Plato Redivivus or, A Dialogue Concerning Government (second edition, 1681) by Henry Neville
Author: Unknown
Date: 0101-01-01T00:00:00+00:00

PLATO

REDIVIVUS:

OR, A

DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

Government,

Wherein, by Observations drawn from other KINGDOMS and STATES
both Ancient and Modern, an Endeavour is used to discover the present POLITICK DISTEMPER of our OWN, with the CAUSES, and REMEDIES.

[by Henry Neville]

Non Ego sum Vates, sed Prisci conscius aevi.

Pluribus exemplis haec tibi Mysta Cano, Res nolunt male administrari.

The Second Edition, with Additions.

LONDON,

Printed for S.I. and Sold by R. Dew, 1681.

Non ego sum vates, sed prisci conscius aevi, Pluribus exemplis haec tibi mysta cano.

Res nolunt male administrari.

I am no prophet, but know about times past and, a priest of the mysteries, sing of many examples for you.[1] A government cannot subsist long under an ill administration.

Contents
page Political Discourses and Histories worth Reading 65

The Publisher to the Reader 67

The Argument 71

The First Dialogue 73

The Second Dialogue 79

The Third Dialogue 152

Political Discourses and Histories worth reading [prefaced to the second edition of Plato Redivivus, 1681]

1. The Works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, Citizen and Secretary of Florence, containing, 1. The History of Florence. 2. The Prince. 3. The Original of the Guelf and Ghibilin Factions. 4. The Life of Castruccio Castracani. 5. The Murther of Vitelli, &c. by Duke Valentino. 6. The State of France. 7. The State of Germany. 8. The Discourses on Titus Livius. 9.

The Art of War. 10. The Marriage of Belphegor, a Novel. 11. Nicholas Machiavel’s Letter, in Vindication of himself and his writings: All written in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully Translated into English. In Folio, Price Bound, 16s. [Ed. H. Neville, 1675.]

2. I Ragguagli di Parnasso; or Advertisements from Parnassus, in two Centuries, with the Politick Touchstone, written Originally in Italian, By that Noble Roman Trajano Boccalini. Englished by the Earl of Monmouth: In Folio, Price bound 8s. [1674.]

3. The History of the Affairs of Europe, in this present age, but more particularly of the Republick of Venice, written in Italian, by Battista Nani, Cavalier and Procurator of St Mark: Englished by Sir Robert Honiwood, Knight; in Folio, price bound 12s. [1673.]

4. The History of the Government of Venice, wherein the Policies, Councils, Magistrates, and Laws of that State are fully related, and the use of the Balloting Box, exactly described: Written in the Year 1675, in Octav. Price bound 3s. [Abraham Nicolas Amelotte de la Houssaye, tr. 1677.]

5. The History of the Turkish Empire, from the year 1623, to the year 1677, containing the Reigns of the three last Emperours, viz. Sultan Morat, Sultan Ibrahim, and Sultan Mahomet 4th, his Son, the 13th Emperour now Reigning: By Paul Rycaut, Esq; late Consul of Smyrna. In Folio, Price bound 14s. [1680.]

6. The present State of the Ottoman Empire in 3 Books, containing the Maximes of the Turkish Polity, their Religion and Military Discipline, Illustrated with divers Figures. Written by Paul Rycaut, Esq; late Secretary to the English Ambassadour there, and since Consul of Smyrna. The Fourth Edition, in Octavo. Price bound 5s. [1672.]

7. The Memoires of Philip de Commines Lord of Argenton, containing the History of Lewis XI. and Charles VIII, Kings of France, with the most remarkable occurrences in their particular Reigns, from the Year 1464, to 1498, Revised and Corrected by Denis Godfrey, Councellour and Historiographer to the French King, and from his Edition lately Printed at Paris, newly Translated into English, in Octav. Price bound 5s. [1674.]

8. The History of France, under the Ministry of Cardinal Mazarine, viz.

from the Death of King Lewes XIII, to the year 1664, wherein all the Affairs of State to that time are exactly Related: By Benjamine Priolo, and faithfully Englished, by Christopher Wase, Gent. in Octav. Price bound 4s.

[1671.]

9. The Present State of the United Provinces of the Low Countries, as to the Government, Laws, Forces, Riches, Manners, Customes, Revenue, and Territory of the Dutch; Collected out of divers Authors: By W. A. Fellow of the Royal Society, the Second Edition in twelves: Price bound 2s. 6d. [Wm. Aglionby, 1670.]

10. The Present State of the Princes and Republicks of Italy, the Second Edition enlarged, with the manner of Election of Popes, and a Character of Spain. Written Originally in English by J. Gailhard, Gent. in twelves.

Price bound 1s. 6d. [1668.]

11. The Policy and Government of the Venetians, both in Civil and Military Affairs: Written in French by the Sieur de la Hay, and faithfully Englished, in 12s. Price bound 1s. [1671.]

12. The Secret History of the Court of the Emperour Justinian, giving a true account of the Debaucheries thereof: Written in Greek, by Procopius of Caesarea; faithfully Englished, in Octav. Price bound 1s. 6d. [1674.]

The Publisher to the Reader

Courteous Reader,

All the account I can give thee of this piece, is; that about the middle of October last[2] it was sent to me; accompanied with a letter without a name, and written in a hand altogether unknown to me; though different from the character of the dialogue itself, and the argument. The letter was very short; and contained only, that the writer having the fortune to meet with this discourse, (of which he denied to be the author,) he thought it very fit to be sent to me, to the end if I thought it could be of any advantage to me and no prejudice, I might publish it if I pleased and make my best of it. When I had opened it, and perceived that it treated of government, and of the present times; I (supposing it to be something of the nature of those scurrilous libels, which the press spawns every day) was extremely displeased with my servant, for receiving in my absence and in these dangerous days, such a packet; without taking any account or notice of the messenger who brought it: till he, to appease me, assured me, that the bearer did look like a gentleman, and had a very unsuitable garb to a trepan, and that he did believe he had seen him often at my shop, and that I knew him well. When I had begun to read it, and found no harm; I was resolved to peruse it in the company of a gentleman, a worthy friend of mine; who, to his exact skill and learning in the laws of his country, has added a very profound knowledge in all other literature; and particularly the excellence of platonic philosophy. When we had jointly gone through it, he was clearly of opinion; that although some might be angry with certain passages in it, yet the discourse reflecting upon no particular person, was very incapable of bringing me into any danger for publishing it; either from the state, or from any private man. When I had secured myself against the resulting loss, we went about the consideration of the other part of the distinction of the schools, which is lack of profit:[3] and I made some objections against the probability of vending this dialogue to profit; which, in things of my trade, is always my design, as it ought to be. My first fear in that behalf was, that this author would disgust the reader, in being too confident and positive in matters of so high a speculation. My friend replied; that the assurance he showed was void of all sauciness, and expressed with great modesty: and that he verily believed, that he meant very faithfully and sincerely towards the interest of England. My next doubt was; that a considerable part of this treatise being a repetition of a great many principles and positions out of Oceana, the author would be discredited for borrowing from another and the sale of the book hindered. To that my friend made answer; that before ever Oceana came out, there were very many treatises and pamphlets which alleged the political principle, that empire was founded in property, and discoursed rationally upon it: amongst the rest, one entitled A Letter from An Officer in Ireland, to his Highness the Lord Protector (which he then showed me) printed in 1653,[4] as I remember; which was more than three years before Oceana was written; and yet, said he, no man will aver that the learned gentleman who writ that book had stolen from that pamphlet: for whosoever sets himself to study politics, must do it by reading history, and observing in it the several turns and revolutions of government; and then the cause of such change will be so visible and obvious, that we need not impute theft to any man that finds it out: it being as lawful and as easy for any person, as well as for the author of Oceana, or that pamphlet, to read Thucydides, Polybius, Livy or Plutarch; and if he do so with attentiveness, he shall be sure to find the same things there that they have found. And if this were not lawful, when that any one person has written in any science, no man must write after him; for in polity, the orders of government; in architecture, the several orders of pillars, arches, architraves, cornices, &c; in physic, the causes, prognostics and crisis of diseases, are so exactly the same in all writers, that we may as well accuse all subsequent authors to have been but plagiaries of the antecedent. Besides this the learned gentleman added: that Oceana was written (it being thought lawful so to do in those times) to evince out of these principles, that England was not capable of any other government than a democracy; and this author out of the same maxims or aphorisms of politics, endeavours to prove, that they may be applied naturally and fitly to the redressing and supporting one of the best monarchies in the world, which is that of England. I had but one doubt more, and that was an objection against the title; which I resolved, at the first, not to mention; because I could salve it by altering the title page: But since I had opportunity, I acquainted the gentleman with it and it was, that certainly no man would ever buy a book that had in the front of it so insolent and presumptuous a motto, as Plato Redivivus; for that he must needs be thought not only vain in the highest degree, but void of sense and judgement too, who compares himself with Plato; the greatest philosopher, the greatest politician (I had almost said the greatest divine too) that ever lived. My counsellor told me, that he had as great a resentment of any injury done to Plato as I, as any man could have: but that he was hard to believe, that this man intended to compare himself to Plato, either in natural parts or learning; but only to show that he did imitate his way of writing, as to the manner of it, (though not the matter) as he has done exactly. For Plato ever writ these high matters in easy and familiar dialogues; and made the philosophers, and learned men of that age; as Simmias, Cebes, Timaeus, Callias, Phaedon, &c, yea and Socrates himself, the interlocutors; although they never heard anything of it till the book came out; and although talking of state-affairs in a monarchy must needs be more offensive, than it was in the democracy where Plato lived; therefore our author has forborne the naming the persons who constitute this dialogue: yet he does make a pretty near representation and character of some persons, who (I dare swear) never heard of this discourse, nor of the author’s design.

This convinced me, and made me suffer the title to pass. So that I have nothing more to say to thee, courteous reader, but to desire thee to pardon the faults in printing; and also the plainness and easiness of the style, and some tautologies: which latter I could easily have mended, but that I thought the author did not let them pass out of neglect, but design; and intended that both they, and the familiarity of the words and expressions, suited better with his purpose of disposing this matter to be treated in ordinary conversation amongst private friends, than full periods and starched language would have done; which might have been impropriety. The next request I have to thee is: that if thou do believe this discourse to be a very foolish one, as it may be for aught I know, (for I am no fit judge of such matters) that thou wilt yet vouchsafe to suspend thy censure of it for a while, till the whole impression is vended; that so, although neither the public nor thyself may ever reap any benefit or profit by it, I may be yet so fortunate by thy favour as to do it: which will make me study thy content hereafter in something better, and in the mean time remain, Thy Friend and Servant.

The Argument

A Noble Venetian,[5] (not one of the young fry, but a grave, sober person who had born office and magistracy in his own commonwealth,) having been some years since in France, with a near relation of his who was ambassador at that court, and finding himself out of employment; resolved to divert himself, by visiting some part of the world which he had never seen: and so passing through Germany, Flanders, and Holland, arrived in England, about the beginning of May last; bringing letters of recommendation to several English gentlemen, who had been travellers, and made friendship in his country: a custom, usually practised amongst such who travel into any part, where they have no habitude or acquaintance. Amongst the rest, he was addressed to one of the gentlemen who acts a part in this dialogue. Who, after he had waited upon him and served him for near two months, had certain necessary occasions, which called him for some time into the country: where he had not been above three weeks, before he heard, by mere accident, that the gentleman of Venice was fallen dangerous sick of a malignant fever: which made him post away immediately to London, to assist and serve him in what he might. But he found him almost perfectly restored to his health, by an eminent physician[6] of our nation; as renowned for his skill and cures at home, as for his writings both here and abroad: and who (besides his profound knowledge in all learning as well in other professions as his own) had particularly arrived to so exact and perfect a discovery of the formerly hidden parts of human bodies; that every one, who can but understand Latin, may by his means know more of anatomy, than either Hippocrates, or any of the ancients or moderns, did or do perceive: and if he had lived in the days of Solomon, that great philosopher would never have said, the heart of man is inscrutable. This excellent doctor being in the sick man’s chamber, when the other English gentleman newly alighted, came to visit him; after some compliments and conversation of course, they began to talk of political matters: as you will better understand, by the introduction and by the discourse itself.

The First Dialogue[7]

ENGLISH GENTLEMAN.[8] The sudden news I had of your sad distemper, and the danger you were in, has been the cause of a great deal of affliction to me; as well as of my present and speedy repair to London, some weeks sooner than I intended. I must confess I received some comfort to hear at my arrival of your amendment; and do take much more now to find you up, and as I hope recovered: which I knew would be a necessary consequence of your sending for this excellent physician, the Aesculapius of our age; it being the first request I had to make to you, if by seeing him here in your chamber I had not found it needless. For the destiny of us Englishmen depends upon him; and we either live or die infallibly, according to the judgement or good fortune we have when we are sick, either to call or not call him to our assistance.

NOBLE VENETIAN. I am infinitely obliged to you, for your care of me; but am sorry it has been so inconvenient to you, as to make you leave your affairs in the country sooner than you proposed to yourself to do. I wish I might be so fortunate in the course of my life, as to find an opportunity of making some part of an acknowledgement, for this and all the rest of your favours; but shall pray God it may not be in the same kind: but that your health may ever be so entire, that you never need so transcendent a charity, as I now receive from your goodness. And as to this incomparable doctor; although, I must confess, that all the good which has happened to me in this country, as well as the knowledge I have received of persons and things, does derive from you; yet I must make an exception, as to this one point: for if I can either read or hear, this gentleman’s excellent writings, and the fame he worthily enjoys in my country, would have made it inexcusable in me to implore the help of any other. And I do assure you, that, before I left England, it was in my ambition to beg your mediation towards the bringing me into the acquaintance and favour of this learned person; even before I had any thoughts of becoming the object of his care and skill, as now I am the trophy of both.

DOCTOR. Well, gentlemen, you are both too great to be flatterers, and I too little to be flattered; and therefore I will impute this fine discourse you both make about me, to the overflowing of your wit, and the having no object near you to vent it upon but me. And for you, sir, if my art fail me not, the voiding this mirth is a very good sign that you are in a fair way to a perfect recovery. And for my countryman here, I hope whilst he has this vent, that his hypochondriac distemper will be at quiet; and that neither his own thoughts, nor the ill posture of our public affairs, will make him hang himself, for at least this twelve-month. Only, gentlemen, pray take notice, that this does not pass upon me, nor do I drink it like milk (as the French phrase it;) being mindful of what a grave gentleman at Florence replied to a young esquire, (who answered his compliments with, ‘Oh, sir, you flatter me,’) — ‘The principle of flattery is that your equals understand you’.[9] That last word I cannot render well into Latin.

ENG. GENT. Well, doctor, we will not offend your modesty: the next time we do you justice, it shall be behind your back, since you are so severe upon us. But you may assure yourself, that my intention of recommending you to this gentleman, was for his own sake and not for yours: for you have too many patients already; and it were much better, both for you and us, that you had but half so many: for then we should have more of your writings, and sometimes enjoy your good conversation; which is worth our being sick on purpose for: and I am resolved to put my self sometimes into my bed, and send for you, since you have done coming to our coffee-house.[10]

But to leave this subject now, I hear you say, that this gentleman is in a perfect way of recovery: pray is he well enough to hear, without any prejudice to his convalescence, a reprehension I have to make him?

DOCT. Yes, yes, you may say what you will to him; for your reprimands will rather divert than trouble him, and prove more a cordial than a corrosive.

ENG. GENT. Then, sir, pray consider what satisfaction you can ever make me for the hard measure you have used towards me, in letting me learn from common fame and fortune, the news of your sickness, and that not till your recovery; and for depriving me of the opportunity of paying the debt I owe to your own merit, and to the recommendation of those worthy persons in Italy, who did me the honour to address you to me. And this injury is much aggravated by the splendour of your condition, and greatness of your fortune; which makes it impossible for me ever to hope for any other occasion to express my faithful service to you, or satisfy any part of the duty I have to be at your devotion. To be sick in a strange country, and to distrust the sincerity and obedience of —

NOBLE VEN. Pray, sir, give me leave to interrupt you, and to assure you, that it was not any distrust of your goodness to me, of which I have had sufficient experience; nor any insensibleness how much your care might advantage me; much less any scruple I had of being more in your debt; which if it had been possible for me to entertain, it must have been thought of long since, before I had received those great obligations, which I never made any difficulty to accept of. It was not, I say, any of these considerations, which hindered me from advertising you of my distemper; but the condition and nature of it, which in a moment deprived me of the exercise of those faculties which might give me a capacity of helping myself in any thing. But otherwise I assure you that no day of my life shall pass, wherein I will not express a sense of your favours; and —

DOCT. Pray now, sir, permit me to interrupt you; for this gentleman, I dare say, looks for no compliments: but that which I have to say, is; that the desire you signified to me, to give you some account of our affairs here, and the turbulency of our present state, will be much better placed, if you please to address it to this gentleman, whose parts and studies have fitted him for such an employment; besides his having had a great share in the managing affairs of state here, in other times: and really no man understands the government of England better than he.[11]

ENG. GENT. Now doctor, I should tell you, those who are my equals understand me;[12] for so you yourself have baptized this kind of civility. But however, this is a province that I cannot be reasonably pressed to take upon me, whilst you are present; who are very well known to be as skilful in the nature and distemper of the body politic, as the whole nation confesses you to be in the concerns of the natural. And you would have good store of practice in your former capacity, if the wise custom amongst the ancient Greeks were not totally out of use. For they, when they found any craziness or indisposition in their several governments, before it broke out into a disease, did repair to the physicians of state (who, from their profession, were called the seven wise men of Greece;) and obtained from them some good recipes, to prevent those seeds of distemper from taking root, and destroying the public peace. But in our days, these signs or forerunners of diseases in state are not foreseen, till the whole mass is corrupted; and that the patient is incurable, but by violent remedies. And if we could have perceived the first symptoms of our distemper, and used good alternatives, the curiosity of this worthy gentleman had been spared, as also his command to you to give him some light into our matters; and we unfortunate Englishmen had reposed in that quiet, ease, and security, which we enjoyed three hundred years since. But let us leave the contest who shall inform this gentleman, lest we spend the time we should do it in unprofitably, and let each of us take his part; for if one speak all, it will look like a studied discourse fitted for the press, and not a familiar dialogue. For it ought to be in private conversation, as it was originally in the planting the gospel; when there were two sorts of preaching: the one concionary,[13]

which was used by the apostles and other missionaries, when they spoke to those who had never heard of the mysteries of Christian religion; possibly not so much, as of the Jewish law or the history of Christ; the duty of those was to hear, and not reply, or any way interrupt the harangue: but when the believers (called the church) assembled together, it was the custom of such of the auditors to whom any thing occurred, or (as saint Paul calls it) was revealed, to interpose and desire to be heard; which was called an interlocutory preaching, or religious conversation: and served very much to the instructing and edifying those who had long believed in Christ, and possibly knew as much of him as their pastor himself; and this is used still amongst many of our independent congregations.

DOCT. I have (besides the reason I alleged before, and which I still insist upon) some other cause to beg that you will please to give yourself the trouble of answering this gentleman’s queries; which is, that I am very defective in my expressions in the Italian language: which though I understand perfectly, and so comprehend all that either of you deliver; yet I find not words at hand to signify my own meaning, and am therefore necessitated to deliver my self in Latin, as you see. And I fear that our pronunciation being so different from that which is used in Italy, this worthy person may not so easily comprehend what I intend, and so be disappointed in the desire he has to be perfectly instructed in our affairs.[14]

NOBLE VEN. Really, sir, that is not all; for besides that, I confess your pronunciation of the Latin tongue to be very new to me, and for that reason I have been forced to be troublesome to you, in making you repeat things twice, or thrice. I say besides that, your Latinity, (as your writings show and all the world knows) is very pure and elegant: which it is notorious to all, that we in Italy scarce understand; gentlemen there never learning more Latin, than what is necessary to call for meat and drink, in Germany or Holland, where most of the hosts speak a certain Franck, compounded of Dutch, Latin, and Italian. And though some of us have Latin enough to understand a good author, (as you have of our language) yet we seldom arrive to speak any better than this Franck; or can without study comprehend good Latin, when we meet with it in discourse. And therefore it is your perfection in that tongue, and my ignorance in it, that makes me concur with you, in desiring this gentleman to take the pains of instructing my curiosity in Italian.

ENG. GENT. I shall obey you in this, and all things else, upon this condition, that both you and the doctor will vouchsafe to interrogate me, and by that means give me the method of serving you in this: and then that you will both please to interrupt and contradict me, when you think I say any thing amiss, or that either of you are of a different opinion; and to give me a good occasion of explaining myself, and possibly of being convinced by you, which I shall easily confess; for I hate nothing more than to hear disputes amongst gentlemen and men of sense, wherein the speakers seem (like sophisters in a college) to dispute rather for victory, than to discover and find out the truth.

DOCT. Well, all this I believe will be granted you; so that we have nothing to do now, but to adjourn, and name a time when to meet again. Which I, being this gentleman’s physician, will take upon me to appoint: and it shall be tomorrow morning about nine of the clock, after he has slept well; as I hope he will, by means of a cordial I intend to send him immediately. In the mean time, not to weary him too much, we will take our leaves of him for this night.

NOBLE VEN. I shall expect your return with great impatience; and if your cordial be not very potent, I believe the desire of seeing you will make me wake much sooner than the hour you appoint: and I am very confident, that my mind as well as my body, will be sufficiently improved by such visits. It begins to be darkish; boy, light your torch, and wait on these gentlemen down.

BOTH. Sir, we wish you all good rest and health.

NOBLE VEN. And I, with a thousand thanks, the like to you.

The Second Dialogue

DOCT. Well, sir, how is it? have you rested well to night? I fear we come too early.

NOBLE VEN. Dear doctor, I find myself very well, thanks to your care and skill; and have been up above these two hours, in expectation of the favour you and this gentleman promised me.

DOCT. Well, then pray let us leave off compliments and repartees (of which we had a great deal too much yesterday) and fall to our business; and be pleased to interrogate this gentleman what you think fit.

NOBLE VEN. Then, sir, my first request to you is, that you will vouchsafe to acquaint me for what reasons this nation, which has ever been esteemed (and very justly) one of the most considerable people of the world; and made the best figure both in peace, treaties, war and trade; is now of so small regard, and signifies so little abroad? Pardon the freedom I take, for I assure you it is not out of disrespect, much less of contempt that I speak it: for since I arrived in England, I find it one of the most flourishing kingdoms in Europe, full of splendid nobility and gentry; the comeliest persons alive, valiant, courteous, knowing, and bountiful; and as well stored with commoners, honest, industrious, fitted for business, merchandise, arts, or arms; as their several educations lead them. Those who apply themselves to study, prodigious for learning, and succeeding to admiration in the perfection of all sciences: all this makes the riddle impossible to be solved; but by some skilful Oedipus, such as you are; whose pains I will yet so far spare, as to acknowledge, that I do in that little time I have spent here, perceive that the immediate cause of all this, is the disunion of the people and the governors; the discontentment of the gentry, and turbulency of the commonalty; although without all violence or tumult, which is miraculous. So that what I now request of you, is, that you will please to deduce particularly to me, the causes of this division; that when they are laid open, I may proceed (if you think fit to permit it) from the disease when known, to enquire after the remedies.

ENG. GENT. Before I come to make you any answer, I must thank you for the worthy and honourable character you give of our nation; and shall add to it, that I do verily believe, that there are not a more loyal and faithful people to their prince in the whole world, than ours are; nor that fear more to fall into that state of confusion, in which we were twenty years since: and that, not only this parliament, which consists of the most eminent men of the kingdom, both for estates and parts; but all the inhabitants of this isle in general; even those (so many of them as have their understandings yet entire) which were of the anti-royal party in our late troubles, have all of them the greatest horror imaginable to think of doing any thing, that may bring this poor country into those dangers and uncertainties, which then did threaten our ruin.[15] And the rather for this consideration: that neither the wisdom of some who were engaged in those affairs, which I must aver to have been very great; nor the success of their contest, which ended in an absolute victory; could prevail so, as to give this kingdom any advantage; nay not so much as any settlement, in satisfaction and requital of all the blood it had lost, money it had spent, and hazard it had run. A clear argument why we must totally exclude a civil war from being any of the remedies, when we come to that point. I must add farther; that as we have as loyal subjects as are anywhere to be found, so we have as gracious and good a prince: I never having yet heard that he did or attempted to do, any the least act of arbitrary power, in any public concern; nor did ever take, or endeavour to take from any particular person the benefit of the law. And for his only brother, (although accidentally he cannot be denied to be a great motive of the people’s unquietness,) all men must acknowledge him to be a most glorious and honourable prince: one who has exposed his life several times for the safety and glory of this nation; one who pays justly and punctually his debts, and manages his own fortune discreetly, and yet keeps the best court and equipage of any subject in Christendom; is courteous and affable to all; and in fine, has nothing in his whole conduct to be excepted against, much less dreaded; excepting, that he is believed to be of a religion contrary to the honour of God, and the safety and interest of this people, which gives them just apprehensions of their future condition.

But of this matter we shall have occasion to speculate hereafter: in the mean time, since we have such a prince, and such subjects, we must needs want the ordinary cause of distrust and division; and therefore must seek higher, to find out the original of this turbulent posture we are in.

DOCT. Truly you had need seek higher, or lower, to satisfy us; for hitherto you have but enforced the gentleman’s question, and made us more admire what the solution will be.

ENG. GENT. Gentlemen, then I shall delay you no longer. The evil counsellors, the pensioner-parliament, the thorough-paced judges, the flattering divines, the busy and designing papists, the French counsels, are not the causes of our misfortunes;[16] they are but the effects, (as our present distractions are) of one primary cause; which is, the breach and ruin of our government: which, having been decaying for near two hundred years,[17] is in our age brought so near to expiration, that it lies agonizing; and can no longer perform the functions of a political life; nor carry on the work of ordering and preserving mankind. So that the shifts that our courtiers have within some years used are but so many tricks, or conclusions which they are trying to hold life and soul together a while longer: and have played handy-dandy[18] with parliaments, (and especially with the house of commons, the only part which is now left entire of the old constitution) by adjourning, and proroguing, and dissolving them; contrary to the true meaning of the law; as well in the reign of our late king, as during his majesty’s that now is. Whereas indeed our counsellors (perceiving the decay of the foundation, as they must if they can see but one inch into the politics) ought to have addressed themselves to the king to call a parliament, the true physician, and to lay open the distemper there; and so have endeavoured a cure, before it had been too late: as I fear, it now is; I mean for the piecing and patching up the old government.

It is true, as the divine Machiavel says, that diseases in government are like a marasmus[19] in the body natural, which is very hard to be discovered, whilst it is curable; and after it comes to be easy to discern, difficult (if not impossible) to be remedied: yet it is to be supposed that the counsellors are, or ought to be skilful physicians; and to foresee the seeds of state-distempers, time enough to prevent the death of the patient: else they ought in conscience to excuse themselves from that sublime employment, and betake themselves to callings more suitable to their capacities. So that although for this reason, the ministers of state here are inexcusable; and deserve all the fury, which must one time or other be let loose against them; (except they shall suddenly fly from the wrath to come, by finding out in time and advising the true means of setting themselves to rights) yet neither prince nor people are in the mean time to be blamed, for not being able to conduct things better; no more, than the waggoner is to answer for his ill guiding, or the oxen for their ill drawing the waggon; when it is with age and ill usage broken, and the wheels unserviceable; or the pilot and mariners, for not weathering out a storm; when the ship hath sprung a plank. And as in the body of man, sometimes the head and all the members are in good order, nay, the vital parts are sound and entire; yet if there be a considerable putrification in the humours, much more, if the blood (which the scripture calls the life) be impure and corrupted; the patient ceases not to be in great danger, and oftentimes dies without some skilful physician: and in the mean time the head and all the parts suffer, and are unquiet, full as much, as if they were all immediately affected: so it is in every respect with the body politic, or commonwealth, when their foundations are mouldered. And although in both these cases, the patients cannot (though the distemper be in their own bodies) know what they ail, but are forced to send for some artist to tell them; yet they cease not to be extremely uneasy and impatient, and lay hold oftentimes upon unsuitable remedies, and impute their malady to wrong and ridiculous causes. As some people do here, who think that the growth of popery is our only evil; and that if we were secure against that, our peace and settlement were obtained; and that our disease needed no other cure. But of this more when we come to the cure.

NOBLE VEN. Against this discourse, certainly we have nothing to reply: but must grant, that when any government is decayed, it must be mended; or all will ruin. But now we must request you to declare to us, how the government of England is decayed; and how it comes to be so. For I am one of those unskilful persons that cannot discern a state-marasmus, when the danger is so far off.

ENG. GENT. Then no man living can; for your government is this day the only school in the world, that breeds such physicians, and you are esteemed one of the ablest amongst them: and it would be manifest to all the world for truth, although there were no argument for it, but the admirable stability and durableness of your government; which has lasted above twelve hundred years entire and perfect. Whereas all the rest of the countries in Europe, have not only changed masters very frequently in a quarter of that time; but have varied and altered their polities very often. Which manifests that you must needs have ever enjoyed a succession of wise citizens, that have had skill and ability to forewarn you betimes of those rocks against which your excellently-built vessel might in time split.

NOBLE VEN. Sir, you over-value, not only me, but the wisdom of my fellow-citizens; for we have none of these high speculations, nor has scarce any of our body read Aristotle, Plato, or Cicero, or any of those great artists ancient or modern, who teach that great science of the governing and increasing great states and cities: without studying which science no man can be fit to discourse pertinently of these matters; much less to found, or mend a government, or so much as find the defects of it.

We only study our own government; and that too chiefly to be fit for advantageous employments, rather than to foresee our dangers. Which yet, I must needs confess, some amongst us are pretty good at; and will in a harangue, made upon passing a law, venture to tell us what will be the consequence of it two hundred years hence. But of these things I shall be very prodigal in my discourse, when you have leisure and patience to command me to say any thing of our polity; in the mean time pray be pleased to go on with your edifying instruction.

ENG. GENT. Before I can tell you how the government of England came to be decayed, I must tell you what that government was; and what it now is. And I should say something too of government in general, but that I am afraid of talking of that subject before you who are so exact a judge of it.

NOBLE VEN. I thought you had been pleased to have done with this discourse.

I assure you, sir, if I had more skill in that matter than ever I can pretend to, it would but serve to make me the fitter auditor of what you shall say on that subject.

ENG. GENT. Sir, in the course of my reasoning upon this point, I shall have occasion to insist and expatiate upon many things, which both myself and others have published in former times. For which I will only make this excuse; that the repetition of such matters is the more pardonable, because they will be at least new to you who are a stranger to our affairs and writings. And the rather, because those discourses shall be applied to our present condition, and suited to our present occasions. But I will say no more; but obey you, and proceed. I will not take upon me to say, or so much as conjecture, how and when government began in the world; or what government is most ancient. History must needs be silent in that point: for that government is more ancient than history; and there was never any writer but was bred under some government; which is necessarily supposed to be the parent of all arts and sciences, and to have produced them. And therefore it would be as hard for a man to write an account of the beginning of the laws and polity of any country, except there were memory of it; (which cannot be before the first historiographer:) as it would be to any person, without records, to tell the particular history of his own birth.

DOCT. Sir, I cannot comprehend you: may not historians write a history of matters done before they were born? If it were so, no man could write but of his own times.

ENG. GENT. My meaning is, where there are not stories, or records, extant; for as for oral tradition, it lasts but for one age, and then degenerates into fable: I call any thing in writing, whereby the account of the passages or occurrences of former times is derived to our knowledge, a history; although it be not penned methodically, so as to make the author pass for a wit: and had rather read the authentic records of any country, that is a collection of their laws and letters concerning transactions of state and the like, than the most eloquent and judicious narrative that can be made.

NOBLE VEN. Methinks, sir, your discourse seems to imply, that we have no account extant of the beginning of governments. Pray what do you think of the books of Moses? Which seem to be penned on purpose to inform us how he, by God’s command, led that people out of Egypt into another land; and in the way made them a government. Besides, does not Plutarch tell us, how Theseus gathered together the dispersed inhabitants of Attica, brought them into one city, and under one government of his own making? The like did Romulus in Italy, and many others in divers countries.

ENG. GENT. I never said, that we had not sufficient knowledge of the original of particular governments; but it is evident, that these great legislators had seen and lived under other administrations, and had the help of learned law-givers and philosophers; excepting the first, who had the aid of God himself. So that it remains undiscovered yet, how the first regulation of mankind began: and therefore I will take for granted that which all the politicians conclude: which is, that necessity made the first government. For every man by the first law of nature (which is common to us and brutes) had, like beasts in a pasture, right to everything; and there being no property, each individual, if he were the stronger, might seize whatever any other had possessed himself of before, which made a state of perpetual war. To remedy which, and the fear that nothing should be long enjoyed by any particular person, (neither was any man’s life in safety,) every man consented to be debarred of that universal right to all things; and confine himself to a quiet and secure enjoyment of such a part, as should be allotted him. Thence came in ownership, or property: to maintain which, it was necessary to consent to laws, and a government; to put them in execution.[20] Which of the governments now extant, or that have been formerly, was first, is not possible now to be known: but I think this must be taken for granted, that whatsoever the frame or constitution was first, it was made by the persuasion and mediation of some wise and virtuous person, and consented to by the whole number. And then, that it was instituted for the good and preservation of the governed; and not for the exaltation and greatness of the person or persons appointed to govern. The reason why I beg this concession is, that it seems very improbable, not to say impossible, that a vast number of people should ever be brought to consent to put themselves under the power of others, but for the ends above-said, and so lose their liberty without advantaging themselves in any thing. And it is full as impossible that any person (or persons so inconsiderable in number as magistrates and rulers are) should by force get an empire to themselves. Though I am not ignorant that a whole people have in imminent dangers, either from the invasion of a powerful enemy, or from civil distractions, put themselves wholly into the hands of one illustrious person for a time; and that with good success, under the best forms of government: but this is nothing to the original of states.

NOBLE VEN. Sir, I wonder how you come to pass over the consideration of paternal government, which is held to have been the beginning of monarchies.[21]

ENG. GENT. Really, I did not think it worth the taking notice of: for though it be not easy to prove a negative, yet I believe if we could trace all foundations of polities that now are, or ever came to our knowledge since the world began; we shall find none of them to have descended from paternal power. We know nothing of Adam’s leaving the empire to Cain, or Seth: it was impossible for Noah to retain any jurisdiction over his own three sons; who were dispersed into three parts of the world, if our antiquaries calculate right: and as for Abraham, whilst he lived, as also his son Isaac, they were but ordinary fathers of families, and no question governed their own household as all others do. And when Jacob upon his death-bed did relate to his children the promise almighty God had made his grandfather; to make him a great nation, and give his posterity a fruitful territory; he speaks not one word of the empire of Reuben his first-born, but supposes them all equal. And so they were taken to be by Moses, when he divided the land to them by lot; and by God’s command made them a commonwealth. So that I believe this fancy to have been first started, not by the solid judgement of any man, but to flatter some prince; and to assert, for want of better arguments, the divine right of monarchy.

NOBLE VEN. I have been impertinent in interrupting you, but yet now I cannot repent of it, since your answer has given me so much satisfaction; but if it be so as you say, that government was at first instituted for the interest and preservation of mankind, how comes it pass, that there are and have been so many absolute monarchies in the world, in which it seems that nothing is provided for, but the greatness and power of the prince?

ENG. GENT. I have presumed to give you already my reason, why I take for granted, that such a power could never be given by the consent of any people, for a perpetuity: for though the people of Israel did against the will of Samuel, and indeed of God himself, demand and afterwards choose themselves a king; yet he was never such a king as we speak of; for that all the orders of their commonwealth, the sanhedrim, the congregation of the people, the princes of the tribes, &c. did still remain in being: as has been excellently proved by a learned gentleman of our nation, to whom I refer you.[22] It may then be enquired into, how these monarchies at first did arise. History being in this point silent as to the ancient principalities, we will conjecture, that some of them might very well proceed from the corruption of better governments, which must necessarily cause a depravation in manners; (as nothing is more certain than that politic defects breed moral ones, as our nation is a pregnant example) this debauchery of manners might blind the understandings of a great many; destroy the fortunes of others, and make them indigent; infuse into very many a neglect and carelessness of the public good (which in all settled states is very much regarded) so that it might easily come into the ambition of some bold aspiring person, to affect empire; and as easily into his power, (by fair pretences with some, and promises of advantages with others,) to procure followers, and gain a numerous party, either to usurp tyranny over his own country, or to lead men forth to conquer and subdue another. Thus it is supposed that Nimrod got his kingdom: who in scripture is called, a great hunter before God; which expositors interpret, a great tyrant. The modern despotical powers have been acquired by one of these two ways. Either by pretending, by the first founder thereof, that he had a divine mission; and so gaining not only followers, but even easy access in some places without force, to empire, and afterwards dilating their power by great conquests; thus Mohamet and Genghis Khan began, and established the Saracen and Tartarian kingdoms: or by a long series of wisdom in a prince, or chief magistrate of a mixed monarchy, and his council, who by reason of the sleepiness and inadvertency of the people, have been able to extinguish the great nobility, or render them inconsiderable; and so by degrees taking away from the people their protectors, render them slaves. So the monarchies of France, and some other countries, have grown to what they are at this day; there being left but a shadow of the three states in any of these monarchies, and so no bounds remaining to the regal power. But since property remains still to the subjects; these governments may be said to be changed, but not founded or established: for there is no maxim more infallible and holding in any science, than this is in politics; that empire is founded in property. Force or fraud may alter a government; but it is property that must found and eternize it. Upon this undeniable aphorism we are to build most of our subsequent reasoning: in the meantime we may suppose, that hereafter the great power of the king of France may diminish much, when his enraged and oppressed subjects come to be commanded by a prince of less courage, wisdom, and military virtue; when it will be very hard for any such king to govern tyrannically a country,[23] which is not entirely his own.

DOCT. Pray, sir, give me leave to ask you by the way, what is the reason that here in our country where the peerage is lessened sufficiently, the king has not got as great an addition of power as accrues to the crown of France?

ENG. GENT. You will understand that, doctor, before I have finished this discourse: but to stay your stomach till then, you may please to know that in France the greatness of the nobility which has been lately taken from them, did not consist in vast riches and revenues; but in great privileges, and jurisdictions, which obliged the people to obey them: whereas our great peers in former times had not only the same great dependencies, but very considerable revenues besides, in demesnes, and otherwise. This vassalage over the people, which the peers of France had, being abolished, the power over those tenants, which before was in their lords, fell naturally and of course into the crown; although the lands and possessions divested of those dependencies did and do still remain to the owners: whereas here in England, though the services are for the most part worn out, and insignificant; yet for want of providence and policy in former kings, who could not forsee the danger afar off, entails have been suffered to be cut off; and so two parts in ten of all those vast estates, as well manors as demesnes, by the luxury and folly of the owners, have been within these two hundred years purchased by the lesser gentry and the commons; which has been so far from advantaging the crown, that it has made the country scarce governable by monarchy. But if you please, I will go on with my discourse about government, and come to this again hereafter.

NOBLE VEN. I beseech you, sir, do.

ENG. GENT. I cannot find by the small reading I have, that there were any other governments in the world anciently than these three: monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. For the first; I have no light out of antiquity to convince me, that there were in old times any other monarchies, but such as were absolutely despotical. All kingdoms then, as well in Greece, (Macedon, Epirus, and the like, where it is said the princes exercised their power moderately) as in Asia, being altogether unlimited by any laws, or any assemblies of nobility or people. Yet I must confess, Aristotle, when he reckons up the corruptions of these three governments, calls tyranny the corruption of the monarchy: by which if he means a change of government, (as it is in the corruptions of the other two;) then it must follow, that the philosopher knew of some other monarchy at the first, which afterwards degenerated into tyranny; that is, into arbitrary power: (for so the word tyranny is most commonly taken, though in modern languages it signifies the ill exercise of power;) for certainly arbitrary government cannot be called tyranny, where the whole property is in the prince, (as we reasonably suppose it to have been in those monarchies); no more than it is tyranny for you to govern your own house and estate as you please. But it is possible Aristotle might not in this speak so according to terms of art, but might mean, that the ill government of a kingdom or family is tyranny. However we have one example, that puzzles politicians: and that is Egypt, where Pharaoh is called king; and yet we see, that till Joseph’s time he had not the whole property: for the wisdom of that patriarch taught his master a way to make a new use of that famine, by telling him, that if they would buy their lives, and sell their estates (as they did afterwards, and preserve themselves by the king’s bread) they shall serve Pharaoh: which shows that Joseph knew well, that empire was founded in property. But most of the modern writers in polity, are of opinion, that Egypt was not a monarchy till then; though the prince might have the title of king: as the Heraclides had in Sparta, and Romulus and the other kings had in Rome; both which states were instituted commonwealths. They give good conjectures for this their opinion, too many to be here mentioned; only one is, that originally (as they go about to prove) all arts and sciences had their rise in Egypt; which they think very improbable to have been under a monarchy. But this position, that all kings in former times were absolute, is not so essential to the intent I have in this discourse; which is to prove, that in all states, of what kind soever, this aphorism takes place: Dominion is founded in property. So that if there were mixed monarchies, then the king had not all the property; but those who shared with him in the administration of the sovereignty, had their part (whether it were the senate, the people, or both) or if he had no companions in the sovereign power, he had no sharers likewise in the dominion or possession of the land. For that is all we mean by property, in all this discourse; for as for personal estate, the subjects may enjoy it in the largest proportion, without being able to invade the empire: the prince may when he pleases take away their goods by his tenants and vassals, (without an army;) which are his ordinary force, and answers to our county force; but the subjects with their money cannot invade his crown.[24] So that all the description we need make of this kind or form of government, is, that the whole possession of the country, and the whole power lies in the hands and breast of one man; he can make laws, break and repeal them when he pleases, or dispense with them in the meantime when he thinks fit; interpose in all judicatories, in behalf of his favourites; take away any particular man’s personal estate, and his life too, without the formality of a criminal process, or trial; send a dagger, or a halter to his chief ministers, and command them to make themselves away; and in fine, do all that his will, or his interest, suggests to him.

DOCT. You have dwelt long here upon an argumentation, that the ancients had no monarchies but what were arbitrary —

ENG. GENT. Pray give me leave to save your objections to that point, and to assure you first; that I will not take upon me to be so positive in that; for that I cannot pretend to have read all the historians and antiquaries that ever wrote; nor have I so perfect a memory as to remember, or make use of, in a verbal and transient reasoning, all that I have ever read: and then to assure you again, that I build nothing upon that assertion; and so your objection will be needless, and only take up time.

DOCT. You mistake me; I had no intent to use any argument or example against your opinion in that, but am very willing to believe that it may be so. What I was going to say was this, that you have insisted much upon the point of monarchy, and made a strange description of it; whereas many of the ancients, and almost all the modern writers, magnify it to be the best of governments.

ENG. GENT. I have said nothing to the contrary. I have told you in fact, what it is; which I believe none will deny. The philosopher said it was the best government; but with this restriction, where philosophers reigned:[25]

and they had an example of it, in some few Roman emperors: but in the most turbulent times of the commonwealth, and factions between the nobility and the people, Rome was much more full of virtuous and heroic citizens, than ever it was under Aurelius or Antoninus. For the moderns that are of that judgement; they are most of them divines, not politicians: and something may be said in their behalf, when by their good preaching, they can infuse into their imaginary prince, (who seems already to have an image of the power of God), the justice, wisdom, and goodness too of the Deity.

NOBLE VEN. We are well satisfied with the progress you have hitherto made in this matter. Pray go on to the two other forms used amongst the ancients, and their corruptions; that so we may come to the modern governments, and see how England stands; and how it came to decay, and what must rebuild it.

ENG. GENT. You have very good reason to hasten me to that; for indeed, all that has been said yet, is but as it were a preliminary discourse to the knowledge of the government of England, and its decay: when it comes to the cure, I hope you will both help me, for both yourself and the doctor are a thousand times better than I at remedies. But I shall dispatch the other two governments. Aristocracy, or optimacy, is a commonwealth, where the better sort, (that is, the eminent and rich men,) have the chief administration of the government: I say, the chief; because there are very few ancient optimacies, but the people had some share: as in Sparta, where they had power to vote, but not debate; for so the oracle of Apollo, brought by Lycurgus from Delphos, settles it. But the truth is, these people were the natural Spartans: for Lycurgus divided the country or territory of Laconia into 39,000 shares; whereof 9,000 only of these owners were inhabitants of Sparta; the rest lived in the country: so that although Thucydides calls it an aristocracy, and so I follow him, yet it was none of those aristocracies usually described by the politicians; where the lands of the territory were in a great deal fewer hands. But call it what you will, wherever there was an aristocracy, there the property, or very much of the overbalance of it, was in the hands of the Aristoi or governors; be they more or fewer: for if the people have the greatest interest in the property, they will, and must have it in the empire. A notable example of it is Rome, the best and most glorious government that ever the sun saw; where the lands being equally divided amongst the tribes (that is, the people) it was impossible for the patricii to keep them quiet, till they yielded to their desires: not only to have their tribunes, to see that nothing passed into a law without their consent, but also to have it declared, that both the consuls should not only be chosen by the people (as they ever were, and the kings too before them) but that they might be elected too, when the people pleased, out of plebeian families.[26] So that now I am come to democracy.

Which you see is a government where the chief part of the sovereign power, and the exercise of it, resides in the people: and where the style is, at the command of the people, by the authority of the senate. And it does consist of three fundamental orders; the senate proposing, the people resolving, and the magistrates executing. This government is much more powerful than aristocracy; because the latter cannot arm the people, for fear they should seize upon the government; and therefore are fain to make use of none but strangers and mercenaries for soldiers: which, as the divine Machiavel says, has hindered your commonwealth of Venice[27] from mounting up to heaven; whither those incomparable orders, and that venerable wisdom used by your citizens in keeping to them, would have carried you; if in all your wars, you had not been ill served.

DOCT. Well, sir, pray let me ask you one thing concerning Venice: how do you make out your empire is founded on property there? Have the gentlemen there, who are the party governing, the possession of the whole territory? does not property remain entire to the gentlemen, and other inhabitants in the several countries of Padua, Brescia, Vicenza, Verona, Bergamo, Cremona, Treviso, and Friuli; as also in the ultramarine provinces and islands? And yet I believe you will not deny, but that the government of Venice is as well founded, and has been of as long continuance, as any that now is or ever was in the world.[28]

ENG. GENT. Doctor, I shall not answer you in this; because I am sure it will be better done by this gentleman, who is a worthy son of that honourable mother.

NOBLE VEN. I thought you had said, sir, that we should have done complimenting; but since you do command me to clear the objection made by our learned doctor, I shall presume to tell you first how our city began.

The Goths, Huns, and Lombards coming with all the violence and cruelty imaginable to invade that part of Italy which we now call Terra Firma, [mainland] and where our ancestors did then inhabit; forced them in great numbers to seek a shelter amongst a great many little rocks, or islands, which stood very thick in a vast lake, or rather marsh, which is made by the Adriatic sea; we call it Laguna, [the Lagoon] here they began to build, and getting boats, made themselves provisions of all kinds from the land; from whence innumerable people began to come to them, finding that they could subsist, and that the barbarous people had no boats to attack them, nor that they could be invaded either by horse or foot without them. Our first government, and which lasted for many years, was no more than what was practised in many country parishes in Italy, (and possibly here too,) where the clerk, or any other person, calls together the chief of the inhabitants to consider of parish-business; as choosing of officers, making of rates, and the like. So in Venice, when there was any public provision to be made by way of law, or otherwise, some officers went about to persons of the greatest wealth and credit, to intreat them to meet and consult; from whence our senate is called to this day Consiglio de pregadi, which in our barbarous idiom is as much as Pregati in Tuscan language. Our security increased daily; and so by consequence our number and our riches: for by this time there began to be another inundation of Saracens upon Asia Minor; which forced a great many of the poor people of Greece to fly to us for protection, giving us the possession of some islands, and other places upon the continent. This opened us a trade, and gave a beginning to our greatness: but chiefly made us consider what government was fittest to conserve ourselves, and keep our wealth; (for we did not then much dream of conquests, else without doubt we must have made a popular government.) We pitched upon an aristocracy: by ordering that those who had been called to council for that present year and for four years before, should have the government in their hands; and all their posterity after them forever: which made first the distinction between gentlemen and citizens. The people, who consisted of diverse nations, most of them newly come to inhabit there, and generally seeking nothing but safety and ease, willingly consented to this change; and so this state has continued to this day: though the several orders and councils have been brought in since, by degrees; as our nobility increased, and for other causes. Under this government we have made some conquests in Italy, and Greece: for our city stood like a wall between the two great torrents of Goths and Saracens; and as either of their empires declined, it was easy for us, without being very warlike, to pick up some pieces of each side. As for the government of these conquests: we did not think fit to divide the land among the nobility, for fear of envy, and the effects of it; much less did we think it advisable to plant colonies of our people, which would have given the power into their hands; but we thought it the best way for our government to leave the people their property, tax them what we thought fit, and keep them under by governors and citadels; and so in short make them a province. So that now the doctor’s riddle is solved; for I suppose this gentleman did not mean that his maxim should reach to provincial governments.

ENG. GENT. No, sir; so far from that, that it is just contrary. For as in national or domestic government, where a nation is governed, either by its own people or its own prince, there can be no settled government, except they have the rule who possess the country: so in provincial governments, if they be wisely ordered, no man must have any the least share in the managing affairs of state, but strangers; or such as have no share or part in the possessions there; for else they will have a very good opportunity of shaking off their yoke.

DOCT. That is true; and we are so wise here (I mean our ancestors were) as to have made a law, that no native in Ireland can be deputy there.[29] But, sir, being fully satisfied in my demand by this gentleman, I beseech you to go on to what you have to say before you come to England.

ENG. GENT. I shall then offer two things to your observation; the first is, that in all times and places, where any great heroes or legislators have founded a government, (by gathering people together, to build a city, or to invade any country to possess it,) before they came to dividing the conquered lands, they did always very maturely deliberate under what form or model of government they meant to live; and accordingly made the partition of the possessions. Moses, Theseus, and Romulus, founders of democracies, divided the land equally. Lycurgus, who meant an optimacy, made a certain number of shares which he intended to be in the hands of the people of Laconia. Cyrus, and other conquering monarchs before him, took all for themselves and successors: which is observed in those eastern countries to this day; and which has made those countries continue ever since under the same government, though conquered and possessed very often by several nations. This brings me to the second thing to be observed; which is, ‘that wherever this apportionment of lands came to be changed in any kind, the government either changed with it, or was wholly in a state of confusion ‘.

And for this reason Lycurgus, the greatest politician that ever founded any government, took a sure way to fix property, by confounding it and bringing all into common: and so the whole number of the natural Spartans, who inhabited the city of Lacedemon, ate and drank in their several convives[30]

together: and as long as they continued so to do, they did not only preserve their government entire (and that for a longer time than we can read of any commonwealth, that ever lasted amongst the ancients,) but held as it were the principality of Greece. The Athenians, for want of some constitutions to fix property as Theseus placed it, were in danger of utter ruin; which they had certainly encountered, if the good genius (as they then called it) of that people, had not raised them up a second founder, (more than 600 years after the first,) which was Solon. And because the history of this matter will very much conduce to the illustrating of this aphorism we have laid down, I will presume so much upon your patience as to make a short recital of it; leaving you to see it more at large, in Plutarch, and other authors.

The lands in the territory of Attica, which were in the possession of the common people, (for what reason history is silent) were for debt all mortgaged to the great men of the city of Athens; and the owners having no possibility of redeeming their estates, were treating to compound with their creditors and deliver up their lands to them. Solon (who was one of those state physicians we spoke of,) was much troubled at this, and harangued daily to the nobility and people against it; telling them first, that it was impossible for the Grecians to resist the Medes (who were then growing up to a powerful monarchy) except Athens, the second city of Greece, did countenance a democracy: that it was as impossible the people could keep their empire, except they kept their lands; nothing being more contrary to nature, than that those who possess nothing in a country should pretend to govern it. They were all sensible of his reasons, and of their own danger; but the only remedy (which was, that the great men should forgive the common people their debts) would not at all be digested. So that the whole city (now fully understanding their condition) were continually in an uproar; and the people flocked about Solon, whenever he came abroad, desiring him to take upon him the government and be their prince, and they would make choice of him the next time they assembled. He told them, No, he would never be a tyrant, especially in his own country: meaning, that he who had no more share than other of the nobles, could not govern the rest, without being an usurper or tyrant. But this he did to oblige his citizens; he frankly forgave all the debts that any of the people owed to him, and released their lands immediately: and this amounted to fifteen Attic talents of gold, (a vast sum in those days:) and betook himself to a voluntary exile; in which he visited Thales, and went to the oracle of Delphos, and offered up his prayers to Apollo for the preservation of his city. In return of which (as the people then believed) the hearts of the great ones were so changed and enlarged, that they readily agreed to remit all their debts to the people; upon condition, that Solon would take the pains to make them a new model of government, and laws suitable to a democracy; which he as readily accepted and performed. By virtue of which that city grew and continued long the greatest, the justest, the most virtuous, learned and renowned, of all in that age: drove the Persians afterwards out of Greece; defeated them both by sea and land, with a quarter of their number of ships and men; and produced the greatest wits and philosophers that ever lived upon earth. The city of Athens instituted a solemn feast in commemoration of that great generosity and self-denial of the nobility; who sacrificed their own interest to the preservation of their country: which feast was called the solemnity of the Seisactheia, (which signifies recision or abolition of debts,) and was observed with processions, sacrifices, and games, till the time of the Romans’ dominion over them (who encouraged it) and even till the change of religion in Greece, and invasion of the Saracens.

The Romans, having omitted in their institution to provide for the fixing of property, and so the nobility (called patricii) beginning to take to themselves a greater share in the conquered lands than had been usual (for in the first times of the commonwealth under Romulus, and ever after, it was always practised to divide the lands equally amongst the tribes), this innovation stirred up Licinius Stolo, then tribune of the people, to propose a law (which, although it met with much difficulty, yet at last was consented to) by which it was provided, that no Roman citizen, of what degree soever, should possess above five hundred acres of land; and for the remaining part of the lands which should be conquered, it was ordered to be equally divided, as formerly, amongst the tribes. This found admittance (after much opposition) because it did provide but for the future; no man at that time being owner of more lands, than what was lawful for him to possess: and if this law had been strictly observed to the last, that glorious commonwealth might have subsisted to this day, for aught we know.[31]

DOCT. Some other cause would have been the ruin of it: what think you of a foreign conquest?

ENG. GENT. Oh doctor, if they had kept their poverty, they had kept their government and their virtue too; and then it had not been an easy matter to subdue them: Whom Jupiter wishes to destroy, he makes mad. Breach of rules and order causes division; and division, when it comes to be incurable, exposes a nation, almost as much as a tyrannical government does. The Goths and Vandals, had they invaded in those days, had met with the same success which befell the Cymbri and the Teutons. I must confess, a foreign invasion is a formidable thing, when a commonwealth is weak in territory and inhabitants, and that the invader is numerous and warlike; and so we see the Romans were in danger of utter ruin, when they were first attacked by the Gauls under Brennus. The like hazard may be feared, when a commonwealth is assaulted by another of equal virtue, and a commander of equal address and valour to any of themselves; thus the Romans ran the risk of their liberty and empire, in the war of Hannibal: but their power and their virtue grew to that height in that contest, that when it was ended, I believe that if they had preserved the foundation of their government entire, they had been invincible. And if I were alone of this opinion, I might be ashamed; but I am backed by the judgement of your incomparable countryman Machiavel: and no man will condemn either of us of rashness, if he first considers what small states, that have stood upon right bottoms, have done to defend their liberty against great monarchs. As is to be seen in the example of the little commonwealth of Athens; which destroyed the fleet of Xerxes, consisting of a thousand vessels, in the straits of Salamis: and before, the land-army of Darius, of three hundred thousand, in the plains of Marathon, and drove them out of Greece: for though the whole confederates were present at the battle of Plataea, yet the Athenian army singly under their general Miltiades gained that renowned battle of Marathon.[32]

NOBLE VEN. I beseech you, sir, how was it possible, or practicable, that the Romans conquering so many and so remote provinces, should yet have been able to preserve their Agrarian Law, and divide all those lands equally to their citizens? or if it had been possible, yet it would have ruined their city, by sending all their inhabitants away; and by taking in strangers in their room, they must necessarily have had people less virtuous and less warlike; and so both their government and their military discipline must have been corrupted: for it is not to be imagined, but that the people would have gone with their families to the place where their lands lay: so that it appears that the Romans did not provide, in the making and framing their first polity, for so great conquests as they afterwards made.

ENG. GENT. Yes, surely they did: from their first beginning they were founded in war, and had neither land nor wives but what they fought for; but yet what you object were very weighty, if there had not been a consideration of that early: for as soon as that great and wise people had subdued the Samnites on the east, and brought their arms as far as the Greek plantations, in that part of Italy which is now called the kingdom of Naples; and westward, had reduced all the Tuscans under their obedience, as far as the river Arnus; they made that, and the river Volturnus, (which runs by the walls of Capua,) the two boundaries of their empire, which was called the abode of empire. These were the uttermost points attained; for what they conquered between these two rivers, was all confiscated and divided amongst the tribes; the rustic tribes being twenty-seven, and the urban tribes nine, which made thirty-six in all. The city tribes were like our companies in London, consisting of tradesmen. The country tribes were divided like shires; and there was scarce any landed man who inhabited in the city, but he was written in that tribe where his estate lay: so that the rustic tribes (though they had all equal voices) were of far more credit and reputation than the urban. Upon the days of the Comitia, which were very well known, as many as thought fit amongst the country tribes came to give their voices; though every tribe was very numerous of inhabitants, that lived in the city.

Now the Agrarian did not extend to any lands conquered beyond this precinct, but they were left to the inhabitants; they paying a revenue to the commonwealth: all but those which were thought fit to be set out to maintain a Roman colony; which was a good number of Roman citizens, sent thither, and provided of lands and habitations: which being armed, did serve in the nature of a citadel and garrison to keep the province in obedience; and a Roman praetor, proconsul, or other governor, was sent yearly to head them, and brought forces with him besides.

Now it was ever lawful for any Roman citizen to purchase what lands he pleased in any of these provinces; it not being dangerous to a city to have their people rich, but to have such a power in the governing part of the empire, as should make those who managed the affairs of the commonwealth depend upon them; which came afterwards to be that which ruined their liberty, and which the Gracchi endeavoured to prevent when it was too late.

For those illustrious persons, seeing the disorder that was then in the commonwealth, and rightly comprehending the reason, which was the intermission of the Agrarian, and by consequence the great purchases which were made by the men of Rome (who had enriched themselves in Asia and the other provinces) in that part of Italy which was between the two rivers before-mentioned, began to harangue the people, in hopes to persuade them to admit of the right remedy; which was to confirm the Agrarian Law with a retrospect; which although they carried, yet the difficulties in the execution proved so great, that it never took effect: by reason that the common people whose interest it was to have their lands restored, yet having long lived as clients and dependents of the great ones, chose rather to depend still upon their patrons than to hazard all for an imaginary deliverance: by which supineness in them, they were prevailed with rather to join (for the most part) with the oppressors of themselves and their country, and to cut the throats of their redeemers, than to employ their just resentment against the covetous violators of their government and property. So perished the two renowned Gracchi, one soon after the other; not for any crime, but for having endeavoured to preserve and restore their commonwealth: for which (if they had lived in times suitable to such an heroic undertaking, and that the virtue of their ancestors had been yet in any kind remaining) they would have merited and enjoyed a reputation equal to that of Lycurgus, or Solon; whereas as it happened they were sometime after branded with the name of sedition, by certain wits, who prostituted the noble flame of poetry (which before had wont to be employed in magnifying heroic actions) to flatter the lust and ambition of the Roman tyrants.

NOBLE VEN. Sir, I approve what you say in all things; and in confirmation of it, shall further allege the two famous princes of Sparta, Agis and Cleomenes: which I couple together, since Plutarch does so. These (finding the corruption of their commonwealth, and the decay of their ancient virtue, to proceed from the neglect and in-observance of their founder’s rules, and a breach of that equality which was first instituted;) endeavoured to restore the laws of Lycurgus, and divide the territory anew; their victory in the Peloponnesian war, and the riches and luxury brought into their city by Lysander, having long before broken all the orders of their commonwealth, and destroyed the proportions of land allotted to each of the natural Spartans. But the first of these two excellent patriots perished by treachery, in the beginning of his enterprise: the other began and went on with incomparable prudence and resolution; but miscarried afterwards, by the iniquity of the times, and baseness and wickedness of the people. So infallibly true it is, that where the policy is corrupted, there must necessarily be also a corruption and depravation of manners; and an utter abolition of all faith, justice, honour, and morality. But I forget myself, and entrench upon your province: there is nothing now remains to keep you from the modern policies, but that you please to shut up this discourse of the ancient governments, with saying something of the corruptions of aristocracy and democracy. For I believe both of us are satisfied that you have abundantly proved your assertion: and that when we have leisure to examine all the states or policies that ever were, we shall find all their changes to have turned upon this hinge of property; and that the fixing of that with good laws in the beginning or first institution of a state, and the holding to those laws afterwards, is the only way to make a commonwealth immortal.

ENG. GENT. I think you are very right: but I shall obey you; and do presume to differ from Aristotle, in thinking that he has not fitly called those extremes (for so I will style them) of aristocracy and democracy, corruptions: for that they do not proceed from the alteration of property, which is the only corruptor of politics. For example, I do not find that oligarchy, or government of a few, which is the extreme of an optimacy, ever did arise from a few men getting into their hands the estates of all the rest of the nobility: for had it begun so, it might have lasted, which I never read of any that did. I will therefore conclude, that they were all tyrannies; for so the Greeks called all usurpations, whether of one or more persons: and all those that I ever read of, as they came in either by craft or violence, (as the thirty tyrants of Athens; the fifteen of Thebes; and the Decemviri of Rome, though these at first came in lawfully:)[33] so they were soon driven out; and ever, were either assassinated, or died by the sword of justice: and therefore I shall say no more of them; not thinking them worth the name of a government. As for the extreme of democracy, which is anarchy, it is not so: for many commonwealths have lasted for a good time under that administration (if I may so call a state so full of confusion.) An anarchy then is when the people not contented with their share in the administration of the government, (which is the right of approving, or disapproving of laws, of leagues, and of making of war and peace, of judging in all causes upon an appeal to them, and choosing all manner of officers) will take upon themselves the office of the senate too, in managing subordinate matters of state, proposing laws originally, and assuming debate in the market-place, making their orators their leaders: nay, not content with this, will take upon them to alter all the orders of the government when they please; as was frequently practised in Athens, and in the modern state of Florence. In both these cities, whenever any great person who could lead the people, had a mind to alter the government, he called them together, and made them vote a change. In Florence they called it: To call the people to a parliament and to reform the government,[34]

which is summoning the people into the market-place to resume the government; and did then presently institute a new one, with new orders, new magistracies, and the like.

Now that which originally causes this disorder, is the admitting (in the beginning of a government, or afterwards) the meaner sort of people, who have no share in the territory, into an equal part of ordering the commonwealth: these being less sober, less considering, and less careful of the public concerns; and being commonly the major part; are made the instruments oft-times of the ambition of the great ones, and very apt to kindle into faction. But notwithstanding all the confusion which we see under an anarchy, (where the wisdom of the better sort is made useless by the fury of the people;) yet many cities have subsisted hundreds of years in this condition: and have been more considerable, and performed greater actions, than ever any government of equal extent did; except it were a well-regulated democracy. But it is true, they ruin in the end; and that never by cowardice or baseness, but by too much boldness and temerarious undertakings; as both Athens and Florence did: the first undertaking the invasion of Sicily, when their affairs went ill elsewhere; and the other, by provoking the Spaniard and the pope. But I have done now; and shall pass to say something of the modern policies.[35]

NOBLE VEN. Before you come to that, sir, pray satisfy me in a point, which I should have moved before but that I was unwilling to interrupt your rational discourse. How came you to take it for granted, that Moses, Theseus, and Romulus were founders of popular governments? As for Moses, we have his story written by an infallible pen. Theseus was ever called king of Athens, though he lived so long since that what is written of him is justly esteemed fabulous: but Romulus certainly was a king; and that government continued a monarchy, though elective, under seven princes.

ENG. GENT. I will be very short in my answer; and say nothing of Theseus, for the reason you are pleased to allege: but for Moses, you may read in holy writ, that when, by God’s command he had brought the Israelites out of Egypt, he did at first manage them by acquainting the people with the estate of their government; which people were called together with the sound of a trumpet, and are termed in scripture the Congregation of the Lord. This government he thought might serve their turn in their passage; and that it would be time enough to make them a better, when they were in possession of the land of Canaan: especially having made them judges and magistrates at the insistence of his father-in-law Jethro; which are called in authors, Jethronic magistracy.[36] But finding that this provision was not sufficient, he complained to God, of the difficulty he had to make that state of affairs hold together. God was pleased to order him, to let seventy elders be appointed for a senate; but yet the Congregation of the Lord continued still and acted: and by the several soundings of the trumpets, either the senate, or popular assembly were called together, or both. So that this government was the same with all other democracies; consisting of a principal magistrate, a senate, and a people assembled together: not by representation, but in a body. Now for Romulus: it is very plain, that he was no more than the first officer of the commonwealth (whatever he was called,) and that he was chosen (as your Doge is,) for life. And when the last of those seven kings usurped the place; that is, did reign without the people’s command and exercise the government tyrannically; the people drove him out, (as all people in the world that have property will do in the like case, except some extraordinary qualifications in the prince preserve him for one age) and afterwards appointed in his room two magistrates, and made them annual; which two had the same command as well in their armies, as in their cities; and did not make the least alteration besides; excepting that they chose an officer that was to perform the king’s function, in certain sacrifices which Numa appointed to be performed by the king; lest the people should think their religion was changed: this officer was called high priest. If you are satisfied; I will go on to the consideration of our modern states.

NOBLE VEN. I am fully answered; and besides am clearly of opinion, that no government, whether mixed monarchy or commonwealth, can subsist without a senate: as well from the turbulent state of the Israelites under Moses, till the Sanhedrim was instituted; as from a certain kingdom of the Vandals in Africa; where, after their conquest of the natives, they appointed a government consisting of a prince and a popular assembly; which latter, within half a year, beat the king’s brains out; he having no bulwark of nobility, or senate, to defend him from them. But I will divert you no longer.

ENG. GENT. Sir, you are very right; and we should have spoken something of that before, if it had been the business of this meeting to discourse of the particular models of government: but intending only to say so much of the ancient policy as to show what Government in general is, and upon what basis it stands; I think I have done it sufficiently to make way for the understanding of our own; at least, when I have said something of the policies which are now extant; and that, with your favour, I will do. I shall need say little now of those commonwealths, which however they came by their liberty, either by arms or purchase, are now much-what under the same kind of policy as the ancients were. In Germany, the free towns, and many princes, make up the body of a commonwealth, called the empire; of which the emperor is head. This general union has its diets or parliaments, where they are all represented; and where all things concerning the safety and interest of Germany in general, or that belong to peace and war, are transacted.

These diets never intermeddle with the particular concerns or policies of those princes or states that make it up, leaving to them their particular sovereignties. The several imperial cities, or commonwealths, are divided into two kinds; Lübeck’s Law, and Cologne’s Law:[37] which being the same exactly with the ancient democracies and optimacies, I will say no more of them. The governments of Switzerland, and the seven provinces of the Low-Countries, were made up in haste; to unite them against persecution and oppression, and to help to defend themselves the better: which they both have done very gallantly and successfully. They seem to have taken their pattern from the Grecians; who, when their greatness began to decline, and the several tyrants who succeeded Alexander began to press hard upon them, were forced to league themselves (yet in several confederacies, as that of the Aetolians, that of the Achaeans, &c.) for their mutual defence. The Swiss consist of thirteen sovereignties; some cities, which are most aristocratical; and some provinces, which have but a village for their head township. These are all democracies; and are governed all, by the owners of land: who assemble, as our freeholders do, at the county-court. They have their general diets, as in Germany.

The government of the United Provinces has for its foundation the Union of Utrecht; made in the beginning of their standing upon their guard against the cruelty and oppression of the Spaniard, and patched up in haste; and seeming to be composed only for necessity as a state of war, has made modern statesmen conjecture, that it will not be very practicable in time of peace and security. At their general diet (which is called the States General) do intervene the deputies of the seven provinces, in what number their principals please: but all of them have but one vote, which are by consequence seven; and every one of the seven has a negative: so that nothing can pass without the concurrence of the whole seven. Every one of these provinces have a council or assembly of their own, called the States Provincial, who send and instruct their deputies to the states general; and perform other offices belonging to the peace and quiet of the province.

These deputies to the states provincial, are sent by the several cities of which every province consists, and by the nobility of the province, which has one voice only. The basis of the government lies in these cities; which are each of them a distinct sovereignty: neither can the states of the province, much less the states general, entrench in the least upon their rights, nor so much as intermeddle with the government of their cities, or administration of justice; but only treat of what concerns their mutual defence, and their payments towards it. Every one of these cities is a sovereignty; governed by an optimacy, consisting of the chief citizens: which upon death are supplied by new ones elected by themselves. These are called the Urnuscaperie, or Herne;[38] which council has continued to govern those towns, time out of mind: even in the times of their princes, who were then the sovereigns: for without the consent of him, or his deputy, called stadtholder, nothing could be concluded in those days. Since, they have instituted an artificial minister of their own, whom they still call stadtholder; and make choice of him in their provincial assemblies, and for form sake defer something to him, as the approbation of their Skepen and other magistrates, and some other matters. This has been continued in the province of Holland, which is the chief province, in the succession of the princes of Orange; and in the most of the others too: the rest have likewise chosen some other of the house of Nassau. This government (so oddly set together, and so composed of a state intended for a monarchy; and which as almanacs calculated for one meridian are made in some sort to serve for another, is by them continued in these several aristocracies) may last for a time: till peace and security, together with the abuse which is like to happen in the choice of the Herne, when they shall elect persons of small note into their body upon vacancies, for kindred or relation, rather than such as are of estate and eminency, or that otherwise abuse their power in the execution of it: and then it is believed, and reasonably enough, that those people (great in wealth, and very acute in the knowledge of their own interest) will find out a better form of government; or make themselves a prey to some great neighbour-prince in the attempting it: and this in case they in the meantime escape conquest from this great and powerful king of France, who at this time gives law to Christendom. I have nothing now left to keep me from the modern monarchies, but the most famous commonwealth of Venice; of which it would be presumption for me to say anything, whilst you are present.

NOBLE VEN. You may very safely go on if you please: for I believe strangers understand the speculative part of our government better than we do; and the doctrine of the ballot, which is our chief excellency: for I have read many descriptions of our frame, which have taught me something in it which I knew not before; particularly, Donato Gianotti the Florentine, to whom I refer those who are curious to know more of our orders. For we that manage the mechanical part of the government, are like horses who know their track well enough, without considering east or west, or what business they go about. Besides, it would be very tedious, and very needless, to make any relation of our model, with the several councils that make it up; and would be that which you have not done in treating of any other government. What we have said is enough to show what beginning we had; and that serves your turn: for we who are called nobility, and who manage the state, are the descendants of the first inhabitants; and had therefore been a democracy, if a numerous flock of strangers (who are contented to come and live among us as subjects) had not swelled our city, and made the governing party seem but a handful. So that we have the same foundations that all other aristocracies have, who govern but one city; and have no territory, but what they govern provincially. And our people, not knowing where to have better justice, are very well contented to live amongst us; without any share in the managing of affairs. Yet we have power to adopt whom we please into our nobility: and I believe that in the time of the Roman greatness, there were five for one of the inhabitants who were written in no tribe, but looked upon as strangers, and yet that did not vitiate their democracy; no more than our citizens and common people can hurt our optimacy. All the difficulty in our administration, has been to regulate our own nobility, and to bridle their faction and ambition; which can alone breed a disease in the vital part of our government: and this we do, by most severe laws; and a very rigorous execution of them.

DOCT. Sir, I was thinking to interpose concerning the propriety of lands in the territory of Padua; which, I hear, is wholly in the possession of the nobility of Venice.

NOBLE VEN. Our members have very good estates there, yet nothing but what they have paid very well for; no part of that country, or of any other province, having been shared amongst us as in other conquests. ‘Tis true, that the Paduans having ever been the most revengeful people of Italy, could not be deterred from those execrable and treacherous murders which were every day committed, but by a severe execution of the laws as well against their lives as estates: and as many of their estates as were confiscated, were (during our necessities in the last war with the Turks)[39] exposed to sale, and sold to them that offered most; without any consideration of the persons purchasing. But it is very true, that most of them came into the hands of our nobility; they offering more than any other; by reason that their sober and frugal living, and their being forbidden all manner of traffic, makes them have no way of employing the money which proceeds from their parsimony; and so they can afford to give more than others, who may employ their advance to better profit elsewhere. But I perceive, doctor, by this question, that you have studied at Padua.

DOCT. No really, sir, the small learning I have was acquired in our university of Oxford; nor was I ever out of this island.

NOBLE VEN. I would you had, sir; for it would have been a great honour to our country to have contributed anything towards so vast a knowledge as you are possessor of: but I wish that it were your country, or at least the place of your habitation, that so we might partake not only of your excellent discourse sometimes, but be the better for your skill; which would make us immortal.

DOCT. I am glad to see you so well that you can make yourself so merry: but I assure you I am very well here. England is a good wholesome climate for a physician. But, pray let our friend go on to his modern monarchies.

ENG. GENT. This is all I have now to do. Those monarchies are two, absolute, and mixed. For the first kind, all that we have knowledge of except the empire of the Turks, differ so little from the ancient monarchies of the Assyrians and Persians; that having given a short description of them before, it will be needless to say any more of the Persian, the Mogul, the king of Burma,[40] China, Prester John; or any other the great men under those princes, as the satraps of old: being made so, only by their being employed and put into great places and governments by the sovereign. But the monarchy of the grand seignior is something different. They both agree in this, that the prince is, in both, absolute proprietor of all the lands, (excepting in the kingdom of Egypt, of which I shall say something anon;) but the diversity lies in the administration of the property: the other emperors as well ancient as modern using to manage the revenue of the several towns and parishes, as our kings or the kings of France do; that is, keep it in their hands, and administer it by officers: and so you may read that Xerxes king of Persia allowed the revenue of so many villages to Themistocles; which assignations are practised at this day, both to public and to private uses, by the present monarchs. But the Turks, when they invaded the broken empire of the Arabians, did not at first make any great alteration in their policy: till the house of Ottoman, the present royal family, did make great conquests in Asia, and afterwards in Greece: whence they might possibly take their present way of dividing their conquered territories; for they took the same course which the Goths and other modern people had used with their conquered lands in Europe, upon which they planted military colonies, by dividing them amongst the soldiers for their pay or maintenance. These shares were called by them timars, which signifies benefices: and differed in this only from the European knights-fees, that these last originally were hereditary, and so property was maintained; whereas amongst the Ottomans, they were merely at will; and they enjoyed their shares whilst they remained the Sultan’s soldiers, and no longer; being turned out both of his service, and of their timars, when he pleases.

This doubtless had been the best and firmest monarchy in the world, if they could have stayed here, and not had a mercenary army besides; which have often (like the praetorians in the time of the Roman tyrants) made the palace and the seraglio the shambles of their princes; whereas if the timariots, as well spahis (or horse) as foot, had been brought together to guard the prince by courses (as they used to do king David) as well as they are to fight for the empire; this horrid flaw and inconvenience in their government had been wholly avoided. For though these are not planted upon entire property, as David’s were; (those being in the nature of trained-bands;) yet the remoteness of their habitations from the court and the factions of the great city, and their desire to repair home and to find all things quiet at their return, would have easily kept them from being infected with that cursed disease of rebellion against their sovereign, upon whose favour they depend for the continuance of their livelihood: whereas the janizaries [infantry] are for life, and are sure to be in the same employment under the next successor: so sure, that no grand seignior can, or dares go about to disband them; the suspicion of intending such a thing having caused the death of more than one of their emperors.[41] But I shall go to the limited monarchies.

DOCT. But pray, before you do so, inform us something of the Roman emperors: had they the whole dominion or property of the lands of Italy?

ENG. GENT. The Roman emperors I reckon amongst the tyrants: for so amongst the Greeks were called those citizens who usurped the government of their commonwealths, and maintained it by force, without endeavouring to found or establish it, by altering the property of lands, as not imagining that their children could ever hold it after them; in which they were not deceived: so that it was plain that the Roman empire was not a natural but a violent government. The reasons why it lasted longer than ordinarily tyrannies do, are many. First, because Augustus the first emperor kept up the senate, and so for his time cajoled them with this bait of imaginary power; which might not have sufficed neither to have kept him from the fate of his uncle, but that there had been so many revolutions and bloody wars between, that all mankind was glad to repose and take breath for a while under any government that could protect them. And he gained the service of these senators the rather, because he suffered none to be so but those who had followed his fortune in the several civil wars; and so were engaged to support him for their own preservation: besides, he confiscated all those who had at any time been proscribed, or sided in any encounter against him; which, considering in how few hands the lands of Italy then were, might be an overbalance of the property in his hands. But this is certain; that whatever he had not in his own possession, he disposed of at his pleasure; taking it away, as also the lives of his people, without any judicial proceedings, when he pleased. That the confiscations were great, we may see by his planting above sixty thousand soldiers upon lands in Lombardy; that is, erecting so many beneficia, or timars: and, if any man’s lands lay in the way, he took them in for neighbourhood, without any delinquency.

‘Mantua, unfortunately, was much too near Cremona’.[42] And it is very evident, that if these beneficia had not afterwards been made hereditary, that empire might have had a stabler foundation; and so a more quiet and orderly progress than it after had: for the court-guards called the praetorians, did make such havoc of their princes, and change them so often, that this (though it may seem a paradox) is another reason why this tyranny was not ruined sooner. For the people, who had really an interest to endeavour a change of government, were so prevented by seeing the prince whom they designed to supplant, removed to their hand, that they were puzzled what to do; taking in the meantime great recreation to see those wild beasts hunted down themselves, who had so often preyed upon their lives and estates: besides that, most commonly the frequent removes of their masters, made them scarce have time to do any mischief to their oppressed subjects in particular, though they were all slaves in general. This government of the later Romans is a clear example of the truth and efficacy of these politic principles we have been discoursing of. First, that any government (be it the most unlimited and arbitrary monarchy) that is placed upon a right basis of property, is better both for prince and people, than to leave them a seeming property still at his devotion; and then for want of fixing the foundation, expose their lives to those dangers and hazards, with which so many tumults and insurrections, which must necessarily happen, will threaten them daily. And in the next place, that any violent constraining of mankind to a subjection, is not to be called a government; nor does salve either the politic or moral ends, which those eminent legislators amongst the ancients proposed to themselves, when they set rules to preserve the quiet and peace, as well as the plenty, prosperity and greatness of the people; but that the politics, or art of governing, is a science to be learned and studied by counsellors and statesmen be they never so great,[43]

or else mankind will have a very sad condition under them, and they themselves a very perplexed and turbulent life, and probably a very destructive and precipitous end of it.

DOCT. I am very glad I gave occasion to make this discourse: now I beseech you, before you go to the mixed monarchies, not to forget Egypt.

ENG. GENT. ‘Twas that I was coming to, before you were pleased to interrogate me concerning the Roman empire. The Egyptians are this day, for aught I know, the only people that enjoy property, and are governed as a province, by any of the eastern absolute princes. For whereas Damascus, Aleppo, and most of the other cities and provinces of that empire, whose territory is divided into timars, are governed by a bashaw,[44] who for his guards has some small number of janizaries or soldiers; the bashaw of Egypt, or of Grand Cairo, has ever an army with him: and divers forts are erected; which is the way European princes use in governing their provinces; and must be so where property is left entire, except they plant colonies as the Romans did. The reason why Selim, who broke the empire of the Mamelukes, and conquered Egypt,[45] did not plant timars upon it, was the laziness and cowardliness of the people, and the great fruitfulness of the soil, and deliciousness of the country, which has mollified and rendered effeminate all the nations that ever did inhabit it. So that a resolution was taken to impose upon them, first, the maintaining an army by a tax; and then to pay a full half of all the fruits and product of their lands to the grand seignior, which they are to cultivate and improve. This is well managed by the bashaws and their officers; and comes to an incredible sum: the goods being sold, the money is conveyed in specie to the port, and is the greatest part of that prince’s revenue. And it is believed, that if all the lands had been entirely confiscated, and that the grand seignior had managed them by his officers, he would not have made a third part so much of the whole, as he receives now annually for one half: not only because those people are extremely industrious, where their own profit is concerned; but for that it is clear, if they had been totally divested of their estates, they would have left their country; and made that which is now the most populous kingdom of the world, a desert: as is all the rest of the Turkish dominions, except some cities. And if the people had removed as they did elsewhere, there would not only have wanted hands to have cultivated and improved the lands, but mouths to consume the product of it; so that the prince’s revenue by the cheapness of victual, and the want of labourers, would have almost fallen to nothing.

NOBLE VEN. Pray God this be not the reason that this king of France leaves property to his subjects; for certainly he has taken example by this province of Egypt: his subjects having a tax (which for the continuance of it, I must call a rent or tribute) imposed upon them, to the value of one full half of their estates; which must ever increase, as the lands improve.

ENG. GENT. I believe, sir, there is another reason; for the property there, being in the nobility and gentry, which are the hands by which he manages his force both at home and abroad, it would not have been easy or safe for him to take away their estates. — But I come to the limited monarchies. They were first introduced (as was said before) by the Goths, and other northern people. Whence those great swarms came, as it was unknown to Procopius himself who lived in the time of their invasion,[46] and who was a diligent searcher into all the circumstances of their concernments, so it is very needless for us to make any enquiry into it: thus much being clear, that they came man woman and child, and conquered and possessed all these parts of the world; which were then subject to the Roman empire, and since Christianity came in have been so to the Latin church; till honest John Calvin[47] taught some of us the way how to deliver ourselves from the tyrannical yoke, which neither we nor our forefathers were able to bear.

Whence those people had the government they established in these parts after their conquest; that is, whether they brought it from their own country, or made it themselves; must needs be uncertain, since their original is wholly so: but it seems very probable that they had some excellent persons among them, though the ignorance and want of learning in that age has not suffered any thing to remain that may give us any great light; for it is plain, that the government they settled, was both according to the exact rules of politics, and very natural and suitable to that division they made of their several territories. Whenever then these invaders had quieted any province, and that the people were driven out or subdued, they divided the lands: and to the prince they gave usually a tenth part, or thereabouts; to the great men, or comites regis, as it was translated into Latin, every one, as near as they could, an equal share. These were to enjoy an hereditary right in their estates; as the king did in his part, and in the crown. But neither he, nor his peers or companions, were to have the absolute disposal of the lands so allotted them: but were to keep a certain proportion to themselves for their use; and the rest was ordered to be divided amongst the freemen, who came with them to conquer. What they kept to themselves was called demesnes, in English and French; and in Italian, beni allodiali. The other part which they granted to the freemen, was called a feud: and all these estates were held of these lords hereditarily, only the tenants were to pay a small rent annually; and at every death or change an acknowledgement in money, and in some tenures the best beast besides. But the chief condition of the feud or grant, was, that the tenant should perform certain services to the lord; of which one (in all tenures of freemen) was to follow him armed to the wars, for the service of the prince and defence of the land.

And upon their admittance to their feuds, they took an oath to be true vassals and tenants to their lords; and to pay their rents, and perform their services; and upon failure to forfeit their estates. And these tenants were divided, according to their habitations, into several manors; in every one of which there was a court kept, twice every year; where they all were to appear, and to be admitted to their several estates, and to take the oath above mentioned. All these peers did likewise hold all their demesnes, as also all their manors, of the prince: to whom they swore allegiance and fealty. There were besides these freemen or franklins, other tenants to every lord, who were called villeins; who were to perform all servile offices, and their estates were all at the lord’s disposal when he pleased: these consisted mostly of such of the former inhabitants of these countries, as were not either destroyed or driven out; and possibly of others who were servants amongst them, before they came from their own countries. Perhaps thus much might have been unnecessary to be said; considering that these lords, tenants, and courts, are yet extant in all the kingdoms in Europe: but that to a gentleman of Venice, where there are none of these things, and where the Goths never were, something may be said in excuse for me.

NOBLE VEN. Tis true, sir, we fled from the Goths betimes; but yet in those countries which we recovered since in Terra Firma, we found the footsteps of these lords, and tenures, and their titles of counts: though being now provinces to us, they have no influence upon the government; as, I suppose, you are about to prove they have in these parts.

ENG. GENT. You are right, sir; for the governments of France, Spain, England, and all other countries where these people settled, were framed accordingly. It is not my business to describe particularly the distinct forms of the several governments in Europe, which do derive from these people, (for they may differ in some of their orders and laws, though the foundation be in them all the same) this would be unnecessary, they being all extant and so well known: and besides, little to my purpose; excepting to show where they have declined from their first institution, and admitted of some change. France, and Poland, have not, nor as I can learn, ever had any freemen below the nobility; that is, had no yeomen; but all are either noble, or villeins: therefore the lands must have been originally given, as they now remain, into the hands of these nobles. But I will come to the administration of the government in these countries; and first say wherein they all agree, or did as least in their institution; which is, that the sovereign power is in the states assembled together by the prince, in which he presides; these make laws, levy money, redress grievances, punish great officers, and the like. These states consist in some places of the prince and nobility only, as in Poland; and anciently in France, before certain towns, for the encouraging of trade, procured privileges to send deputies: which deputies are now called the third estate: and in others, consist of the nobility and commonalty; which latter had, and still have the same right to intervene and vote, as the great ones have both in England, Spain, and other kingdoms.

DOCT. But you say nothing of the clergy: I see you are no great friend to them, to leave them out of your politics.[48]

ENG. GENT. The truth is, doctor, I could wish there had never been any: the purity of Christian religion, as also the good and orderly government of the world, had been much better provided for without them; as it was in the apostolical time, when we hear nothing of clergy: but my omitting their reverend lordships was no neglect, for I meant to come to them in order; for you know that the northern people did not bring Christianity into these parts, but found it here, and were in time converted to it; so that there could be no clergy at the first. But if I had said nothing at all of this race, yet I had committed no solecism in the politics: for the bishops and great abbots intervened in the states here, upon the same foundation that the other peers do; viz. for their great possessions, and the dependence their tenants and vassals have upon them: although they being a people of that great sanctity and knowledge, scorn to intermix so much as titles with us profane lay-idiots; and therefore will be called, lords spiritual. But you will have a very venerable opinion of them, if you do but consider how they came by these great possessions, which made them claim a third part of the government. And truly not unjustly, by my rule; for I believe they had no less (at one time) than a third part of the lands, in most of these countries.

NOBLE VEN. Pray, how did they acquire these lands? was it not here by the charitable donation of pious Christians, as it was elsewhere?

ENG. GENT. Yes, certainly, very pious men! some of them might be well-meaning people, but still such as were cheated by these holy men: who told them perpetually, both in public and private, ‘that they represented God upon earth, being ordained by authority from him who was his viceroy here; and that what was given to them, was given to God; and he would repay it largely, both in this world, and the next.’ This wheedle made our barbarous ancestors, newly instructed in the Christian faith, (if this religion may be called so, and sucking in this foolish doctrine more than the doctrine of Christ) so zealous to these vipers, that they would have plucked out their eyes to serve them; much more bestow, as they did, the fruitfullest and best situate of their possessions upon them. Nay, some they persuaded to take upon them their callings; vow chastity, and give all they had to them; and become one of them; amongst whom, I believe, they found no more sanctity, than they left in the world. But this is nothing to another trick they had: which was to insinuate into the most notorious and execrable villains with which that age abounded; men, who being princes, (and other great men, for such were the tools they worked with) had treacherously poisoned or otherwise murdered their nearest relations, fathers, brothers, wives, to reign or enjoy their estates: these they did persuade into a belief, ‘that if they had a desire to be saved notwithstanding their execrable villainies, they need but part with some of those great possessions (which they had acquired by those acts:) to their bishoprics or monasteries, and they would pray for their souls; and they were so holy and acceptable to God, that he would deny them nothing:’ which they immediately performed; so great was the ignorance and blindness of that age! And you shall hardly find in the story of those times, any great monastery, abbey or other religious house in any of these countries, (I speak confidently as to what concerns our own Saxons,) that had not its foundation from some such original.

DOCT. A worthy beginning, of a worthy race!

[[[49] NOBLE VEN. Sir, you maintain a strange position here, that it had been better there had been no clergy. Would you have had no gospel preached, no sacraments, no continuance of Christian religion in the world? Or do you think that these things could have been without a succession of the true priesthood, or (as you call it, of true ministry) by means of ordination?

Does not your own church hold the same?

ENG. GENT. You will know more of my church, when I have told you what I find the word church to signify in scripture; which is to me, the only rule of faith, worship, and manners: neither do I seek these additional helps, of fathers, councils, or ecclesiastical history; much less tradition: for since it is said in the word of God itself, ‘that Antichrist did begin to work even in those days;’ I can easily believe that he had brought his work to some perfection, before the word church was by him applied to the clergy. I shall therefore tell you what I conceive that church, clergy, and ordination, signified in the apostolical times. I find then the word, church, in the New Testament taken but in two senses: the first, for the universal invisible church, called sometimes of the first-born; that is, the whole number of the true followers of Christ in the world, wherever resident, or into what part soever dispersed. The other signification of church, is an assembly; which though it be sometimes used to express any meetings (even unlawful and tumultuous ones) as well in scripture, as profane authors; yet it is more frequently understood of a gathering together to the duties of prayer, preaching, and breaking of bread: and the whole number so congregated is, both in the acts of the apostles and in their holy epistles, called the Church. Nor is there the least colour for appropriating that word to the pastors and deacons; who, since the corruptions of Christian religion, are called clergy. Which word in the Old Testament is used, sometimes for God’s whole people, and sometimes for the tribe of Levi, out of which the priests were chosen; for the word signifies a lot; so that tribe is called God’s lot, because they had no share allotted them when the land was divided, but were to live upon tithe, and serve in the functions of their religion, and be singers, porters, butchers, bakers, and cooks, for the sacrifices &c. So that this tribe was styled clergy but figuratively; and the allegory passed into the New Testament: where the saints are sometimes called clergy; but never the pastors or deacons: who were far from pretending, in those days, to come in the place of the Aaronical priesthood. The word ordination, in scripture, signifies lifting up of hands; and is used, first, for the giving a suffrage, which in all popular assemblies was done by stretching out the hand (as it is in the common hall of London:)[50] in the next place, it is applied to the order or decree made by the suffrage so given; which was then (and is yet too in all modern languages) called an ordinance; and the suffrage itself ordination: which word proves that the first Christian churches were democratical; that is, that the whole congregation had the choice in this, as well as the sovereign authority in all excommunications, and all other matters whatsoever that could occur: for in all aristocratical commonwealths the word for choice is Keirothesia, or imposition of hands, (for so the election of all magistrates and officers was made,) and not Keirotonia [stretching forth of hands — as in voting for M.P.s for example]. These pastors and other officers did not pretend to be, by virtue of such choice, of a peculiar profession different from other men; as their followers have done since Antichrist’s reign; but were only called and appointed (by the congregation’s approval of their gifts or parts) to instruct or feed the flock; visit the sick; and perform all other offices of a true minister (that is, servant) of the gospel. At other times, they followed the business of their own trades and professions: and the Christians in those times (which none will deny to have been the purest of the church) did never dream that a true pastor ought to pretend to any succession, to qualify him for the ministry of the word; or that the idle and ridiculous ceremonies used in your church, (and still continued in that which you are pleased to call mine,) were any way essential or conducing to capacitate a person to be a true preacher or dispenser of the Christian faith. And I cannot sufficiently admire why our clergy, who very justly refuse to believe the miracle which is pretended to be wrought in transubstantiation; because they see both the wafer and the wine to have the same substance, and the same accidents after the priest has mumbled words over those elements as they had before; yet will believe, that the same kind of spell or charm in ordination can have the efficacy to metamorphose a poor lay-idiot, into a heavenly creature: notwithstanding that we find in them the same human nature, and the same necessities of it, to which they were subject before such transformation; nay, the same debauch, profaneness, ignorance, and disability to preach the gospel.

NOBLE VEN. Sir, this discourse is very new to me. I must confess I am much inclined to join with you in believing, that the power priests exercise over mankind, with the jurisdiction they pretend to over princes and states, may be a usurpation; but that they should not have a divine call to serve at the altar, or that any person can pretend to perform those sacred functions without being duly ordained, seems very strange.

ENG. GENT. I am not now to discourse of religion: it is never very civil to do so in conversation of persons of a different belief; neither can it be of any benefit towards a Roman Catholic; for if his conscience should be never so clearly convinced, he is not yet master of his own faith; having given it up to his church, of whom he must ask leave to be a convert, which he will be sure never to obtain. But if you have the curiosity when you come amongst the learned in your own country (for amongst our ordination-mongers, there is a great scarcity of letters and other good parts) you may please to take the Bible, which you acknowledge to be the word of God as well as we; and intreat some of them to show you any passage, the plain and genuine sense of which can any way evince this succession, this ordination, or this priesthood, we are now speaking of: and when you have done, if you will let your own excellent reason and discourse judge, and not your priest, (who is too much concerned in point of interest) I make no doubt but you will be convinced that the pretence to the dispensing of divine things by virtue of a human constitution, and so ridiculous a one too as the ordination practised by your bishops and ours, (who descend and succeed from one and the same mother) is as little justifiable by scripture and reason, and full as great a cheat and usurpation, as the empire which the ecclesiastics pretend to over the consciences and persons of men, and the exemption from all secular power.

NOBLE VEN. Well, sir, though neither my faith nor my reason can come up to what you hold, yet the novelty and the grace of this argument has delighted me extremely: and if that be a sin, as I fear it is, I must confess it to my priest; but I ask your pardon first, for putting you upon this long deviation.]]

ENG. GENT. Well, this digression is not without its use: for it will shorten our business, (which is grown longer than I thought it would have been;) for I shall mention the clergy no more: but whenever I speak of peerage, pray take notice, that I mean both lords spiritual and temporal; since they stand both upon the same foot of property. But if you please, I will fall immediately to discourse of the government of England; and say no more of those of our neighbours, than what will fall in by the way, or be hinted to me by your demands: for the time runs away, and I know the doctor must be at home by noon, where he gives daily charitable audience to an infinity of poor people; who have need of his help, and who send or come for it, not having the confidence to send for him, since they have nothing to give him: though he be very liberal too of his visits to such, where he has any knowledge of them. But I spare his modesty, which I see is concerned at the just testimony I bear to his charity. The sovereign power of England then is in king, lords, and commons. The parliaments, as they are now constituted (that is, the assigning a choice to such a number of boroughs, as also the manner and form of elections and returns) did come in, as I suppose, in the time of Henry the third; where now our statute-book begins.

And I must confess I was inclined to believe, that before that time, our yeomanry or commonalty had not formally assembled in parliament, but been virtually included and represented by the peers, upon whom they depended: but I am fully convinced, that it was otherwise, by the learned discourses lately published by Mr Petyt of the Temple, and Mr Atwood of Grays-Inn; being gentlemen whom I do mention, honoris causa [in order to honour].[51]

And really they deserve to be honoured, that they will spare some time from the mechanical part of their callings (which is to assist clients with counsel, and to plead their causes, which I acknowledge likewise to be honourable) to study the true interest of their country; and to show how ancient the rights of the people in England are: and that in a time, when neither profit nor countenance can be hoped for, from so ingenious an undertaking. But I beg pardon for the deviation.

Of the three branches of sovereign power which politicians mention, which are enacting laws, levying of taxes, and making war and peace, the two first of them are indisputably in the parliament; and when I say parliament, I ever intend, with the king. The last, has been usually exercised by the prince; if he can do it with his own money. Yet because even in that case it may be ruinous to the kingdom, by exposing it to an invasion, many have affirmed that such a power cannot be (by the true and ancient free government of England) supposed to be entrusted in the hands of one man; and therefore we see in divers kings’ reigns the parliament has been consulted, and their advice taken in those matters that have either concerned war or leagues; and that if it has been omitted, addresses have been made to the king by parliaments, either to make war, or peace; according to what they thought profitable to the public. So that I will not determine whether that power which draws such consequences after it, be by the genuine sense of our laws in the prince or no; although I know of no statute, or written record, which makes it otherwise. That which is undoubtedly the king’s right or prerogative, is to call and dissolve parliaments; to preside in them; to approve of all acts made by them; and to put in execution, as supreme or sovereign magistrate (in the intervals of parliaments, and during their sitting) all laws made by them, as also the common law. For which cause he has the nomination of all inferior officers and ministers under him, excepting such as by law or charter are eligible otherwise; and the power of the sword, to force obedience to the judgements given both in criminal and civil causes.

DOCT. Sir, you have made us a very absolute prince: what have we left us?

If the king have all this power, what do our liberties or rights signify, whenever he pleases?

ENG. GENT. This objection, doctor, makes good what I said before, that your skill did not terminate in the body natural, but extended to the politic: for a more pertinent interrogatory could never have been made by Plato or Aristotle. In answer to which, you may please to understand; that when these constitutions were first made, our ancestors were a plain-hearted, well-meaning people, without court-reserves, or tricks; who having made choice of this sort of government, and having power enough in their hands to make it take place, did not foresee or imagine, that any thoughts of invading their rights could enter into the prince’s head. Nor do I read that it ever did, till the Norman line came to reign: which coming in by treaty,[52] it was obvious there was no conquest made upon any but Harold; in whose stead William the first came, and would claim no more after his victory, than what Harold enjoyed: excepting, that he might confiscate (as he did) those great men who took part with the wrong title; and Frenchmen were put into their estates. Which though it made in this kingdom a mixture between Normans and Saxons, yet produced no change or innovation in the government; the Norman peers being as tenacious of their liberties, and as active in the recovery of them to the full, as the Saxon families were.

Soon after the death of William, (and possibly, in his time,) there began some invasions upon the rights of the kingdom; which begat grievances, and afterwards complaints and discontents: which grew to that height, that the peers were fain to use their power, that is, arm their vassals to defend the government; whilst the princes of that age, first king John, and then Henry the third, got force together. The barons called in Lewis the dauphin, (whilst the king would have given away the kingdom to the Saracens, as he did to the pope) and armed their own creatures; so that a bloody war ensued, for almost forty years off and on, as may be read in our history. The success was, that the barons or peers obtained, in the close, two charters or laws for the ascertaining their rights; by which, neither their lives, liberties, or estates, could ever be in danger any more from any arbitrary power in the prince: and so the good government of England, which was before this time (like the law of nature) only written in the hearts of men; came to be expressed in parchment and remain a record in writing; though these charters gave us no more, than what was our own before. After these charters were made, there could not choose but happen some encroachment upon them; but so long as the peers kept their greatness, there was no breaches but what were immediately made up in parliament: which whenever they assembled, did in the first place confirm the charters, and made very often interpretations upon them, for the benefit of the people; witness the statute de Tallagio non concedendo,[53] and many others.

But to come nearer the giving the doctor an answer, you may please to understand, that not long after the framing of these forementioned charters, there did arise a grievance not foreseen or provided for by them; and it was such an one that had beaten down the government at once, if it had not been redressed in an orderly way. This was the intermission of parliaments; which could not be called but by the prince; and he not doing of it, they ceased to be assembled for some years. If this had not been speedily remedied, the barons must have put on their armour again: for who can imagine, that such brisk assertors of their rights could have acquiesced in an omission that ruined the foundation of the government? which consisting of king, lords, and commons, and having at that time marched near five hundred years upon three legs, must then have gone on hopping upon one; which could it have gone forward (as was impossible, whilst property continued where it was) yet would have ridden but a little way. Nor can it be wondered at, that our great men made no provision against this grievance in their charters: because it was impossible for them to imagine that their prince, who had so good a share in this government, should go about to destroy it, and to take that burden upon himself; which, by our constitution was undeniably to be divided between him and his subjects. And therefore divers of the great men of those times speaking with that excellent prince king Edward the first about it, he (to take away from his people all fear and apprehension that he intended to change the ancient government,) called speedily a parliament, and in it consented to a declaration of the kingdom’s right in that point: without the clearing of which, all our other laws had been useless, and the government itself too; of which the parliament is (at the least) as essential a part as the prince. So that there passed a law in that parliament, that one should be held every year; and oftener, if need be:[54] which like another Magna Charta, was confirmed by a new act made in the time of Edward the third, that glorious prince. Nor were there any sycophants in those days, who durst pretend loyalty by using arguments to prove that it was against the royal prerogative, for the parliament to entrench upon the king’s right of calling and dissolving of parliaments: as if there were a prerogative in the crown, to choose whether ever a parliament should assemble, or no. I would desire no more, if I were a prince, to make me grand seignior. Soon after this last act, the king, by reason of his wars with France and Scotland, and other great affairs, was forced sometimes to end his parliaments abruptly, and leave business undone; (and this not out of court-tricks, which were then unknown:) which produced another act not long after, by which it was provided; that no parliament should be dismissed, till all the petitions were answered. That is, in the language of those times, till all the bills (which were then styled petitions) were finished.

DOCT. Pray, sir, give me a little account of this last act you speak of; for I have heard in discourse from many lawyers, that they believe there is no such.

ENG. GENT. Truly, sir, I shall confess to you, that I do not find this law in any of our printed statute-books. But that which first gave me the knowledge of it, was what was said about three years ago in the house of commons, by a worthy and learned gentleman, who undertook to produce the record in the reign of Richard the second: and since, I have questioned many learned counsellors about it, who tell me there is such a one: and one of them, who is counted a prerogative lawyer, said it was so; but that the act was made in factious times.[55] Besides, I think it will be granted, that for some time after, (and particularly in the reigns of Henry the fourth, Henry the fifth, and Henry the sixth) it was usual for a proclamation to be made in Westminster-hall, before the end of every session: That all those that had any matter to present to the parliament, should bring it in before such a day; for otherwise, the parliament at that day should determine. But if there were nothing at all of this, nor any record extant concerning it; yet I must believe that it is so by the fundamental law of this government, which must be lame and imperfect without it. For it is all one to have no parliaments at all but when the prince pleases, and to allow a power in him to dismiss them when he will; that is, when they refuse to do what he will.

So that if there be no statute, it is certainly because our wise ancestors thought there needed none, but that by the very essence and constitution of the government it is provided for. And this we may call (if you had rather have it so) the common law; which is of as much value (if not more) than any statute, and of which all our good acts of parliament, and Magna Charta itself, is but declaratory. So that your objection is sufficiently answered in this, that though the king is entrusted with the formal part of summoning and pronouncing the dissolution of parliaments, which is done by his writ; yet the laws (which oblige him as well as us) have determined how and when he shall do it: which is enough to show, that the king’s share in the sovereignty, (that is, in the parliament,) is cut out to him by the law, and not left at his disposal. Now I come to the king’s part in the intervals of parliament.

NOBLE VEN. Sir, before you do so, pray tell us what other prerogatives the king enjoys in the government; for otherwise, I who am a Venetian, may be apt to think that our Doge, who is called our prince, may have as much power as yours.[56]

ENG. GENT. I am in a fine condition amongst you, with my politics: the doctor tells me, I have made the king absolute; and now you tell me, I have made him a doge of Venice. But when your prince has power to dispose of the public revenue; to name all officers ecclesiastical and civil, that are of trust and profit in the kingdom; and to dispose absolutely of the whole militia, by sea, and land; then we will allow him to be like ours, who has all these powers.

DOCT. Well, you puzzle me extremely! For when you had asserted the king’s power to the height, in calling and dissolving parliaments, you gave me such satisfaction, and showed me wherein the law had provided that this vast prerogative could not hurt the people, that I was fully satisfied; and had not a word to say: now you come about again, and place in the crown such a power, which in my judgement is inconsistent with our liberty.

ENG. GENT. Sir, I suppose you mean chiefly the power of the militia; which was, I must confess, doubtful, before a late statute declared it to be in the king.[57] For our government has made no other disposal of the militia, than what was natural; viz. that the peers in their several counties, or jurisdictions, had the power of calling together their vassals: either armed for the wars, or only so as to cause the law to be executed by serving writs; and in case of resistance, giving possession: which lords amongst their own tenants did then perform the two several offices of lord-lieutenant, and sheriff; which latter was but the earl’s deputy, as by his title of vice-comes does appear. But this latter being of daily necessity; and justice itself (that is, the lives, liberties and estates of all the people in that county) depending upon it; when the greatness of the peers decayed, (of which we shall have occasion to speak hereafter,) the electing of sheriff was referred to the county-court: where it continued, till it was placed where it now is by a statute.[58] For the other part of the militia; which is, the arming the people for war, it was de facto exercised by commission from the king, to a lord-lieutenant (as an image of the natural lord) and other deputies: and it was tacitly consented to, though it were never settled by statute, (as I said before,) till his majesty’s happy Restoration.

But to answer you I shall say, that whatever powers are in the crown, whether by statute or by old prescription, they are, and must be understood to be entrusted in the prince for the preservation of the government, and for the safety and interest of the people: and when either the militia, which is given him for the execution and support of the law, shall be employed by him to subvert it, (as in the case of ship-money it was;)[59] or the treasure shall be misapplied, and made the revenue of courtiers and sycophants, (as in the time of Edward the second;) or worthless or wicked people shall be put into the greatest places, (as in the reign of Richard the second,) in this case, though the prince here cannot be questionable for it, (as the kings were in Sparta, and your doges I believe would be;) yet it is a great violation of the trust reposed in him by the government: and a making that power, which is given him by law, unlawful in the execution. And the frequent examples of justice inflicted in parliament upon the king’s ministers, for abusing the royal power, show plainly that such authority is not left in his hands to use as he pleases. Nay, there have befallen sad troubles and dangers to some of these princes themselves, who have abused their power to the prejudice of the subjects; which although they are no way justifiable, yet may serve for an instruction to princes, and an example not to hearken to ruinous counsels: for men when they are enraged do not always consider justice, or religion; passion being as natural to man, as reason and virtue: which was the opinion of divine Machiavel.[60]

To answer you then, I say, that though we do allow such powers in the king; yet since they are given him for edification and not destruction, and cannot be abused without great danger to his ministers, and even to himself: we may hope that they can never be abused but in a broken government. And if ours be so (as we shall see anon), the fault of the ill execution of our laws is not to be imputed either to the prince or his ministers; excepting that the latter may be, as we said before, justly punishable for not advising the prince to consent to the mending the frame: of which we shall talk more hereafter. But in the meantime I will come to the king’s other prerogatives: as having all royal mines; the being served first before other creditors where money is due to him; and to have a speedier and easier way than his subjects, to recover his debts and his rents; &c. But to say all in one word, when there arises any doubt whether anything be the king’s prerogative or no, this is the way of deciding it: viz. To consider whether it be for the good and protection of the people, that the king have such a power; for the definition of prerogative is a considerable part of the common law, by which power is put into the prince for the preservation of his people. And if it be not for the good of his subjects, it is not prerogative, nor law; for our prince has no authority of his own, but what was first entrusted in him by the government, of which he is head: nor is it to be imagined that they would give him more power than what was necessary to govern them. For example, the power of pardoning criminals condemned, is of such use to the lives and estates of the people, that without it many would be exposed to die unjustly. As lately a poor gentleman, who by means of the harangue of a strepitous [talkative] lawyer was found guilty of murder, for a man he never killed; or if he had, the fact had been but man-slaughter; and he had been inevitably murdered himself, if his majesty had not been graciously pleased to extend his royal mercy to him: as he did likewise vouchsafe to do to a gentleman convicted for speaking words he never uttered; or if he had spoken them, they were but foolishly not maliciously spoken.[61] On the other side, if a controversy should arise, as it did in the beginning of the last parliament, between the house of commons and the prerogative lawyers, about the choice of their speaker; these latter having interested his majesty in the contest, and made him, by consequence, disoblige, at the beginning, a very loyal, and a very worthy parliament: and for what? For a question, which if you will decide it the right way, will be none; for setting aside the precedents, and the history when the crown first pretended to any share in the choice of a speaker, (which argument was very well handled by some of the learned patriots then;) I would have leave to ask, what man can show, and what reason can be alleged, why the protection and welfare of the people should require that a prerogative should be in the prince to choose the mouth of the house of commons; when there is no particular person in his whole dominion that would not think it against his interest if the government had given the king power to nominate his bailiff, his attorney, or his referee in any arbitration? Certainly there can be no advantage either to the sovereign or his subjects, that the person whose office, it is to put their deliberations into fitting words, and express all their requests to his majesty, should not be entirely in their own election and appointment: which there is the more reason for too, because the speakers for many years past have received instructions from the court; and have broken the privileges of the house, by revealing their debates, adjourning them without a vote; and committed many other misdemeanours, by which they have begotten an ill understanding between the king and his house of commons, to the infinite prejudice both of his majesty’s affairs and his people.[62] Since I have given this rule to judge prerogative by, I shall say no more of it: for as to what concerns the king’s office in the intervals of parliament, it is wholly ministerial; and is barely to put in execution the common law, and the statutes made by the sovereign power (that is, by himself and the parliament) without varying one tittle; or suspending, abrogating, or neglecting the execution of any act whatsoever: and to this he is solemnly sworn at his coronation. And all his power in this behalf is in him by common law; which is reason itself: written as well in the hearts of rational men, as in the lawyers’ books.

NOBLE VEN. Sir, I have heard much talk of the king’s negative voice in parliaments; which in my opinion is as much as a power to frustrate, when he pleases, all the endeavours and labours of his people, and to prevent any good that might accrue to the kingdom by having the right to meet in parliament: for certainly, if we in Venice had placed any such prerogative in our duke, or in any of our magistracies, we could not call ourselves a free people.

ENG. GENT. Sir, I can answer you, as I did before: that if our kings have such a power, it ought to be used according to the true and genuine intent of the government; that is, for the preservation and interest of the people; and not for the disappointing the counsels of a parliament towards reforming grievances, and making provision for the future execution of the laws. And whenever it is applied to frustrate those ends, it is a violation of right, and infringment of the king’s coronation-oath; in which there is this clause, that he shall confirm the laws, (which, in the Latin of those times, is laws which the people shall choose.) I know some critics, who are rather grammarians than lawyers, have made a distinction between elegerim and elegero: and will have it, that the king swears to such laws as the people ‘shall have chosen’: and not to those they ‘shall choose’. But in my opinion, if that clause had been intended only to oblige the king to execute the laws made already, it might have been better expressed by ‘preserve the laws’ than by ‘confirm the laws’, (or customs): besides that he is by another clause in the same oath sworn to execute all the laws. But I shall leave this controversy undecided: those who have a desire to see more of it, may look into those quarrelling declarations pro and con about this matter, which preceded our unhappy civil wars. This is certain, that there are not to be found any statutes that have passed, without being presented to his majesty, or to some commissioned by him; but whether such addresses were intended for respect and honour to his majesty, as the speaker of the house of commons and the lord mayor of London are brought to him, I leave to the learned to discourse. Only thus much we may affirm; that there never were yet any parliamentary requests, which did highly concern the public, presented to any king and by him refused, but such denials did produce very dismal effects: as may be seen in our histories ancient and late: it being certain, that both the barons’ wars, and our last dismal combustions, proceeded from no other cause than the denial of the princes then reigning to consent to the desires of the states of the kingdom. And such has been the wisdom and goodness of our present gracious prince; that in twenty years, and somewhat more (for which time we have enjoyed him, since his happy Restoration) he has not exercised his negative voice towards more than one public bill; and that too, was to have continued in force (if it had passed into an act) but for six weeks; being for raising the militia for so long time:[63] and as for the private bills, which are matters of mere grace, it is unreasonable his majesty should be refused that right that every Englishman enjoys, which is not to be obliged to dispense his favours but where he pleases. But for this point of the negative vote; it is possible that when we come to discourse of the cure of our political distemper, some of you will propose the clearing and explanation of this matter, and of all others which may concern the king’s power and the people’s rights.[64]

NOBLE VEN. But pray, sir, have not the house of peers a negative voice in all bills? How come they not to be obliged to use it for the public good?

ENG. GENT. So they are, no doubt; and the commons too: but there is a vast difference between a deliberative vote, which the peers have with their negative; and that in the crown, to blast all without deliberating. The peers are coordinate with the commons in presenting and hammering of laws; and may send bills down to them, as well as receive any from them; excepting in matters wherein the people are to be taxed. And in this our government imitates the best and most perfect commonwealths that ever were: where the senate assisted in the making of laws; and by their wisdom and dexterity, polished, filed, and made ready things for the more populous assemblies; and sometimes by their gravity and moderation, reduced the people to a calmer state; and by their authority and credit stemmed the tide, and made the waters quiet, giving the people time to come to themselves. And therefore if we had no such peerage now, upon the old constitution; yet we should be necessitated to make an artificial peerage or senate instead of it. Which may assure our present lords, that though their dependencies and power are gone, yet we cannot be without them: and that they have no need to fear an annihilation by our reformation, as they suffered in the late mad times. But I shall speak a word of the people’s rights; and then show how this brave and excellent government of England came to decay.

The people by the fundamental laws, (that is, by the constitution of the government of England) have entire freedom in their lives, properties, and their persons: neither of which can in the least suffer, but according to the laws already made; or to be made hereafter in parliament, and duly published. And to prevent any oppression that might happen in the execution of these good laws, (which are our birthright) all trials must be by twelve men of our equals, and of our neighbourhood. These in all civil causes judge absolutely, and decide the matter of fact, upon which the matter of law depends: but if where matter of law is in question, these twelve men shall refuse to find a special verdict at the direction of the court, the judge cannot control it; but their verdict must be recorded. But of these matters, as also of demurrers, writs of error, and arrests of judgement, &c. I have discoursed to this gentleman (who is a stranger) before now; neither does the understanding of the execution of our municipal laws at all belong to this discourse. Only it is to be noted, that these juries, or twelve men, in all trials or causes which are criminal, have absolute power, both as to matter of law, and fact, (except the party by demurrer confess the matter of fact, and take it out of their hands.) And the first question the officer asks the foreman, when they all come in to deliver their verdict, is this; is he guilty in manner and form as he is indicted, or not guilty? Which shows plainly, that they are to examine and judge, as well whether, and how far the fact committed is criminal, as whether the person charged has committed that fact. But though by the corruption of these times (the infallible consequences of a broken frame of government) this office of the juries and right of Englishmen have been of late questioned, yet it has been strongly and effectually vindicated by a learned author of late, to whom I refer you for more of this matter.[65]

I shall say no more of the rights of the people, but this one thing; that neither the king, nor any by authority from him, has any the least power of jurisdiction over any Englishman, but what the law gives them: and that although all commissions and writs go out in the king’s name, yet his majesty has no right to issue out any writ (with advice of his council, or otherwise) excepting what come out of his courts; nor to alter any clause in a writ, or add anything to it. And if any person shall be so wicked as to do any injustice to the life, liberty, or estate of any Englishman, by any private command of the prince, the person aggrieved, or his next of kin (if he be assassinated) shall have the same remedy against the offender, as he ought to have had by the good laws of this land, if there had been no such command given: which would be absolutely void and null, and understood not to proceed from that royal and lawful power which is vested in his majesty, for the execution of justice and the protection of his people.

DOCT. Now I see you have done with all the government of England; pray before you proceed to the decay of it, let me ask you what you think of the Chancery: whether you do not believe it a solecism in the politics to have such a court amongst a free people. What good will Magna Charta, the Petition of Right, or St Edward’s laws do us to defend our property, if it must be entirely subjected to the arbitrary disposal of one man, whenever any impertinent or petulant person shall put in a bill against you? How inconsistent is this tribunal with all that has been said in defence of our rights, or can be said? Suppose the prince should, in time to come, so little respect his own honour and the interest of his people, as to place a covetous or revengeful person in that great judicatory; what remedy have we against the corruption of registers, who make what orders they please; or against the whole hierarchy of knavish clerks? Whilst not only the punishing and reforming misdemeanours depend upon him, who may without control be the most guilty himself; but that all the laws of England stand there arraigned before him, and may be condemned when he pleases. Is there, or ever was there any such tribunal in the world before, in any country?

ENG. GENT. Doctor, I find you have had a suit in chancery: but I do not intend to contradict or blame your orthodox zeal in this point. This court is one of those buildings that cannot be repaired, but must be demolished. I could inform you how excellently matters of equity are administered in other countries; and this worthy gentleman could tell you of the venerable Quarantia [court of the forty judges] in his city, where the law as well as the fact, is at the bar, and subject to the judges, and yet no complaint made or grievance suffered. But this is not the place for it, this is but the superstructure: we must settle the foundation first. Everything else is as much out of order as this: trade is gone; suits are endless; and nothing amongst us harmonious. But all will come right when our government is mended; and never before, though our judges were all angels. This is the first question and when you have this, all other things shall be added unto you. When that is done, neither the Chancery (which is grown up to this since our ancestors’ time) nor the spiritual courts, nor the cheats in trade, nor any other abuses, no not the giant popery itself, shall ever be able to stand before a parliament; no more than one of us can live, like a salamander, in the fire.[66]

NOBLE VEN. Therefore, sir, pray let us come now to the decay of your government; that we may come the sooner to the happy restoration.

ENG. GENT. This harmonious government of England being founded as has been said upon property, it was impossible it should be shaken so long as property remained where it was placed: for if, when the ancient owners the Britons fled into the mountains, and left their lands to the invaders (who divided them, as is above related) they had made an Agrarian Law to fix it; then our government, and by consequence our happiness, had been for aught we know immortal. For our constitution, as it was really a mixture of the three, (which are monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, as has been said) so the weight and predominancy remained in the optimacy; who possessed nine parts in ten of the lands, and the prince but about a tenth part. In this I count all the peoples’ shares to the peers, and therefore do not trouble myself to enquire what proportion was allotted to them; for although they had an hereditary right in their lands, yet it was so clogged with tenures and services, that they depended, as to public matters, wholly on their lords: who by them could serve the king in his wars; and in time of peace, by leading the people to what they pleased, could keep the royal power within its due bounds; and also hinder and prevent the people, from invading the rights of the crown. So that they were the bulwarks of the government; which in effect was much more an aristocracy, than either a monarchy or democracy: and in all governments, where property is mixed, the administration is so too; and that part which has the greater share in the lands, will have it too in the jurisdiction. And so in commonwealths, the senate or the people have more or less power, as they have more or fewer possessions, as was most visible in Rome, where in the beginning, the patricii could hardly bring the people to any thing; but afterwards, when the Asiatic conquests had enriched the nobility to that degree, that they were able to purchase a great part of the lands in Italy, the people were all their clients, and easily brought even to cut the throats of their redeemers the Gracchi, who had carried a law for restoring them their lands.

But enough of this before. I will not trouble myself, nor you, to search into the particular causes of this change which has been made in the possessions here in England, but it is visible that the fortieth part of the lands which were at the beginning in the hands of the peers and church, is not there now: besides that not only all villainage is long since abolished, but the other tenures are so altered and qualified, that they signify nothing towards making the yeomanry depend upon the lords.[67] The consequence is: that the natural part of our government, which is power, is by means of property in the hands of the people; whilst the artificial part, or the parchment in which the form of government is written, remains the frame. Now art is a very good servant and help to nature, but very weak and inconsiderable, when she opposes her, and fights with her; it would be a very uneven contest between parchment and power. This alone is the cause of all the disorder you heard of, and now see in England; and of which every man gives a reason according to his own fancy, whilst few hit the right cause. Some impute all to the decay of trade; others to the growth of popery: which are both great calamities, but they are effects, and not causes. And if in private families there were the same causes, there would be the same effects: suppose now you had five or six thousand pounds a year, (as it is probable you have,) and keep forty servants; and at length by your neglect, and the industry and thrift of your domestics, you sell one thousand to your steward, another to your clerk of the kitchen, another to your bailiff, till all were gone: can you believe that these servants, when they had so good estates of their own, and you nothing left to give them, would continue to live with you, and to do their service as before?

It is just so with a whole kingdom. In our ancestors’ times, most of the members of our house of commons thought it an honour to retain to some great lord, and to wear his blue coat: and when they had made up their lord’s train, and waited upon him from his own house to the lords’ house, and made a lane for him to enter, and departed to sit themselves in the lower house of parliament, as it was then (and very justly) called; can you think that anything could pass in such a parliament, that was not ordered by the lords? Besides, these lords were the king’s great council in the intervals of parliaments, and were called to advise of peace and war; and the latter was seldom made without the consent of the major part: if it were, they would not send their tenants; which was all the militia of England, besides the king’s tenth part. Can it be believed, that in those days the commons should dislike anything the lords did in the intervals, or that they would have disputed their right to receive appeals from courts of equity, if they had pretended to it in those days, or to mend money-bills?

And what is the reason, but because the lords themselves at that time represented all their tenants (that is, all the people) in some sort?[68]

And although the house of commons did assemble to present their grievances, yet all great affairs of high importance concerning the government, were transacted by the lords; and the war which was made to preserve it, was called the barons’ wars, not the war of both houses: for although in ancienter times the word baron was taken in a larger sense, and comprehended the franklins or freemen; yet who reads any history of that war, shall not find that any mention is made of the concurrence of any assembly of such men: but that Simon Montford, earl of Leicester, and others of the great ones, did by their power and interest manage that contest.

Now if this property which is gone out of the peerage into the commons, had passed into the king’s hands, as it did in Egypt in the time of Joseph; as was before said, the prince had had a very easy and peaceable reign over his own vassals: and might either have refused, justly, to have assembled the parliament any more; or if he had pleased to do it, might have for ever managed it as he thought fit. But our princes have wanted a Joseph: that is, a wise counsellor; and instead of saving their revenue, which was very great and their expenses small; and buying in those purchases, which the vast expenses and luxury of the lords made ready for them; they have alienated their own inheritance. So that now the crown-lands, that is, the public patrimony, is come to make up the interest of the commons: whilst the king must have a precarious revenue out of the peoples’ purses; and be beholden to the parliament for his bread in time of peace: whereas the kings their predecessors never asked aid of his subjects, but in time of war and invasion. And this alone (though there were no other decay in government) is enough to make the king depend upon his people: which is no very good condition for a monarchy.

NOBLE VEN. But how comes it to pass that other neighbouring countries are in so settled a state in respect of England? does their property remain the same it was, or is it come into the hands of the prince? You know you were pleased to admit, that we should ask you, in passing, something of other countries.[69]

ENG. GENT. Sir, I thank you for it, and shall endeavour to satisfy you. I shall say nothing of the small princes of Germany; who keep in a great measure their ancient bounds, both of government and property: and if their princes now and then exceed their part; yet it is in time of troubles and war, and things return into their right channel of assembling the several states, which are yet in being everywhere. But Germany lying so exposed to the invasion of the Turks on the one side, and of the French on the other; and having ever had enough to do to defend their several liberties against the encroachments of the house of Austria (in which the imperial dignity is become in some sort hereditary) if there had been something of extraordinary power exercised of late years, I can say in war law is silent: but besides their own particular states, they have the diet of the empire, which never fails to mediate and compose things; if there be any great oppression used by princes to their subjects, or from one prince or state to another. I shall therefore confine myself to the three great kingdoms, France, Spain, and Poland:[70] for as to Denmark[71] and Sweden, the first has lately changed its government, and not only made the monarchy hereditary, which was before elective; but has pulled down the nobility, and given their power to the prince: which how it will succeed, time will show. Sweden remains in point of constitution, and property, exactly as it did anciently; and is a well-governed kingdom. The first of the other three, is France; of which I have spoken before, and shall only add: that though it be very true, that there is property in France, and yet the government is despotical at this present; yet it is one of those violent states, which the Grecians called tyrannies. For if a lawful prince (that is, one who being so by law, and sworn to rule according to it) breaks his oaths and his bonds, and reigns arbitrarily, he becomes a tyrant and an usurper, as to so much as he assumes more than the constitution has given him: and such a government, being as I said violent, and not natural, but contrary to the interest of the people, cannot be lasting when the adventitious props which support it fail; and whilst it does endure, must be very uneasy both to prince and people: the first being necessitated to use continual oppression, and the latter to suffer it.

DOCT. You are pleased to talk of the oppression of the people under the king of France, and for that reason, call it a violent government; when, if I remember, you did once today extol the monarchy of the Turks for well-founded and natural: are not the people in that empire as much oppressed as in France?

ENG. GENT. By no means: unless you will call it oppression for the grand seignior to feed all his people out of the product of his own lands: and though they serve him for it, yet that does not alter the case; for if you set poor men to work and pay them for it, are you a tyrant? Or rather, are not you a good commonwealths-man, by helping those to live who have no other way of doing it but by their labour? But the king of France knowing that his people have, and ought to have property; and that he has no right to their possessions; yet takes what he pleases from them, without their consent, and contrary to law: so that when he sets them on work he pays them what he pleases, and that he levies out of their own estates. I do not affirm that there is no government in the world, but where rule is founded in property; but I say there is no natural fixed government, but where it is so. And when it is otherwise, the people are perpetually complaining, and the king in perpetual anxiety; always in fear of his subjects, and seeking new ways to secure himself: God having been so merciful to mankind, that he has made nothing safe for princes, but what is just and honest.

NOBLE VEN. But you were saying just now, that this present constitution in France will fall when the props fail; we in Italy, who live in perpetual fear of the greatness of that kingdom, would be glad to hear something of the decaying of those props: what are they, I beseech you?

ENG. GENT. The first is the greatness of the present king: whose heroic actions and wisdom has extinguished envy in all his neighbour-princes, and kindled fear; and brought him to be above all possibility of control at home: not only because his subjects fear his courage, but because they have his virtue in admiration; and amidst all their miseries cannot choose but have something of rejoicing, to see how high he has mounted the empire and honour of their nation. The next prop, is the change of their ancient constitution; in the time of Charles the seventh, by consent: for about that time the country being so wasted by the invasion and excursions of the English, the states, then assembled, petitioned the king that he would give them leave to go home, and dispose of affairs himself; and order the government for the future, as he thought fit. Upon this, his successor Lewis the eleventh, being a crafty prince, took an occasion to call the states no more; but to supply them with an assembly of notables: which were certain men of his own nomination, like Barebone’s parliament here, but that they were of better quality. These in succeeding reigns, (being the best men of the kingdom,) grew troublesome and intractable; so that for some years the edicts have been verified, (that is, in our language, bills have been passed) in the grand chamber of the parliament at Paris, commonly called the audience chamber: who lately, (and since the imprisonment of president Brouselles, and others, during this king’s minority,) have never refused or scrupled any edicts whatsoever.[72] Now whenever this great king dies; and the states of the kingdom are restored; these two great props of arbitrary power are taken away.

Besides these two, the constitution of the government of France itself, is somewhat better fitted than ours, to permit extraordinary power in the prince. For the whole people there possessing lands are gentlemen; (that is, infinitely the greater part;) which was the reason why in their assembly of estates, the deputies of the provinces (which we call here knights of the shire) were chosen by, and out of the gentry: and sat with the peers in the same chamber, as representing the gentry only, called Petite noblesse.

Whereas our knights here (whatever their blood is) are chosen by commoners; and are commoners: our laws and government taking no notice of any nobility, but the persons of the peers; whose sons are likewise commoners, even their eldest, whilst their fathers live. Now gentry are ever more tractable by a prince, than a wealthy and numerous commonalty; out of which our gentry (at least those we call so) are raised from time to time: for whenever either a merchant, lawyer, tradesman, grazier, farmer, or any other gets such an estate, as that he or his son can live upon his lands without exercising of any other calling, he becomes a gentleman. I do not say, but that we have men very nobly descended amongst these; but they have no pre-eminence, or distinction, by the laws or government. Besides this, the gentry in France are very needy, and very numerous: the reason of which is, that the elder brother in most parts of that kingdom has no more share in the division of the paternal estate than the cadets or younger brothers; excepting the principal house, with the orchards and gardens about it: which they call Vol de Chappon, as who should say as far as a capon can fly at once. This house gives him the title his father had, who was called seignior, or baron, or count of that place; which if he sells, he parts with his baronship: and for aught I know becomes in time roturier, or ignoble. This practice divides the lands into so many small parcels, that the possessors of them being noble, and having little to maintain their nobility, are fain to seek their fortune; which they can find nowhere so well as at the court; and so become the king’s servants and soldiers; for they are generally courageous, bold, and of a good mien. None of these can ever advance themselves but by their desert; which makes them hazard themselves very desperately: by which means great numbers of them are killed; and the rest come in time to be great officers, and live splendidly upon the king’s purse: who is likewise very liberal to them; and according to their respective merits, gives them often, in the beginning of a campaign, a considerable sum to furnish out their equipage. These are a great prop to the regal power: it being their interest to support it; lest their gain should cease, and they be reduced to be poor Provinciaux, that is country-gentlemen, again. Whereas if they had such estates as our country-gentry have, they would desire to be at home at their ease; whilst these (having ten times as much from the king as their own estates can yield them, which supply must fail if the king’s revenue were reduced) are perpetually engaged to make good all exorbitances.

DOCT. This is a kind of governing by property too: and it puts me in mind of a gentleman of good estate in our country, who took a tenant’s son of his to be his servant; whose father not long after dying, left him a living of about ten pound a year. The young man’s friends came to him, and asked him why he would serve, now he had an estate of his own able to maintain him?

His answer was, that his own lands would yield him but a third part of what his service was worth to him in all: besides, that he lived a pleasant life; wore good clothes; kept good company; and had the conversation of very pretty maids, that were his fellow-servants; which made him very well digest the name of being a servant.

ENG. GENT. This is the very case; but yet service, in both these cases, is no inheritance. And when there comes a peaceable king in France who will let his neighbours be quiet, or one that is covetous; these fine gentlemen will lose their employments, and their king his prop: and the rather, because these gentlemen do not depend (as was said before) in any kind upon the great lords whose standing interest is at court; and so cannot in a change, be by them carried over to advance the court-designs, against their own good and that of their country. And thus much is sufficient to be said concerning France.

As for Spain; I believe there is no country (excepting Sweden) in Christendom, where the property has remained so entirely the same it was at the beginning: and the reason is, the great and strict care that is taken to hinder the lands from passing out of the old owners’ hands. For except it be by marriages, no man can acquire another man’s estate; nor can any grandee, or titulador, or any other hidalgo there, alienate or engage his paternal or maternal estate, otherwise than for his life; nor can alter tenures, or extinguish services, or dismember manors: for to this the prince’s consent must be had, which he never gives till the matter be debated in the council chamber: which is no junta, or secret war council; but one wherein the great men of the kingdom intervene, and wherein the great matters concerning the preservation of the government are transacted, not relating to foreign provinces or governments, but to the kingdom of Castile and Leon; of which only I speak now. It is true, there have been one or two exceptions against this severe rule, since the great calamities of Spain; and two great lordships have been sold, the Marquisate de Monastero to a Genoese contractor, and another to Sebastian Cortiza a Portuguese of the same profession: but both these have bought the entire lordships, without curtailing or altering the condition in which these two great estates were before; and notwithstanding, this has caused so much repining amongst the natural Godos (as the Castilians call themselves still for glory) that I believe this will never be drawn into an example hereafter.[73] Now the property remaining the same, the government does so too; and the king’s domestic government, over his natural Spaniards, is very gentle, whatever it be in his conquered provinces: and the kings there have very great advantages of keeping their great men (by whom they govern) in good temper, by reason of the great governments they have to bestow upon them, both in Europe and the Indies; which changing every three years, go in an age through all the grandees, which are not very numerous. Besides, Castile having been in the time of king Roderigo over-run and conquered by the Moors (who governed there despotically, some hundreds of years, before it could be recovered again by the old inhabitants who fled to the mountains;) when they were at length driven out, the count of Castile found a tax set upon all commodities whatsoever by the Moors in their reign, called alcabala; which was an easy matter to get continued, when their old government was restored, by the cortes or assembly of the states: and so it has continued ever since, as the excise has done here; which being imposed by them who drove and kept out the king, does now since his happy Restoration remain a revenue of the crown. This alcabala, or excise, is a very great revenue; and so prevented, for some time, the necessities of the crown, and made the prince have the less need of asking relief of his people, the ordinary cause of disgust: so that the cortes, or assembly of the states, has had little to do of late; though they are duly assembled every year, but seldom contradict what is desired by the prince; for there are no greater idolaters of their monarch in the world than the Castilians are, nor who drink deeper of the cup of loyally. So that in short the government in Spain is, as ours was in queen Elizabeth’s time; or in the first year after his now majesty’s return; when the parliament for a time complemented the prince, who had by that means both his own power and the peoples’: which days I hope to see again, upon a better and more lasting foundation.

But before I leave Spain, I must say a word of the kingdom of Aragon; which has not at all times had so quiet a state of their monarchy, as Castile has enjoyed. For after many combustions which happened there concerning their charters and privileges, which are their fundamental laws; the king one day coming to his seat in parliament, and making his demands as was usual, they told him that they had a request to make to him first: and he withdrawing thereupon, (for he had no right of sitting there to hear their debates) they fell into discourse how to make their government subsist against the encroachments of the prince upon them; and went very high in their debates, which could not choose but come to the king’s ear, who walked in a gallery in the same palace to expect the issue: and being in great passion, was seen to draw out his dagger very often, and thrust it again into the sheath; and heard to say, ‘this will cost blood’! Which coming to the knowledge of the estates, they left off the debate; and sent some of their number to him, to know what blood it should cost, and whether he meant to murder anybody. He drew out his dagger again, and pointing it to his breast, he said, ‘the blood of the king’ leaving them in doubt, whether he meant that his subjects would kill him, or that he would do it himself. However, that parliament ended very peaceably: and a famous settlement was there and then made, by which a great person was to be chosen every parliament, who should be as it were an umpire between the king and his people; for the execution of the laws, and the preservation of their government, their laws and privileges; which are their courts of justice, and their charters. This officer was called, the Justiciar of Aragon and his duty was to call together the whole power of the kingdom, whenever any of the aforesaid rights were by open force violated or invaded, and to admonish the king whenever he heard of any clandestine counsels among them to that effect. It was likewise made treason, for any person of what quality soever, to refuse to repair upon due summons to any place where this Justiciar should erect his standard; or to withdraw himself without leave; much more, to betray him, or to revolt from him. Besides, in this cortes or parliament, the old oath which at the first foundation of their state was ordered to be taken by the king at his admittance, was again revived; which is in these words: ‘We who are as good as you, and more powerful, do choose you our king; upon condition that you preserve our rights and privileges: and otherwise, we do not choose you.’

Notwithstanding all this, Philip the second, being both king of Castile and Aragon, picked a quarrel with the latter, by demanding his secretary Antonio Perez, who fled from the king’s displeasure thither, being his own country; and they refusing to deliver him (it being expressly contrary to a law of Aragon, that a subject of that kingdom should be against his will carried to be tried elsewhere:) the king took that occasion, to invade them with the forces of his kingdom of Castile, (who had ever been rivals and enemies to the Aragonese;) and they, to defend themselves under their Justiciar, who did his part faithfully and courageously; but the Castilians being old soldiers, and those of Aragon but county-troops, the former prevailed: and so this kingdom, in getting that of Castile by a marriage but an age before, lost its own liberty and government; for it is since made a province and governed by a viceroy from Madrid, although they keep up the formality of their cortes still.[74]

DOCT. No man living that knew the hatred and hostility that ever was between the English and Scots, could have imagined in the years 1639 and 1640, (when our king was with great armies of English upon the frontiers of Scotland, ready to invade that kingdom) that this nation would not have assisted, to have brought them under; but it proved otherwise.[75]

ENG. GENT. It may be, they feared, when Scotland was reduced to slavery, and the province pacified and forces kept up there, such forces and greater might have been employed here to reduce us into the same condition; an apprehension, which at this time sticks with many of the common people, and helps to fill up the measure of our fears and distractions. But the visible reason, why the English were not at that time very forward to oppress their neighbours, was the consideration that they were to be invaded for refusing to receive from hence certain innovations in matters of religion, and the worship of God, which had not long before been introduced here; and therefore the people of this kingdom were unwilling to perpetuate a mongrel church here, by imposing it upon them. But I do exceedingly admire when I read our history, to see how zealous and eager our nobility and people here were anciently to assert the right of our crown to the kingdom of France; whereas it is visible, that if we had kept France (for we conquered it entirely and fully) to this day, we must have run the fate of Aragon; and been, in time, ruined and oppressed by our own valour and good fortune. A thing that was foreseen by the Macedonians, when their king Alexander had subdued all Persia and the East; who weighing how probable it was, that their prince having the possession of such great and flourishing kingdoms, should change his imperial residence and inhabit in the centre of his dominions, and from thence govern Macedon; by which means the Grecians, who by their virtue and valour had conquered and subdued the barbarians, should in time (even as an effect of their victories) be oppressed and tyrannized over by them: and this precautions foresight in the Greeks (as was fully believed in that age) hastened the fatal catastrophe of that great prince.

DOCT. Well, I hope this consideration will forearm our parliaments, that they will not easily suffer their eyes to be dazzled any more with the false glory of conquering France.

NOBLE VEN. You need no great cautions against conquering France, at this present; and I believe your parliaments need as little admonition against giving of money towards new wars or alliances; that fine wheedle having lately lost them enough already: therefore, pray, let us suffer our friend to go on.

ENG. GENT. I have no more to say of foreign monarchies, but only to tell you; that Poland is both governed and possessed by some[76] very great persons or potentates, called palatines, and under them by a very numerous gentry. For the king is not only elective, but so limited, that he has little or no power but to command their armies in time of war; which makes them often choose foreigners of great fame for military exploits: and as for the commonalty or countrymen, they are absolutely slaves, or villains. This government is extremely confused; by reason of the numerousness of the gentry: who do not always meet by way of representation as in other kingdoms; but sometimes, for the choice of their king and upon other great occasions, collectively in the field; as the tribes did at Rome: which would make things much more turbulent if all this body of gentry did not wholly depend for their estates upon the favour of the palatines their lords, which makes them much more tractable. I have done with our neighbours beyond sea; and should not without your command have made so long a digression in this place: which should indeed have been treated of before we come to speak of England, but that you were pleased to divert me from it before: however, being placed near the portraiture of our own country, it serves better (as contraries set nearby) to illustrate it. But I will not make this deviation longer by apologizing for it; and shall therefore desire you to take notice: that as in England by degrees property came to shift from the few to the many, so the government is grown heavier and more uneasy both to prince and people; the complaints more in parliament; the laws more numerous, and much more tedious and prolix: to meet with the tricks and malice of men, which works in a loose government: for there was no need to make acts verbose, when the great persons could presently force the execution of them. The law of Edward the first for frequent parliaments, had no more words than ‘a parliament shall be holden every year;’ whereas our act for a triennial parliament,[77] in the time of king Charles the first, contained several sheets of paper: to provide against a failure in the execution of that law.

Which if the power had remained in the lords, would have been needless; for some of them, in case of intermission of assembling the parliament, would have made their complaints and address to the king, and have immediately removed the obstruction; which, in those days, had been the natural and easy way: but now that many of the lords, (like the bishops which the popes make at Rome in heathen lands,) are merely grown titular; and purchased for nothing but to get their wives’ place; it cannot be wondered at if the king slight their addresses, and the court-parasites deride their honourable undertakings for the safety of their country.[78] Now the commons succeeding, as was said, in the property of the peers, and church; (whose lands, five parts of six, have been alienated; and mostly is come into the same hands, with those of the king and peers;) have inherited likewise, according to the course of nature, their power: but being kept from it by the established government, (which not being changed by any lawful acts of state, remains still in being formally, whereas virtually it is abolished) so that for want of outward orders and provisions, the people are kept from the exercise of that power, which is fallen to them by the law of nature: and those who cannot by that law pretend to the share they had, do yet enjoy it by virtue of that right which is now ceased; as having been but the natural effect of a cause that is no longer in being: and you know, the cause removed, the effect is gone. I cannot say that the greater part of the people do know this their condition, but they find very plainly that they want something which they ought to have; and this makes them lay often the blame of their unsettledness upon wrong causes: but however, are altogether unquiet and restless in the intervals of parliament; and when the king pleases to assemble one, spend all their time in complaints of the inexecution of the law; of the multiplication of an infinity of grievances; of misspending the public monies; of the danger our religion is in by practices to undermine it and the state, by endeavours to bring in arbitrary power; and in questioning great officers of state, as the causes and promoters of all these abuses: in so much, that every parliament seems a perfect state of war; wherein the commons are tugging and contending for their right, very justly and very honourably, yet without coming to a point.

So that the court sends them packing; and governs still worse and worse in the vacancies, being necessitated thereunto by their despair of doing any good in parliament; and therefore are forced to use horrid shifts to subsist without it, and to keep it off: without ever considering, that if these counsellors understood their trade, they might bring the prince and people to such an agreement in parliament, as might repair the broken and shipwrecked government of England; and in this secure the peace, quiet and prosperity of the people, the greatness and happiness of the king, and be themselves not only out of present danger, (which no other course can exempt them from,) but be renowned to all posterity.

NOBLE VEN. I beseech you, sir, how comes it to pass, that neither the king, nor any of his counsellors could ever come to find out the truth of what you discourse? for I am fully convinced it is as you say.

ENG. GENT. I cannot resolve you that; but this is certain, they have never endeavoured a cure, though possibly they might know the disease: as fearing that though the effects of a remedy would be, as was said, very advantageous both to king and people, and to themselves; yet possibly, such a reformation might not consist with the merchandize they make of the prince’s favour; nor with such bribes, gratuities and fees as they usually take for the dispatch of all matters before them. And therefore our counsellors have been so far from suggesting any such thing to their master, that they have opposed and quashed all attempts of that kind: as they did the worthy proposals made by certain members of that parliament in the beginning of king James’s reign, which is yet called the undertaking parliament.[79] These gentlemen considering what we have been discoursing of, viz. that our old government is at an end; had framed certain heads, which, if they had been proposed by that parliament to the king, and by him consented to, would, in their opinion, have healed the breach: and that if the king would perform his part, that house of commons would undertake for the obedience of the people. They did believe that if this should have been moved in parliament before the king was acquainted with it, it would prove abortive; and therefore sent three of their number to his majesty: sir James Croft, grandfather or father to the present bishop of Hereford; Thomas Harley, who was ancestor to the honourable family of that name in Herefordshire; and sir Henry Neville, who had been ambassador from queen Elizabeth to the French king. These were to open the matter at large to the king, and to procure his leave that it might be proposed in parliament: which, after a very long audience and debate, that wise prince consented to; with a promise of secrecy in the meantime, which they humbly begged of his majesty. However, this took vent; and the earl of Northampton, of the house of Howard, (who ruled the roost in that time) having knowledge of it, engaged sir R. Weston, afterwards lord treasurer and earl of Portland, to impeach these undertakers in parliament, before they could move their matters: which he did the very same day; accompanying his charge (which was endeavouring to alter the established government of England) with so eloquent an invective, that if one of them had not risen, and made the house acquainted with the whole series of the affair, they must have been in danger of being impeached by the commons, but however it broke their design, which was all that Northampton and Weston desired; and prevented posterity from knowing any of the particulars of this reformation: for nothing being moved, nothing could remain upon the journal.

So that, you see, our predecessors were not ignorant altogether of our condition; though the troubles which have befallen this poor kingdom since, have made it much more apparent; for since the determination of that parliament, there has not been one called, (either in that king’s reign, or his son’s, or since,) that has not been dissolved abruptly; whilst the main businesses, and those of most concern to the public, were depending and undecided. And although there has happened in this interim a bloody war, which in the close of it, changed the whole order and foundation of the polity of England; and that it has pleased God to restore it again by his majesty’s happy return, so that the old government is alive again: yet it is very visible that its deadly wound is not healed; but that we are to this day tugging with the same difficulties, managing the same debates in parliament, and giving the same disgusts to the court and hopes to the country, which our ancestors did before the year 1640; whilst the king has been forced to apply the same remedy of dissolution to his two first parliaments, that his father used to his four first and king James to his three last, contrary to his own visible interest and that of his people: and this for want of having counsellors about him of abilities and integrity enough to discover to him the disease of his government, and the remedy.

Which I hope, when we meet tomorrow morning you will come prepared to enquire into; for the doctor says, he will advise you to go take the air this afternoon in your coach.

NOBLE VEN. I shall think it very long till the morning come: But before you go, pray give me leave to ask you something of your civil war here. I do not mean the history of it, (although the world abroad is very much in the dark as to all your transactions of that time for want of a good one) but the grounds or pretences of it; and how you fell into a war against your king.

ENG. GENT. As for our history, it will not be forgotten. One of those who was in employment from the year ‘40 to ‘60, has written the history of those twenty years; a person of good learning and elocution: and though he be now dead, yet his executors are very unwilling to publish it so soon, and to rub a sore that is not yet healed.[80] But the story is writ with great truth and impartiality; although the author was engaged, both in councils and arms, for the parliament’s side. But for the rest of your demand, you may please to understand, that our parliament never did, as they pretended, make war against the king: for he by law can do no wrong, and therefore cannot be quarrelled with. The war they declared was undertaken to rescue the king’s person out of those men’s hands who led him from his parliament, and made use of his name to levy a war against them.

NOBLE VEN. But does your government permit, that in case of a disagreement between the king and his parliament, either of them may raise arms against the other?

ENG. GENT. It is impossible that any government can go farther than to provide for its own safety and preservation whilst it is in being, and therefore it can never direct what shall be done when itself is at an end; there being this difference between our bodies natural and politic, that the first can make a testament to dispose of things after his death, but not the other. This is certain, that wherever any two coordinate powers do differ, and there be no power on earth to reconcile them otherwise, nor any umpire; they will, in fact, fall together by the ears. What can be done in this case justly, look into your own countryman Machiavel, and into Grotius; who in his book De Jure Belli ac Pacis, [Of War and Peace] treated of such matters long before our wars. As for the ancient politicians, they must needs be silent in the point, as having no mixed governments amongst them; and as for me, I will not rest myself in so slippery a place. There are great disputes about it in the parliament’s declarations before the war; and something considerable in the king’s answer to them; which I shall specify immediately, when I have satisfied you how our war began: which was in this manner.

The Long Parliament, having procured from the king his royal assent for their sitting till they were dissolved by act;[81] and having paid and sent out the Scottish army, and disbanded our own; went on in their debates for the settling and mending our government. The king, being displeased with them for it; and with himself for putting it out of his power to dissolve them, now the business which they pretended for their perpetuation was quite finished; takes an unfortunate resolution to accuse five principal men of the commons house, and one of the peers, of high-treason: which he prosecuted in a new unheard of way, by coming with armed men into the commons house of parliament, to demand their members. But nothing being done, by reason of the absence of the five; and tumults of discontented citizens flocking to Whitehall and Westminster; the king took that occasion to absent himself from his parliament. Which induced the commons house to send commissioners to Hampton Court, to attend his majesty with ‘a remonstrance of the state of the kingdom;’ and an humble request to return to his parliament, for the redressing those grievances which were specified in that remonstrance. But the king otherwise counselled, goes to Windsor; and thence northwards, till he arrived at York: where he summons in the militia, that is, the trained bands of the county; and besides, all the gentry: of which there was a numerous appearance. The king addressed himself to the latter with complaints against a prevailing party in parliament, which intended to take the crown from his head: that he was come to them, his loving subjects, for protection: and, in short, desired them to assist him with monies to defend himself by arms. Some of these gentlemen petitioned his majesty to return to his parliament; the rest went about the debate of the king’s demands; who, in the meantime, went to Hull, to secure the magazine there; but was denied entrance by a gentleman whom the house had sent down to prevent the seizing it: who was immediately declared a traitor, and the king fell to raising of forces. Which coming to the knowledge of the house, they made this vote; ‘That the king, seduced by evil counsel, intended to levy war against his parliament and people, to destroy the fundamental laws and liberties of England, and to introduce an arbitrary government; &c.’ This was the first time they named the king, and the last.

For in all their other papers, and in their declaration to arm for their defence, (which did accompany this vote,) they name nothing but malignant counsellors.

The king’s answer to these votes and this declaration, is that which I mentioned: wherein his majesty denies any intention of invading the government; with high imprecations upon himself and posterity, if it were otherwise; and owns, that they have right to maintain their laws and government. This is to be seen in the paper itself, now extant: and this gracious prince never pretended, (as some divines have done for him,) that his power came from God, and that his subjects could not dispute it, nor ought he to give any account of his actions (though he should enslave us all) to any but him. So that our war did not begin upon a point of right; but upon a matter of fact. For without going to lawyers or casuists to be resolved, those of the people who believed that the king did intend to destroy our liberties, joined with the parliament; and those who were of opinion that the prevailing party in parliament did intend to destroy the king or dethrone him, assisted vigorously his majesty with their lives and fortunes. And the question, you were pleased to ask, never came: for both parties pretended and believed they were in the right; and that they did fight for, and defend the government. But I have wearied you out. —

NOBLE VEN. No sure, sir! But I am infinitely obliged to you for the great care you have taken and still have used to instruct me; and beg the continuance of it for tomorrow morning.

ENG. GENT. I shall be sure to wait upon you at nine o’clock: but I shall beseech both of you to bethink yourselves what to offer; for I shall come with a design to learn, not to teach: nor will I presume in such a matter to talk all, as you have made me do today; for what I have yet to say in the point of cure is so little, that it will look like the mouse to the mountain of this day’s discourse.

DOCT. It is so in all arts; the corollary is short: and in ours, particularly. Those who write of the several diseases incident to human bodies, must make long discourses of the causes, symptoms, signs and prognostics of such distempers; but when they come to treat of the cure, it is dispatched in a few recipes.

ENG. GENT. Well, sir, for this bout, I humbly take my leave of you. — Nay, sir, you are not in a condition to use ceremony.

DOCT. Sir, I forbid you this door; pray retire. — To stand here, is worse than to be in the open air.

NOBLE VEN. I obey you both.

DOCT. I shall wait on you in the evening.

The Third Dialogue

NOBLE VEN. Gentlemen, you are very welcome: what, you are come both together!

DOCT. I met this gentleman at the door but methinks we sit looking one upon another, as if all of us were afraid to speak.

ENG. GENT. Do you think we have not reason, in such a subject as this is?

How can any man, without hesitation, presume to be so confident as to deliver his private opinion in a point, upon which for almost two hundred year[82] (for so long our government has been crazy) no man has ventured?

and when parliaments have done anything towards it, there have been animosities, and breaches, and at length civil wars?

NOBLE VEN. Our work today, is to endeavour to show, how all these troubles may be prevented for the future, by taking away the cause of them; which is the want of a good government: and therefore it will not be so much presumption in you, as charity, to declare yourself fully in this matter.

ENG. GENT. The cure will follow naturally, if you are satisfied in the disease and in the cause of the disease. For if you agree that our government is broken; and that it is broken, because it was founded upon property, and that foundation is now shaken: it will be obvious, that you must either bring property back to your old government, and give the king and lords their lands again; or else you must bring the government to the property, as it now stands.

DOCT. I am very well satisfied in your grounds: but because this fundamental truth is little understood amongst our people; and that in all conversations men will be offering their opinions of what the parliament ought to do at their meeting; it will not be amiss to examine some of those expedients they propose: and to see whether some, or all of them, may not be effectual towards the bringing us to some degree of settlement; rather than to venture upon so great a change and alteration, as would be necessary to model our government anew.

ENG. GENT. Sir, I believe there can be no expedients proposed in parliament, that will not take up as much time and trouble; find as much difficulty in passing with the king and lords; and seem as great a change of government, as the true remedy would appear: at least I speak as to what I have to propose. But however, I approve your method: and if you will please to propose any of those things, I shall either willingly embrace them; or endeavour to show reason, why they will be of little fruit in the settling our state.

DOCT. I will reduce them to two heads, (besides the making good laws for keeping out arbitrary power, which is always understood;) the hindering the growth of popery, and consequently the providing against a popish successor; and then declaring the duke of Monmouth’s right to the crown, after it has been examined and agreed to in parliament.

ENG. GENT. As for the making new laws, I hold it absolutely needless; those we have already against arbitrary power being abundantly sufficient, if they might be executed: but that being impossible (as I shall show hereafter) till some change shall be made, I shall postpone this point. And for the first of your other two, I shall divide and separate the consideration of the growth of popery, from that of the succession. I am sorry that in the prosecution of this argument, I shall be forced to say something that may not be very pleasing to this worthy gentleman, we being necessitated to discourse with prejudice of that religion which he professes; but it shall be with as little ill breeding as I can, and altogether without passion or invectives.

NOBLE VEN. It would be very hard for me to suspect anything from you that should be disobliging: but pray, sir, go on to your political discourse.

For I am not so ignorant myself but to know, that the conservation of the national religion (be it what it will) is essential to the well ordering a state. And though in our city the doctrinals are very different from what are professed here; yet as to the government of the state, I believe you know, that the pope or his priests have as little influence upon it, as your clergy have here, or in any part of the world.

ENG. GENT. I avow it fully, sir; and with the favour you give, will proceed. It cannot be denied but that, in former times, popery has been very innocent here to the government; and that the clergy and the pope were so far from opposing our liberties, that they both sided with the barons to get a declaration of them by means of Magna Charta. It is true also that if we were all papists, and that our state were the same both as to property and empire as it was four hundred years ago, there would be but one inconvenience to have that religion national again in England: which is, that the clergy, since such, had and will have a share in the sovereignty; and inferior courts in their own power called ecclesiastical.[83] This is, and ever will be, a solecism in government; besides a manifest contradiction to the words of Christ our Saviour who tells us his kingdom is not of this world. And the truth is, if you look into the scriptures, you will find that the apostles did not reckon that the religion they planted should be national in any country; and therefore have given no precepts to the magistrate to meddle in matters of faith and the worship of God: but preached, that Christians should yield them obedience in all lawful things.

There are many passages in holy writ which plainly declare, that the true believers and saints should be but a handful, and such as God had separated, and as it were taken out of the world; which would not have been said by them if they had believed that whole nations and people should have been true followers of Christ and of his flock: for certainly none of them are to be damned; and yet Christ himself tells us, that few are saved; and bids us strive to get in at the strait gate. And therefore I conceive it not to be imaginable, that either Christ or his apostles did ever account that the true religion should be planted in the world by the framing of laws, catechisms, or creeds; by the sovereign powers and magistrates whether you call them spiritual or temporal: but that it should have a progress suitable to its beginning. For it is visible that it had its original from the power and spirit of God; and came in against the stream: not only without a Numa Pompilius, or a Mohamet, to plant and establish it, by humane constitutions and authority;[84] but had all the laws of the world to oppose it, and all the bloody tyrants of that age to persecute it, and to inflict exquisite torments on the professors of it. In Nero’s time (which was very early) the Christians were offered a temple in Rome, and in what other cities they pleased, to be built to Jesus Christ; and that the Romans should receive him into the number of their gods; but our religion being then in its purity, this was unanimously refused; for that such a God must have no companions, nor needed no temples; but must be worshipped in spirit and truth. The successors to these good Christians were not so scrupulous: for within some ages after, the priests to get riches and power, and the emperors to get and keep the empire, (for by this time the Christians were grown numerous and powerful,) combined together to spoil our holy religion, to make it fit for the government of this world; and to introduce into it all the ceremonious follies and superstitions of the heathen; and (which is worse) the power of priests, both over the persons and consciences of men. I shall say no more of this; but refer you to innumerable authors who have treated of this subject: particularly to a French minister, who has written a book entitled, La Religion catholique apostolique Romaine instituée par Nume Pompile;[85] and to the incomparable Machiavel in his posthumous Letter, printed lately in our language with the translation of his works.[86] But I have made a long digression: and to come back again, shall only desire you to take notice, when I say that anciently popery was no inconvenience in this kingdom, I mean only politically, as the government then stood; and do not speak at all of the prejudice which men’s souls did and will ever receive from the belief of those impious tenets, and the want of having the true gospel of Jesus Christ preached unto them, living in perpetual superstition and idolatry. But the consideration of these matters is not so proper to my present purpose, being to discourse only of government. Notwithstanding therefore, as I said before, that popery might have suited well enough with our old constitution; yet as to the present estate which inclines to popularity, it would be wholly as inconsistent with it, and with the power of the keys and the empire of priests, (especially where there is a foreign jurisdiction in the case,) as with the tyranny and arbitrary power of any prince in the world.

I will add thus much in confirmation of the doctor’s assertion, that we ought to prevent the growth of popery; since it is now grown a dangerous faction here against the state.

NOBLE VEN. How can that be, I beseech you, sir?

ENG. GENT. Sir, I will make you judge of it yourself. I will say nothing of those foolish writings that have been put forth by Mariana, Emanuel Sa,[87]

and some others; about the lawfulness of destroying princes and states in case of heresy: because all the conscientious and honest papists, (of which I know there are great numbers in the world,) do not only not hold, but even abhor such cursed tenets; and do believe, that when the pope, by excommunication has cut off any prince from the communion of the church, he can go no further; nor ought to pretend a power to deprive him of his crown, or absolve his subjects from their oaths and obedience. But I shall confine myself to the present condition of our papists here. You know how dangerous it is for any kingdom or state to have a considerable, wealthy, flourishing party amongst them, whose interest it is to destroy the polity and government of the country where they live; and therefore if our papists prove this party, you will not wonder why this people are so eager to depress them. This is our case: for in the beginning of queen Elizabeth’s reign, there was an alteration of religion in our country; which did sufficiently enrage the holy father at Rome, to see that this good cow would be milked no longer. He declares her an heretic and a bastard, (his sanctity not having declared null that incestuous marriage which her father had contracted before with his brother’s wife, and which that king had dissolved to marry her mother) and afterwards excommunicated our queen, depriving her as much as in him lay, of the kingdom. Some of the zealots of that party, (having a greater terror for those thunder-bolts than I believe many have now,) began to conspire against her: and plots grew at length so frequent, and so dangerous, that it was necessary (as the parliaments then thought) to secure the queen, by making severe laws against a people, who did not believe themselves her majesty’s subjects; but on the contrary, many of them thought themselves in conscience obliged to oppose and destroy her. And although that excommunication, as also the pretended doubtfulness of the title, both died with that renowned queen; yet a new desperate conspiracy against the king her successor and the whole parliament ensuing not long after her decease,[88] those rigorous laws have been so far from being repealed, that very many more (and far severer) have been since made, and are yet in force. Now these laws make so great a distinction between protestants and papists, that whereas the former are by our government and laws the freest in the world, the latter are little better than slaves; are confined to such a distance from their houses; are not to come near the court; (which being kept in the capital city, mostly deprives them from attending their necessary occasions) they are to pay two third parts of their estates annually to the king; their priests are to suffer as traitors, and they as felons for harbouring them. In fine one of us, if he do not break the municipal laws for the good government of the country, need not fear the king’s power; whereas, their being what they are is a breach of the law; and does put them into the prince’s hands to ruin them when he pleases; nay, he is bound by oath to do it; and when he does it not, is complained against by his people, and parliaments take it amiss. Now judge you, sir, whether it is not the interest of these people to desire and endeavour a change, whilst they remain under these discouragements; and whether they are not like to join with the prince, (whose connivance at the inexecution of those laws is the only means and hope of their preservation,) whenever he shall undertake anything for the increase of his own power, and the depressing his parliaments.

NOBLE VEN. What you say is very undeniable; but then the remedy is very easy and obvious, as well as very just and honourable, which is the taking away those cruel laws; and if that were done they would be one people with you; and would have no necessity, and by consequence no desire to aggrandize the king against the interest and liberty of their own country.

ENG. GENT. You speak very well; and one of the reasons amongst many which I have to desire a composure of all our troubles by a settled government, is that I may see these people (who are very considerable, most of them, for estates, birth and breeding) live quietly under our good laws; and increase our trade and wealth with their expenses here at home: whereas now the severity of our laws against them, makes them spend their revenues abroad, and enrich other nations with the stock of England. But as long as the state here is so unsettled as it is, our parliaments will never consent to countenance a party, who by the least favour and indulgence may make themselves able to bring in their own religion to be national, and so ruin our polity and liberties.

NOBLE VEN. I wonder why you should think that possible?

ENG. GENT. First, sir, for the reason we first gave, which is the craziness of our polity: there being nothing more certain, than that both in the natural and also the politic body any sinister accident that intervenes, during a very diseased habit, may bring a dangerous alteration to the patient. An insurrection in a decayed government, a thing otherwise very inconsiderable, has proved very fatal; as I knew a slight flesh-wound bring a lusty man to his grave in our wars, for that he being extremely infected with the French disease, could never procure the orifice to close. So although the designs both at home and abroad for altering our religion, would be very little formidable to a well-founded government; yet in such an one as we have now, it will require all our care to obviate such machinations. Another reason is the little zeal that is left amongst the ordinary protestants: which zeal uses to be a great instrument of preserving the religion established; as it was here in queen Elizabeth’s time. I will add, the little credit the church of England has amongst the people; most men being almost as angry with that popery which is left amongst us (in surplices, copes, altars, cringings, bishops, ecclesiastical courts, and the whole hierarchy; besides an infinite number of useless, idle, superstitious ceremonies; and the ignorance and viciousness of the clergy in general) as they are with those dogmas that are abolished: so that there is no hopes that popery can be kept out, but by a company of poor people called fanatics, who are driven into corners as the first Christians were; and who only in truth conserve the purity of Christian religion, as it was planted by Christ and his apostles and is contained in scripture. And this makes almost all sober men believe, that the national clergy, besides all their other good qualities, have this too; that they cannot hope to make their hierarchy subsist long against the scriptures, the hatred of mankind, and the interest of this people, but by introducing the Roman religion; and getting a foreign head and supporter, which shall from time to time brave and hector the king and parliament in their favour and behalf: which yet would be of little advantage to them, if we had as firm and wise a government as you have at Venice.

Another reason, and the greatest, why the Romish religion ought to be very warily provided against at this time, is; that the lawful and undoubted heir to the crown, if his majesty should die without legitimate issue, is more than suspected to embrace that faith: which (if it should please God to call the king, before there be any remedy applied to our distracted state) would give a great opportunity by the power he would have in intervals of parliament either to introduce immediately that profession, with the help of our clergy, and other English and foreign aids; or else to make so fair a way for it, that a little time would perfect the work. And this is the more formidable, for that he is held to be a very zealous and bigoted Romanist; and therefore may be supposed to act anything to that end, although it should manifestly appear to be contrary to his own interest and quiet; so apt are those who give up their faith and the conduct of their lives to priests, (who to get to themselves empire, promise them the highest seats in heaven; if they will sacrifice their lives, fortunes, and hopes, for the exaltation of their holy mother, and preventing the damnation of an innumerable company of souls which are not yet born) to be led away with such erroneous and wild fancies. Whereas Philip the second of Spain, the house of Guise in France, and other great statesmen, have always made their own greatness their first aim; and used their zeal as an instrument of that: and, instead of being cozened by priests, have cheated them; and made them endeavour to preach them up to the empire of the world.

So I have done with the growth of popery; and must conclude that, if that should be stopped in such manner that there could not be one papist left in England, and yet our polity left in the same disorder that now afflicts it, we should not be one scruple the better for it nor the more at quiet: the growth and danger of popery not being the cause of our present distemper, but the effect of it. But as a good and settled government would not be at all the nearer, for the destruction of popery; so popery and all the dangers and inconveniences of it would not only be further off, but would wholly vanish, at the sight of such a reformation. And so we begin at the wrong end, when we begin with religion before we heal our breaches. I will borrow one similitude more, with our doctor’s favour from his profession. I knew once a man given over by the physicians, of an incurable cachexy;[89] which they said proceeded from the ill quality of the whole mass of blood, from great adustion, and from an ill habit of the whole body: the patient had very often painful fits of the colic, which they said, proceeded from the sharpness of the humour which caused the disease; and, amongst the rest, had one fit which tormented him to that degree, that it was not expected he could out-live it; yet the doctors delivered him from it in a small time: notwithstanding, soon after the man died of his first distemper. Whereas, if their art had arrived to have cured that which was the cause of the other, the colic had vanished of itself and the patient recovered. I need make no application nor shall need to say much of the succession of the crown, (which is my next province,) but this I have said already; that it is needless to make any provision against a popish successor, if you rectify your government; and if you do not, all the care and circumspection you can use in that particular will be useless and of none effect; and will but at last (if it do not go off easily, and the next heir succeed peaceably, as is most likely, especially if the king live till the people’s zeal and mettle is over) end probably in a civil war about title: and then the person deprived may come in with his sword in his hand, and bring in upon the point of it both the popish religion, and arbitrary power. Which, though I believe he will not be able to maintain long, (for the reasons before alleged,) yet that may make this generation miserable and unhappy.

[[[90] It will certainly be agreed by all lovers of their country, that popery must be kept from returning and being national in this kingdom; as well for what concerns the honour and service of God, as the welfare and liberty of the people. And I conceive there are two ways, by which the parliament may endeavour to secure us against that danger. The first, by ordering such a change in the administration of our government, that whoever is prince can never violate the laws; and then we may be very safe against popery, (our present laws being effectual enough to keep it out, and no new ones being like to be made in parliament that may introduce it;) and this remedy will be at the same time advantageous to us, against the tyranny and encroachments of a protestant successor; so that we may call it an infallible remedy both against popery and arbitrary power. The second way is, by making a law to disable any papists (by name, or otherwise) from inheriting the crown; and this is certainly fallible, that is, may possibly not take place (as I shall show immediately:) and besides it is not improbable that an heir to this kingdom in future times, may dissemble his religion till he be seated in the throne; or possibly be perverted to the Roman faith after he is possessed of it, when it may be too late to limit his prerogative in parliament: and to oppose him without that will, I fear, be judged treason.]]

DOCT. But sir, would you have the parliament do nothing, as things stand, to provide (at least as much as in them lies) that whoever succeeds be a good protestant?

ENG. GENT. Yes, I think it best in the first place to offer to his majesty the true remedy; and if they find him averse to that, then to pursue the other which concerns the succession: because the people (who are their principals and give them their power) do expect something extraordinary from them at this time; and the most of them believe this last the only present means to save them from popery, which they judge (and very justly) will bring in with it a change of government. But then, I suppose, they may be encouraged to propose, in the first place, the true cure: not only because that is infallible, as has been proved; but likewise because his majesty in probability will sooner consent to any reasonable demand towards the reforming of the government and to the securing us that way, than to concur to the depriving his only brother of the crown: And possibly this (as I said before) may be the only way the parliament can hope will prove effectual: for if you please to look but an age back into our story, you will find that Henry the eighth did procure an act of parliament, which gave him power to dispose of the crown by his last will and testament;[91] and that he did accordingly make his said will, and by it devise the succession to his son Edward the sixth, in the first place, and to the heirs of his body; and for want of such, to his daughter Mary, and to the heirs of her body; and for want of which heirs, to his daughter Elizabeth (our once sovereign, of immortal, and blessed memory) and the heirs of her body; and for want of all such issue, to the right heirs of his younger sister; who was, before he made this will, married to Charles Brandon duke of Suffolk, and had issue by him. By this testament he disinherited his elder sister; who was married in Scotland: and by that means did, as much as in him lay, exclude his majesty (who now, by God’s mercy, reigns over us) as also his father and grandfather. And to make the case stronger, there passed an act long after, in the reign of queen Elizabeth; that it should be treason during that queen’s life, and a praemunire afterwards, to assert that the imperial crown of England could not be disposed of by act of parliament.[92] Yet after the decease of that queen, there was no considerable opposition made to the peaceable reception and recognition of king James of happy memory: and those who did make a little stir about the other title, as the lord Cobham,[93]

sir Walter Rawleigh, and a few others, were apprehended and condemned according to law. And notwithstanding that, since, in the reign of king Charles the first, there was a bloody civil war, in which men’s minds were exasperated at a high rate, yet in all the course of it the original want of title was never objected against his late majesty. I do not urge this to aver that the parliament with the king’s consent cannot do lawfully this, or any other great matter; (which would be an incurring the penalty of that law, and a solecism in the politics:) but to show, that when the passions of men are quieted, and the reasons other than they were, it happens oftentimes that those acts which concern the succession fall to the ground of themselves; and that even without the sword, which in this case was never adopted, and that therefore this remedy in our case may be likely never to take place, if it please God the king live till this nation be under other kind of circumstances.

DOCT. Sir, you say very well: but it seems to me, that the last parliament was in some kind of fault, if this be true that you say; for I remember that my lord chancellor did once during their sitting, in his majesty’s name, offer them to secure their religion and liberties any way they could advise of, so they would let alone meddling with the succession; and invited them to make any proposals they thought necessary to that end.[94]

ENG. GENT. Hence these tears! If this had been all, we might have been happy at this time: but this gracious offer was, at the beginning, accompanied with such conditions that made the parliament conjecture that it was only to perplex and divide them; and did look upon it as an invention of some new romance (counsellors and those too, possibly, influenced by the French), to make them embrace the shadow for the substance; and satisfying themselves with this appearance, to do their ordinary work of giving money, and be gone and leave the business of the kingdom as they found it. For it was proposed, that whatsoever security we were to receive should be both conditional, and reversionable. That is, first, we should not be put into possession of this new charter (be it what it will) rill after the death of his majesty who now is: whereas such a provision is desirable, and indeed necessary for us for this only reason; that when that unfortunate hour comes, we might not be (in that confusion) unprovided of a calm, settled and orderly, as well as a legal way, to keep out popery: whereas otherwise if we be to take possession in that minute, it must either miscarry, or be gotten by a war. If it be true that possession be nine points of the law in other cases, it is in this the whole ten: and I should be very unwilling in such a distraction to have no sanctuary to fly to, but a piece of parchment kept in the pells; and to have this too, as well as other advantages, in the power and possession of him in whose prejudice it was made. This had been almost as good an expedient to keep out popery, as the bill which was thrown out that parliament; which provided, that in the reign of a king that should be a papist, the bishops should choose one another upon vacancies. Those counsellors who put my lord chancellor upon this proposal, were either very slender politicians themselves; or else thought the parliament so. If Magna Charta, and the Petition of Right, had not been to take place till after the decease of those princes who confirmed them, neither had the barons shed their blood to so good purpose; nor the members of the parliament in the third year of king Charles [1628] deserved so glorious an imprisonment, after it was ended.[95] The other condition, in this renowned proposal, is; that all provision and security which is given us to preserve our religion shall cease immediately, whenever the prince shall take a certain oath to be penned for that purpose: and I leave it to all thinking men to determine what that will avail us, when we shall have a king of that profession over us, who shall not have so much zeal for his religion, as he who is now the next successor has; but shall possibly prefer his ambition, and his desire to get out of wardship, before the scruples of his confessor; and yet may afterwards, by getting absolution for, and dispensation from such oaths and compliance, employ the power he gets himself, and the security he deprives us of, to introduce violently what worship and faith he pleases. This gracious offer had the fatality to disgust one of the best parliaments that ever sat, and the most loyal: so that laying it aside, they fell upon the succession (the only thing they had then left) and were soon after dissolved: leaving the kingdom in a more distracted condition than they found it. And this can no way be composed, but by mending the polity; so that whoever is king cannot (be he never so inclined to it) introduce popery, or destroy whatever religion shall be established. As you see in the example of the duchy of Hanover, whose prince, some fourteen years since, was perverted to the Roman church; went to Rome to abjure heresy, (as they call the truth;) returned home; where he lived and governed as he did before; without the least animosity of his subjects for his change, or any endeavour of his to introduce any in his government or people: and dying this last spring, left the peaceable and undisturbed rule of his subjects to the next successor, his brother the bishop of Osnaburg, who is a protestant.[96] And this because the polity of that dukedom has been conserved entire for many years, and is upon a right basis: and if our case were so, we should not only be out of danger to have our religion altered (as I said before) whoever is king, but should in other things be in a happy and flourishing condition. But I have made a long and tedious digression to answer your demands: now ‘tis time you assist me to find the natural cure of all our mischiefs.

DOCT. Stay, sir; I confess myself to be wonderfully edified with your discourse hitherto, but you have said nothing yet of the duke of Monmouth.

ENG. GENT. I do not think you desire it, though you were pleased to mention such a thing; for I suppose you cannot think it possible, that this parliament (which is now speedily to meet by his majesty’s gracious proclamation) can ever suffer such a thing to be so much as debated amongst them.

DOCT. Sir, you have no reason to take that for granted, when you see what books are printed; what great and honourable persons frequent him in private, and countenance him in public; what shoals of the middle sort of people have in his progress this summer met him before he came into any great town; and what acclamations and bonfires have been made in places where he lodged.

ENG. GENT. These things, I must confess, show how great a distemper the people are in; and the great reason we have to pray God of his mercy to put an end to it by a happy agreement in parliament. But certainly this proceeds only from the hatred they have to the next successor and his religion; and from the compassion they have to the duke of Monmouth (who as they suppose, has suffered banishment and disfavour at court, at his instance;) and not from any hopes, or expectations, that the parliament will countenance any pretence that can be made in his behalf to the succession.

DOCT. It may be when we have discoursed of it, I shall be of your mind; as indeed I am inclined already. But yet as nothing in war is more dangerous than to contemn an enemy; so in this argumentation that we use to secure our liberties, we must leave nothing unanswered that may stand in the way of that; especially the duke of Monmouth’s claim, which is pretended to confirm and fortify them: for (say some men) if you set him up, he will presently pass all bills that shall concern the safety and interest of the people; and so we shall be at rest forever.

ENG. GENT. Well, I see I must be more tedious than I intended. First then, the reasoning of these men you speak of, does in my apprehension suppose a thing, I cannot mention without horror; which is, that this person should be admitted immediately to the possession of the crown, to do all these fine matters. For otherwise, if he must stay till the death of our sovereign who now reigns, (which I hope and pray will be many years,) possibly these delicate bills may never pass; nor he find hereafter the people in so good a humour to admit him to the reversion; which if it could be obtained (as I think it impossible politically) yet the possession must be kept by a standing army; and the next successor cannot have a better game to play, nor a better adversary to deal with, than one who leaps in over the heads of almost all the protestant princes’ families abroad; (besides some papists who are greater:) and when we have been harrassed with wars and the miseries that accompany it some few years, you shall have all these fine people, who now run after him, very weary of their new prince. I would not say anything to disparage a person so highly born, and of so early merit; but this I may say, that if a lawful title should be set on foot in his favour, and a thousand Dutch hosts and such like should swear a marriage, yet no sober man that is not blinded with prejudice will believe, that our king (whom none can deny to have an excellent understanding) would ever marry a woman so much his inferior as this great person’s mother was; and this at a time when his affairs were very low, and he had no visible or rational hopes to be restored to the possession of his kingdoms, but by an assistance which might have been afforded him by means of some great foreign alliance.

Well, but to leave all this, do these men pretend that the duke of Monmouth shall be declared successor to the crown in parliament, with the king’s concurrence, or without it? If without it, you must make a war for it; and I am sure that no cause can be stated upon such a point, that will not make the asserters and undertakers of it be condemned by all the politicians and moralists of the world, and by the casuists of all religions: and so by consequence, it is like to be a very unsuccessful war. If you would have this declared with the king’s consent; either you suppose the royal assent to be given, when the king has his liberty either to grant it or not grant it, to dissolve the parliament or not dissolve it, without ruin or prejudice to his affairs: if in the first case, it is plain he will not grant it, because he cannot do it without confessing his marriage to that duke’s mother, which he has already declared against in a very solemn manner, and caused it to be registered in Chancery; and which not only no good subject can choose but believe, but which cannot be doubted by any rational person: for it would be a very unnatural, and indeed a thing unheard of, that a father who had a son in lawful matrimony, and who was grown to perfection, and had signalized himself in the wars, and who was ever entirely beloved by him, should disinherit him by so solemn an asseveration (which must be a false one too) to cause his brother to succeed in his room. And whereas it is pretended by some, that his majesty’s danger from his brother’s counsels and designs may draw from him something of this: beside that they do not much complement the king in this; it is clear, his brother is not so popular, but that he may secure him when he pleases without hazard, if there were any ground for such an apprehension.

But we must in the next place suppose that the king’s affairs were in such a posture, that he could deny the parliament nothing without very great mischief and inconvenience to himself and the kingdom: then I say, I doubt not, but the wisdom of the parliament will find out divers demands and requests to make to his majesty of greater benefit, and more necessary for the good of his people than this would be; which draws after it not only a present unsettledness, but the probable hazard of misery and devastation for many years to come, as has been proved. So that as on the one side, the parliament could not make a more unjustifiable war than upon this account; so they could not be dissolved upon any occasion wherein the people would not show less discontent and resentment, and for which the courtiers would not hope to have a better pretext to strive in the next choice to make their arts and endeavours more successful in the election of members more suitable to their designs for the continuance of this present misgovernment: for if this parliament do misspend the peoples’ mettle which is now up, in driving that nail which cannot go; they must look to have it cool, and so the ship of this commonwealth, which if they please may be now in a fair way of entering into a safe harbour, will be driven to sea again in a storm; and must hope for, and expect another favourable wind to save them: and God knows when that may come.

[[[97] DOCT. But, sir, there are others, who not minding whether the parliament will consider the duke of Monmouth’s concern so far as to debate it, do yet pretend that there is great reason to keep up the peoples’

affections to him; and possibly to foment the opinion they have of his title to the crown: to the end, that if the king should die before such time as the government is redressed, or the duke of York disabled by law to succeed, the people might have a head; under whose command and conduct they might stand upon their guard, till they had some way secured their government and religion.

ENG. GENT. What you have started is not a thing that can safely be discoursed of, nor is it much material to our design; which is intended to speculate upon our government, and to show how it is decayed. I have industriously avoided the argument of rebellion, as I find it couched in modern politicians; because most princes hold, that all civil wars in mixed monarchies must be so; and a politician (as well as an orator) ought to be an upright man; so ought to discourse nothing, how rational soever, in these points under a peaceable monarchy which gives him protection, but what he would speak of his prince if all his counsel were present. I will tell you only that these authors hold, that nothing can be alleged to excuse the taking arms by any people in opposition to their prince from being treason, but a claim to a lawful jurisdiction or coordination in the government, by which they may judge of and defend their own rights; and so pretend to fight for and defend the government. For though all do acknowledge, that the good of the people is, and ought to be, the most supreme or sovereign law in the world; yet if we should make private persons, how numerous soever, judge of the welfare of the people, we should have all the risings and rebellions that should ever be made, justified by that title: as happened in France, when The League of the Public Weal took that name; which was raised by the insatiable ambition of a few noblemen, and by correspondency and confederacy with Charles, son of the duke of Burgundy, and other enemies to that crown.[98]

DOCT. But would you have our people do nothing then, if the king should be assassinated, or die of a natural death?

ENG. GENT. You may ask me a very fine question, doctor. If I say, I would have the people stir in that case, then the king and his laws take hold of me; and if I should answer, that I would have them be quiet, the people would tear me in pieces for a jesuit; or at least, believe that I had no sense of the religion, laws, and liberty of my country. In fact, I do suppose, that if the people do continue long in this heat which now possesses them; and remain in such a passion at the time of the king’s death without settling matters; they may probably fall into tumults and civil war: which makes it infinitely to be desired, and prayed for by all good Englishmen, that during the quiet and peace we enjoy by the blessing of his majesty’s life and happy reign, we might likewise be so wise and fortunate as to provide for the safety and prosperity of the next generation.

DOCT. But if you would not have the people in such a case take the duke of Monmouth for their head, what would you have them do?

ENG. GENT. Doctor, you ask me very fine questions! Do not you know that Machiavel, the best and most honest of all the modern politicians, has suffered sufficiently by means of priests, and other ignorant persons?[99]

who do not understand his writings, and therefore impute to him the teaching subjects how they should rebel and conspire against their princes; which if he were in any kind guilty of, he would deserve all the reproaches that have been cast upon him, and ten times more; and so should I, if I ventured to obey you in this. I am very confident, that if any man should come to you, to implore your skill in helping him to a drug that might quickly, and with the least fear of being suspected, dispatch an enemy of his, or some other, by whose death he was to be a gainer; or some young lass that had gotten a surreptitious great belly, should come to you to teach her how to destroy the fruit; I say, in this case you would scarce have had patience to hear these persons out: much less would you have been so wicked to have in the least assisted them in their designs. No more than Solon, Lycurgus, Periander, or any other of the sages could have been brought to have given their advice to any persons who should have begged it, to enable them to ruin and undermine the government of their own commonwealths.

DOCT. Sir, this reprehension would be very justly given me, if I had intended by this question to induce you to counsel me, or any other how to rebel. My meaning was to desire you (who have heretofore been very fortunate in prophesying concerning the events of our changes here) to exercise your faculty a little at this time; and tell us, what is like to be the end of these distractions we are under, in case we shall not be so happy as to put a period to them by mending our government and securing our religion and liberty in a regular way.

ENG. GENT. Doctor, I will keep the reputation of prophecy, which I have gained with you; and not hazard it with any new predictions, for fear they should miscarry.

Yet I care not, if I gratify your curiosity a little in the point about which you first began to interrogate me, by presaging to you; that in case we should have troubles and combustions here, after his majesty’s decease (which God avert) we must expect a very unsuccessful end of them, if we should be so rash and unadvised as to make the great person we have been lately speaking of, our head; and that nothing can be more dangerous and pernicious to us than such a choice. I have not in this discourse the least intention to except against, much less to disparage the personal worth of the duke of Monmouth, which the world knows to be very great; but do believe that he has courage and conduct proportionable to any employment that can be conferred upon him, whether it be to manage arms or counsels: but my opinion is, that no person in his circumstance can be a proper head in this case.

For the people having been already put on upon the scent of his title to the crown, will be very hardly called off; and so will force the wiser men, who may design better things, to consent that he be proclaimed king immediately: except there be some other head, who by his power, wisdom, and authority, may restrain the forwardness of the multitude, and obviate the acts of some men, whose interest and hopes may prompt them to foment the humours of the people. Now the consequences of hurrying a man to the throne so tumultuously, without the least deliberation, are very dismal: and do not only not cure the politic distemper of our country which we have talked so much of, but do infinitely augment it; and add to the disease our state labours under already (which is a consumption) a very violent fever too; I mean war at home, and from abroad, which must necessarily follow in a few years: nor is it possible to go back, when once we have made that step; for our new king will call a parliament, which being summoned by his writ, neither will nor can question his title or government, otherwise than by making addresses and by presenting bills to him, as they do to his now majesty.

NOBLE VEN. It seems to me, that there needs nothing more than that: for if he consent to all laws as shall be presented to him; you may reform your government sufficiently, or else it is your own fault.

ENG. GENT. We have showed already, and shall do more hereafter, that no laws can be executed till our government be mended: and if you mean we should make such as should mend that, (besides that it would be a better method to capitulate that, before you make choice of your prince, as wise people have done in all ages, and the cardinals do at Rome in the conclave before they choose their pope) I say besides this, it is not to be taken for granted that any bills that tend to make considerable alterations in the administration, (and such we have need of as you will see anon) would either in that case be offered, or consented to. Both prince and people being so ready to cry out upon forty-one, and to be frighted with the name of a commonwealth; even now when we think popery is at the door: which some people then will think farther off, and so not care to make so great alterations to keep it out. Besides, the great men, and favourites of the new prince, will think it hard that the king should be so bounded and limited both in power and revenue, that he shall have no means to exercise his liberality towards them; and so may use their interest and eloquence, in both houses, to dissuade them from pressing so hard upon a prince, who is a true zealous protestant, and has always headed that party; and who is justly admired, if not adored by the people: and considering too that all the power they leave him, will serve but to enable him to defend us the better from popery and arbitrary power; to prevent the latter of which most monarchies were originally instituted.

Thus we may exercise, during a parliament or two, love-tricks between the prince and his people; and imitate the honeymoon that continued for about two years after his majesty’s Restoration: till the ill management of affairs, and the new grievances that shall arise, (which will be sure never to fail till our true cure be effected, notwithstanding the care of the new king and his counsellors) shall awaken the discontents of the people; and then they will curse the time, in which they made this election of a prince; and the great men, for not hindering them. Then men will be reckoning up the discontents of the peers, sometime after they had made a rash choice of Henry the seventh in the field, (who had then no title,) when they saw how he made use of the power they gave him; to lessen their greatness and to fortify himself, upon their ruins. When it comes to this, and that the governing party comes to be but a little faction; the people, who never know the true cause of their distemper, will be looking out abroad who has the lawful title; (if the next heir be not in the meantime with an army of English and strangers in the field here, as is most likely:) and look upon the prince of Orange,[100] or the next of kin, as their future saviour; in case the duke be dead in the meantime, and so the cause of all their distrust taken away. Thus most men, (not only discontented persons, but the people in general,) looked upon his majesty that now is, as their future deliverer, during our late distractions; when his condition was so weak that he had scarce wherewithal to subsist, and his enemies powerful at home and victorious abroad: which will not be, I fear, our case.

I prophesy then, (because you will have me use this word,) that if nobles or people make any such unfortunate choice as this, during the distractions we may be in upon his majesty’s death, we shall not only miss our cure; or have it deferred, till another government make it; but remain in the confusion we now suffer under; and besides that, shall be sure to feel, first or last, the calamity of a civil and foreign war: and in the meantime to be in perpetual fear of it, and suffer all the burden and charge which is necessary to provide for it; besides all the other ill consequences of a standing army. To conclude, I assure you on the faith of a Christian, that I have made this discourse solely and singly out of zeal and affection to the interest of my country; and not at all with the least intention to favour or promote the cause or interest of the duke of York, or to disparage the duke of Monmouth: from whom I never received the least unkindness; nor ever had the honour to be in his company: and to whom I shall ever pay respect suitable to his high birth and merit.]]

NOBLE VEN. Well, sir, your reasoning in this point has extremely satisfied me; and the doctor, I suppose, was so before, as he averred; therefore pray let us go on where we left.

ENG. GENT. I cannot take so much upon me as to be dictator in the method of our cure, since either of you is a thousand times better qualified for such an office; and therefore shall henceforth desire to be an auditor.

DOCT. Pray, sir, let us not spend time in compliments, but be pleased to proceed in this business; and we doubt not but as you have hitherto wonderfully delighted us, so you will gratify us in concluding it.

ENG. GENT. I see I must obey you: but pray help me, and tell me in the first place, whether you do not both believe, that as the chief cause of all our distractions is (as has been proved) the breach of our government, so that the immediate causes are two; first, the great distrust on both sides between the king, and his people and parliament; the first fearing that his power will be so lessened by degrees, that at length it will not be able to keep the crown upon his head: and the latter seeing all things in disorder, and that the laws are not executed, (which is the second of the two causes,) fear the king intends to change the government and be arbitrary.

NOBLE VEN. I am a stranger; but (though I never reflected so much upon the original cause, as I have done since I heard you discourse of it) yet I ever thought, that those two were the causes of the unquietness of this kingdom. I mean the jealousy between the king and his people; and the inexecution of the great law of calling parliaments annually, and letting them sit, to dispatch their affairs: I understand this in the time of his majesty’s grandfather and father, more than in his own reign.

ENG. GENT. Then whoever can absolutely lay these two causes asleep forever, will arrive to a perfect cure: which I conceive no way of doing, but that the king have a great deal more power, or a great deal less. And you know that what goes out of the king must go into the people, and so vice versa; insomuch that the people must have a great deal more power, or a great deal less. Now it is no question, but either of these two would rather increase their power than diminish it: so that if this cannot be made up by the wisdom of this age, we may see in the next; that both the king will endeavour to be altogether without a parliament, and the parliament to be without a king.

DOCT. I begin to smell what you would be nibbling at; the pretence which some had before his majesty’s Restoration, of a commonwealth, or democracy.

ENG. GENT. No; I abhor the thoughts of wishing, much less endeavouring, any such thing, during the circumstances we are now in: that is, under oaths of obedience to a lawful king. And truly, if any Themistocles should make to me such a proposal, I should give the same judgement concerning it that Aristides did in such a case. The story is short. After the war between the Greeks and the Persians was ended, and Xerxes driven out of Greece; the whole fleet of the Grecian confederates, (except that of Athens, which was gone home) lay in a great arsenal (such as were then in use) upon the coast of Attica: during their abode there. Themistocles harrangues one day the people of Athens, (as was then the custom,) and tells them, that he had a design in his head, which would be of infinite profit and advantage to the commonwealth: but that it could not be executed without the order and authority of them; and that it did likewise require secrecy, and if it were declared there in the market-place, (where strangers as well as citizens might be present,) it could not be concealed; and therefore proposed it to their consideration what should be done in it. It was at length concluded, that Themistocles should propose it to Aristides; and if he did next morning acquaint the people that he gave his approbation to it, it should be proceeded in. Themistocles informs him, that the whole fleet of their confederates in the war against the Medes had betaken themselves to the great arsenal upon their coast, where they might be easily fired; and then the Athenians would remain absolute masters of the sea, and so give law to all Greece. When Aristides came the next day to deliver his judgement to the people, he told them that the business proposed by Themistocles, was indeed very advantageous and profitable to the Athenians; but withal, the most wicked and villainous attempt that ever was undertaken: upon which it was wholly laid aside. And the same judgement do I give, doctor, of your democracy, at this time. But to return to the place where I was; I do believe that this difference may easily be terminated very fairly; and that our house need not be pulled down, and a new one built; but may be very easily repaired, so that it may last many hundred years.

NOBLE VEN. I begin to perceive that you aim at this; that the king must give the people more power, as Henry the third, and king John did; or the parliament must give the king more, as you said they did in France in the time of Lewis the eleventh; or else that it will come in time to a war again.

ENG. GENT. You may please to know; that in all times hitherto, the parliament never demanded anything of the king, wherein the interest and government of the kingdom was concerned, (excepting acts of pardon,) but they founded their demands upon their right; not only because it might seem unreasonable for them to be earnest with him, to give them that which was his own; but also because they cannot choose but know that all powers which are fundamentally and lawfully in the crown, were placed there upon the first institution of our government, to capacitate the prince to govern and protect his people: so that for the parliament to seek to take from him such authority, were to be felo de se, as we call a self-homicide. But as in some distempers of the body the head suffers as well as the inferior parts, so that it is not possible for it to order, direct and provide for the whole body, as its office requires; since the wisdom and power which is placed there, is given by God to that end: in which case, though the distemper of the body may begin from the disease of some other part, or from the mass of blood, or putrefaction of other humours; yet since that noble part is so affected by it that reason and discourse fail, therefore to restore this again remedies must be applied to, and possibly humours or vapours drawn from the head itself; that so it may be able to govern and reign over the body, as it did before: or else the whole man, like a slave, must be ruled and guided from without, that is, by some keeper: so is it now with us, in our politic disease: where granting (if you please) that the distemper does not proceed from the head, but the corruption of other parts; yet in the cure, applications must be made to the head as well as to the members, if we mean poor England shall recover its former perfect health: and therefore it will be found, perhaps, essential to our being, to ask something (in the condition we now are) to which the king as yet may have a right; and which except he please to part with, the phenomena of government cannot be salved; that is, our laws cannot be executed; nor Magna Charta itself made practicable: and so both prince and people, that is the polity of England, must die of this disease; or in this delirium, must be governed from without and fall to the lot of some foreign power.

NOBLE VEN. But, sir, (since the business is come to this dilemma) why may not the king ask more power of the parliament, as well as they of him?

ENG. GENT. No question but our present counsellors and courtiers would be nibbling at that bait again, if they had another parliament that would take pensions for their votes; but in one that is come fresh from the people, and understands their sense and grievances very well, I hardly believe they will attempt it: for both council and parliament must needs know by this time-a-day, that the cause of all our distractions coming (as has been said an hundred times) from the king’s having a greater power already, than the condition of property at this present can admit without confusion and disorder, it is not like to mend matters for them to give him more; except they will deliver up to him at the same instant their possessions and right to their lands, and become naturally and politically his slaves.

NOBLE VEN. Since there must be a voluntary parting with power, I fear your cure will prove long and ineffectual: and we reconcilers, shall, (I fear,) prove like our devout Capuchin at Venice. This poor man’s name was Friar Bernardino da Udine; and was esteemed a very holy man, as well as an excellent preacher: insomuch that he was appointed to preach the Lent sermons in one of our principal churches; which he performed at the beginning with so much eloquence, and applause, that the church was daily crowded three hours before the sermon was to begin. The esteem and veneration this poor friar was in, elevated his spirit a little too high to be contained within the bounds of reason: but before his delirium was perceived, he told his auditory one day; that the true devotion of that people, and the care they had to come to hear his word preached, had been so acceptable to God and to the virgin, that they had vouchsafed to inspire him with the knowledge of an expedient, which he did not doubt but would make men happy and just even in this life; and that the flesh should no longer lust against the spirit; but that he would not acquaint them with it at that present, because something was to be done on their parts to make them capable of this great blessing; which was to pray zealously for a happy success upon his endeavours, and to fast and to visit the churches, to that end: therefore he desired them to come the Wednesday following to be made acquainted with this blessed expedient. You may imagine how desirous our people were, to hear something more of this fifth monarchy. I will shorten my story, and tell you nothing of what crowding there was all night, and what quarrelling for places in the church; nor with what difficulty the ‘sages’, who were sent by the magistrate to keep the peace, and to make way for the preacher to get into the pulpit, did both: but up he got: and after a long preamble of desiring more prayers, and addressing himself to our senate to mediate with the pope, that a week might be set apart for a jubilee and fasting three days all over the Christian world; to storm heaven with masses, prayers, fasting and alms to prosper his designs; he began to open the matter: that the cause of all the wickedness and sin, and by consequence of all the miseries and affliction which is in the world, arising from the enmity which is between God and the devil; by which means God was often crossed in his intentions of good to mankind here and hereafter, the devil by his temptations making us incapable of the mercy and favour of our creator: therefore he had a design (with the helps before-mentioned) to mediate with almighty God, that he would pardon the devil; and receive him into his favour again after so long a time of banishment and imprisonment; and not to take all his power from him, but to leave him so much as might do good to man, and not hurt: which he doubted not but he would employ that way, after such reconciliation was made, as his faith would not let him question. You may judge, what the numerous auditory thought of this: I can only tell you, that he had a different sort of company at his return from what he had when he came; for the men left him to the boys, who with great hoops instead of acclamations brought him to the gondola, which conveyed him to the Redentore; where he lodged: and I never had the curiosity to enquire, what became of him after.[101]

DOCT. I thank you heartily for this intervention; I see you have learned something in England: for, I assure you, we have been these twenty years turning this, and all serious discourses into ridicule. But yet your similitude is very pat: for in every parliament that has been in England these sixty years, we have had notable contests between the seed of the serpent and the seed of the woman.

ENG. GENT. Well, sir, we have had a Michael here in our age, who has driven out Lucifer, and restored the true deity to his power:[102] but where omnipotency is wanting, (which differs the Friar’s case and mine,) the devil of civil war and confusion may get up again; if he be not laid by prudence and virtue, and better conjurers than any we have yet at court.

NOBLE VEN. Well, gentlemen, I hope you have pardoned me for my farce: but, to be a little more serious, pray tell me how you will induce the king to give up so much of his right as may serve your turn? Would you have the parliament make war with him again?

ENG. GENT. There cannot, nor ought to be, any change but by his majesty’s free consent: for besides, that a war is to be abhorred by all men that love their country; any contest of that kind in this case (viz. to take away the least part of the king’s right) could be justified by no man living. I say besides that, a civil war has miscarried in our days; which was founded (at least pretendedly) upon defence of the people’s own rights: in which, although they had as clear a victory in the end, as ever any contest upon earth had, yet could they never reap the least advantage in the world by it; but went from one tyranny to another, from Barebone’s parliament, to Cromwell’s reign; and from that, to a committee of safety: leaving those grave men, who managed affairs at the beginning, amazed to see new men and new principles governing England: and this induced them to cooperate to bring things back, just where they were before the war. Therefore this remedy will be either none, or worse than the disease: it not being now as it was in the barons’ time, when the lord who led out his men, could bring them back again when he pleased, and rule them in the meantime, being his vassals: but now there is no man of so much credit, but that one who behaves himself bravely in the war, shall out-vie him; and, possibly, be able to do what he pleases with the army and the government: and in this corrupt age, it is ten to one, he will rather do hurt than good with the power he acquires. But because you ask me how we would persuade the king to this? I answer; by the parliament’s humbly remonstrating to his majesty, that it is his own interest, preservation, quiet and true greatness, to put an end to the distractions of his subjects; and that it cannot be done any other way: and to desire him to enter into debate with some men authorized by them, to see if there can be any other means than what they shall offer to compose things: if they find there may, then to embrace it; otherwise, to insist upon their own proposals; and if in the end they cannot obtain those requests, which they think the only essential means to preserve their country, then to beg their dismissal; that they may not stay, and be partakers in the ruin of it.

Now, my reasons why the king will please to grant this after the thorough discussing of it, are two. First, because all great princes have ever made up matters with their subjects upon such contests, without coming to extremities. The two greatest and most valiant of our princes, were Edward the first, and his grandchild Edward the third: these had very great demands made them by parliaments, and granted them all; as you may see upon the statute-book. Edward the second, and Richard the second, on the contrary, refused all things till they were brought to extremity. There is a memorable example in the Greek story of Theopompus, king of Sparta; whose subjects finding the government in disorder for want of some persons that might be a check upon the great power of the king, proposed to him the creation of the ephors (officers who made that city so great and famous afterwards.) The king finding by their reasons, which were unanswerable, (as I think ours now are,) that the whole government of Sparta was near its ruin without such a cure; and considering that he had more to lose in that disorder than others, freely granted their desires: for which being derided by his wife, who asked him what a kind of monarchy he would leave to his son? He answered; a very good one, because it will be a very lasting one. Which brings on my second reason, for which I believe the king will grant these things; because he cannot any way mend himself, nor his condition, if he do not.

NOBLE VEN. You have very fully convinced me of two things: first, that we have no reason to expect or believe that the parliament will ever increase the king’s power: and then, that the king cannot by any way found himself a new and more absolute monarchy, except he can alter the condition of property: which I think we may take for granted to be impossible. But yet, I know not why we may not suppose that (although he cannot establish to all posterity such an empire) he may, notwithstanding, change the government at the present; and calling parliaments no more, administer it by force, (as it is done in France,) for some good time.

ENG. GENT. In France it has been a long work: and although that tyranny was begun, as has been said, by petition from the states themselves not to be assembled any more; yet the kings since, in time of great distraction, have thought fit to convocate them again: as they did in the civil wars thrice, once at Orleans, and twice at Blois.[103]

I would not repeat what I have so tediously discoursed of concerning France already; but only to entreat you to remember that our nation has no such poor and numerous gentry, which draw better revenues from the king’s purse, than they can from their own estates: all our country people consisting of rich nobility and gentry, of wealthy yeomen, and of poor younger brothers; who have little or nothing, and can never raise their companies, if they should get commissions, without their elder brother’s assistance amongst his tenants, or else with the free consent and desire of the people; which, in this case, would hardly be afforded them. But we will suppose there be idle people enough to make an army, and that the king has money enough to arm and raise them: and I will grant too, to avoid tediousness (although I do not think it possible) that the people will at the first for fear, receive them into their houses and quarter them against law; nay, pay the money, which shall be by illegal edicts imposed upon the subjects to pay them: yet is it possible an army can continue any time to enslave their own country? Can they resist the prayers, or the curses, of their fathers, brothers, wives, mothers, sisters, and of all persons wherever they frequent? Upon this account, all the Greek tyrants were of very short continuance: who being in chief magistracy and credit in their commonwealths, by means of soldiers and satellites, usurped the sovereignty. But did ever any of them, excepting Dionysius, leave it to his son? who was driven out within less than a year after his father’s death. Many armies of the natives have destroyed tyrannies: so the decemvirate was ruined at Rome, and the Tarquins expelled before that.

Our own country has been a stage, even in our time, where this tragedy has been sufficiently acted: for the army, after the war was done, fearing the monarchy should be restored again, held counsels; got agitators; and though there were often very severe executions upon the ring-leaders, did at length by their perseverance necessitate their officers to join with them, (having many good headpieces of the party to advise them;) and so broke all treaties. And the parliament adhering to a small party of them who consented to lay aside kingly government, they afterwards drove them away too; fearing they would continue to govern by an oligarchy. I am far from approving this way they used; in which they broke all laws divine and human, political and moral: but I urge it only to show how easily an army of natives is to be deluded with the name of liberty; and brought to pull down anything, which their ring-leaders tell them tends to enslaving their country. Tis true, this army was afterwards cheated by their general; who without their knowledge, (much less consent,) one morning suddenly made himself tyrant of his country.[104] It is true, that their reputation (not their arms) supported him in that state for some time; but it is as certain that they did very often, and to the last, refuse to be instrumental to levy moneys, though for their own pay: and so he, against his will, was fain to call from time to time parliamentary conventions. And it is most certain, that he did, in the sickness of which he died, often complain that his army would not go a step farther with him: and, in fact, some months after his death, they did dethrone his son, and restore the remainder of the old parliament; upon promise made to them in secret, (by the demagogues of that assembly,) that a commonwealth should be speedily framed and settled.

NOBLE VEN. Sir, I am satisfied that an army raised here on a sudden, and which never saw an enemy, could not be brought to act such high things for the ruin of their own government; nor possibly, would be any way able to resist the fury and insurrection of the people: but what say you of a foreign army, raised by your king abroad, and brought over, whose officers and soldiers shall have no acquaintance or relations amongst the people here?

ENG. GENT. All forces of that kind must be either auxiliaries, or mercenaries. Auxiliaries, are such as are sent by some neighbour prince or state, with their own colours, and paid by themselves; though possibly, the prince who demands them may furnish the money. These usually return home again, when the occasion for which they were demanded is over: but whether they do or not, if they be not mixed and overbalanced with forces which depend upon the prince who calls them, but that the whole weight and power lies in them; they will certainly, first or last, seize that country for their own sovereign. And as for mercenaries; they must be raised (‘tis true) with the money of the prince who needs them, but by the authority and credit of some great persons who are to lead and command them: and these, in all occasions, have made their own commander prince: as F. Sforza at Milan drove out by this trick the Visconti, ancient dukes of that state; and the Mamelukes in Egypt made themselves a military commonwealth. So that the way of an army here, would either be no remedy at all; or one very much worse than the disease, to the prince himself.

NOBLE VEN. Well, sir, I begin to be of opinion, that anything the king can grant the parliament (especially such a parliament as this is, which consists of men of very great estates and so can have no interest to desire troubles) will not be so inconvenient to him, as to endeavour to break the government by force. But why may he not, for this time (by soothing them and offering them great alliances abroad for the interest of England, and balancing matters in Europe more even than they have been; and, in fine, by offering them a war with the French, to which nation they have so great a hatred;) lay them asleep, and get good store of money; and stave off this severe cure you speak of, at least for some time longer?

ENG. GENT. There has been something of this done too lately; and there is a gentleman lies in the tower, who is to answer for it.[105] But you may please to understand, that there is scarce any amongst the middle sort of people, much less within the walls of the house of commons, who do not perfectly know, that we can have no alliance with any nation in the world that will signify anything to them, or to ourselves, till our government be redressed and new modelled: and therefore, though there were an army landed in this island, yet that we must begin there; before we are fit to repulse them, or defend ourselves. And the fear and sense of this people, universally, is; that if we should have any war, either for our own concerns, or for those of our allies, whilst matters remain as they do at home, it would certainly come to this pass: that either being beaten, we should subject this kingdom to an invasion, at a time when we are in a very ill condition to repel it; or else, if we were victorious, that our courtiers and counsellors ardently (or as the French cry, in a trice)[106]

would employ that mettle and good fortune, to try some such conclusions at home, as we have been discoursing of. And therefore, if any war should be undertaken without parliament; you would see the people rejoice as much at any disaster our forces should receive, as they did when the Scots seized the four northern counties, in 1639; or, before that, when we were beaten at the isle of Rhee;[107] or when we had any loss in the last war with Holland.

And this joy is not so unnatural as it may seem to those who do not consider the cause of it: which is the breach of our old government, and the necessity our governors are under to make some new experiments; and the fear we are in, that any prosperity may make them able to try them, either with effect, or at least with impunity. Which consideration made a court-droll say lately to his majesty, (who seemed to wonder why his subjects hated the French so much;) sir, it is because you love them, and espouse their interest; and if you would discover this truth clearly, you may please to make war with the king of France; and then you shall see, that this people will not only love them, take their parts, and wish them success: but will exceedingly rejoice, when they are victorious in sinking your ships, or defeating your forces. And this is sufficient to answer your proposal for alliances abroad, and for a war with France. Besides this (to wind all up in a word) it is not to be imagined; that so good and wise a prince as we have at this time should ever be induced, when he comes to understand perfectly his own condition, to let his own interest (granting his power to be so, which is very false) contest with the safety and preservation of his people; for which only it was given him: or that he will be any way tenacious of such prerogatives, as now by a natural revolution of political circumstances are so far from continuing useful to his governing the people, that they are the only remora and obstacle of all government, settlement, and order. For his majesty must needs know, that all forms of regulating mankind under laws were ordained, by God and man, for the happiness and security of the governed; and not for the interest and greatness of those who rule: unless where there is better nature in the case. So God governs man, for his own glory only; and men reign over beasts, for their own use and service. But where an absolute prince rules over his own servants, whom he feeds and pays, (as we have said;) or the master of a great and numerous family governs his household; they are both bound, by the law of God and nature, and by their own interest, to do them justice; and not anger or tyrannize over them, more than the necessity of preserving their empire and authority requires.

DOCT. But sir, considering the difficulty which will be found in the king, and possibly in the parliament too, to come up to so great an alteration at the first; and the danger that may happen by our remaining long in this unsettled condition, which does hourly expose us to innumerable hazards, both at home, and from abroad; why may we not begin, and lay the foundation now, by removing all his majesty’s present council, by parliament? Which is no new thing; but has been often practised, in many kings’ reigns.

ENG. GENT. First, the council (that is, the privy council, which you mean) is no part of our government; as we may have occasion to show hereafter: nor is the king obliged by any fundamental law, or by any act of parliament, to hearken to their advice; or so much as to ask it: and if you should make one on purpose, besides that it would not be so effectual as what we may propose, it would be full as hard to go down either with king or parliament.

But besides all this, you would see some of these counsellors so nominated by parliament, perhaps, prove honest; and then they would be forced to withdraw, as some lately did; because they found, I suppose, that till the administration be altered, it is impossible that their counsels can be embraced; or anything be acted by them which may tend to the good of their country.[108] Those, who have not so great a sense of honour and integrity, will be presently corrupted by their own interest; whilst the prince is left in possession of all those baits and means to answer such men’s expectations: it being most certain, that if you have a musty vessel, and by consequence dislike the beer which comes out of it, and draw it out; causing the barrel to be immediately filled with good and sound liquor: it is certain by experience, that both your new drink, and all that ever you shall put into the cask, till it be taken in pieces, and the pipes shaved and new-modelled, will be full as musty and unsavoury as the first which you found fault with.

NOBLE VEN. Now sir, I think we are at an end of our questions: and I for my part am convinced, that as the king cannot better himself any way by falling out with his people at this time; so that his goodness and wisdom is such, that he will rather choose to imitate the most glorious and generous of his predecessors; as Edward the first, and Edward the third; than those who were of less worth, and more unfortunate; as Edward the second, and Richard the second. And therefore we are now ready to hear what you would think fit to ask of so excellent a prince.

ENG. GENT. I never undertook to be so presumptuous: there is a parliament to sit speedily,[109] and certainly they are the fittest every way to search into such matters; and to anticipate their wisdom would be unreasonable, and might give them just offence. But because all this tittle-tattle may not go for nothing, I shall presume to give you my thoughts how the cure must be wrought, without descending to particulars. The cause immediate (as we have said) of our disease, is the inexecution of our laws: and it is most true, that when that is altered for the better, and that all our laws are duly executed, we are in health. For as we can never have the entire benefit of them, till our government is upon a right basis; so whenever we enjoy this happiness, to have the full benefit of those constitutions which were made by our ancestors for our safe and orderly living, our government is upon a right basis: therefore we must enquire into the cause, why our laws are not executed; and when you have found and taken away that cause, all is well.

The cause can be no other than this, that the king is told, and does believe, that most of these great charters or rights of the people, of which we now chiefly treat, are against his majesty’s interest; though this be very false (as has been said) yet we will not dispute it at this time, but take it for granted: so that the king having the supreme execution of the laws in his hand, cannot be reasonably supposed to be willing to execute them whenever he can choose whether he will do it or no; it being natural for every man not to do anything against his own interest when he can help it. Now when you have thought well what it should be that gives the king a liberty to choose whether any part of the law shall be current or no; you will find, that it is the great power the king enjoys in the government: when the parliament has discovered this, they will no doubt demand of his majesty an abatement of his royal prerogative in those matters only which concern our enjoyment of our all, that is our lives, liberties and estates; and leave his royal power entire and untouched, in all the other branches of it. When this is done, we shall be as if some great hero had performed the adventure of dissolving the enchantment, we have been under so many years; and all our statutes from the highest to the lowest, from Magna Charta to that for burying in woollen,[110] will be current: and we shall neither fear the bringing in popery, nor arbitrary power in the intervals of parliament; neither will there be any dissensions in them; all causes of factions between the country and court party being entirely abolished; so that the people shall have no reason to distrust their prince, nor he them.

DOCT. You make us a fine golden age: but after all this, will you not be pleased to show us a small prospect of this Canaan, or country of rest?

Will you not vouchsafe to particularize a little, what powers there are in the king, which you would have discontinued? Would you have such prerogatives abolished, or placed elsewhere?

ENG. GENT. There can be no government, if they be abolished. But I will not be like a man who refuses to sing amongst his friends at their entreaty, because he has an ill voice; I will rather suffer my self to be laughed at by you in delivering my small judgement in this matter: but still with this protestation, that I do believe than an infinity of men better qualified than myself for such sublime matters, and much more the house of commons, who represent the wisdom as well as the power of this kingdom, may find out a far better way than my poor parts and capacity can suggest. The powers then which now being in the crown do hinder the execution of our laws, and prevent by consequence our happiness and settlement, are four. First, the absolute power of making war and peace, treaties and alliances with all nations in the world; by which means, by ignorant counsellors, or wicked ministers, many of our former kings have made confederations and wars, very contrary and destructive to the interest of England: and by the unfortunate management of them, have often put the king in great hazard of invasion.

Besides that, as long as there is a distinction made between the court party and that of the country, there will ever be a jealousy in the people; that those wicked counsellors, (who may think they can be safe no other way,) will make alliances with powerful princes, in which there may be a secret article by which those princes shall stipulate to assist them with forces upon a short warning to curb the parliament, and possibly to change the government. And this apprehension in the people will be the less unreasonable; because Oliver Cromwell, (the great pattern of some of our courtiers,) is notoriously known to have inserted an article in his treaty with cardinal Mazarin, during this king of France’s minority, that he should be assisted with ten thousand men from France upon occasion, to preserve and defend him in his usurped government, against his majesty that now is; or the people of England; or in fine, his own army; whose revolt he often feared.[111]

The second great prerogative the king enjoys, is the sole disposal and ordering of the militia by sea and land, raising forces, garrisoning and fortifying places, setting out ships of war, so far as he can do all this without putting taxations upon the people; and this not only in the intervals of parliament, but even during their session; so that they cannot raise the train-bands of the country or city to guard themselves, or secure the peace of the kingdom. The third point is; that it is in his majesty’s power to nominate and appoint as he pleases, and for what time he thinks fit, all the officers of the kingdom that are of trust or profit, both civil, military, and ecclesiastical, (as they will be called,) except where there is patronage. These two last powers may furnish a prince who will hearken to ill-designing counsellors, with the means either of invading the government by force, or by his judges and other creatures undermining it by fraud. Especially by enjoying the fourth advantage; which is the laying out and employing, as he pleases, all the public revenues of the crown or kingdom, and that without having any regard (except he thinks fit) to the necessity of the navy, or any other thing that concerns the safety of the public. So that all these four great powers, as things now stand, may be administered at any time, as well to destroy and ruin the good order and government of the state; as to preserve and support it, as they ought to do.

NOBLE VEN. But if you divest the king of these powers, will you have the parliament sit always to govern these matters?

ENG. GENT. Sir, I would not divest the king of them; much less would I have the parliament assume them, or perpetuate their sitting. They are a body more fitted to make laws, and punish the breakers of them, than to execute them. I would have them therefore petition his majesty by way of bill, that he will please to exercise these four great magnalia of government, with the consent of four several councils to be appointed for that end, and not otherwise; that is, with the consent of the major part of them, if any of them dissent. In all which councils, his majesty, (or who he pleases to appoint) shall preside. The councils to be named in parliament; first all the number, and every year afterwards a third part: so each year a third part shall go out, and a recruit of an equal number come in; and in three years they shall be all new: and no person to come into that council, or any other of the four, till he have kept out of any of them full three years, being as long as he was in: and this I learnt from your Quarantias at Venice.[112] And the use is excellent: for being in such a circulation, and sure to have their intervals of power; they will neither grow so insolent as to brave their king, nor will. the prince have any occasion to corrupt them; although he had the means to do it, which in this new model he cannot have.

These men in their several councils should have no other instructions, but to dispose of all things and act in their several charges, for the interest and glory of England; and shall be answerable to parliament, from time to time, for any malicious or advised misdemeanour. Only that council which manages the public revenue, shall (besides a very copious and honourable revenue which shall be left to his majesty’s disposal for his own entertainment, as belongs to the splendour and majesty of the government) have instructions to serve his majesty (if he pleases to command them, and not otherwise) in the regulating and ordering his economy and household: and if they shall see it necessary, for extraordinary occasions of treating foreign princes and ambassadors, or presenting them, (and the like ostentation of greatness) to consent with his majesty moderately to charge the revenue to that end.

I verily believe that this expedient is much more effectual, than either the justiciar of Aragon was, or the ephors of Sparta: who being to check the king almost in every thing, without having any share in his counsels or understanding them, could not choose but make a sullen posture of affairs:[113] whereas these both seem, and really are, the king’s ministers; only obliged by parliament to act faithfully and honestly: to which, even without that, all other counsellors are bound by oath. As for the other council, now called the privy council, the king may still please to continue to nominate them at his pleasure; so they act nothing in any matters properly within the jurisdiction of these four councils; but meddle with the affairs of merchants, plantations, charters, and other matters to which the regal power extends.[114] And provided that his majesty call none of the persons employed in these other four councils, during their being so; nor that this council do any way intermeddle with any affairs, criminal or civil, which are to be decided by law; and do belong to the jurisdictions of other courts or magistrates: they being no established judicatory, or congregation, which either our government or laws do take notice of: (as was said before) but persons congregated by the king, as his friends and faithful subjects, to give him their opinion in the execution of his regal office. As for example, the king does exercise, at this time, a negative voice as to bills presented to him by the parliament; which he claims by right: no man ever said that the privy council had a negative voice; yet former kings did not only ask their advice as to the passing or not passing of such bills; but often decided the matter by their votes: which, although it be a high presumption in them, when they venture to give him counsel contrary to what is given him by his greatest council, yet never any of them have been questioned for it; being looked upon as private men who speak according to the best of their cunning, and such as have no public capacity at all. But if this be not so, and that this council have some foundation in law, and some public capacity; I wish in this new settlement it may be made otherwise: and that his majesty please to take their counsel in private, but summon no persons to appear before them; much less give them authority to send for in custody, or imprison any subject; which may as well be done by the judges and magistrates: who, if secrecy be required, may as well be sworn to secrecy as these gentlemen; and (I believe) can keep counsel as well, and give it too.

NOBLE VEN. But would you have none to manage state-affairs? None imprisoned for secret conspiracies, and kept till they can be fully discovered? You have made an act here lately, about imprisonments; that every person shall have his habeas corpus, I think you call it: so that no man, for what occasion soever, can lie in prison above a night, but the cause must be revealed, though there be great cause for the concealing it.

ENG. GENT. This act[115] you mention, (and a great many more which we have to the same purpose, that is against illegal imprisonments) shows, that for a long time the power over men’s persons has been exercised (under his majesty) by such as were likely, rather to employ it ill than well: that is, would rather imprison ten men for honourable actions; (such as standing for the people’s rights in parliament, refusing to pay illegal taxes, and the like) than one for projecting and inventing illegal monopolies; or any other kind of oppressing the people. This made, first Magna Charta, then the Petition of Right, and divers other acts besides this last, take that power quite away; and make the law and the judges the only disposers of the liberties of our persons. And it may be, when the parliament shall see the fruit of this alteration we are now discoursing of, and that state-affairs are in better hands, they may think fit to provide that a return or warrant of imprisonment from one of these four councils, (which I suppose will have a power of commitment given them as to persons appearing delinquents before them) wherein it shall be expressed; that if the public is like to suffer or be defrauded, if the matter be immediately divulged; I say in this case, the parliament may please to make it lawful for the judge to delay the bailing of him for some small time: because it is not to be judged, that these counsellors, so chosen, and so instructed, and to continue so small a time, will use this power ill; especially being accountable for any abusing of it to the next parliament: and I suppose the parliament, amongst other provisions in this behalf, will require that there shall be a register kept of all the votes of these several councils, with the names as well of those who consented, as of such who dissented. And as to the former part of your question, whether I would have none to manage state-affairs? I think there are very few state-affairs, that do not concern either peace and war, and treaties abroad; the management of the armies, militia, and the county force at home; the management of all the public moneys, and the election of all officers whatsoever. The other parts of state-affairs, which are making and repealing of laws, punishing high crimes against the state, with levying and proportioning all manner of impositions upon the people, this is reserved to the parliament itself: and the execution of all laws, to the judges and magistrates. And I can think of no other affairs of state than these.

DOCT. Do you intend that the council for choosing officers shall elect them of the king’s household, that is his menial servants?

ENG. GENT. No; that were unreasonable. Except any of them have any jurisdiction in the kingdom; or any place or pre-eminence in parliament annexed to such office; but in these things which concern the powers and jurisdictions of these several councils, (wherein the protection of liberty, as Machiavel calls it, is now to be placed) I shall not presume to say anything; but assure yourself, if ever it come to that, it will be very well digested in parliament: they being very good at contriving such matters, and making them practicable; as well as at performing all other matters, that concern the interest and greatness of the kingdom.

DOCT. I have thought, that the ephors of Sparta were an admirable magistracy; not only for the interest of the people, but likewise for the preservation of the authority of the kings, and of their lives too. For Plutarch observes, that the cities of Messene and Argos had the same government with Lacedaemon; and yet for want of erecting such an authority as was in the ephors, they were not only perpetually in broils amongst themselves, and for that reason ever beaten by their enemies; (whereas the Spartans were always victorious;) but even their kings were the most miserable of men: being often called in question judicially, and so lost their lives; and many of them murdered by insurrections of the people. And at last, in both these cities, the kings were driven out; their families extirpated; the territory new divided; and the government turned into a democracy. And I ever thought that this expedient you propose (for I have heard you discourse of it often before now), would prove a more safe and a more noble reformation, than the institution of the ephors was: and that a prince who is a lover of his country; who is gracious, wise and just, (such a one as it has pleased God to send us at this time;) shall be ten times more absolute when this regulation is made, than ever he was or could be before: and that whatsoever he proposes in any of these councils will be received as a law, nay as an oracle: and, on the other side, ill and weak princes shall have no possibility of corrupting men; or doing either themselves, or their people, any kind of harm or mischief. But have you done now?

ENG. GENT. No, sir; when this provision is made for the execution of the laws, which I think very effectual, (not to say infallible,) although it is not to be doubted, but that there will be from time to time many excellent laws enacted; yet two I would have passed immediately. The one, concerning the whole regulation of the elections to parliament: which we need very much; and no doubt but it will be well done.[116] That part of it which is necessary to go hand in hand with our settlement, and which indeed must be part of it, is: that a parliament be elected every year at a certain day, and that without any writ or summons; the people meeting of course at the time appointed in the usual place; (as they do in parishes at the church-house to choose officers;) and that the sheriffs be there ready to preside and to certify the election. And that the parliament so chosen shall meet at the time appointed; and sit and adjourn, as their business is more or less urgent; but still setting yet a time for their coming together again. And if there shall be a necessity (by reason of invasion, or some other cause) for their assembling sooner; then the king to call the counsellors of these four councils all together, and with the consent of the major part of them, intimate their meeting sooner. But when the day comes for the annual meeting of another parliament, they must be understood to be dissolved in law, without any other ceremony; and the new one to take their place.

DOCT. I would have this considered too, and provided for; that no election should be made of any person who had not the majority of the electors present to vote for him: so the writ orders it; and so reason dictates. For else how can he be said to represent the county, if not a fifth part have consented to his choice? As happens sometimes; and may do oftener: for where seven or eight stand for one vacant place, (as I have known in our last Long Parliament,)[117] the votes being set in columns, he who has had most votes has not exceeded four hundred, of above two thousand who were present.

NOBLE VEN. This is a strange way! I thought you had put every man by himself, as we do in our government, and as I understood they do in the house of commons, when there is any nomination; and then, if he has not the major part, he is rejected.

ENG. GENT. This is very material; and indeed essential: but I make no doubt, but if this project should come in play in parliament, this and all other particulars (which would be both needless and tedious to discourse of here) will be well and effectually provided for. The next act I would have passed, should be concerning the house of peers: that as I take it for granted, that there will be a clause in the bill concerning elections, that no new boroughs shall be enabled to send members to parliament except they shall be capacitated thereunto by an act; so it being of the same necessity as to the liberty of parliament, that the peers (who do and must enjoy both a negative and deliberative voice in all parliamentary transactions, except what concern levying of money originally) be exempted from depending absolutely upon the prince; and that therefore it be declared by act, for the future, that no peer shall be made but by act of parliament, and then that it be hereditary in his male line.[118]

NOBLE VEN. I am not yet fully satisfied how you can order your matters, concerning this house of peers: nor do I see, how the contests between the house of commons and them can be so laid asleep, but that they will arise again. Besides, the house of commons must necessarily be extremely concerned to find the house of peers, (which consists of private persons, though very great and honourable ones,) in an instant, dash all that they have been so long hammering for the good of all the people of England, whom they represent. Were it not better, now you are upon so great alterations, to make an annual elective senate; or at least one wherein the members should be but for life, and not hereditary?[119]

ENG. GENT. By no means, sir; the less change the better: and in this case, the metaphysical maxim is more true than in any, viz. nothing should be multiplied unnecessarily: for great alterations fright men, and puzzle them; and there is no need of it at all in this case. I have told you before, that there is a necessity of a senate; and how short this government would be without it; and how confused in the meantime. The Roman senate was hereditary amongst the patricii; except the censor left any of them out of the roll during his magistracy, for some very great and scandalous offence: and in that case too there was an appeal to the people, as in all other causes; witness the case of Lucius Quinctius, and many others.[120] To show that there can be no need of such a change here as you speak of, you may please to consider; that all differences between the several parts of any government, come upon the account of interest. Now when this settlement is made, the house of peers and the house of commons can have no interest to dissent: for as to all things of private interest, (that is, the rights of peers, both during the sitting of parliaments, and in the intervals,) is left to their own house to judge of; as it is to the house of commons, to judge of their own privileges. And as for the contest of the peers’

jurisdiction as to appeals from courts of equity; (besides that I would have that settled in the act which should pass concerning the lords’ house,) I believe it will never happen more, when the government is upon a right foundation; it having been hitherto fomented by two different parties: the court-party sometimes blowing up that difference to break the session, lest some good bills for the people should pass; or that the king, by rejecting them, might discontent his people. To avoid which dilemma, there needed no more, but to procure some person to prosecute his appeal before the lords.

Some honest patriots afterwards possibly might use the same policy which they learnt from the courtiers, to quash some bill very destructive in which they were out-voted in the commons house; otherwise it is so far from the interest of the commons to hinder appeals from courts of equity, that there is none amongst them but know we are almost destroyed for want of it. And when they have considered well, and that some such reformation as this shall take place; they will find that it can never be placed in a more honourable and unbiased judicatory than this: and I could wish, that even in the intermission of parliamentary sessions, the whole peerage of England, (as many of them as can conveniently be in town) may sit in their judicial capacities, and hear appeals in equity; as well as judge upon writs of error.

Now as to your other objection, (which is indeed of great weight,) that the house of commons must needs take it ill, that the lords should frustrate their endeavours for the people’s good by their negative; if you consider one thing, the force of this objection will vanish: which is, that when this new constitution shall be admitted, the lords cannot have any interest or temptation to differ with the commons in anything wherein the public good is concerned; but are obliged by all the ties in the world to run the same course and fortune with the commons; their interest being exactly the same: so that if there be any dissenting upon bills between the two houses, when each of them shall think their own expedient conduces most to the advantage of the public, this difference will ever be decided by right reason at conferences; and the lords may as well convince the commons, as be convinced by them: and these contests are and ever will be of admirable use and benefit to the commonwealth. The reason why it is otherwise now, and that the house of peers is made use of to hinder many bills from passing, that are supposed to be for the ease of the people, is; that the great counsellors and officers which sit in that house do suggest, (whether true or false,) that it is against his majesty’s will and interest that such an act should pass; whereupon it has found obstruction. But hereafter, if our expedient take place, it cannot be so; first, because our king himself cannot have any designs going (as was proved before) which shall make it his advantage to hinder any good intended his people, whose prosperity then will be his own; and then, because in a short time the peers, being made by act of parliament, will consist of the best men of England both for parts and estates; and those who are already made, if any of them have small estates, the king, (if he had the interest,) would not have the means to corrupt them: the public moneys, and the great offices being to be dispensed in another manner than formerly: so their lordships will have no motive in the world to steer their votes and counsels, but their own honour and conscience, and the preservation and prosperity of their country. So that it would be both needless and unjust to pretend any change of this kind.

Besides, this alteration in the administration of our government being proposed to be done by the unanimous consent of king, lords, and commons, and not otherwise, it would be very preposterous to believe, that the peers would depose themselves of their hereditary rights; and betake themselves to the hopes of being elected. It is true, they have lost the power they had over the commons; but that has not been taken from them by any law, no more than it was given them by any, but is fallen by the course of nature; as has been shown at large. But though they cannot lead the commons by their tenures as formerly, yet there is no reason or colour that they should lose their coordination; which I am sure they have by law, and by the fundamental constitution of the government: and which is so far from being prejudicial to a lasting settlement, (as was said) that it infinitely contributes to it; and prevents the confusion which would destroy it. If I should have proposed anything in this discourse, which should have entrenched upon the king’s hereditary right; or that should have hindered the majesty and greatness of these kingdoms from being represented by his royal person; I should have made your story of the capuchin friar very applicable to me.

NOBLE VEN. I see you have not forgiven me that novel yet: but pray give me leave to ask you one question. Why do you make the election of great officers, to be by a small secret council? That had been more proper for a numerous assembly; as it is in most commonwealths.

ENG. GENT. It is so in democracies, and was so in Sparta; and is done by your great council in Venice: but we are not making such a kind of government, but rectifying an ancient monarchy; and giving the prince some help in the administration of that great branch of his regality: besides it is sufficient, that our parliament chooses these councils; (that is always understood, the lords and commons, with the king’s consent.)[121] Besides, it is possible that if such a regulation as this come in debate amongst them, the parliament will reserve to itself the approbation of the great officers; as chancellor, judges, general officers of an army, and the like; and that such shall not have a settlement in those charges, till they are accordingly allowed of; but may in the meantime exercise them. As to particulars, I shall always refer you to what the parliament will judge fit to order in the case: but if you have anything to object, or to show in general, that some such regulation as this cannot be effectual towards the putting our distracted country into better order; I shall think myself obliged to answer you: if you can have patience to hear me, and are not weary already; as you may very well be.

NOBLE VEN. I shall certainly never be weary of such discourse; however I shall give you no further trouble in this matter: for I am very fully satisfied, that such reformation, (if it could be compassed;) would not only unite all parties; but make you very flourishing at home, and very great abroad. But have you any hopes that such a thing will ever come into debate?

What do the parliament-men say to it?

ENG. GENT. I never had any discourse to this purpose, either with any lord, or member of the commons house; otherwise than as possibly some of these notions might fall in, at ordinary conversation: for I do not intend to entrench upon the office of God, to teach our senators wisdom. I have known some men so full of their own notions, that they went up and down, sputtering them in every man’s face they met. Some went to great men during our late troubles; nay, to the king himself; to offer their expedients from revelation. Two men I was acquainted with, of which one had an invention to reconcile differences in religion; the other, had a project for a bank of lands to lie as a security for sums of money lent; both these were persons of great parts and fancy; but yet so troublesome at all times, and in all companies, that I have often been forced to repeat an excellent proverb of your country: ‘God deliver me from a man that has but one business!’[122]

And I assure you there is no man’s reputation that I envy less, than I do that of such persons; and therefore you may please to believe, that I have not imitated them in scattering these notions; nor can I prophesy, whether any such apprehensions as these will ever come into the heads of those men, who are our true physicians.

But yet to answer your question, and give you my conjecture; I believe that we are not ripe yet for any great reform. Not only because we are a very debauched people; I do not only mean that we are given to whoring, drinking, gaming and idleness; but chiefly that we have a politic debauch, which is a neglect of all things that concern the public welfare, and a setting up our own private interest against it: I say, this is not all; for then the polity of no country could be redressed: for every commonwealth that is out of order, has ever all these debauches we speak of, as consequences of their loose state.

But there are two other considerations which induce me to fear that our cure is not yet near. The first is; because most of the wise and grave men of this kingdom are very silent, and will not open their budget upon any terms: and although they dislike the present condition we are in as much as any men, and see the precipice it leads us to, yet will never open their mouths to prescribe a cure; but being asked what they would advise, give a shrug, like your countrymen. There was a very considerable gentleman[123] as most in England, both for birth, parts, and estate; who being a member of the parliament that was called in 1640, continued all the war with them: and by his wisdom and eloquence (which were both very great) promoted very much their affairs. When the factions began between the presbyters and independents, he joined cordially with the latter: so far as to give his affirmative to the vote of no addresses: that is, to an order made in the house of commons, to send no more messages to the king, nor to receive any from him. Afterwards, when an assault was made upon the house by the army, and divers of the members taken violently away and secluded; he disliking it, though he were none of them, voluntarily absented himself; and continued retired (being exceedingly averse to a democratical government, which was then declared for,) till Cromwell’s usurpation: and being infinitely courted by him, absolutely refused to accept of any employment under him; or to give him the least counsel. When Cromwell was dead; and a parliament called by his son, or rather by the army; the chief officers of which did, from the beginning, whisper into the ears of the leading members, that if they could make an honest government, they should be stood by (as the word then was) by the army: this gentleman, at that time, neither would be elected into that parliament, nor give the least advice to any other person that was; but kept himself still upon the reserve. Insomuch that it was generally believed, that although he had ever been opposite to the late king’s coming to the government again, though upon propositions; yet he might hanker after the restoration of his majesty that now is. But the apprehension appeared groundless when it came to the pinch: for being consulted as an oracle by the then general Monk, whether he should restore the monarchy again or no; he would make no answer, nor give him the least advice: and, in fact, has ever since kept himself from public business.

Although, upon the banishment of my lord of Clarendon, he was visited by one of the greatest persons in England; and one in as much esteem with his majesty as any whatsoever; and desired to accept of some great employment near the king: which he absolutely refusing, the same person, not a stranger to him, but well known by him, begged of him to give his advice how his majesty (who desired nothing more than to unite all his people together, and repair the breaches which the civil war had caused, now my lord Clarendon was gone who by his counsels kept those wounds open) might perform that honourable and gracious work: but still this gentleman made his excuses.

And, in short, neither then, nor at any time before or after, (excepting when he sat in the Long Parliament of the year ‘40;) neither during the distracted times, nor since his majesty’s return, when they seemed more reposed; would ever be brought, either by any private intimate friend, or by any person in public employment, to give the least judgement of our affairs; or the least counsel to mend them: though he was not shy of declaring his dislike of matters as they went. And yet this gentleman was not only by repute and esteem a wise man, but was really so; as it appeared by his management of business, and drawing declarations, when he was contented to act; as also by his exceeding prudent managing of his own fortune, which was very great; and his honourable living and providing for his family: his daughters having been all married to the best men in England; and his eldest son to the most accomplished lady in the world. I dare assure you, there are above an hundred such men in England; though not altogether of that eminency.

NOBLE VEN. Methinks these persons are altogether as bad an extreme as the loquacious men you spoke of before. I remember when I went to school, our master, amongst other commonplaces in the commendation of silence, would tell us of a Latin saying; that a fool while he held his peace did not differ from a wise man: but truly I think we may as truly say, that a wise man whilst he is silent does not differ from a fool: for how great soever his wisdom is, it can neither get him credit, nor otherwise advantage himself, his friend, nor his country. But let me not divert you from your other point.

ENG. GENT. The next reason I have to make me fear, that such an expedient as we have been talking of will not be proposed suddenly; is the great distrust the parliament has of men. Which will make most members shy of venturing at such matters, which being very new, at the first motion are not perfectly understood; at least to such as have not been versed in authors who have written of the politics; and therefore the mover may be suspected of having been set on by the court party to puzzle them; and so to divert, by offering new expedients, some smart mettlesome debates they may be upon concerning the succession to the crown, or other high matters. For it is the nature of all popular councils (even the wisest that ever were, witness the people of Rome and Athens, which Machiavel so much extols) in turbulent times, to like discourses that heighten their passions and blow up their indignation; better than those that endeavour to rectify their judgements, and tend to provide for their safety. And the truth is, our parliament is very much to be excused, or rather justified, in this distrust they have of persons; since there has been of late so many and so successful attempts used by the late great ministers, to debauch the most eminent members of the commons house, by pensions and offices:[124] and therefore it would wonderfully conduce to the good of the commonwealth, and to the composing our disordered state; if there were men of so high and unquestionable a reputation, that they were above all suspicion and distrust, and so might venture upon bold, that is (in this case) moderate counsels, for the saving of their country. Such men there were in the parliament of 1640; at least twenty or thirty:[125] who having stood their ground in seven parliaments before, which in the two last kings’ reigns had been dissolved abruptly and in wrath; and having resisted the fear of imprisonment and great fines for their love to England, as well as the temptation of money and offices to betray it; both offered by the wicked counsellors of that age, tending both to the ruin of our just rights and the detriment of their master’s affairs: I say, having constantly and with great magnanimity and honour made proof of their integrity, they had acquired so great a reputation, that not only the parliament, but even almost the whole people stuck to them; and were swayed by them in actions of a much higher nature than any are now discoursed of; without fear of being deserted, or as we say, left in the lurch; as the people of France often are by their grandees, when they raise little civil wars to get great places; which as soon as they are offered, they lay down their arms, and leave their followers to be hanged.

But although these two reasons of the silence of some wise men, and the want of reputation in others, does give us but a sad prospect of our land of promise; yet we have one consideration, which does encourage us to hope better things ere long: and that is the infallible certainty that we cannot long continue as we are; and that we can never meliorate, but by some such principles as we have been here all this while discoursing of: and that without such helps and succours as may be drawn from thence, we must go from one distraction to another, till we come into a civil war; and in the close of it be certainly a prey to the king of France, who (on which side it matters not) will be a gamester and sweep stakes at last; the world not being now equally balanced between two princes alike powerful, as it was during our last civil war: and if as well this danger, as the other means to prevent it, be understood in time, (as no doubt it will;) we shall be the happiest and the greatest nation in the world in a little time; and in the meantime, enjoy the best and most just easy government of any people upon earth. If you ask me, whether I could have offered anything that I thought better than this; I will answer you as Solon did a philosopher, who asked him whether he could not have made a better government for Athens? Yes; but that his was the best, that the people would or could receive. And now I believe you will bear me witness; that I have not treated you as a wise man would have done, in silence: but it is time to put an end to this tittle-tattle, which has nauseated you for three days together.

NOBLE VEN. I hope you think better of our judgements than so; but I believe you may very well be weary.

DOCT. I am sure the parish priests are often thanked for their pains, when they have neither taken half so much as you have, nor profited their auditory the hundredth part so much.

ENG. GENT. The answer to thank you for your pains, is always, thank you, sir, for your patience; and so I do, very humbly, both of you. —

NOBLE VEN. Pray, sir, when do you leave the town?

ENG. GENT. Not till you leave the kingdom. I intend to see you, if please God, aboard the yacht at Gravesend.

NOBLE VEN. I should be ashamed to put you to that trouble.

ENG. GENT. I should be much more troubled, if I should not do it; in the meantime I take my leave of you for this time, and hope to wait on you again tomorrow. What, doctor, you stay to consult about the convalescence?

Adieu to you both.

DOCT. Farewell, sir.

Nullum numen abest, si sit prudentia.

[If prudence be present, no divine power is absent.]

FINIS