing that nature follows a fixed and immutable order.

(6:31) Let us take miracle as meaning that which cannot be
explained through natural causes. (32) This may be interpreted
in two senses: either as that which has natural causes, but
cannot be examined by the human intellect; or as that which has
no cause save God and God’s will. (33) But as all things which
come to pass through natural causes, come to pass also solely
through the will and power of God, it comes to this, that a
miracle, whether it has natural causes or not, is a result which
cannot be explained by its cause, that is a phenomenon which
surpasses human understanding; but from such a phenomenon, and
certainly from a result surpassing our understanding, we can
gain no knowledge. (6:34) For whatsoever we understand clearly
and distinctly should be plain to us either in itself or by means
of something else clearly and distinctly understood; wherefore
from a miracle or a phenomenon which we cannot understand, we can
gain no knowledge of God’s essence, or existence, or indeed
anything about God or nature; whereas when we know that all things
are ordained and ratified by God, that the operations of nature
follow from the essence of God, and that the laws of nature are
eternal decrees and volitions of God, we must perforce conclude
that our knowledge of God, and of God’s will increases in
proportion to our knowledge and clear understanding of nature,
as we see how she depends on her primal cause, and how she works
according to eternal law. (6:35) Wherefore so far as our
understanding goes, those phenomena which we clearly and
distinctly understand have much better right to be called works
of God, and to be referred to the will of God than those about
which we are entirely ignorant, although they appeal powerfully
to the imagination, and compel men’s admiration.

(6:36) It is only phenomena that we clearly and distinctly
understand, which heighten our knowledge of God, and most
clearly indicate His will and decrees. (37) Plainly, they
are but triflers who, when they cannot explain a thing, run
back to the will of God; this is, truly, a ridiculous way
of expressing ignorance. (6:38) Again, even supposing that
some conclusion could be drawn from miracles, we could not
possibly infer from them the existence of God: for a miracle
being an event under limitations is the expression of a fixed
and limited power; therefore we could not possibly infer from
an effect of this kind the existence of a cause whose power
is infinite, but at the utmost only of a cause whose power is
greater than that of the said effect. (6:39) I say at the utmost,
for a phenomenon may be the result of many concurrent causes,
and its power may be less than the power of the sum of such
causes, but far greater than that of any one of them taken
individually. (6:39a) On the other hand, the laws of nature, as
we have shown, extend over infinity, and are conceived by us as,
after a fashion, eternal, and nature works in accordance with
them in a fixed and immutable order; therefore, such laws
indicate to us in a certain degree the infinity, the eternity,
and the immutability of God.

(6:40) We may conclude, then, that we cannot gain knowledge of
the existence and providence of God by means of miracles, but
that we can far better infer them from the fixed and immutable
order of nature. (41) By miracle, I here mean an event which
surpasses, or is thought to surpass, human comprehension: for
in so far as it is supposed to destroy or interrupt the order
of nature or her laws, it not only can give us no knowledge of

God, but, contrariwise, takes away that which we naturally have,
and makes us doubt of God and everything else.

(6:42) Neither do I recognize any difference between an event
against the laws of nature and an event beyond the laws of nature

(that is, according to some, an event which does not contravene
nature, though she is inadequate to produce or effect it) - for a
miracle is wrought in, and not beyond nature, though it may be
said in itself to be above nature, and, therefore, must
necessarily interrupt the order of nature, which otherwise we
conceive of as fixed and unchangeable, according to God’s decrees.

(6:43) If, therefore, anything should come to pass in nature which
does not follow from her laws, it would also be in contravention
to the order which God has established in nature for ever through
universal natural laws: it would, therefore, be in contravention
to God’s nature and laws, and, consequently, belief in it would
throw doubt upon everything, and lead to Atheism.

(6:44) I think I have now sufficiently established my second
point, so that we can again conclude that a miracle, whether in
contravention to, or beyond, nature, is a mere absurdity; and,
therefore, that what is meant in Scripture by a miracle can only
be a work of nature, which surpasses, or is believed to surpass,
human comprehension. (45) Before passing on to my third point, I
will adduce Scriptural authority for my assertion that God cannot
be known from miracles. (46) Scripture nowhere states the doctrine
openly, but it can readily be inferred from several passages.

(6:47) Firstly, that in which Moses commands (Deut. xiii.) that a
false prophet should be put to death, even though he work miracles:

“If there arise a prophet among you, and giveth thee a sign or
wonder, and the sign or wonder come to pass, saying, Let us go
after other gods … thou shalt not hearken unto the voice of
that prophet; for the Lord your God proveth you, and that prophet
shall be put to death.” (48) From this it clearly follows that
miracles could be wrought even by false prophets; and that, unless
men are honestly endowed with the true knowledge and love of God,
they may be as easily led by miracles to follow false gods as to
follow the true God; for these words are added: “For the Lord your

God tempts you, that He may know whether you love Him with all
your heart and with all your mind.”

(6:49) Further, the Israelites, from all their miracles, were
unable to form a sound conception of God, as their experience
testified: for when they had persuaded themselves that Moses
had departed from among them, they petitioned Aaron to give
them visible gods; and the idea of God they had formed as the
result of all their miracles was - a calf!

(6:50) Asaph, though he had heard of so many miracles, yet
doubted of the providence of God, and would have turned himself
from the true way, if he had not at last come to understand true
blessedness. (See Ps. lxxiii.) (51) Solomon, too, at a time
when the Jewish nation was at the height of its prosperity,
suspects that all things happen by chance. (See Eccles. iii:19,

20, 21; and chap. ix:2, 3, &c.)

(6:52) Lastly, nearly all the prophets found it very hard to
reconcile the order of nature and human affairs with the
conception they had formed of God’s providence, whereas
philosophers who endeavour to understand things by clear
conceptions of them, rather than by miracles, have always
found the task extremely easy - at least, such of them as
place true happiness solely in virtue and peace of mind, and
who aim at obeying nature, rather than being obeyed by her.

(6:53) Such persons rest assured that God directs nature
according to the requirements of universal laws, not according
to the requirements of the particular laws of human nature,
and trial, therefore, God’s scheme comprehends, not only the
human race, but the whole of nature.

(6:54) It is plain, then, from Scripture itself, that miracles
can give no knowledge of God, nor clearly teach us the providence
of God. (55) As to the frequent statements in Scripture, that

God wrought miracles to make Himself plain to man - as in

Exodus x:2, where He deceived the Egyptians, and gave signs of

Himself, that the Israelites might know that He was God,- it does
not, therefore, follow that miracles really taught this truth,
but only that the Jews held opinions which laid them easily open
to conviction by miracles. (6:56) We have shown in Chap. II. that
the reasons assigned by the prophets, or those which are formed
from revelation, are not assigned in accordance with ideas
universal and common to all, but in accordance with the accepted
doctrines, however absurd, and with the opinions of those to
whom the revelation was given, or those whom the Holy Spirit
wished to convince.

(6:57) This we have illustrated by many Scriptural instances,
and can further cite Paul, who to the Greeks was a Greek, and
to the Jews a Jew. (58) But although these miracles could
convince the Egyptians and Jews from their standpoint, they
could not give a true idea and knowledge of God, but only
cause them to admit that there was a Deity more powerful than
anything known to them, and that this Deity took special care
of the Jews, who had just then an unexpectedly happy issue of
all their affairs. (6:59) They could not teach them that God
cares equally for all, for this can be taught only by
philosophy: the Jews, and all who took their knowledge of God’s
providence from the dissimilarity of human conditions of life
and the inequalities of fortune, persuaded themselves that God
loved the Jews above all men, though they did not surpass their
fellows in true human perfection.

[6:4] (60) I now go on to my third point, and show from Scripture
that the decrees and mandates of God, and consequently His
providence, are merely the order of nature - that is, when Scripture
describes an event as accomplished by God or God’s will, we must
understand merely that it was in accordance with the law and
order of nature, not, as most people believe, that nature had
for a season ceased to act, or that her order was temporarily interrupted.

(6:61) But Scripture does not directly teach matters unconnected with its
doctrine, wherefore it has no care to explain things by their natural
causes, nor to expound matters merely speculative. (62) Wherefore our
conclusion must be gathered by inference from those Scriptural narratives
which happen to be written more at length and circumstantially than usual.

(63) Of these I will cite a few.

(6:64) In the first book of Samuel, ix:15, 16, it is related that

God revealed to Samuel that He would send Saul to him, yet God
did not send Saul to Samuel as people are wont to send one man to
another. (65) His “sending” was merely the ordinary course of
nature. (66) Saul was looking for the asses he had lost, and was
meditating a return home without them, when, at the suggestion of
his servant, he went to the prophet Samuel, to learn from him
where he might find them. (67) From no part of the narrative does
it appear that Saul had any command from God to visit Samuel beyond
this natural motive.

(6:68) In Psalm cv. 24 it is said that God changed the hearts of
the Egyptians, so that they hated the Israelites. (69) This was
evidently a natural change, as appears from Exodus, chap.i.,
where we find no slight reason for the Egyptians reducing the

Israelites to slavery.

(6:70) In Genesis ix:13, God tells Noah that He will set His
bow in the cloud; this action of God’s is but another way of
expressing the refraction and reflection which the rays of the
sun are subjected to in drops of water.

(6:71) In Psalm cxlvii:18, the natural action and warmth of the
wind, by which hoar frost and snow are melted, are styled the
word of the Lord, and in verse 15 wind and cold are called the
commandment and word of God.

(6:72) In Psalm civ:4, wind and fire are called the angels and
ministers of God, and various other passages of the same sort
are found in Scripture, clearly showing that the decree,
commandment, fiat, and word of God are merely expressions for
the action and order of nature.

(6:73) Thus it is plain that all the events narrated in Scripture
came to pass naturally, and are referred directly to God because

Scripture, as we have shown, does not aim at explaining things by
their natural causes, but only at narrating what appeals to the
popular imagination, and doing so in the manner best calculated
to excite wonder, and consequently to impress the minds of the
masses with devotion. (6:74) If, therefore, events are found in
the Bible which we cannot refer to their causes, nay, which seem
entirely to contradict the order of nature, we must not come to a
stand, but assuredly believe that whatever did really happen
happened naturally. (75) This view is confirmed by the fact that
in the case of every miracle there were many attendant
circumstances, though these were not always related, especially
where the narrative was of a poetic character.

(6:76) The circumstances of the miracles clearly show, I maintain,
that natural causes were needed. (77) For instance, in order to
infect the Egyptians with blains, it was necessary that Moses
should scatter ashes in the air (Exod. ix: 10); the locusts also
came upon the land of Egypt by a command of God in accordance with
nature, namely, by an east wind blowing for a whole day and night;
and they departed by a very strong west wind (Exod. x:14, 19).

(6:78) By a similar Divine mandate the sea opened a way for the

Jews (Exo. xiv:21), namely, by an east wind which blew very
strongly all night.

(6:79) So, too, when Elisha would revive the boy who was believed
to be dead, he was obliged to bend over him several times until
the flesh of the child waxed warm, and at last he opened his eyes

(2 Kings iv:34, 35).

(6:80) Again, in John’s Gospel (chap. ix.) certain acts are
mentioned as performed by Christ preparatory to healing the blind
man, and there are numerous other instances showing that something
further than the absolute fiat of God is required for working a
miracle.

(6:81) Wherefore we may believe that, although the circumstances
attending miracles are not related always or in full detail, yet
a miracle was never performed without them.

(6:82) This is confirmed by Exodus xiv:27, where it is simply
stated that “Moses stretched forth his hand, and the waters of
the sea returned to their strength in the morning,” no mention
being made of a wind; but in the song of Moses (Exod. xv:10) we
read, “Thou didst blow with Thy wind (i.e. with a very strong
wind), and the sea covered them.” (83) Thus the attendant
circumstance is omitted in the history, and the miracle is
thereby enhanced.

(6:84) But perhaps someone will insist that we find many things
in Scripture which seem in nowise explicable by natural causes,
as for instance, that the sins of men and their prayers can be
the cause of rain and of the earth’s fertility, or that faith
can heal the blind, and so on. (85) But I think I have already
made sufficient answer: I have shown that Scripture does not
explain things by their secondary causes, but only narrates them
in the order and the style which has most power to move men, and
especially uneducated men, to devotion; and therefore it speaks
inaccurately of God and of events, seeing that its object is not
to convince the reason, but to attract and lay hold of the
imagination. (6:86) If the Bible were to describe the destruction
of an empire in the style of political historians, the masses
would remain unstirred, whereas the contrary is the case when it
adopts the method of poetic description, and refers all things
immediately to God. (87) When, therefore, the Bible says that
the earth is barren because of men’s sins, or that the blind were
healed by faith, we ought to take no more notice than when it says
that God is angry at men’s sins, that He is sad, that He repents of
the good He has promised and done; or that on seeing a sign he
remembers something He had promised, and other similar expressions,
which are either thrown out poetically or related according to the
opinion and prejudices of the writer.

[6:5] (88) We may, then, be absolutely certain that every event
which is truly described in Scripture necessarily happened, like
everything else, according to natural laws; and if anything is
there set down which can be proved in set terms to contravene the
order of nature, or not to be deducible therefrom, we must
believe it to have been foisted into the sacred writings by
irreligious hands; for whatsoever is contrary to nature is also
contrary to reason, and whatsoever is contrary to reason is
absurd, and, ipso facto, to be rejected.

(6:89) There remain some points concerning the interpretation
of miracles to be noted, or rather to be recapitulated, for most
of them have been already stated. (90) These I proceed to discuss
in the fourth division of my subject, and I am led to do so lest
anyone should, by wrongly interpreting a miracle, rashly suspect
that he has found something in Scripture contrary to human reason.

(6:91) It is very rare for men to relate an event simply as it
happened, without adding any element of their own judgment.

(92) When they see or hear anything new, they are, unless strictly
on their guard, so occupied with their own preconceived opinions
that they perceive something quite different from the plain facts
seen or heard, especially if such facts surpass the comprehension
of the beholder or hearer, and, most of all, if he is interested
in their happening in a given way.

(6:93) Thus men relate in chronicles and histories their own
opinions rather than actual events, so that one and the same
event is so differently related by two men of different opinions,
that it seems like two separate occurrences; and, further, it is
very easy from historical chronicles to gather the personal
opinions of the historian.

(6:94) I could cite many instances in proof of this from the
writings both of natural philosophers and historians, but I will
content myself with one only from Scripture, and leave the reader
to judge of the rest.

(6:95) In the time of Joshua the Hebrews held the ordinary opinion
that the sun moves with a daily motion, and that the earth remains
at rest; to this preconceived opinion they adapted the miracle
which occurred during their battle with the five kings. (96) They
did not simply relate that that day was longer than usual, but
asserted that the sun and moon stood still, or ceased from their
motion - a statement which would be of great service to them at
that time in convincing and proving by experience to the Gentiles,
who worshipped the sun, that the sun was under the control of
another deity who could compel it to change its daily course.

(6:97) Thus, partly through religious motives, partly through
preconceived opinions, they conceived of and related the occurrence
as something quite different from what really happened.

(6:98) Thus in order to interpret the Scriptural miracles and
understand from the narration of them how they really happened,
it is necessary to know the opinions of those who first related
them, and have recorded them for us in writing, and to distinguish
such opinions from the actual impression made upon their senses,
otherwise we shall confound opinions and judgments with the
actual miracle as it really occurred: nay, further, we shall
confound actual events with symbolical and imaginary ones.

(6:99) For many things are narrated in Scripture as real, and
were believed to be real, which were in fact only symbolical
and imaginary. (100) As, for instance, that God came down from
heaven (Exod. xix:28, Deut. v:28), and that Mount Sinai smoked
because God descended upon it surrounded with fire; or, again
that Elijah ascended into heaven in a chariot of fire, with horses
of fire; all these things were assuredly merely symbols adapted
to the opinions of those who have handed them down to us as they
were represented to them, namely, as real. (101) All who have any
education know that God has no right hand nor left; that He is
not moved nor at rest, nor in a particular place, but that He is
absolutely infinite and contains in Himself all perfections.

(6:102) These things, I repeat, are known to whoever judges of
things by the perception of pure reason, and not according as his
imagination is affected by his outward senses. (103) Following
the example of the masses who imagine a bodily Deity, holding a
royal court with a throne on the convexity of heaven, above the
stars, which are believed to be not very far off from the earth.

(6:104) To these and similar opinions very many narrations in

Scripture are adapted, and should not, therefore, be mistaken
by philosophers for realities.

(6:105) Lastly, in order to understand, in the case of miracles,
what actually took place, we ought to be familiar with Jewish
phrases and metaphors; anyone who did not make sufficient
allowance for these, would be continually seeing miracles in

Scripture where nothing of the kind is intended by the writer;
he would thus miss the knowledge not only of what actually
happened, but also of the mind of the writers of the sacred text.

(6:106) For instance, Zechariah speaking of some future war says

(chap. xiv;7): “It shall be one day which shall be known to the

Lord, not day nor night; but at even time it shall be light.”

(106a) In these words he seems to predict a great miracle, yet
he only means that the battle will be doubtful the whole day,
that the issue will be known only to God, but that in the evening
they will gain the victory: the prophets frequently used to
predict victories and defeats of the nations in similar phrases.

(6:107) Thus Isaiah, describing the destruction of Babylon, says

(chap. xiii.): “The stars of heaven, and the constellations
thereof, shall not give their light; the sun shall be darkened
in his going forth, and the moon shall not cause her light to
shine.” (108) Now I suppose no one imagines that at the
destruction of Babylon these phenomena actually occurred any
more than that which the prophet adds, “For I will make the
heavens to tremble, and remove the earth out of her place.”

(6:109) So, too, Isaiah in foretelling to the Jews that they would
return from Babylon to Jerusalem in safety, and would not suffer
from thirst on their journey, says: “And they thirsted not when

He led them through the deserts; He caused the waters to flow out
of the rocks for them; He clave the rocks, and the waters gushed
out.” (110) These words merely mean that the Jews, like other
people, found springs in the desert, at which they quenched their
thirst; for when the Jews returned to Jerusalem with the consent
of Cyrus, it is admitted that no similar miracles befell them.

(6:111) In this way many occurrences in the Bible are to be
regarded merely as Jewish expressions. (112) There is no need
for me to go through them in detail; but I will call attention
generally to the fact that the Jews employed such phrases not
only rhetorically, but also, and indeed chiefly, from devotional
motives. (113) Such is the reason for the substitution of

“bless God” for “curse God” in 1 Kings xxi:10, and Job ii:9,
and for all things being referred to God, whence it appears
that the Bible seems to relate nothing but miracles, even when
speaking of the most ordinary occurrences, as in the examples
given above.

(6:114) Hence we must believe that when the Bible says that the

Lord hardened Pharaoh’s heart, it only means that Pharaoh was
obstinate; when it says that God opened the windows of heaven,
it only means that it rained very hard, and so on. (115) When
we reflect on these peculiarities, and also on the fact that
most things are related very shortly, with very little details
and almost in abridgments, we shall see that there is hardly
anything in Scripture which can be proved contrary to natural
reason, while, on the other hand, many things which before
seemed obscure, will after a little consideration be understood
and easily explained.

(6:116) I think I have now very clearly explained all that I
proposed to explain, but before I finish this chapter I would
call attention to the fact that I have adopted a different
method in speaking of miracles to that which I employed in
treating of prophecy. (117) Of prophecy I have asserted
nothing which could not be inferred from promises revealed
in Scripture, whereas in this chapter I have deduced my
conclusions solely from the principles ascertained by the
natural light of reason. (6:118) I have proceeded in this
way advisedly, for prophecy, in that it surpasses human
knowledge, is a purely theological question; therefore,

I knew that I could not make any assertions about it, nor
learn wherein it consists, except through deductions from
premises that have been revealed; therefore I was compelled
to collate the history of prophecy, and to draw therefrom
certain conclusions which would teach me, in so far as such
teaching is possible, the nature and properties of the gift.

(6:119) But in the case of miracles, as our inquiry is a
question purely philosophical (namely, whether anything can
happen which contravenes, or does not follow from the laws of
nature), I was not under any such necessity: I therefore
thought it wiser to unravel the difficulty through premises
ascertained and thoroughly known by the natural light of reason.

(119a) I say I thought it wiser, for I could also easily have
solved the problem merely from the doctrines and fundamental
principles of Scripture: in order that everyone may acknowledge
this, I will briefly show how it could be done.

(6:120) Scripture makes the general assertion in several passages
that nature’s course is fixed and unchangeable. (121) In

Ps. cxlviii:6, for instance, and Jer. xxxi:35. (122) The wise
man also, in Eccles. i:10, distinctly teaches that “there is
nothing new under the sun,” and in verses 11, 12, illustrating
the same idea, he adds that although something occasionally
happens which seems new, it is not really new, but “hath been
already of old time, which was before us, whereof there is no
remembrance, neither shall there be any remembrance of things
that are to come with those that come after.” (123) Again in
chap. iii:11, he says, “God hath made everything beautiful in
his time,” and immediately afterwards adds, “I know that
whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever; nothing can be put
to it, nor anything taken from it.”

(6:124) Now all these texts teach most distinctly that nature
preserves a fixed and unchangeable order, and that God in all
ages, known and unknown, has been the same; further, that the
laws of nature are so perfect, that nothing can be added thereto
nor taken therefrom; and, lastly, that miracles only appear as
something new because of man’s ignorance.

(6:125) Such is the express teaching of Scripture: nowhere does

Scripture assert that anything happens which contradicts, or
cannot follow from the laws of nature; and, therefore, we should
not attribute to it such a doctrine.

(6:126) To these considerations we must add, that miracles require
causes and attendant circumstances, and that they follow, not from
some mysterious royal power which the masses attribute to God, but
from the Divine rule and decree, that is (as we have shown from

Scripture itself) from the laws and order of nature; lastly, that
miracles can be wrought even by false prophets, as is proved from

Deut. xiii. and Matt. xxiv:24.

(6:127) The conclusion, then, that is most plainly put before us is,
that miracles were natural occurrences, and must therefore be so
explained as to appear neither new (in the words of Solomon) nor
contrary to nature, but, as far as possible, in complete agreement
with ordinary events. (128) This can easily be done by anyone,
now that I have set forth the rules drawn from Scripture.

(6:129) Nevertheless, though I maintain that Scripture teaches
this doctrine, I do not assert that it teaches it as a truth
necessary to salvation, but only that the prophets were in
agreement with ourselves on the point; therefore everyone
is free to think on the subject as he likes, according as he
thinks it best for himself, and most likely to conduce to the
worship of God and to singlehearted religion.

(6:130) This is also the opinion of Josephus, for at the conclusion
of the second book of his “Antiquities,” he writes: Let no man
think this story incredible of the sea’s dividing to save these
people, for we find it in ancient records that this hath been seen
before, whether by God’s extraordinary will or by the course of
nature it is indifferent. (6:131) The same thing happened one time
to the Macedonians, under the command of Alexander, when for want
of another passage the Pamphylian Sea divided to make them way;

God’s Providence making use of Alexander at that time as His
instrument for destroying the Persian Empire. (132) This is
attested by all the historians who have pretended to write the

Life of that Prince. (133) But people are at liberty to think what
they please.”

(6:134) Such are the words of Josephus, and such is his opinion
on faith in miracles.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––-

[7:0] CHAPTER VII. - OF THE INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE

(7:1) When people declare, as all are ready to do, that the Bible
is the Word of God teaching man true blessedness and the way of
salvation, they evidently do not mean what they say; for the masses
take no pains at all to live according to Scripture, and we see most
people endeavouring to hawk about their own commentaries as the word
of God, and giving their best efforts, under the guise of religion,
to compelling others to think as they do: we generally see, I say,
theologians anxious to learn how to wring their inventions and
sayings out of the sacred text, and to fortify them with Divine
authority. [7:1] (2) Such persons never display less scruple or
more zeal than when they are interpreting Scripture or the mind
of the Holy Ghost; if we ever see them perturbed, it is not that
they fear to attribute some error to the Holy Spirit, and to stray
from the right path, but that they are afraid to be convicted of
error by others, and thus to overthrow and bring into contempt
their own authority. (3) But if men really believed what they
verbally testify of Scripture, they would adopt quite a different
plan of life: their minds would not be agitated by so many
contentions, nor so many hatreds, and they would cease to be excited
by such a blind and rash passion for interpreting the sacred writings,
and excogitating novelties in religion. (7:4) On the contrary, they
would not dare to adopt, as the teaching of Scripture, anything
which they could not plainly deduce therefrom: lastly, those
sacrilegious persons who have dared, in several passages,
to interpolate the Bible, would have shrunk from so great a
crime, and would have stayed their sacrilegious hands.

(7:5) Ambition and unscrupulousness have waxed so powerful, that
religion is thought to consist, not so much in respecting the
writings of the Holy Ghost, as in defending human commentaries,
so that religion is no longer identified with charity, but with
spreading discord and propagating insensate hatred disguised
under the name of zeal for the Lord, and eager ardour.

(7:6) To these evils we must add superstition, which teaches men
to despise reason and nature, and only to admire and venerate that
which is repugnant to both: whence it is not wonderful that for
the sake of increasing the admiration and veneration felt for

Scripture, men strive to explain it so as to make it appear to
contradict, as far as possible, both one and the other: thus they
dream that most profound mysteries lie hid in the Bible, and weary
themselves out in the investigation of these absurdities, to the
neglect of what is useful. (7:7) Every result of their diseased
imagination they attribute to the Holy Ghost, and strive to defend
with the utmost zeal and passion; for it is an observed fact that
men employ their reason to defend conclusions arrived at by reason,
but conclusions arrived at by the passions are defended by the
passions.

(7:8) If we would separate ourselves from the crowd and escape
from theological prejudices, instead of rashly accepting human
commentaries for Divine documents, we must consider the true
method of interpreting Scripture and dwell upon it at some length:

for if we remain in ignorance of this we cannot know, certainly,
what the Bible and the Holy Spirit wish to teach.

(7:9)I may sum up the matter by saying that the method of
interpreting Scripture does not widely differ from the method of
interpreting nature - in fact, it is almost the same. (10) For as
the interpretation of nature consists in the examination of the
history of nature, and therefrom deducing definitions of natural
phenomena on certain fixed axioms, so Scriptural interpretation
proceeds by the examination of Scripture, and inferring the
intention of its authors as a legitimate conclusion from its
fundamental principles. (7:11) By working in this manner everyone
will always advance without danger of error - that is, if they
admit no principles for interpreting Scripture, and discussing
its contents save such as they find in Scripture itself - and will
be able with equal security to discuss what surpasses our
understanding, and what is known by the natural light of reason.

[7:2] (12) In order to make clear that such a method is not only
correct, but is also the only one advisable, and that it agrees
with that employed in interpreting nature, I must remark that

Scripture very often treats of matters which cannot be deduced
from principles known to reason: for it is chiefly made up of
narratives and revelation: the narratives generally contain
miracles - that is, as we have shown in the last chapter,
relations of extraordinary natural occurrences adapted to the
opinions and judgment of the historians who recorded them:

the revelations also were adapted to the opinions of the prophets,
as we showed in Chap. II., and in themselves surpassed human
comprehension. (7:13) Therefore the knowledge of all these -
that is, of nearly the whole contents of Scripture, must be sought
from Scripture alone, even as the knowledge of nature is sought
from nature. (14) As for the moral doctrines which are also
contained in the Bible, they may be demonstrated from received
axioms, but we cannot prove in the same manner that Scripture
intended to teach them, this can only be learned from Scripture
itself.

(7:15) If we would bear unprejudiced witness to the Divine origin
of Scripture, we must prove solely on its own authority that it
teaches true moral doctrines, for by such means alone can its

Divine origin be demonstrated: we have shown that the certitude
of the prophets depended chiefly on their having minds turned
towards what is just and good, therefore we ought to have proof
of their possessing this quality before we repose faith in them.

(7:16) From miracles God’s divinity cannot be proved, as I have
already shown, and need not now repeat, for miracles could be
wrought by false prophets. (17) Wherefore the Divine origin of

Scripture must consist solely in its teaching true virtue.

(7:18) But we must come to our conclusion simply on Scriptural
grounds, for if we were unable to do so we could not, unless
strongly prejudiced accept the Bible and bear witness to its

Divine origin.

(7:19) Our knowledge of Scripture must then be looked for in

Scripture only.

(7:20) Lastly, Scripture does not give us definition of things
any more than nature does: therefore, such definitions must be
sought in the latter case from the diverse workings of nature;
in the former case, from the various narratives about the given
subject which occur in the Bible.

(7:21) The universal rule, then, in interpreting Scripture is
to accept nothing as an authoritative Scriptural statement which
we do not perceive very clearly when we examine it in the light
of its history. (22) What I mean by its history, and what should
be the chief points elucidated, I will now explain.

(7:23) The history of a Scriptural statement comprises -

(7:23a) I. The nature and properties of the language in which the
books of the Bible were written, and in which their authors were,
accustomed to speak. (24) We shall thus be able to investigate
every expression by comparison with common conversational usages.

(7:25) Now all the writers both of the Old Testament and the New
were Hebrews: therefore, a knowledge of the Hebrew language
is before all things necessary, not only for the comprehension
of the Old Testament, which was written in that tongue, but also
of the New: for although the latter was published in other
languages, yet its characteristics are Hebrew.

(7:26) II. An analysis of each book and arrangement of its contents
under heads; so that we may have at hand the various texts which
treat of a given subject. (27) Lastly, a note of all the passages
which are ambiguous or obscure, or which seem mutually contradictory.

(7:28) I call passages clear or obscure according as their meaning
is inferred easily or with difficulty in relation to the context,
not according as their truth is perceived easily or the reverse by
reason. (29) We are at work not on the truth of passages, but
solely on their meaning. (30) We must take especial care, when we
are in search of the meaning of a text, not to be led away by our
reason in so far as it is founded on principles of natural knowledge

(to say nothing of prejudices): in order not to confound the meaning
of a passage with its truth, we must examine it solely by means of
the signification of the words, or by a reason acknowledging no
foundation but Scripture.

(7:31) I will illustrate my meaning by an example. (32) The words
of Moses, “God is a fire” and “God is jealous,” are perfectly clear
so long as we regard merely the signification of the words, and I
therefore reckon them among the clear passages, though in relation
to reason and truth they are most obscure: still, although the
literal meaning is repugnant to the natural light of reason,
nevertheless, if it cannot be clearly overruled on grounds and
principles derived from its Scriptural “history,” it, that is, the
literal meaning, must be the one retained: and contrariwise if these
passages literally interpreted are found to clash with principles
derived from Scripture, though such literal interpretation were in
absolute harmony with reason, they must be interpreted in a different
manner, i.e. metaphorically.

(7:33) If we would know whether Moses believed God to be a fire or
not, we must on no account decide the question on grounds of the
reasonableness or the reverse of such an opinion, but must judge
solely by the other opinions of Moses which are on record.

(7:34) In the present instance, as Moses says in several passages
that God has no likeness to any visible thing, whether in heaven
or in earth, or in the water, either all such passages must be
taken metaphorically, or else the one before us must be so
explained. (35) However, as we should depart as little as
possible from the literal sense, we must first ask whether this
text, God is a fire, admits of any but the literal meaning - that
is, whether the word fire ever means anything besides ordinary
natural fire. {7:36) If no such second meaning can be found, the
text must be taken literally, however repugnant to reason it may
be: and all the other passages, though in complete accordance with
reason, must be brought into harmony with it. (37) If the verbal
expressions would not admit of being thus harmonized, we should
have to set them down as irreconcilable, and suspend our judgment
concerning them. (38) However, as we find the name fire applied to
anger and jealousy (see Job xxxi:12) we can thus easily reconcile
the words of Moses, and legitimately conclude that the two
propositions God is a fire, and God is jealous, are in meaning
identical.

(7:39) Further, as Moses clearly teaches that God is jealous, and
nowhere states that God is without passions or emotions, we must
evidently infer that Moses held this doctrine himself, or at any
rate, that he wished to teach it, nor must we refrain because
such a belief seems contrary to reason: for as we have shown, we
cannot wrest the meaning of texts to suit the dictates of our
reason, or our preconceived opinions. (40) The whole knowledge
of the Bible must be sought solely from itself.

(7:41) III. Lastly, such a history should relate the environment of
all the prophetic books extant; that is, the life, the conduct,
and the studies of the author of each book, who he was, what was
the occasion, and the epoch of his writing, whom did he write for,
and in what language. (42) Further, it should inquire into the
fate of each book: how it was first received, into whose hands it
fell, how many different versions there were of it, by whose
advice was it received into the Bible, and, lastly, how all the
books now universally accepted as sacred, were united into a single
whole.

(7:43) All such information should, as I have said, be contained
in the “history” of Scripture. (44) For, in order to know what
statements are set forth as laws, and what as moral precepts, it
is important to be acquainted with the life, the conduct, and the
pursuits of their author: moreover, it becomes easier to explain
a man’s writings in proportion as we have more intimate knowledge
of his genius and temperament.

(7:45) Further, that we may not confound precepts which are eternal
with those which served only a temporary purpose, or were only meant
for a few, we should know what was the occasion, the time, the age,
in which each book was written, and to what nation it was addressed.

(7:46) Lastly, we should have knowledge on the other points I have
mentioned, in order to be sure, in addition to the authenticity of
the work, that it has not been tampered with by sacrilegious hands,
or whether errors can have crept in, and, if so, whether they have
been corrected by men sufficiently skilled and worthy of credence.

(7:47) All these things should be known, that we may not be led away
by blind impulse to accept whatever is thrust on our notice, instead
of only that which is sure and indisputable.

(7:48) Now when we are in possession of this history of Scripture,
and have finally decided that we assert nothing as prophetic
doctrine which does not directly follow from such history, or
which is not clearly deducible from it, then, I say, it will be
time to gird ourselves for the task of investigating the mind of
the prophets and of the Holy Spirit. (49) But in this further
arguing, also, we shall require a method very like that employed
in interpreting nature from her history. (7:50) As in the examination
of natural phenomena we try first to investigate what is most
universal and common to all nature - such, for instance, as motion
and rest, and their laws and rules, which nature always observes,
and through which she continually works - and then we proceed to
what is less universal; so, too, in the history of Scripture, we
seek first for that which is most universal, and serves for the
basis and foundation of all Scripture, a doctrine, in fact, that is
commended by all the prophets as eternal and most profitable to all
men. (7:51) For example, that God is one, and that He is omnipotent,
that He alone should be worshipped, that He has a care for all men,
and that He especially loves those who adore Him and love their
neighbour as themselves, &c. (52) These and similar doctrines,

I repeat, Scripture everywhere so clearly and expressly teaches,
that no one was ever in doubt of its meaning concerning them.

(7:53) The nature of God, His manner of regarding and providing
for things, and similar doctrines, Scripture nowhere teaches
professedly, and as eternal doctrine; on the contrary, we have
shown that the prophets themselves did not agree on the subject;
therefore, we must not lay down any doctrine as Scriptural on
such subjects, though it may appear perfectly clear on rational
grounds.

(7:54) From a proper knowledge of this universal doctrine of

Scripture, we must then proceed to other doctrines less universal,
but which, nevertheless, have regard to the general conduct of
life, and flow from the universal doctrine like rivulets from a
source; such are all particular external manifestations of true
virtue, which need a given occasion for their exercise; whatever
is obscure or ambiguous on such points in Scripture must be
explained and defined by its universal doctrine; with regard to
contradictory instances, we must observe the occasion and the time
in which they were written. (7:55) For instance, when Christ says,

“Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted” we do
not know, from the actual passage, what sort of mourners are meant;
as, however, Christ afterwards teaches that we should have care for
nothing, save only for the kingdom of God and His righteousness,
which is commended as the highest good (see Matt. vi;33), it follows
that by mourners He only meant those who mourn for the kingdom of

God and righteousness neglected by man: for this would be the only
cause of mourning to those who love nothing but the Divine kingdom
and justice, and who evidently despise the gifts of fortune. (56) So,
too, when Christ says: “But if a man strike you on the right cheek,
turn to him the left also,” and the words which follow.

(7:57) If He had given such a command, as a lawgiver, to judges,

He would thereby have abrogated the law of Moses, but this He
expressly says He did not do (Matt. v:17). (58) Wherefore we must
consider who was the speaker, what was the occasion, and to whom
were the words addressed. (59) Now Christ said that He did not
ordain laws as a legislator, but inculcated precepts as a teacher:

inasmuch as He did not aim at correcting outward actions so much
as the frame of mind. (60) Further, these words were spoken
to men who were oppressed, who lived in a corrupt commonwealth
on the brink of ruin, where justice was utterly neglected.

(7:61) The very doctrine inculcated here by Christ just
before the destruction of the city was also taught by

Jeremiah before the first destruction of Jerusalem, that is,
in similar circumstances, as we see from Lamentations iii:25-30.

(7:62) Now as such teaching was only set forth by the prophets
in times of oppression, and was even then never laid down as a
law; and as, on the other hand, Moses (who did not write in
times of oppression, but - mark this - strove to found a
well-ordered commonwealth), while condemning envy and hatred
of one’s neighbour, yet ordained that an eye should be given for
an eye, it follows most clearly from these purely Scriptural
grounds that this precept of Christ and Jeremiah concerning
submission to injuries was only valid in places where justice
is neglected, and in a time of oppression, but does not hold
good in a well-ordered state.

(7:63) In a well-ordered state where justice is administered
every one is bound, if he would be accounted just, to demand
penalties before the judge (see Lev:1), not for the sake of
vengeance (Lev. xix:17, 18), but in order to defend justice
and his country’s laws, and to prevent the wicked rejoicing
in their wickedness. (64) All this is plainly in accordance
with reason. (65) I might cite many other examples in the
same manner, but I think the foregoing are sufficient to
explain my meaning and the utility of this method, and this
is all my present purpose. (7:66) Hitherto we have only shown
how to investigate those passages of Scripture which treat
of practical conduct, and which, therefore, are more easily
examined, for on such subjects there was never really any
controversy among the writers of the Bible.

(7:67) The purely speculative passages cannot be so easily traced
to their real meaning: the way becomes narrower, for as the prophets
differed in matters speculative among themselves, and the narratives
are in great measure adapted to the prejudices of each age, we must
not, on any account infer the intention of one prophet from clearer
passages in the writings of another; nor must we so explain his
meaning, unless it is perfectly plain that the two prophets were
at one in the matter.

(7:68) How we are to arrive at the intention of the prophets in
such cases I will briefly explain. (69) Here, too, we must begin
from the most universal proposition, inquiring first from the
most clear Scriptural statements what is the nature of prophecy
or revelation, and wherein does it consist; then we must proceed
to miracles, and so on to whatever is most general till we come
to the opinions of a particular prophet, and, at last, to the
meaning of a particular revelation, prophecy, history, or miracle.

(7;70) We have already pointed out that great caution is necessary
not to confound the mind of a prophet or historian with the mind
of the Holy Spirit and the truth of the matter; therefore I need
not dwell further on the subject. (71) I would, however, here
remark concerning the meaning of revelation, that the present
method only teaches us what the prophets really saw or heard, not
what they desired to signify or represent by symbols. (72) The
latter may be guessed at but cannot be inferred with certainty
from Scriptural premises.

(7:73) We have thus shown the plan for interpreting Scripture, and
have, at the same time, demonstrated that it is the one and surest
way of investigating its true meaning. (74) I am willing indeed
to admit that those persons (if any such there be) would be more
absolutely certainly right, who have received either a trustworthy
tradition or an assurance from the prophets themselves, such as is
claimed by the Pharisees; or who have a pontiff gifted with
infallibility in the interpretation of Scripture, such as the Roman

Catholics boast. (7:75) But as we can never be perfectly sure, either
of such a tradition or of the authority of the pontiff, we cannot
found any certain conclusion on either: the one is denied by the
oldest sect of Christians, the other by the oldest sect of Jews.

(7:76) Indeed, if we consider the series of years (to mention no
other point) accepted by the Pharisees from their Rabbis, during
which time they say they have handed down the tradition from

Moses, we shall find that it is not correct, as I show elsewhere.

(77) Therefore such a tradition should be received with extreme
suspicion; and although, according to our method, we are bound to
consider as uncorrupted the tradition of the Jews, namely, the
meaning of the Hebrew words which we received from them, we may
accept the latter while retaining our doubts about the former.

(7:78) No one has ever been able to change the meaning of a word
in ordinary use, though many have changed the meaning of a
particular sentence. (79) Such a proceeding would be most
difficult; for whoever attempted to change the meaning of a word,
would be compelled, at the same time, to explain all the authors
who employed it, each according to his temperament and intention,
or else, with consummate cunning, to falsify them.

(7:80) Further, the masses and the learned alike preserve language,
but it is only the learned who preserve the meaning of particular
sentences and books: thus, we may easily imagine that the learned
having a very rare book in their power, might change or corrupt the
meaning of a sentence in it, but they could not alter the
signification of the words; moreover, if anyone wanted to change
the meaning of a common word he would not be able to keep up the
change among posterity, or in common parlance or writing.

(7:81) For these and such-like reasons we may readily conclude
that it would never enter into the mind of anyone to corrupt a
language, though the intention of a writer may often have been
falsified by changing his phrases or interpreting them amiss.

(82) As then our method (based on the principle that the
knowledge of Scripture must be sought from itself alone) is the
sole true one, we must evidently renounce any knowledge which
it cannot furnish for the complete understanding of Scripture.

[7:3] (83) I will now point out its difficulties and shortcomings,
which prevent our gaining a complete and assured knowledge of
the Sacred Text.

(7:84) Its first great difficulty consists in its requiring a
thorough knowledge of the Hebrew language. (85) Where is such
knowledge to be obtained? (86) The men of old who employed
the Hebrew tongue have left none of the principles and bases
of their language to posterity; we have from them absolutely
nothing in the way of dictionary, grammar, or rhetoric.

(7:87) Now the Hebrew nation has lost all its grace and beauty

(as one would expect after the defeats and persecutions it has
gone through), and has only retained certain fragments of its
language and of a few books. (88) Nearly all the names of fruits,
birds, and fishes, and many other words have perished in the wear
and tear of time. (89) Further, the meaning of many nouns and
verbs which occur in the Bible are either utterly lost, or
are subjects of dispute. (90) And not only are these gone,
but we are lacking in a knowledge of Hebrew phraseology.

(91) The devouring tooth of time has destroyed turns of
expression peculiar to the Hebrews, so that we know them
no more.

(7:92) Therefore we cannot investigate as we would all the
meanings of a sentence by the uses of the language; and there
are many phrases of which the meaning is most obscure or
altogether inexplicable, though the component words are
perfectly plain.

(7:93) To this impossibility of tracing the history of the

Hebrew language must be added its particular nature and
composition: these give rise to so many ambiguities that it
is impossible to find a method which would enable us to gain
a certain knowledge of all the statements in Scripture. [Endnote 7]

(94) In addition to the sources of ambiguities common to all
languages, there are many peculiar to Hebrew. (95) These, I think,
it worth while to mention. (96) Firstly, an ambiguity often arises
in the Bible from our mistaking one letter for another similar one.

(7:97) The Hebrews divide the letters of the alphabet into five
classes, according to the five organs of the month employed in
pronouncing them, namely, the lips, the tongue, the teeth, the
palate, and the throat. (98) For instance, Alpha, Ghet, Hgain, He,
are called gutturals, and are barely distinguishable, by any sign
that we know, one from the other. (99) El, which signifies to, is
often taken for hgal, which signifies above, and vice versa.

(100) Hence sentences are often rendered rather ambiguous or
meaningless.

(7:101) A second difficulty arises from the multiplied meaning
of conjunctions and adverbs. (102) For instance, vau serves
promiscuously for a particle of union or of separation, meaning,
and, but, because, however, then: ki, has seven or eight meanings,
namely, wherefore, although, if, when, inasmuch as, because, a
burning, &c., and so on with almost all particles.

(7:103) The third very fertile source of doubt is the fact that

Hebrew verbs in the indicative mood lack the present, the past
imperfect, the pluperfect, the future perfect, and other tenses
most frequently employed in other languages; in the imperative
and infinitive moods they are wanting in all except the present,
and a subjunctive mood does not exist. (104) Now, although all
these defects in moods and tenses may be supplied by certain
fundamental rules of the language with ease and even elegance,
the ancient writers evidently neglected such rules altogether,
and employed indifferently future for present and past, and
vice versa past for future, and also indicative for imperative
and subjunctive, with the result of considerable confusion.

(7:105) Besides these sources of ambiguity there are two others,
one very important. (106) Firstly, there are in Hebrew no vowels;
secondly, the sentences are not separated by any marks elucidating
the meaning or separating the clauses. (107) Though the want of
these two has generally been supplied by points and accents, such
substitutes cannot be accepted by us, inasmuch as they were invented
and designed by men of an after age whose authority should carry no
weight. (108) The ancients wrote without points (that is, without
vowels and accents), as is abundantly testified; their descendants
added what was lacking, according to their own ideas of Scriptural
interpretation; wherefore the existing accents and points are
simply current interpretations, and are no more authoritative than
any other commentaries.

(7:109) Those who are ignorant of this fact cannot justify the
author of the Epistle to the Hebrews for interpreting (chap. xi;21)

Genesis (xlvii:31) very differently from the version given in our

Hebrew text as at present pointed, as though the Apostle had been
obliged to learn the meaning of Scripture from those who added
the points. (110) In my opinion the latter are clearly wrong.

(7:111) In order that everyone may judge for himself, and also see
how the discrepancy arose simply from the want of vowels, I will
give both interpretations. (112)Those who pointed our version read,

“And Israel bent himself over, or (changing Hqain into Aleph,
a similar letter) towards, the head of the bed.” (113) The author
of the Epistle reads, “And Israel bent himself over the head of
his staff,” substituting mate for mita, from which it only differs
in respect of vowels. (114) Now as in this narrative it is Jacob’s
age only that is in question, and not his illness, which is not
touched on till the next chapter, it seems more likely that the
historian intended to say that Jacob bent over the head of his
staff (a thing commonly used by men of advanced age for their
support) than that he bowed himself at the head of his bed,
especially as for the former reading no substitution of letters
is required. (7:115) In this example I have desired not only to
reconcile the passage in the Epistle with the passage in Genesis,
but also and chiefly to illustrate how little trust should be
placed in the points and accents which are found in our present

Bible, and so to prove that he who would be without bias in
interpreting Scripture should hesitate about accepting them,
and inquire afresh for himself. (116) Such being the nature and
structure of the Hebrew language, one may easily understand that
many difficulties are likely to arise, and that no possible method
could solve all of them. (7:117) It is useless to hope for a way out
of our difficulties in the comparison of various parallel passages

(we have shown that the only method of discovering the true sense
of a passage out of many alternative ones is to see what are the
usages of the language), for this comparison of parallel passages
can only accidentally throw light on a difficult point, seeing that
the prophets never wrote with the express object of explaining
their own phrases or those of other people, and also because we
cannot infer the meaning of one prophet or apostle by the meaning
of another, unless on a purely practical question, not when the
matter is speculative, or if a miracle, or history is being narrated.

(7;118) I might illustrate my point with instances, for there are
many inexplicable phrases in Scripture, but I would rather pass on
to consider the difficulties and imperfections of the method under
discussion.

(7:119) A further difficulty attends the method, from the fact
that it requires the history of all that has happened to every
book in the Bible; such a history we are often quite unable to
furnish. (120) Of the authors, or (if the expression be preferred),
the writers of many of the books, we are either in complete
ignorance, or at any rate in doubt, as I will point out at length.

(7:121) Further, we do not know either the occasions or the epochs
when these books of unknown authorship were written; we cannot say
into what hands they fell, nor how the numerous varying versions
originated; nor, lastly, whether there were not other versions,
now lost. (122) I have briefly shown that such knowledge is
necessary, but I passed over certain considerations which I will
now draw attention to.

(7:123) If we read a book which contains incredible or impossible
narratives, or is written in a very obscure style, and if we know
nothing of its author, nor of the time or occasion of its being
written, we shall vainly endeavour to gain any certain knowledge
of its true meaning. (124) For being in ignorance on these points
we cannot possibly know the aim or intended aim of the author; if
we are fully informed, we so order our thoughts as not to be in
any way prejudiced either in ascribing to the author or him for
whom the author wrote either more or less than his meaning, and
we only take into consideration what the author may have had in
his mind, or what the time and occasion demanded. (125) I think
this must be tolerably evident to all.

(7:126) It often happens that in different books we read histories
in themselves similar, but which we judge very differently, according
to the opinions we have formed of the authors. (127) I remember once
to have read in some book that a man named Orlando Furioso used to
drive a kind of winged monster through the air, fly over any
countries he liked, kill unaided vast numbers of men and giants,
and such like fancies, which from the point of view of reason are
obviously absurd. (128) A very similar story I read in Ovid of

Perseus, and also in the books of Judges and Kings of Samson, who
alone and unarmed killed thousands of men, and of Elijah, who flew
through the air, said at last went up to heaven in a chariot of fire,
with horses of fire. (129) All these stories are obviously alike,
but we judge them very differently. (130) The first only sought to
amuse, the second had a political object, the third a religious
object. (7:131) We gather this simply from the opinions we had
previously formed of the authors. (132) Thus it is evidently
necessary to know something of the authors of writings which are
obscure or unintelligible, if we would interpret their meaning;
and for the same reason, in order to choose the proper reading from
among a great variety, we ought to have information as to the
versions in which the differences are found, and as to the
possibility of other readings having been discovered by persons
of greater authority.

(7:133) A further difficulty attends this method in the case of
some of the books of Scripture, namely, that they are no longer
extant in their original language. (133a) The Gospel according to

Matthew, and certainly the Epistle to the Hebrews, were written,
it is thought, in Hebrew, though they no longer exist in that form.

(7:134) Aben Ezra affirms in his commentaries that the book of

Job was translated into Hebrew out of another language, and that
its obscurity arises from this fact. (135) I say nothing of the
apocryphal books, for their authority stands on very inferior ground.

(7:136) The foregoing difficulties in this method of interpreting

Scripture from its own history, I conceive to be so great that I
do not hesitate to say that the true meaning of Scripture is in
many places inexplicable, or at best mere subject for guesswork;
but I must again point out, on the other hand, that such
difficulties only arise when we endeavour to follow the meaning
of a prophet in matters which cannot be perceived, but only
imagined, not in things, whereof the understanding can give a
clear idea, and which are conceivable through themselves: [Endnote 8]

matters which by their nature are easily perceived cannot be
expressed so obscurely as to be unintelligible; as the proverb says,

“a word is enough to the wise.” (7:137) Euclid, who only wrote of
matters very simple and easily understood, can easily be comprehended
by anyone in any language; we can follow his intention perfectly, and
be certain of his true meaning, without having a thorough knowledge
of the language in which he wrote; in fact, a quite rudimentary
acquaintance is sufficient. (138) We need make no researches
concerning the life, the pursuits, or the habits of the author;
nor need we inquire in what language, nor when he wrote, nor the
vicissitudes of his book, nor its various readings, nor how, nor
by whose advice it has been received.

[7:4] (139) What we here say of Euclid might equally be said of
any book which treats of things by their nature perceptible:

thus we conclude that we can easily follow the intention of

Scripture in moral questions, from the history we possess of
it, and we can be sure of its true meaning.

(7:140) The precepts of true piety are expressed in very
ordinary language, and are equally simple and easily understood.

(7:141) Further, as true salvation and blessedness consist in a
true assent of the soul - and we truly assent only to what we
clearly understand - it is most plain that we can follow with
certainty the intention of Scripture in matters relating to
salvation and necessary to blessedness; therefore, we need not
be much troubled about what remains: such matters, inasmuch as
we generally cannot grasp them with our reason and understanding,
are more curious than profitable.

(7:142) I think I have now set forth the true method of Scriptural
interpretation, and have sufficiently explained my own opinion
thereon. (143) Besides, I do not doubt that everyone will see that
such a method only requires the aid of natural reason. (144) The
nature and efficacy of the natural reason consists in deducing and
proving the unknown from the known, or in carrying premises to their
legitimate conclusions; and these are the very processes which our
method desiderates. (7:145) Though we must admit that it does not
suffice to explain everything in the Bible, such imperfection does
not spring from its own nature, but from the fact that the path
which it teaches us, as the true one, has never been tended or
trodden by men, and has thus, by the lapse of time, become very
difficult, and almost impassable, as, indeed, I have shown in the
difficulties I draw attention to.

(7:146) There only remains to examine the opinions of those who
differ from me. [7:5] (147) The first which comes under our notice
is, that the light of nature has no power to interpret Scripture,
but that a supernatural faculty is required for the task. (148) What
is meant by this supernatural faculty I will leave to its
propounders to explain. (149) Personally, I can only suppose that
they have adopted a very obscure way of stating their complete
uncertainty about the true meaning of Scripture. (150) If we look
at their interpretations, they contain nothing supernatural, at
least nothing but the merest conjectures.

(7:151) Let them be placed side by side with the interpretations
of those who frankly confess that they have no faculty beyond
their natural ones; we shall see that the two are just alike -
both human, both long pondered over, both laboriously invented.

(7:152) To say that the natural reason is insufficient for such
results is plainly untrue, firstly, for the reasons above stated,
namely, that the difficulty of interpreting Scripture arises
from no defect in human reason, but simply from the carelessness

(not to say malice) of men who neglected the history of the Bible
while there were still materials for inquiry; secondly, from the
fact (admitted, I think, by all) that the supernatural faculty is
a Divine gift granted only to the faithful. (153) But the prophets
and apostles did not preach to the faithful only, but chiefly to
the unfaithful and wicked. (7:154) Such persons, therefore, were
able to understand the intention of the prophets and apostles,
otherwise the prophets and apostles would have seemed to be
preaching to little boys and infants, not to men endowed with
reason. (155) Moses, too, would have given his laws in vain, if
they could only be comprehended by the faithful, who need no law.

(7:156) Indeed, those who demand supernatural faculties for
comprehending the meaning of the prophets and apostles seem truly
lacking in natural faculties, so that we should hardly suppose
such persons the possessors of a Divine supernatural gift.

(7:157) The opinion of Maimonides was widely different. (158) He
asserted that each passage in Scripture admits of various, nay,
contrary, meanings; but that we could never be certain of any
particular one till we knew that the passage, as we interpreted it,
contained nothing contrary or repugnant to reason. (159) If the
literal meaning clashes with reason, though the passage seems in
itself perfectly clear, it must be interpreted in some metaphorical
sense. (160) This doctrine he lays down very plainly in
chap. xxv. part ii. of his book, “More Nebuchim,” for he says:

“Know that we shrink not from affirming that the world hath existed
from eternity, because of what Scripture saith concerning the
world’s creation. (7:161) For the texts which teach that the world
was created are not more in number than those which teach that God
hath a body; neither are the approaches in this matter of the
world’s creation closed, or even made hard to us: so that we
should not be able to explain what is written, as we did when
we showed that God hath no body, nay, peradventure, we could explain
and make fast the doctrine of the world’s eternity more easily than
we did away with the doctrines that God hath a beatified body.

(7:162) Yet two things hinder me from doing as I have said, and
believing that the world is eternal. (163) As it hath been clearly
shown that God hath not a body, we must perforce explain all those
passages whereof the literal sense agreeth not with the
demonstration, for sure it is that they can be so explained.

(164) But the eternity of the world hath not been so demonstrated,
therefore it is not necessary to do violence to Scripture in support
of some common opinion, whereof we might, at the bidding of reason,
embrace the contrary.”

[7:7] (165) Such are the words of Maimonides, and they are evidently
sufficient to establish our point: for if he had been convi