Opinion of Messieurs Coin Delisle and Paillard de Villeneuve
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Title:Opinion of Messieurs Coin Delisle & Paillard de Villeneuve on the validity of the disposition contained in the will of the late John D. Fink providing for the construction & support of an asylum in the city of New Orleans for the benefit of protestant widows &
orphans.

Author:Coin-Delisle, Jean Baptiste César, 1789-1865.

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Print Source:Opinion of Messieurs Coin Delisle & Paillard de Villeneuve on the validity of the disposition contained in the will of the late John D. Fink providing for the construction & support of an asylum in the city of New Orleans for the benefit of protestant widows & orphans.

Coin-Delisle, Jean Baptiste César, 1789-1865.

14, 14 p. 22 1/2 cm.

New Orleans,

1860.

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~~~f X A fJ ~I/ Le testament authentique de John D. Fink,’ la NouvelleOrl6ans, en date du 7 novembre 1855, contient, apros divers legs particuliers, la disposition universelle suivante: “It is my wish and desire and I do hereby declare the tb.“to be my will, that after payment of my just debts and the’ several legacies herein above mentioned, that the proceeds of the whole of Estate, property, rights and credits be applied to the erection, maintainance and support of a suitable Asylum in this City, to be used solely as an Asylum for Protestant Widows and Orphans, to be called “Fink Asylum” and I do herein request and authorize my friend Diederick Bullerdieck, ‘ after my decease, to name and appoint three worthy and res ponsible persons as trustees to carry out my said intentions res pecting the aforesaid Asylum. I hereby nominate and appoint my said friend Diederick Bullerdieck sole executor of this my last will and testament with full power to take possession of my estate and be detainer thereof.” L’ex6cuteur testamentaire, au lieu de nommer trois trust(, a r6uni six autres personnes pour obtenir un acte d’incorporation priv6d, avec lui septibme, pour le Fin?k ssylumi: suivant la forme requise par uneloi de 1855 pour l’organisation des Corporations Litteraires, SCientifiques, Religieuses ou Charitables. t”4” , I i 1 7 I C>19 I. II I I

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(2) Comme le testament ordonnait a l’ex6cuteur testamentaire de nommer trois trustees, et que cette disposition est nulle et qu’elle annulle le legs, certains heritiers du ddfunt ont demandd enjustice contre l’exdcuteur testamentaire, la restitution du legs de residuo. Ils ont dchou6 par ddcision de la Cour Supreme de l’Etat de la Louisiane du 16
mars 1857, qui ddclare infirmer le jugement rendu au profit de l’hdritier, qui declare en meme temps que le le,gs du residu est fait au profit de la ville de New Orleans (laquelle u’dtait pas en cause), et qui, statuant sur l’intervention au procbs de la Corporation the Fink.4syliim, la ddmet de cette intervention. On a mis sous les yeux du Conseil, lo. L’expddition du testa* t4 20. Une copie en forme de la decision de la Cour Supreme etqleelques autres pieces qu’il est inutile de relater ici. On lui demande son sentiment dans l’intdret d’autres hdritier du meme testateur si, selon son sentiment, les h6ritiers du dit ddfunt auxquels on ne pourrait pas apposer l’arret de la Cour Su preme du 16 mars 1857, ont le droit de demander la nullit6 du legs de residuo, soit contre l’exdcuteur testamentaire, soit contre la ville de New Orleans, a qui la Cour a declare que le legs appartenait, soit enfin et cumulativement contre les trustees (s’il y en a eu de nommds) et autres pr6tendants a d6tenir les deniers et biens quelconquesrestant aprbs paiemeut des legs et des justes dettes du testateur. CONSULTATION. Sur quoi l’avocat a la Cour Imp6riale de Paris, soussign6, En supposant, en fait et en droit, qu’il y ait quelque hdritier du defunt auquel la ddcision de la Cour Supreme de la Louisiane, diC 16 iarrs 185t, ne soit ni applicable, ni opposable, parce qu’il -0 a

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(3) n’y aurait t6 ni partie, ni repr6sent6; - point que le soussign6 ne peut exatniner, faute de connaissances spdciales sur la proc6dure des Etats-Unis, Est d’avis, Que tout hdritier du testateur qui n’aurait 6t ni partie, ni reprdsent6 dans ladite decision de la Cour Supreme, a le droit in contestable de demander, en ce qui le concerne, dans les formes et suivant les rbgles de comp6tence et de procedure usitdes dans le pays, la nullit6 du legs de residuo, tant contre l’ex6cuteur testamentaire, que contre la ville de New-Orleans, a qui la Cour a d6clar6 que le legs appartenait, quoiqu’elle ne fut pas en cause et ne le r6clamat point, et contre les trustees, s’il en a t6 nom~6, et autres pretendants droit a ddtenir les biens de la succession’ do John David Fink, apres lc paiement des justes dettes du d6funt, et l’acquit de ses legs a titre particulier; Que le legs universel de residuo par cela seul qu’il est confi6, a trois trustees, est nul a quelque personne qu’il ait 6t6 fait, meme quand il aurait 6t6 fait a la ville de New Orleans; [aux termes de l’article 1507
du code de la Louisiane calqu6 sur l’article 896 du Code Napoleon, mais y ajoutant trois mots de plus; “Les substitutions et les fideicommis sont prohibds. Toute disposition par laquelle le donataire, l’hdritier ou le ldgataire est charg6 de conserver et de rendre a un tiers est nulle, memo “a l’dgard du donataire, de l’hdritier institu6 ou du ldgataire.” Que toute l’affaire rdside dans cet article, puisque l’ex6cuteur testamentaire reqoit l’ordre du testateur de nommer trois trustees pour exdcuter sos intentions testamentaires quant au legs de residuo. Que le plus grand danger que courra le demandeur sera quand a une phase quelconque de la procddure, il arrivera devant la Cour Supreme do la Louisiane, et rencontrera par consdquent

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( 4 ) (4) commiepreceddent, l’arr(,t ou ddcision du 16 MAars 1857; mais qu’alors il est’t croire que la loyaute’ de la magistrature lui fera faire une distinction sur la difference de consulter les preccdents judiciaires dans les pays legifdrds ou codifids et dans les pays de coutumes, et quc la verit6 16gale triomphlera, par l’organe meme de la Cour Suprrme, qui, sans s’arreter a ce pr~c6dent prononcera la nullit6 du legs universel de r6siduo et ordonnera que le residu de la succession, soitpar l’executeur testamientaire, les tirustees, ouil tous autres d6tenteurs ou pr6tendants a ce legs universel, restitu6 a l’h6ritier ou aux h6ritiers avec qui le jugrement, arret ou d6cision du 16 Mlars 1857, i}‘aura pas 6tc5 dcl,,lr6
comimun. ,Qlclqiies reflexions d6inonticront le fondemeit des proposi t],;’-‘qule le soussigu6 vicuet d‘“6iettre. I. La inaxime res jttdicata pro veritcte liabetur a ses limites chez tous les peuples. Lajustice n’a le pouvoir de decider les questions qu’entre les parties qui proce6dent devrant elle. La chose jug6e ne nuit ni ne profite aux tiers qui ne sont pas parties au procbs. Res judicata nec prodest nec nocet tertio. Donc, la ddcision de la Cour Supreme qui a, en l’absence de la ville de New Orleans, ddclar6 la dite ville, ldgataire universelle du rdsidu des biens du testateur, nonobstant la nullittl du legs, n’a pas meme rendu un jugement au profit de cette ville. Elle n’avait pas intent. d’action; elle n‘6tait pas partie au procbs: donc, rien n’estjugd a son (gard.- Ce que le juge a dit n’est qu’une simple opinion, mais ne confure aucun droit a la Cit6 de New Orleans. - Si elle a des droits, qu’elle agisse contre les antres parties: jusque la, elle ne peut invoquer un jugement qui mui est 6tranger. De meme, un oi plusieurs he’ritiers q’i n’etaient pas parties au

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(;) procbs ou qui n’y dtaient pas ri’pr’scntds nie peuvent:trc l1ess par un jugement a eux etranger. Ils sont ljersonnes dirffecntes de celles avec qui le jugemient a 6td rendu. Cela cst 611mentairc dans tous les pays ou rg(rne le droit. II. Ce qui est encore clmentaire et commun i toutes les nations, c’est que la nullit6 du testament tourne toujours au profit de l’hiritier. L’hdritier legal, 1’hdritier ab intestat est cclui auquel reviennent les biens si le testament est nul et non valide. La raison en est que toutes les nations ctablisscniit par leurs lois l’ordre des successions dans les familles, que la facult( de tester n’est qu’une puissance privce accordce an sujct de la loi, sous la condition de ne pas violer les lois de la cit; quc lorsque le testatcur viole les dispositions prohibitives du droit public, il n’y a plus de testament en cette partic; et s’il n’y a plus de testament in parte qua, la disposition de l’homme n’existc plus, et l’ordre l6gitime des hdritiers indiquc seTul qu’ils sont les vrais he6ritiers. III. Dans l’cspccc, le legataire universel n’est pas autre que les trois trustees que l’exdcuteur testamentaire doit nommer et constituer pour exdcuter les intentions du testateur et qui seront charg6s d’appliquer le rdsidu de ses biens a la construction, au maintien et au soutien d’un asile pour les veuves et orphelins Protestants dans la ville de la Nouvelle-Orldans; les personnes, objet de la libdralit6 et qui profiteront du fideicommis ne sont pas les veuves et orphelins Protestants, existants au jour du de’cis du testateur, ce qui cut dtd un legs a distribuer entre eux et fort licite quoique de difficile ex6cution; c‘6tait tout au contraire une fondation pour l’avenir, qui ne leur conferait quo l’usage de l’asile

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{) t a 1lever, maintenir et entretenir; ce n‘6tait pas ligue a la ville ce devait etre construit dans la ville; et le nom meme de Fink .dsylurn indiquait meme que ce n‘“tait qu’un dtablissement priv6, confi6
aux trustees ou fideicommissaires qui, n’en auraient la propriete que in trust, sous l’obligation morale de donner aux fonds et aux deniers la destination perp6tuelle indiqude par le testateur Or, cc n’est pas le but moral du testateur que le soussign6 attaque: ce qu’il blaime, ce qu’il dit contraire a la loi, c’est la disposition en elle-mime comme violant le droit public de l‘6tat de la Louisiane. L’article 1507 du code Louisianais prolibe dans les donations et les testaments les fideicommis; il ne se contente pas de le prohiber; il les ddclare nuls: ce n’est p)as assez de les avoir d6claris nuls, il d6clare nul meme la disposition qu’ils affectent; ils sont a la fois nuls et annullateurs, nuls et irritants.

Rien n’en doit subsister ni la disposition principale ni les effets pour les tiers. Done, le legs du r6sidu grdv6 du fideicommis pour faire un 6tablissement priv6 ddcor6 du nom du testateur pour soutenir une classe de personnes qui ne constitue pas une corporation publique, est un legs nul et sans effet, done le testateur a fait ce que la loi lui ddfendait de faire; done, les biens compris dans ce legs universel, sont restds dans la succession; done, ils appartiennent b ses hdritiers lgitimes dis l’instant de l’ouverture de la succession (Code de la Louisiane, Art. 934.) IV.

Quand meme on donnerait une autre interpretation au testament et qu’on regarderait la ville de New-Orldans comme le but de la liberalit6 de John D. Fink (ce que nous ne croyons pas etre) il n’en serait pas moins vrai, en point de fait, que le testateur n’a pas donn6 directement a la ville, et qu’il aurait charg6 expres.

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( 7 ) s6ment son ex6cuteur de nommier et d‘6tablir trois personnes pour trustees afin queces trustees mnetteint l’exScution ses intentions d’appliquer ce qui restrerait apres paiemient des justes dettes et des legs, sur l’universalit6 de ses biens, propri6tcs, droits, effets et cr6ances, a’ l‘6rection maintien et soutien d’un Asyle convenable dans la ville pour en faire profiter seulemnent les veuves et orphelins Protestants:-ainsi et en point de fait, c’est toujours a des trustees, c’esta-dire a des fideicommissaires que le testament a ordonn6 de remettre le residu de la succession pour l’ex6cution de la volont6 du d6funt. I1
importe pen qu’apr~s eux, l’Asyle Fink appartienne a la ville (corporation publique et reconnue) ou ne lui appartienno pas, puisque l’Asyle Fink ne pourrait parvenir a la ville que par une cons6quence de fideicommis proliib6. Quand l’article 1507 a dit les fideicommis sont proh ibe’s, et qu’il a annull6 le fideicommis et’la substitution il n’a pas fait comme la loi franwaise. Celle-ci, dans l’article 911 du Code Napol6on, a proliib6
seulement les fideicommis faits au profit des incapables, par ces mots: “
toute disposition au profit d’un incapable sera nulle, meme si on l’a fait sous le nom de personnes interpos6es.” Le code de la Louisiane est plus s6vore: “les fideicommis sont prohibis.” ILS SONT PROHIBES soit que les personnes qui en profiteront plus tard soient capables ou incapables, priv6es ou publiques, corporations aux simples particuliers. Dans le systbme Louisianais, dbs qu’il y a fideicommis, le legs est d’une nullit6
radicale. Donc, pen importe quelle interpretation on donnera au legs, quelle fin on lui indlquera, quelle personne en doit profiter. Sera-ce la ville, corporation publique ou reconnue? Sera-ce les veuves et orphelins protestants; classe qui ne forme pas une corporation

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(8) mniie priv e? Sera-ce une corporation priv-e etablie suivant le3 lois du 1)ays, ct qui se trouvera en position de coinmercer du bien du ddfunt, en imposant des conditions pour entrer dans l’Asyle; Tout cela nous iinporte peu, et il n’y a pas besoin d’examiner. Des que le testateur a voulu que le r-sidu de sa succession entrait aux mains dc fideicommissaires chargds de remplir et d’ex6 - cuter sa volontd sur ce point, le legs de residuo est nulle et d’une nullit6 absolue.-Ce qui constitue ce residu est dans la succession ab intestat. V. Le soussignIl ne dira qu’un mot sur le mot trustees dont se sert le testament. Les trustees sont les fideicommissaires anglais. Dans une consultation delibdrde pour la Nouvelle-Orldans, dans l’affaire McDonough, avec ses illustres confreres AIMI. Delangle, Giraud, Duranton pere et Marcadd le 18

Ddcembre 1851, il avait dej ” 6crit “le mot fideicommis (fideicommissa ) nous parait avoir “dt ajoutd i l’art 896 du Code Louisianien, k cause de l’origine anglaise des autres Etats-Unis, et pour proscrire en meme temps taut les substitutions de l’ancien droit franqais que les trsts du droit anglais.” I a depuis appris que Mr. Brown, lrun des rddacteurs du Code de la Louisiane. avait dit la memo chose d’une manibre formelle. Donc, il peut dire avec raison et en toute connaissance de cause que les trustees n’dtant que des fideicommissaires, le legs fait de residuo par le testateur aux trois trustees a nommer par son ex6cuteur pour mettre en ceuvre ses intentions sur i’Asyle a dtablir, le maintenir et le soutenir est un legs radicalement nul d’apres les lois de l’Etat. VI. On dlve ici une difficultd secondaire; et l’on dit contre l’hdrdit6, qu’effectivement il y a dans le testament une ddldgation par le testateur i ure tierce personne (l’ex6cuteur) de choisir des

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(9) trustees ou admiiistrateurs d’une portion de sa fortune; que dans la vdrit6 c’est l une pure nullitd; mais que d’apres l’article 1506 du Code Louisianais; les conditions ou clauses nulles dans les testaments sont et doivent etre considdrds comme non ecrites. Et de la l’on a tir6 la consequence, qu’effectivement si le legs 6tait principalement fait pour l’utilit6 des veuves et orphelins protestants de N.-Orldans, le legs de residuo serait effectivement nul, puisque les veuves et les orphelins protestants dans une cit6 ne forment pas une corporation ou personne civile, et sont incapables de recevoir cornme personnes incertaines; mais qu’en decidant en fait que le vrai ldgataire de residuo 6tait la cit6 de la N.-Orldans, (corporation publique capable de recevoir), on pouvait effacer l’institution de trustees comme contraire a la loi et par consdquent la considerer comme non dcrite. Or, selon le soussi,gn6, cela est contraire au testament, si on en considere le sens; et cela est contraire a la loi Louisanienne, si l’on veut en consulter le texte et l’esprit. VII. Quant au sens, il est impossible de dire que cette disposition “JIa volonte’ est que l’entier reste de mes biens…… soit applique’ ” et employe a l’erection, maintenance et entretien d’un.Asyle dans la ville JV’.-Orleans, pour l’usage seulement des veuves protestants et des “orphelinsprotestants…….. “soit une disposition en faveur de la ville. La ville n’est point ldgataire; la phrase n’indique par les mots in this City que le lieu ou le testateur veut que l’Asylo soit 6rig,. Le reste de la disposition prouve encore davantage que la ville n’est pas gratifiee, qu’elle n’est meme pas le but de la libdralit6 du testateur; car le testateur vent qute l’exdcuteur nomme trois trustees pour etre charges de l‘6rectioin, maintenance et entretien du dit asile, et que l’asile porte le nom du testateur.-Donc, l’ta-.

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(10) blissenient qu il projette n’appartienidra pas k a 1 ilIe, et ne senL
qu’un 6tablissenmenlt priv6, ayant une existence et une administration absolument ind6pendante de l’admiiistration de la ville. L’(tablissement des trustees, et l’ordre d’en normmer, est une preuve certaine que le testateur, loin de songer a domer a la ville, youlait que l’administration publique et municipale ne s’iinmiseat en rien dans un legs, qu’il faisait pour l’utilite d’une classe de personnes d’une religion ddtermine et nialtraitdes par la fortune. VIII. 31ais, dans tous les cas, meIne quaind le legs aurait 6t6 fait par le testatcur dans le but final dcetre utile a la ville de N.-Orl6ans quand dans sa pens6e, les trustees ou fideicommissaires auraient du 6riger, nainitenir et soutenir l’asile Fink, le conserver ainsi apres l’avoir formS, et le rendre a la ville de New-Orleanls, en examinant la question d’apres la legislation Louisiane, il faut ne6ces sairemnent prononeer la nullite du leg,s, et l’on ne peut considdrer l’ordre de nommer des trustees comme une disposition non derite. Dans tous ]es legs par fideicommmis comme dans toutes substitutions, on distingue deux especes de personncs sur lesquels l’intention du testateur est dirige: le grevj, celui auquel le testateur donne directement et qui est charg6 de rendre, et l’appel6 ou les appeles, ceux envers lesquels le greve6 doit ex6cuter la vo lont6 du testateur. Or, d’apres les lois de la Louisiane, tout est nul pour les fideicommis comme pour les substitutions, et rien ne doit demeurer du legs, ni la disposition faite au profit du grev6, ni la disposition faite pour les appels; encore une fois tout est nul. La question n’est pas nouvelle. Elle s’est presentde en droit franqais pour les substitutions fiddicornnmmissaires sur l’art. 896 du Code Napoldon semblable pour son texte a T’art. 1507 du Code de la Louisiane, lequel ajoute aux substitutions les fidkie’ I

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( It ) La Jurisprudence de la Cour de Cassation est clez nous certaine sur cc point. En vain, viendrait-on dire: les conditions contraires a la loi sont repittees non ecrites (Art. 900 du Code Napoleon). Donc, le grev5
peut garder son legs; il n’y a de nul que la substitution. -On r6pond: il y a en droit fran~ais deux lois bien distinctes 1’art. 900 et r’art.

896.-(Iotons qu’il faut en dire autant en droit Louisianien, il y a aussi deux lois bien distinctes, l’article 1506 semblable a notre article 900 et l’art 1507 semblable a notre article 896 et qui ajoute les fideicommis.) L’article 900 est une regle g6ner-ale (1506) l’art. 896 (1507) est une exception. En grniral, si une disposition n’a d’autre vice que d’etre faite sous une condition impossible ou contraire ak la loi, elle est valable, parceque la condition ill~gale est cense6c non erite; au contraire quand la loi annulle la charge ou condition de conserver et de rendre, il n’y a plus a s’occuper de l’art 900 (ou 1506:) il n’est pas fait pour cc cas special. La disposition principale est nulle; la disposition secondaire l’est aussi. Le premier arret de la Cour de Cassation sur cette matiere est du 18 janvier 1808; il so trouve au repertoire de M. Mferlin, au mot substitution fideicommissaire, Sect. 1 ~

IV, No 2, et contient son rdquisitoire; et c’est du jurisprudence certnine. Ajoutons qu’il en doit etre a plus forte raison de meme des fideicommis perpetuels.-Ji perpetual trust constitu6 pour former un 6tablisscment priv6 est un fideicommis perp6tuel; I-loi Louisianaise les proscrit. ELLE LES ROEIBE: Cc n’est plus la condition qui est prohib6e: c’est le legs en lui-meme. Le iesidu do la succession 6tant donn6
nullement et contre la prohlibition de la loi, demeure dans la succession ab intestat.

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( 12 ) ix. Le soussignal a dit que le plus grand danger que courrait le demandeur, s’elevcrait quand dans une phase quelconque du pro ces, il reviendrait devant la Cour Supreme de la Louisiane et rencontrerait comnire prdcedent l’arret du 16 mars 1857. Car il est certain pour lui qu’en Angleterre et chez les nations qui ont emprunte de l’Angleterre lcur mode de procader, les prdcedents et les arrets d ja’ rendus out une influence sur les ddcisions a venir bien autremeut puissante qu’cn France.

Pour ce cas il soumet a la loyant6 des nmagistrats de la Louisiane les observations suivanites A la Louisiane, comme chez nous, les arrets ne statuent que sur des cas particuliers. Tout cc qui est dit par le juge avant la partie dispositive du jugcement est l’cxpression d’opinion, d’examen, de doctrine, mais n’est pas encore cc qu’on peut appeler res jud,‘cata. La chose jugde n’est vd6ritablement que dans le dictum; et encore cette chose jugee n’existe-t-elle qu’entre les parties qui ont 4t6
parties a la ddcision judiciaire. Les magistrats qui composeront la Cour, rdfldchiront dans leur haute sagesse que les prdcddents doivent avoir beaucoup moins d’influence sur les jugements a rendre dans l’Etat de la Louisiane que dans les autres Etats de l’Amdrique du Nord, par cela seul que la Louisiane est un pays 16gifdr( par son Code Civile. En effet, il semble que les Cours de justice doivent faire une grande difference quant a la puissance des prdcddents entre les pays ou les lois Civiles ont dt6
codifides et ceux ou elles ne l’ont pas t6. Dans les pays que nous appellerions en franvais pays de Coutie:~, et en anglais of Comnon law, nous reconnaissons qu’il

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( 13 ) e,st d’une haute utilit6 d’invoquer les arrLts prdcde’ents (seris rerum perpetu6 judicatlarurnm), parce que la sdrie d’arrets conforme est une preuve autlhentique et respectaTble do at coutume qui s’est introduite sur un point donn6. Mlais dans les pays 16g,if6r6s, quant aux lois civiles (ceux qui se sont donn6s des Codes, comme la France, comine la Louisiane), les arrets comniandent encore le respect, mais ils n’y peuvent exercer d’autorit( qu’autant qu’on reconnait leur parfaite conformit6 a la loi 6crite. Dans ces pays, les citoyens, par leur adhdsion h un Code civil, ont positivement de6clard qu’ils n’entendaient pas mettre leurs biens, leurs personnes et leurs droits a la merci du flot changeant et mobile de l’opinion; que, pour eux, la loi etait l’ancre de salut; que, si quelqucs arrets s’en dcartaient, ils ne seraient chose jugde qu’entre les parties; et que les arrets suivants, quoique dans des espbces semblables, devaielit se conformer a la loi; car le pouvoir judiciaire, maitre des citoyens qui recourent a lui, ne pent, par une suite d’arrcts, changer la loi dont il n’est que le ministre. Et de cette vdrit6, il suit qu’unte partie qui demande la meme chose que la partie qui a succomb6 en 1857, a le droit de ddmontrer, soit devant le juge du premier degr6, soit devant la Cour Supreme, que malgrd le morite personnel du magistrat, et malgr6 son autorit6 sur les parties qui etaient en cause, l’arret de 1857 ne pent pas etre pris comme un pre6cddent liant les magistrats dans une affaire intentde par un nouveau demandeur non re prdsent6 a l’arret de 1857. On sera libre d’examiner si tous les dldments de la cause out dt6 bicn connus, bien combin6s; si les raisonnements 6taient ,;ustes, complets et concluants; et meme en presenter d’autres; I

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(14 ) hr l’affaire n’est plus la nmite; ce n’est pas la meme affaire, quoique semblable. D6libdr6 a Paris, le 19 d6cembre 1859. COIN DELISLE, Avocat a la Cortr Imperiale; ancien membre du Conseil de l’Ordre.

L’avocat, soussigncl, adhere completement a la Consultation de son honorable confrere, MI. Coin Delislec. Paris, le 20 ddcembre 1859.

PAILLARD DE VILLENEUVE, Avocat (i la Cour Imperiale de Paris, Membre du Conseil de l’ Ordre. ,, *, 44 . I

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OPINION of Messieurs Coin Delisle and Paillard de Villeneuve on the validity of the disposition contained in the will of the late John D Fink providing for the con struction and support of an Asylum in the city of New Orleans for the benefit of Protestant Widows and Orphans. STATEMENT OF

THE CASE. The will of John D. Finik made in the authentic form and dated at New Orleans on the seventh of novenlmber 1855, contains after several particular legacies, the following universal disposition: It is my wish and desire and I do hereby declare the same to be my will, that after payment of my just debts, and the several legacies herein-above mentioned, that the proceeds of the whole of my estate, property, rights and credits be applied to the erection, maintenance and support of a suitable asylum in this city to be used solely as an asylum for Protestant Widows and Orphans to be called “Fink’s Asylum; “and I do herein request and auth.

orise my friend I)iedrick Bullerdieck, after my decease, to name and appoint three worthy and responsible persons as Trustees to carry out my said intentions respecting the aforesaid asylum. “I hereby nominate and appoint my said friend Diedrick Bullerdieck sole executor of this my last will and testament, withi full power to take possession of my estate and be detainer thereof..”

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(2 ) The testamentary executor instead of appointing three trustees, united with six other persons to obtain an act of incorporation of the Fink A.,ylurn in accordance with a statute of 1855 providing for the organization of litterary, scientific, religious or charitable corporations. As the will directed the testamentary executor to appoint three trustees and as this disposition is null and annuls the legacy, certain heirs of the deceased claimed judicially from the executor, the restitution of the residuum of the succession embraced in the legacy. In this they failed by the decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana rendered on the 16th of Miarch 1857, which reversed the judgment that had been rendered in favor of the heirs, declared at the same time that the legacy of the residue enured to the benefit of the City of New Orleans (that corporation being no party to the cause), and dismissed the intervention of the Fink .sylum Corporation. The will, a certified copy of the decision of the Supreme Court and some other papers not material to be mentioned here, have been submitted to the undersigned. His opinion is asked on behalf of other heirs of the same testator, whether supposing the judgment of the Supreme Court of the 16th of Mtarch, 1857, could not be opposed to them, they have the right to demand the nullity of the legacy de residuo against the testamentary executor, the city of New Orleans to whom the Court has decided the legacy to belong, and cumulatively against trustees (if any have been named) or others asserting any claim to detain the property or any portion of it remaining after the payment of the legacies and the just debts of the testator. I

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CONSULTATION. Whereupon the undersigned Counsel of the Imperial Court of Paris, supposing that in fact and in law there is any heir of the deoedent to whom the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana of the 16th of March, 1857, is innapplicable and cannot be opposed as being neither a party to nor represented in the cause; a point which the undersigned declines to examine from a want of the requisite knowledge of the rules of practice of the Courts of the United States, Is of opinion, That every heir of the testator, not a party to or represented in the decision of the Supreme Court has the incontestable right, in so far as concerns him, to demand in the form and according to thile rules of jurisdiction and procedure in force in the country, the nullity of the legacy de residue as well against the Testamentary Executor as against the city of New Orleans to whom the Court declared the legacy to belong, although it was no party to the record, and did not claim it, and against the trustees if they have been appointed or others claiming right to detain the property of the succession of John David Fink, after the payment of the just debts of the deceased, and the discharge of the particular legacies; That the universal legacy de residue for the reason alone that it is confided to three trustees, is null, no matter to whom the same may have been made, even though it should have been made to the city of New Orleans; and this according to the terms of article 1507 of the Code of Louisiana framed upon the 896th article of the Code Napoleon with the addition of three words more “Les substitutions et les fldeicomvris sont prohibis. Toute disposition par laquelle le donataire, l’h6ritier ou le1 6gataire est charg6 de conserver et de rendre h uu tiers est nulle, meme ab l’~gard du donataire, de l’h6ritier institu6 ou du lgataire…. “

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(4) That the whole case is embraced in this article because tihe Testamentary Executor is ordered by the Testator to appoint three trustees to execute his testamentary intentions with respect to the legacy de residuo. That the principal danger the plaintiff has to incur will be when at a particular stage of the proceedings, he shall come before the Supreme Court of Louisiana, and will consequently have to meet as a precedent, the decree or decision of the 16th of March, 1857. He can, however, confidently expect that the loyalty of that tribunal will induce it to appreciate the difference between the effect to be given to judicial precedents in a country governed by a positive or codified system of laws, and that to which they are entitled in a country of customary law, and that legal truth will triumph through the organ of the Supreme Court itself which without regarding this precedent, will pronounce the nullity of the universal legacy dce residuo, and decree the restitution of the residue of the succession by the testamentary executor, the trustees or any other detainers of this universal legacy, to the heir or heirs not bound by the judgment or decision of the 16th of MIarchl, 1857. A few observations will show upon what foundation these propositions are supporteld. I. The maxim res judicata pro veritate habetur has its limits in all countries-courts of justice have power to decide controversies only between the parties who appear before them. The authority of the thing adjudged cannot be invoked either for or against third persons not parties to the action-Res judicata nec prodest, nec itocet tertio. The decision, then, of the Supreme Court, which in the absence of the city of New Orleans, declared that corporation the uni

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versal legatee of the residiuum of the property of the deceased, notwithstandling the nullity of that legacy, has not even the force of a judgment in favor of the city. The city had brought no suit, and was no party to the proceedings, consequently nothing was adjudged sofar as concerned that corporation-what the court said was nothing more than a simple opinion, conferring no right upon the city of New Orleans. If the city has any rights, let it assert them against the other parties, for until then it cannot avail itself of a judgment to which it is a stranger.

In the sanie manner one or more of the heirs who were not parties to or represenited in the suit, cannot be injuriously affected by a judgment which is foreign to them-They are dfiferent persons from those between whom thle judgment has been pronounced. This is elementary. II. What is also elementary and admitted in every country is that it is always the heir who profits by the nullity of a testament. It is to the legal heir, the heir cb iiitestato, that the propertyrever8is if the will be null and invalid. The reason of this is that all nations establish by their laws the order of succession in families, and that the testamentary power is only a private right accorded to the citizen, on condition that hlie does not violate the public law (les lois de la cit6); that when the testator violates the prohibitory dispositions of public law, there is in that part of his will no testament, and if there be no testament in parte qua, the disposition no longer exists, and the legal order of succession alone indicates who are the real heirs. III. Ii the present case the universal legatee is none other than the three trustees whomn the testamentary executor is to nominate and appoint ia order to execute the intentions of the testator,

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(6) and who are to be charged with the application of the residuum of his property, towards the construction, maintenance and support of an asylum for Protestant widows and orphans in the city of New Orleans, the persons who are the objects of this liberality and are to profit by the fdeicommis are not the Protestant widows and orphans living at the death of the testator, this would have been a legacy to be distributed among these persons and quite lawful, although difficult of execution. On the contrary it was a foundation for thie future, which gave them only the use of the Asylum to be built, endowed and supported; which was not bequeathed to the city; for it was to be built in the city. and its very name, Finik Asylum, showed it was merely a private establishment confided to trustees or fideicommissaries who were to hold the property only in tru?st under the moral obligation to apply the funds to the perpetual destination indicated by the testator. Hence the undersigned does not attack the moral object the testator had in view, but what he censures and what he insists is illegal is the disposition in itself as violative of the public law of Louisiana. Article 1507 of the Louisiana Code, prohibits fideicommissa in donations and testaments. It does not alone prohibit them, it declares them null-and not content with declaring them null, it declares also null the disposition they affect-they are at the same time null and nullifying (nuls et annultateurs, nuls et irritants.) Nothing of them can be kept alive, neither the principal disposition nor its effects upon third persons. Thus the legacy of ~the residue burthened with the trust to create a private establishment endowed with the testator’s name, for the purpose of supporting a class of persons who do not constitute a public corporation is a legacy which is cull and of no

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( 7 ) effect; hence the testatorhas done what thlelaw prohibited him from doing; and hence the property which is embraced in this universal legacy has continued to remain in the succession and has consequently belonged to the legal heirs from the moment the succession was opened. (Code of Louisiana, Art. 934.) IV. But even if a different interpretation were to be given to the will, and the city of New Orleans should (contrary to our opinion) be considered as the object of the liberality of John I). Fink, it would not be the less true that the testator has not given directly to the city and that he has expressly charged his executor to appoint and constitute three persons as trustees in order that those trustees should put in execution his intention of applying the remainder of his succession after payment of just debts and legacy to the construction, maintenance and support of a suitable asylum in the city for the sole benefit of Protestant widows and orphans. Thus in point of fact it is always to trustees that the testament directs the residue of the succession to be remitted, for the execution of the will of the deceased. It is of little importance that after them the Fink Asylum will or will not belong to the city (an acknowledged public corporation) since the Fink Asylum cannot come to the city except through the intervention of a prohibited fideicommissum. When article 1507 declares that fideicommi8ssa are prohibited, and that it annuls fideicommissa and substitutions, it proceeds differently from the French Law, which in the following words of article 911 of the Code Napoleon prohibits only those fidei commissa which are created for the benefit of persons incapable of taking directly: “toute disposition en faveur d’un incapable sera nulle mcme si on l’a fait sous le nom des personnes interpo sies.”. I………………………

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(8) The Code of Louisiana is imore rigorous; “fideicomtmis.sa are prohibitedl.” THEY ARE PROHIBITED whethler the persons who are ultimately to profit by them are capable or incapable, private or public, corporations or individuals. In the Louisiana systemn the moment there is a fideicommis sum the legacy is radically null. Hence it is of little consequence what interpretation be given to the leg,acy, what object be assigned to it or what person is to profit by it. Is it the city a public or recognised corporation? or is it the Protestant widows and orphans, a class of persons who do not even constitute a private corporation? or is it a private corporation established in conformity with law and which by imposing the requisite condition for entering the Asylum may have placed itself in a position to claim the property of the deceased? These are questions which concern us but little, and there is no need to examine them. As soon as the testator willed that the residue of his succession should go in the hands of fideicommissaires charged to fulfil and execute his behests in this particular, the legacy de residuo became null, radically null. What composes the residue remains in the succession ab intestato. V. The undersigned has but one observation to make upon the word trustees used by the testator. Trustees are the English fideicommissaries. In a consultation held for the city of New Orleans in the MIcDonogh case with his illustrious confrbres Atessrs. DelaIngle, Giraud, Duranton pare and AIarcad6 on the 18th of December 1851, he had already written” this word fideicommis (fideicommissa) seems to us to have been added to article 896 of the Louisiana Code on account of the English origin of the other S +ates of the Unioi and to prohibit as well the substitution of the

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(9) old French law as the trusts of the English system.” Hie has learned since that Mr. Brown one of the framers of the Code of Louisiana had formally made the same remark. We may, then, say with reason and understandingly that trustees being but fideicommissaries, the legacy de residuo made by the testator to the three trustees to be nominated by his executor to put in action his intentions with respect to the erection, maintenance and support of the asylum is a legacy radically null under the law of the State. VI. Here a difficulty of secondary importance is presented and it is urged against the heirs that although, in truth, there is in the will a delegation by the testator to a third person (the executor) to choose trustees or administrators of a portion of his fortune, and that this beyond question is a pure nullity: still according to article 1506 of the Louisiana Code those conditions or clauses in a will which are null, are and are to be reputed as not written. And from this the conclusion is drawn that, while the legacy de rcsidtuo would if made directly for the benefit of the Protestants widows and orphans of New Orleans, be entirely void because theProtestant widows and orphans in a city do not coustitute a corporation a civil person and are incapable of taking as uncertain persons; nevertheless by deciding as a fact that the true legatee de residtio was the city of New Orleans a public corporation capa. ble of receiving, the institution of trustees might be effaced as being contrary to law and consequently be considered as not written. But in the view of the undersigned, this is contrary to the testarnent, if we have regard to its meaning, and contrary to the Law of Louisiana if we consult its text and its spirit. VII. As to the meaning of the will, it is impossible to say that this disposition ” It is my will and desire and I do hereby de

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( 10 ) dare the same to be my uwill…… that the proceeds of my whole estate, property, rights, effeccts and credits be applied to the erection and maintenance and support of a suitable asylum in this city, to be utsed soly as an asyltum for Protestant widows aud orphans”, can be a disposition in favor of the city. The city is not a legatee; the words in this city merely indicate the place where the testator wishes the asylum should be constructed. The remainder of the disposition establishes still more clearly that the city is not the beneficiary, nor even the object of the liberality of the testator. For he wills that the executor shall appoint three trustees to be charged with the duty of erecting, maintaining and supporting the asylum, which is to bear his name. The asylum then which he projected was not to belong to the city, it was only to be a private establishment having an existence and an administration absolutely independent of the administration of the city. The appointment of trustees, the order to the executor to select them is a conclusive proof the testator never dreamed of an intention to give to the city but desired that the public municipal administration should have no part in a legacy which he destined for the benefit of a class of persons of a particular religion to whom fortune had not been propitious. VIII. But in any case-even should the legacy have been made by the testator with the ultimate view of being useful to the city;‘even if in his thought, the trustees or fideicommissaries were to construct, maintain and endow the asylum, and after forming it to deliver it over to the city of New IOrleans-examining the question under the Legislation of Louisiana, we are forced to pronounce the nullity of the legacy and to affirm that the order to appoint trustees cannot be considered as a disposition not written. In all fideicommissary legacies as in all substitutions two classes

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(11 ) of )persons are to be distiuguislied on wlion the intentions of the tcstator rest; the greve to whomi tihe testator gives directly and wlio is charged to deliver, atd the appe[e or appele’s, those for whom thie grev is to execute the will of the testator. Now accordiing to the Law of Louisiana every thing is null for thefidecommissumn as for tlie substitution and niiothling ought to remiain of the legacy, neither thee disposition made in favor of the grev6 nor tihe disposition made for the appeles: once more tew whole is iultl. The question is not a new one. It has arisen in the French system with respect to fideicommissary substitutions under article 896 of the Code Napoleon similar in its text to article 1507 of the Louisiana Code to which latterftdeicommissa have been added. The jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation is with us fixed upon this point. In vain would it be said, conditions contrary to the law are reputed not written, (Art 900 Code Napol6on) and hence the gireve can keep his legacy, it is only the substitution which is null. The answer is: there are in the French law, two provisions very distinct from each other, article 900 and article 89(6. (remark that the same is to be said of the law of Louisiana, where there all also two equally distinct provisions, article 1506 similar to our article 900 and article 1507isimilar to our article 896 and which adds to it, ftdeicoinmissa.) Art 900 (1506) is the general rule, article 896 (1507) is an exception. Generally if a disposition has no other defect than that it is made under an impossible condition or one contrary to law, it is valid because the illegal condition is reputed not written: on the other hand where the law annuls the charge or condition to preserve and to render, there is no room for the application of article 900 (or 1506): It is not designed for this particularcase.‘Tlio principal disposition is nits, the secondary one is ala null.

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( I- ) The first ariet of the court of Cassation Upon this subject is of the 18th of january 1808: it is to be found in the Repertoire of Mr.

Merlin under the head s?tbstit?itionfi(leicommissaire Sec. 1 ~ IV No 2 and contains his official opinion. This jurisprudence is uniform. Let us add that afortiori this should be so with respect to per-.

petualfideicof77imissa.. pcr)et?ealtrqust constituted to form a private establishlinent is a perpetual fidcleicommissum. The law of Lonisiana proscribes tlhem-IT PROHIBITS TIEM-It is no-longer the condition which is prohibited, it is the legacy in itself. The residuary legacy being invalid and made contrary to the prohlibition of the law remains in the slluccession at) intestafe. IX. The undersigned 1las said that the principal danger to whichlthe plaintiff is exposed would arise when at soneic stage of the cause he would come before the Supreme Court of Louisiana where the judgment of the 16 of March, 1857, will be opposed to him as a precedent. For the undersigned is aware that in England and in those countries who have derived their mnode of procedure from England, precedents and adjudged cases have an influence upon future decisions far more potent than in France. For this reason he submits to the consideration of the court the following observations In Louisiana, as with us, judgments make the law only of particular cases. All that is said by the judge before the decretal part of the judgment (la partie dippositive) is the expression of opinion, minere matter of doctrine, which does not constitute res judicata. The thing adjudged is contained only in the decree (dictum) and even this thing adjudged exists only between the persons who have been parties to the judgnment.

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( l, ) IThe Court will doubtless bear in mind teat precedents ought to have much less influence upon subsequent decisions in Louisiana, than in the other States of the Union inasmuch as through its Civil Code, Louisiana is a country of codified or written law. It would appear that Courts of Justice ought in fact to make a great difference as to the force of precedents between those countries whose laws have been and those whose laws have not been codified. . In the countries which in French we would designate as custonmry (pays de costumes) and in English as countries of common law, wfe recognize the great utility of invoking former decisions (series rerum perpetuo judicatarum); because a uniform series of decisions is an authentic and reliable proof of the custom which has been introduced in a given matter. But in countries of written law, which as France and Louisiana, have enacted codes, precedents whilethey command respect, have no authority except in so far as they conform to the written law. In those countries, the citizens by their adoption of a Civil Code, have positively declared their wish not to put their persons, their rights and their property at the mercy of the changing’current of opinion. For them the law is their anchor of safety, a departure from which even in a series of decisions would be consecrated into the force of the thing adjudged, only between the parties thereto, and subsequent decisions, though in similar cases, should take the law and not the precedents for their guide; the judiciary, though it controls the rights of the citizens who have recourse to it, cannot by a series of decisions change the law, which it has only the power to administer. And from this truth we draw the consequence that a party who demands the same thing as the one who failed in 1857, has the right ,to demaonstrte whether before the Court of the first instance 4..v -d ‘r.

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( 14 ) or before the Supreme Court, that notwithstanding the personal merit of the Judge and notwithstanding his authority over the persons who were parties to the decree of 1857, that decree should not be taken as a precedent binding upon the magistracy in a case instituted by a new plaintiff not represented in the judgment of 1857. Such a person will be free to examine whether all the elements of the cause have been well ascertained and properly combined; whether the reasons were correct, complete and conclusive and even to present additional ones, for the case is no longer the same, however similar. Considered at Paris, December 19th, 1859. [Signed] COIN DELISLE, Avocat (I la Cour Impdriale; ancien nembre du Conseil de l’Ordre. The undersigned adopts in its entirety the above opinion of his honorable confrere. PAILLARD DE VILLENEUYE, Avocat t a Gour Imp ria~e de Paris; ileembre du Covzseil de l’Or&de. PARIS, Deceimber 20, 1859. I

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