The American Colonial Militia, 1606-1785, 1997, Edwin Mellen Pr Introduction
Author: Unknown
Date: 0101-01-01T00:00:00+00:00

The Citizen-Soldier

In medieval times it was a matter of law that common folk must purchase at their own expense and keep ready in their homes some basic weapons to serve and protect their king and state. The rulers expected the peasants to have acquired certain skills with their weapons prior to deployment, although they failed to provide any sort of funding for training. The English Assize of Arms (1181), promulgated by Henry II, required that each man keep at his own expense in his home a weapon appropriate to his rank and position. The American use of militia was, in reality, a return to traditional practices of this earlier age. In medieval Europe the law defined a militia as “the whole body of freemen” between the ages of fifteen and forty years, who were required by law to keep weapons in defense of their nation. In the later Middle Ages the militia was the whole body of “citizens, burgesses, free tenants, villeins [serfs] and others from 15 to 60 years of age” who were obliged by the law to be armed.

Trained Bands (or Trainbands) are found primarily in Elizabethan and Stuart England. The concept and term may be found as early as the reign of Alfred the Great (849-899). “For greater security, certain men in or near each settlement or City, who volunteered or were selected otherwise, were given, or agreed to procure, arms in advance of any emergency.” These men became the mainstay of Cromwell’s army during the Puritan Revolution and these units developed from the broader militia. The term is occasionally encountered referring to select militia in the American colonies, especially in New England.

Most European nations had abandoned the militia system by the sixteenth century. Americans chided the English for abandoning the militia system which had worked so well here. The militia, alone, had served as a check on the native aborigine in the colonial period of American history. For instances, when General Braddock was defeated near Pittsburgh, then Fort DuQuesne, the Virginia militia under Colonel George Washington’s command stood against the French and Indians. The British army fled to the eastern seaboard. During the colonial period Americans came to trust the militia to a far greater extent than they trusted the regular royal army. The fancy uniforms and European battle formations may have served the British well in wars in the old world, but they were ill suited for backwoods America.

America’s colonial citizen-soldier citizens soldier had their counterparts throughout history, as in ancient and medieval times when the peasants were conscripted to fight as foot soldiers. After the wars were over the peasants, too, returned to their fields. Tradesmen, farmers, men in all walks and vocations of life, had one thing in common: they stood as brothers in arms against the enemy as part of the citizen-soldiery.

The citizen-soldier stands in marked contrast to the professional soldier whose vocation is war. The citizen-soldier does not enter war for pay or booty. He goes to war only reluctantly, spurred on by notions of patriotism, nationalism and duty. He deplores war. He fights only as a last recourse when his nation is threatened and not in imperialistic adventures. There is no human institution any where more fundamental than the militia. As we shall show in this and the ensuing four volumes, excepting only religious dissenters, the true, traditional citizens owned firearms, less as a privilege than as a matter of duty. They came to equate firearms ownership with freedom. A free man is armed; a slave is dispossessed of his arms.

No man can trust a government that seeks to disarm him. Those who claim the right to bear arms over and against tyrannical government stand arm in arm with his ancestors who refused to give up their arms at Lexington, Concord, and on a thousand other locations.

A recent article concluded that the Second Amendment to the Constitution was adopted “as a declaration that the Federal Government can never fully nationalize all the military forces of this nation” because the masses of men with their own guns constitute “an essentially civilian-manned and oriented set of military forces” who can “inveigh against federal professionalization of the state militia.” The Preamble to the Declaration of Independence listed as two grievances against King George III that “[h]e has kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies without the consent of our legislatures [and]… [h]e has affected to render the military independent of and superior to the Civil power.”

Reverend Samuel McClintock (1732-1804) was commissioned to deliver a sermon on 3 June 1784, the occasion being the adoption of the newly adopted New Hampshire state constitution. He had served as a militia chaplain in both the French and Indian War and the American Revolution, and was thus well acquainted with the concept, organization and purpose of a militia system. His comments on that portion of the new basic document of the New Hampshire state government read like a passionate and patriotic definition of militia. “An army of freemen, voluntarily assembling at the alarm of danger — men who had been nurtured in the bosom of liberty, and unused to slavish restraints … willing to submit to the severity of military government, for the safety of their country, and patiently endure hardships that would have overcome the fortitude of veterans, following their illustrious leader in the depths of winter, through the cold and snow, in nakedness and perils, when every step they took was marked with the blood that issued from their swollen feet, and when they could not be animated to such patience and perseverance by any mercenary motives … .”

A recent author distinguished among army, trained bands and the various types of militia. An army is any armed land force that is organized and controlled by a clear chain of command. A militia which derived from the Latin miles and the old English and French milice indicated “the obligation of every able bodied Englishman to defend his country.” It implies the obligation that all citizens and perhaps resident aliens have to serve in the armed forces of their nation. In the American colonies the transition was made from English common law to the law of the colonies. The federal Constitution made certain that any national obligation did not preclude service to the state which was primary and original. Initially the enrolled militia (or organized militia) included those select or specially trained militia enlisted by the colonies or states. Early select and enrolled militia were occasionally called Trained Bands. The minutemen of New England were select or enrolled militia.

Theoretically, a naval militia may be authorized by letters of marque and reprisal. During the Revolution a few states, notably Pennsylvania, had state navies manned by militia. President Thomas Jefferson toyed with the idea of protecting our shores with large row boats armed with smaller cannon and manned by militia.

In 1889 Massachusetts created a naval militia as a counterpart to the regular, land-based state militia, and a very few other states followed.

Partisans are intended to supplement the regular army and even the militia, carrying out such duties as security, reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, scouting, and transportation. Partisans generally operate in wartime, especially when a nation is occupied by hostile forces. They may disrupt a wide variety of enemy activities, including transportation and communications. Parisans may or may not be officially authorized. The Norwegian Home Guard, for example, operated as an authorized partisan band during the nazi occupation and the reign of the collaborationist government of Vikung Quisling. The government, before leaving for exile in England ordered it to prevent or delay enemy transport of men and supplies by operations behind the enemy lines. The guard was instructed to attack enemy transport and supply convoys and offer armed resistance in occupied territories. The Norwegian Home Guard is a part of the regular army and is always prepared to perform its functions any time the nation is invaded. As a legal entity it would function best in occupied areas, but before the nation had surrendered.

Theoretically, the Home Guard could be disarmed as a part of a surrender, for surrender ordinarily implies the end of hostilities with, and disarmament of, all armed forces of a nation.

Most partisan operations may be termed guerrilla. Because guerrilla or partisan forces are not subject to formal government controls, they differ substantially from home guards. Another term that applies to “the military organization of the entire nation” is levees en masse. This force “must be recruited from men … women, children and the aged.” It stands quite a part from the regular army, and even the militia. Its combattants commonly have no uniforms or military discipline or training. These men fight only in their home areas, along ill-defined battle lines. Levees en masse may stage an uprising of all the people, or of a significant portion thereof. Usually, it is called forth by a general call to resist the enemy, rather than a muster call; or it may simply issue forth spontaneously. It never fights abroad. Its weapons are whatever is available from among the people.

While it most frequently occurs immediately after the local area is attacked, the term might apply to a popular uprising that occurs after an area is occupied.

The United States Supreme Court discussed the meaning of the militia in a 1939 decision which was based on traditional views expressed in state court decisions. “The significance attributed to the term Militia appears from the debates in the Constitutional Convention, the history and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of approved commentators. These show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. “A body of citizens enrolled for military discipline.” And further, that ordinarily when called for service these men were expected bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time… . In all the colonies, as in England, the militia system was based on the principle of the assize of arms. This implied the general obligation of all adult males inhabitants to possess arms, and, with certain exceptions, to cooperate in the work of defense.

The possession of arms also implied the possession of ammunition, and the authorities paid quite as much attention to the latter as to the former.”

The sentimental role of the citizen-soldier is found in the parallel to the Roman Cincinnatus who left his plow in the field to answer his country’s call.

The Supreme Court in one of the very few rulings rendered on the right to keep and bear arms, looked at the historical context in which forces consisting of citizen-soldiers had developed. “It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved military force or reserve militia of the United States as well as of the States; and, in view of this prerogative of the general government, as well as of its general powers, the States cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in question out of view, prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of their rightful resource from maintaining the public security, and disable the people from performing their duty to the general government.”

Most of the political writers of the colonial and federal periods were intimately familiar with the liberal political writings of the Enlightenment. One of the most writers who exercised great influence on the development of the American mind was James Harrington (1611-1677), the philosopher of property rights and economic determinism. Harrington called the militia, “the vast body of citizens in arms, both elders and youth.” Harrington also noted that the militia consisted of “Men accustomed to their arms and their liberties.” Commenting on Harrington’s thought, Sir Henry Vance the Younger wrote that the militia comprised those who “have deserved to be trusted with the keeping or bearing Their own Armes in publick defense.”

A more contemporary writer was the first great economic philosopher, Adam Smith (1723-1790), author of the influential treatise, The Wealth of Nations, published in 1776. Smith defined the term militia as, “either all the citizens of military age, or a certain number of them, to join in some measure the trade of a soldier to whatever other trade or profession they may happen to carry on. If this is found to be the policy of a nation, its military force is then said to consist of a militia.”

A French contemporary of Smith’s, Hilliard d’Auberteuil, observed that “a well regulated militia [is] drawn from the body of the people.” It is “accustomed to arms” and “is the proper, natural and sure defense of a free state.” He cautioned his readers that a standing army, on the other hand, was destructive of liberty.

French military theorist Comte de Guibert expressed little admiration for militiamen who were not well disciplined. Having witnessed American militiamen in action, he described the citizen-soldier a as “real barbarian” who is terrible when angered, he will carry flame and fire to the enemy. He will terrify, with his vengeance, any people who may be tempted to trouble his repose. And let no one call barbarous these reprisals based on laws of nature [although] they may be violations of so-called laws of war… . He arises, leaves his fireside, he will perish, in the end, if necessary; but he will obtain satisfaction, he will avenge himself, he will assure himself, by the magnificence of this vengeance, of his future tranquility.

Sir James A. H. Murray in his New English Dictionary of Historical Principles, defined the militia as, “a military force, especially the body of soldiers in the service of the sovereign of the state, [who are] the whole body of men amenable to military service, without enlistment, whether drilled or not … . A citizen army as distinguished from a body of mercenaries or professional soldiers.”

Simeon Howard (1733-1804), writing in Boston in 1773, said that a militia was “the power of defense in the body of the people … [that is], a well-regulated and well-disciplined militia. This is placing the sword in hands that will not be likely to betray their trust, and who will have the strongest motives to act their part well, in defence of their country.”

Justice Story in his Commentaries defended the militia system. He wrote, “The militia is the natural defense of a free country against sudden foreign invasions, domestic usurpation of power by rulers. It is against sound policy for a free people to keep up large military establishments and standing armies in time of peace, both from the enormous expense with which they afford ambitious and unprincipled rulers to subvert the government, or trammel upon the rights of the people. The rights of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered as the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary powers of rulers; and will generally, even if these are successful in the first instance, enable the people to resist and triumph over them.”

Benjamin Franklin defined the militia as a voluntary association of extra-governmental armed troops acting under their own authority. Franklin wrote that a militia is a “voluntary Assembling of great Bodies of armed Men, from different Parts of the Province, on occasional Alarm, whether true or false, … without Call or Authority from the Government, and without due Order and Direction among themselves … which cannot be done where compulsive Means are used to force Men into Military Service… . “

Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote concerning the minutemen of Massachusetts,

Among the grievous wrongs of which [the Americans] complained in the Declaration of Independence were that the King had subordinated the civil power to the military, that he had quartered troops among them in times of peace, and that through his mercenaries, he had committed other cruelties. Our War of the Revolution was, in good measure, fought as a protest against standing armies. Moreover, it was fought largely with a civilian army, the militia, and its great Commander-in-Chief was a civilian at heart… . [Fears of despotism]

were uppermost in the minds of the Founding Fathers when they drafted the Constitution.

Distrust of a standing army was expressed by many. Recognition of the danger from Indians and foreign nations caused them to authorize a national armed force begrudgingly.

Award winning historian and former Librarian of Congress Daniel Boorstin noted,

Everywhere, Americans relied on an armed citizenry rather than a professional army. The failure to distinguish between the “military man” and every other man was simply another example of the dissolving of the monopolies and distinctions of European life … . In a country inhabited by “Minute Men” why keep a standing army? … The fear of a standing army which, by European hypotheses was the instrument of tyrants and the enslaver of peoples, reenforced opposition to a professional body of men in arms.

While the English Parliament and His Majesty’s government argued that the colonials ought to bear some part of the cost of the wars with the French and Indians, the colonists disagreed. The colonial legislatures had appropriated money to pay their militias. The British troops were useless in the woods. They had been effective against the French armies in Canada, but that was of little concern to the colonials. Let the English bear the cost of their wars with France. After all, the wars here were only an extension of the greater wars in Europe.

Since the colonists’ wars were generally brought on by England’s massive conflicts on the Continent the home country could rarely spare many of its professional soldiers to defend the colonies against the French. In peacetime royal troops were more numerous, but they were unpopular. They enforced the hated smuggling laws and, later, Britain’s policy against westward expansion for the colonies. Such “tyranny,” and the memory of the uses to which Cromwell and the Stuarts had put standing armies, seemed to validate the truisms of classical political philosophy: that an armed populace provides all the security necessary against either foreign invasion or domestic tyranny, while a professional army allows rulers to oppress their unarmed subjects.

After the Revolution began, the British decided that victory would prevent any future armed conflict with the colonists over the payment of taxes or for any other cause. The British government had planned to disarm the Americans completely, had they won the war of the American Revolution. In 1777 the British cabinet, confident of impending victory, intended to abolish the militia. The cabinet had planned that, “The Militia Laws should be repealed and none suffered to be reenacted and the Arms of All the People should be taken away … . nor should any Foundry or Manufactory of Arms, Gunpowder or Warlike Stores, be ever suffered in America, nor should any Gunpowder, Lead, Arms or Ordnance be imported into it without Licence.”

In the late seventeenth century the militiamen, coming from the towns and cities of New England, proved sadly deficient in the firearms skills and discipline necessary to contain even the ragged, ill-clothed and underfed braves of King Philip’s army. The southern militia was all but nonexistent. Only in the middle colonies of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, and, to a slightly lesser degree, New York, were they really a formidable force.

During the Revolution George Washington decided that, however useful the militia might be in harassing or quasi-guerrilla warfare, lasting victory could be forged only with a regular army. But the militia concept had appealed to the Founding Fathers because it accorded with their philosophical predispositions and their own experience in warfare. From their inception the American colonies had to rely upon an armed populace for defense. Many times the colonies simply could not afford to maintain a sufficient standing military establishment. It also became a matter of duty. One had to work and to be prepared to defend the colony if he wished to live within its borders. Necessity, popular opinion and abstract philosophy had combined to commit the Founding Fathers to a military system based ultimately on what was then described as the “unorganized militia.”

The New England Beginnings

It has become popular to say that the militia system developed in the New World because the colonies were too poor to be able to devote a significant portion of the able-bodied manpower to a permanent military establishment. There were constant dangers from all sides, ranging from Britain’s various traditional enemies, such as Spain and France, to the native aborigine. Therefore, the colonies reverted to the military organization of an earlier time, the militia system as used at the beginning of modern Europe. While the European militias had atrophied and could, at best, be considered a vestigial organ of the state, the American militias had become vibrant military, social, and fraternal organizations necessary to the very existence of the colonies. No king would attempt to stave off his enemies on the continent, but the French and English kings depended almost exclusively upon their North American colonial militias. Nowhere was the militia system as well organized as in Puritan New England.

When the Puritans landed in New England they wished to found their own city on the hill, secular paradise, or land of the chosen people. Initially, the Pilgrims courted the indigenous Amerindians and became friends with the Wampanoags. The Massachusetts colony was wholly separatist and wanted nothing more than to be left alone. In the earliest years there was virtually no need for a strong military system. The friendship was short-lived, for the Europeans never did quite master the skill of being good neighbors to the Amerindians and leaving them alone. Within ten years the Puritans had come to regard themselves as the new Zion and the Amerindians as Canaanites. They did not regard themselves as interlopers, but as God’s chosen people for whom the new land had been prepared, and which they could develop without limitation. Like the Jews of the Exodus, the Puritans did not spare the Canaanites. Within ten years after the Puritans initially landed those at Boston had formed a mighty militia system.

Three separate, and often mutually distrustful, authorities vied for control of the New England militias. First, each colony had its own militia organization which was identical with, or responsible to, the colonial legislature and/or governor. Second, the New England colonies having created a unified military plan known as the New England Confederation, placed their individual militias under this regional authority. At various times the individual colonial authorities refused to cooperate and release militiamen to assist the general authority. Massachusetts refused to assist the other members in the first Narragansett War (1645-50) when it was not especially threatened, but demanded assistance from the other colonies when in 1675 in the second Narragansett War it was sacked and pillaged. Third, the mother country was the ultimate sovereign authority that periodically intervened in local militia affairs. As with most other aspects of colonial policy, England generally neglected the colonies, but on occasion it attempted to impose its will on its dependencies. The colonial militias usually provided for virtually all of their own colonies’ defense and this freed the English standing army for larger and, to the mother nation, more important duties. In general, the colonies were delighted to receive money, materials, equipment, and arms from England, but they disliked the brutal discipline and elitist attitude of the professional officer corps and they held the army in disdain for it was essentially useless in frontier warfare against savages who did not follow the rules of European warfare. They especially resented English intrusion into the appointment of militia officers.

The New England Puritans of c.1630 were displeased with the English militia system for a variety of reasons. Charles I had reorganized the English militia, creating a far more elitist and disciplined organization than his father, James I, had possessed. He brought veteran professional military men, many the veterans of several continental European wars, to train and discipline the raw militia recruits. He also introduced new weapons and required that existing weapons, most long neglected and in a sad state of disrepair, be properly mended.

He angered the Puritans by requiring that, following church services on Sundays, the train bands were to engage in such sports as “archery, running, wrestling, leaping, football playing, casting the sledge hammer and playing at cudgels.” The Puritans regarded this as a sacrilegious violation of the Sabbath which they argued was to be a day of rest and not of praying and playing games. Thus, Charles added a religious question to the existing legal and constitutional questions concerning his reorganization of the militia. Charles I bragged that his reorganized train band system was “the perfect militia.”

The English Puritan brethren had rejected the militia policies of Charles I and in the bitter debate in the parliamentary session of 1628 railed hard against the imposition of tyrannical standards on an essentially civilian body. Those Puritans who sailed with John Winthrop in 1630 had an idea of a militia constituted in a way quite different from the Stuart train bands. There was no question that they would create a militia, for they were well aware of the massacre of the ill-prepared Virginians at the hands of the Indians in 1622. But they did not agree with Charles I that his idea of a train band was a perfect militia.

The Charter of New England of 1620 created a militia primarily as an instrument to contain “Rebellion, Insurrection and Mutiny” against the crown. The militia was also to “encounter, expulse, repel and resist by Force of Arms” by “all ways and meanes” whatever foreign or native forces might be directed against the colony. The charter made the president the militia commander, although the assent of council was needed to deploy the militia. Council was to make appropriate laws for enrollment, training and discipline of the militia. The charter required the president and council to supply arms, ammunition and other goods of war.

The New England Puritans first hired professional military men to equip, drill and train the militia, but these men were veteran soldiers who were not Puritans and did not share the religious vision of the city on the hill. They had a particular dislike for the demand the Puritan made that they be allowed to elect officers, an idea inconceivable to professional military men. They were also expensive, both in terms of pay and in terms of the discontent they fostered in the colony. Jost Weillust, a German artillery specialist, left the Massachusetts Bay Colony almost immediately, having acquired no love for the new land and perhaps overcome by homesickness. Daniel Patrick and John Underhill lasted somewhat longer, but they were never comfortable with the spartan life of New England Puritanism. Both were accused of having committed adultery with young women of the community and were asked to leave. Underhill and the Puritans parted company on less than friendly terms. He observed with disgust that the Puritans were, at best, “soldiers not accustomed to war” who were “unexpert in the use of their arms.” The political authorities of New England decided that henceforth they would hire only Puritans, whether they were military veterans or not.

There were many demands for money to fund various governmental activities and the tax base was small. One of the larger items in the defense budgets was the erection and maintenance of frontier fortifications. To save money the militias were originally all volunteer organizations. Many militiamen objected to their deployment in construction and maintenance of forts and places of refuge.

However, when the governments failed to recruit enough volunteers to complete the work, they turned to the draft to fill out the quota of volunteer workmen. The draft depleted the resources of many militia companies.

Beginning with the Mayflower Compact of 11 November 1620 the New England colony had been founded upon a social contract. The colonists believed that the only way free men could be brought to obey the law was to base the law upon a contract upon which all agreed. The New England Puritans had a strong sense of democracy and they demanded broad based political participation in all decision making. The social contract had a natural law, Scriptural base. Each man agreed to give up his own interest and benefits voluntarily to the greater community in exchange for protection and congeniality. Among free men no amount of coercion could replace voluntary consent of the governed as the cornerstone of the polity. The congregational churches, election of ministers and magistrates, creation of state and town governments, and organization of the militia were all arranged contractually. Thomas Hooker, one of the most important of the Puritan theorists, argued that a man who desired to live a good life in a Christian polity must “willingly binde and ingage himself to each member of that society … or else a member actually he is not.” Each man under contract viewed himself as the author of law and the creator of order.

This contractual model extended to the founding and operation of the militia. The major application of the contractual principle extended to recruiting and training a militia in New England and with the popular election of militia officers. The New England militia was a contractual or covenanted organization, based on the principle of voluntary collectivism. A contractual militia was no threat to civil liberties, freedom or civil rights, especially when tied to Scripture.

The contract limited deployment of troops and militiamen argued that no governmental power could force them to serve beyond the boundaries of their own colony, and only rarely beyond their own region.

In times of trials and external threats the Puritans frequently called for fasting among the entire community as a means of supporting their militiamen.

Fasting served as communal expiation for their un-Christian divisiveness within the ranks of the faithful. It also served to assist in communal re-dedication to their sacred covenant. As late as the 1760s, while Boston was under the yoke of British occupation forces who were being quartered in private homes, Governor Bernard called for “a general fast, to be kept the sixth of April next” offered up so that “God would be graciously pleased to continue us, the enjoyment of all our invaluable privileges, of a civil and religious nature.”

The British authorities intensely disliked this democratic practice. When Sir Charles Hardy in 1756 was raising troops for his attack on the French fort at Crown Point he complained bitterly about the practice of the militiamen electing their own officers.

Pray, my Lord, where have these men come from? Under the vote for raising the Men …

the Men have it in their own Choice & are supported in it by a law of the Colony from whence they came, and the Consequence is plain … . The present Method is attendant with great Delays … . Captains of the Regulars will think it hard to be commanded by Field Officers of the Provincials & the Field Officers will likewise think so in having them on equal foot … . All Men raised in the Provinces for his Majesty’s Service should be raised by the Commander in Chief who may give blank Commissions in such Numbers he thinks proper, to the several Governors, to fill up with the Names of such Persons as may be qualified … .

In the other colonies the officers were appointed by the governors, proprietors or legislature. In practice it made little difference because the New Englanders were generally much persuaded to recruit officers from among the better class, which frequently translated to the religious hierarchy. There was no discernable difference between the military and the social structure of the community.

As early as 1632 Governor Winthrop noted that the people had demanded the right of free men to select their own officers. He was able to delay the grant of this right temporarily, for the Puritans had long since decided that free men who could elect their own ministers and political leaders could certainly be entrusted with the selection of militia officers. Besides, it was their very lives, and not the life of the governor, they were entrusting to their elected officers. The legislature bided its time, waiting to force the governor’s hand at the first opportunity. That opportunity came in 1636 as the colony prepared for war with the Pequot Indians.

The Massachusetts General Court enacted legislation allowing each regiment and company to nominate its own officers, subject to ratification by the council. In practice, this confirmation was ordinarily automatic. The militia units responded immediately by holding elections and sending in the names for approval. The requirements for becoming an officer, in addition to election, were correct church membership and status as freemen. In a few cases, the militia units would send up more names than were actually needed, or additional names after council had questioned a name, but frequently these additional names were found to be disqualified on some ground. In 1643 the general court fully yielded its power to appoint militia offices, although it still appointed sergeant major general, the highest office in the New England colonies. However, the company sergeant-majors, were made elective.

As late as the American Revolution the practice of election of officers came under criticism of several experienced military and some legislators from the middle and southern colonies. General George Washington, for example, disliked the practice of electing officers because he believed that it was misplaced democracy, was wholly inappropriate to the martial spirit, and that it subverted attempts to foster military temperament. During the war Washington cashiered several officers because they had fraternized too much with their men. Such fraternal relations, Washington reasoned, would subvert discipline, while doing nothing to create a spirit of command. He argued that the only way to select officers was to test the military prowess and competence and learning in the art of war.

While the English regarded the Puritans as hopelessly democratic, the colony of Massachusetts Bay still had a rigid class structure, seen nowhere better than in its militia organization. The wealthy citizens who could afford the equipment organized as cavalry, which became the elite units within the militia.

The underclass, on the other hand, supplied the foot soldiers. These were men for the most part who could barely afford to buy the most basic weapons that the law required them to supply. The many men who were so poor that they could not otherwise afford arms were provided guns at public expense, but only in exchange for performing public service. John Shy likened their obligation to labor to pay for their arms to the English working class which had to labor in the working-houses to compensate for charitable support.

The chief military commanders ordinarily held the position of colonial governor, a title well established in England. His military deputies carried the title of councillors. In time of actual war in New England the governors frequently asked for and received the support of various town and city officials, men who often doubled as militia officers. Together, these men constituted the council of war.

By 1641 both the home government and various local authorities in New England had come to the conclusion that a militia was indispensable for the protection of the inhabitants. A publication entitled An Abstract of the Laws of New England as They are Now Established concluded that for the best protection of the county, “First, a law [is] to be made for the training of all the men in the country fit to bear arms, unto the exercise of military discipline… .” The only other measure suggested for colonial defense was “and withal, another law to be made for the maintenance of military officers and forts.”

The New England Confederation, formed in 1643, was a primarily military organization consisting of New Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay, Connecti cut, New Haven, Cornwall [Maine], and King’s Province [a disputed area in southern New England]. This was essentially the same area as James II reorga nized in 1686-89 as the Dominion of New England. It was devised as for “mutual safety and welfare,” a self-defense program based on the colonial militias of these member provinces. Delegates met in Boston and adopted a written constitution which formed The United Colonies of New England. Each colony retained its own system of managing internal affairs. Questions of war and peace were decided by eight commissioners representing Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut and New Haven. Any six commissioners constituted a working majority. The commission ers met at least once a year and more frequently if there were problems brewing within its area of design.

Expenses for the defensive system were borne by the colonies in proportion to the male population between ages 16 and 60, that is, of men of the proper age to serve in the militia. Massachusetts certainly bore the bulk of the expenses and had the vast majority of men subject to militia service, yet its commissioners carried no greater weight than the smaller colonies. The confederation would make, or at least approve, all appointments of officers and designate an overall commander-in-chief. Ordinarily, confederation troops were to be under the command of the ranking officer of the colony in which the troops were presently deployed.

In 1653 the council met at Boston to consider “what number of soldiers might be requisite, if God called the Collonies to make warr against the Dutch.”

It named as captain commander John Leverett of Boston and apportioned its force of 500 as follows: Massachusetts Bay, 333; Plymouth, 60; Connecticut, 65; and New Haven, 42.

A major problem occurred for the confederation in 1653 when Massachu setts Bay refused to approve a war against the Dutch. Without its men and monetary contributions the union could not operate effectively. Initially, Massachusetts opposed the admission of Narragansett Bay [Rhode Island] and Cornwall [Maine] because the inhabitants held heterodox religious views. After 1664, when New Haven was annexed to Connecticut, the quotas and representation of the two confederation members was combined. At that point the constitution was amended to allow for meetings once ever three years instead of annually. The federation simultaneously went into a precipitous declined, but it revived briefly after a major threat from the native aborigine appeared. Between 1645 and 1650, and again in 1675, it waged war on the Narragansetts. It operated most successfully during King Philip’s War (1675-76), coordinating the defense of the region.

In 1684 the charter of Massachusetts Bay was withdrawn and the confederation came to an end.

The Confederation had assumed the power to negotiate arms and gunpowder contracts, and to contract for maintenance and repair of the confederation’s arms. Arms and supplies were to be stored in several convenient locations, with access to these materials of war granted to all members. It had sought the authority to declare war on Amerindian tribes on behalf of all members and to regulate the Indian trade and license Indian traders. It had sought the power to negotiate alliances with the various Amerindian tribes and to send negotiators to settle inter-tribal disputes. The confederation legally could take no action until at least six members approved, although this was not always the actual case.

New England was more than sufficiently rich to sustain its militia. When it deployed men on the frontier it found that a town could feed, house, and otherwise provide for a considerable number of men. Most towns could contribute a company or two of militia to the general effort while retaining sufficient strength to defend themselves. Most towns had one or more fortified buildings that served as a base of operations when the militia was deployed in the area; and as places of refuge if the town came under Amerindian attack.

New England frequently offered its militiamen various incentives for performing their duties well. Although these colonies did not have large blocks of land to donate (as Virginia did) but they did offer occasional bounties in land, notably in Maine. The colonies generally did not have to offer scalp bounties in order to mobilize militiamen, but again, on occasion, they did so. Too, there were possibilities of militiamen obtaining plunder; and others obtained money from the sales of Amerindian captives as slaves.

In 1688 the King James II was expelled, nominally because he kept a standing army in violation of Parliament’s orders and for being sympathetic to Roman Catholics and to the French. Parliament passed a Mutiny Act, setting up courts-martial and imposing military law for periods of up to six months. There was no appeal to either the courts or Parliament and we may view this action as the beginning of true, sovereign parliamentary supremacy.

The Glorious Revolution brought a Bill of Rights, that, among other things, provided that the king could not keep a standing army in the time of peace.

Parliament would fund the military on an annual basis through the conventional budgetary process. In April 1689 the colonists of New England decided to endorse in the change of government by ousting royalist and reactionary Governor Edmund Andros. The provincial authorities also ordered the arrest of royalist officers serving in Andros’s army. Without their leaders, the army dissolved. A popular leader, Jacob Leisler, declared himself to be acting lieutenant-governor, to serve until the pleasure of Parliament become known. Dutch settlers in Albany (who were also under Andros’s control) refused to recognize Leisler’s dubious claim, choosing to rule themselves through a popularly elected town assembly. Only a militia remained to protect the borders, restrain and pacify the Amerindians and maintain order.

The Dominion of New England “fulfilled the expectations of the Lords of Trade as a solution of the colonial problem of defense.” It checked Indian encroachments and strengthened the alliance with the Iroquois. Andros’s garrisoning of the frontier and his aggressive military ventures “made New England formidable to its enemies.” When the Dominion of New England collapsed, the new government in England delayed the formulation of imperial policy for the defense of the colonies. The Lords of Trade were insisting on reestablishing a consolidated government over the northern colonies, which they interpreted to include New England, New York, and New Jersey, under a single governor-general. However, this plan of reconsolidation was left unresolved because of the effective opposition led by the New England agents in London. The New England Puritans could claim victory only to the extent that they had succeeded in maintaining their status as a separate colonies. Still, for a variety of good reasons, substantial opinion existed for reestablishing the Dominion. There was general agreement that any new dominion must shed its autocratic features. On 25 January 1691, a group of forty-five of the leading citizens of Massachusetts petitioned the King to appoint “a Governor and Council over us to administer the Government with an elected Assembly … and as many of the little provinces as seem good to you may be united under one Governor for mutual defence and security.” In July 1691 New York Governor Henry Sloughter, claiming that he had the backing of the council and General Assembly, expressed the same desire. On 14 May 1692

William Phips (1651-1695) arrived at Boston carrying a parliamentary commission naming him as captain-general, governor and commander in chief of the militia for Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, the KIng’s Province, Massachusetts and New Hampshire estates. This was a plan the New England colonies opposed with great vigor because these provinces claimed that they alone controlled their own militias. They claimed there was no legal provision for subordinating the provincial militias to any exterior authority.

Meanwhile, the colonists sought to create a military union on their own, prompted by the French and Indian hostilities along the New York and Maine frontiers in 1689. These incursions caught the northern colonies unprepared. To meet the emergency, attempts were made to reinstate a regional military union of much the same sort as the New England Confederation. Mutual military support was the theme of the times. In July 1689 Massachusetts Governor Bradstreet requested that Connecticut authorities to “be ready to yield all necessary assistance when desired according to the rules of our ancient union and confederation.”

But the Confederation was not revitalized. Robert Livingston, writing from Hartford, speaking for many, argued that “it will be very requisite that the united Colonies take Inspection of all affairs with us, since their interest and ours are so inseparable … “

Connecticut and Rhode Island would not allow Phips to recruit volunteers, let alone draft men, from their militia on grounds that their charters granted them exclusive and inviolable rights to control and deploy their own militias. Phips appealed to the king, arguing that “you will not be soe unmindfull of your old neighbours.” This failed to yield any results. The Rhode Island Assembly refused to recognize Phips as commander over the colony’s militia and petitioned the crown for recognition of its charter rights. The Attorney General and Committee of Trade agreed to uphold Rhode Island’s constitutional stand, but reaffirmed the Attorney General’s opinion of 1690 that the crown retained the power to appoint a commander in chief over any part of a colony’s militia. Thus, in time of invasion the king or his delegate could take charge of whatever forces required. Phips made no overt move to assume command over the militia of the colonies.

In May 1693, the crown ordered Benjamin Fletcher, governor of Pennsylvania, West Jersey, and New York, to take command of the Connecticut militia for an expedition against Canada. It told Phips to “consult and advise” with Fletcher. East Jersey and Pennsylvania refused to respond to Fletcher’s demands for money and troops. In October 1693 Fletcher, accompanied by two members of the New York Council, traveled to Hartford to establish his commission as commander of the Connecticut militia. Having learned of Fletcher’s intentions earlier, the Connecticut General Court dispatched Fitz-John Winthrop to England to secure confirmation of the charter. The General Court took the position that Fletcher’s commission could not supersede the powers that the Connecticut Charter granted to the colony over its own over the militia. “We are still willing to doe our proportion with our neighbours in such public charge wherein we are equally concerned,” the Connecticut General Court informed Fletcher, but other colonies must do their share. Connecticut argued that it had already done more than its part by contributing to the garrisons at Albany and Deerfield.

Fletcher, in a letter to the Lords of Trade, warned that Connecticut’s obstinacy would lead to a French victory in North America. “These People of Connecticut are in a greate fright the noise of a Quo Warranto or A sharp Letter from theire Majesties will reduce Them the wisest and Richest of them Desire to bee under the Kings imediate Government.” Fletcher called a general conference of the governors to obtain pledges of troops and financial aid from each colony.

The Board of Trade authorized to Fletcher to issue a call for troops from New York, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia.

Moreover, the crown authorized the appointment of a chief commander to order the combined provincial militias in time of war. The crown also ordered the colonies to contribute troops or other assistance upon request of the governor of New York.

Several of the colonies were outraged at this assertion of English power over the colonial militias. The Rhode Island Assembly resolved that “in time of peace, and when the danger is over, the militia within each of the said provinces ought, as we humbly conceive, to be under the government and disposition of the respective Governors of the Colonies, according to their Charters.” Another negative provincial reaction was financial. For example, the Maryland House of Delegates only reluctantly voted a small appropriation and elusively talked of the possibility of future free will donations. The London Board of Trade considered the establishment of a colonial military union to be of paramount importance.

On 30 September 1696 the Board considered various proposals along that line from the colonies. John Nelson, Governor Fletcher of New York and Governor Nicholson of Maryland offered plans that, while intriguing, were also insufficient or unacceptable. The Board concluded that in wartime all provincial militia should be placed under one a single authority who would bear the title of captain general, who would be invested with the powers of a royal governor.

American colonial representatives then appeared before the Board of Trade, but they were unable to agree on a united front that they would present before the board. Edmund Harrison, Henry Ashurst, William Phips, representing New England and Daniel Coxe of New York argued for the creation of a governor general with civil as well as well as military jurisdiction. Fitz-John Winthrop reiterated Connecticut’s position based upon the charter rights it held that precluded tampering with its militia. Chidley Brooke and William Nicoll of New York favored a stronger union than any yet proposed. The Board of Trade feared the consequences of voiding the charters of Rhode Island and Connecticut without due legal process. Thus, the Board decided to recommend a military union superim posed by the Crown. In February 1697 an order by the king-in-council directed the establishment of a military union of the four New England colonies, New York, and West New Jersey under a captain-general.

The first appointment of captain-general went to Richard Coote, first Earl of Bellomont in the Irish peerage. Bellomont had powerful support, for among those backing him were William III, Lord Shrewsbury and Sir Henry Ashurst. It was a good appointment for Bellomont was acceptable to the New England and New York. While his political title was Governor of New York, Massachusetts and New Hampshire, in reality Bellomont received command over all the militia of the northern colonies. That command could be exercised only during wartime.

Bellomont did not reach New York until April 1698 and did not take over the reins of the Massachusetts government until May 1699. Unfortunately, his first great commitment was not military but criminal. He arrived just in time to become embroiled in the Captain Kidd affair. He had no success in gaining recognition of his military powers in Rhode Island. Whatever chance he may have had to succeed there initially was soon lost as he became obsessed with enforcement of the highly unpopular Navigation Acts. More destructive yet, he became entangled in the complex politics, largely of New York, that had also undone his predecessor, Benjamin Fletcher. Bellomont died suddenly in March 1701, and with him died also the plan for military unity.

Renewed call for a central military authority for New England came as the colonies prepared to enter Queen Anne’s War. Joseph Dudley had received his commission in 1702 as Governor of Massachusetts and New Hampshire. With this was his appointment as captain general with authority over all the New England militia in time of war. He was also vice-admiral of Rhode Island. Dudley found it impossible to weld together an intercolonial military system. New England had two objections to his appointment. First, there had objections to his previous service as the first governor of the Dominion of New England. He was also closely tied to the established high church party in England. Rhode Island and Connecticut remained recalcitrant concerning their charter privileges. Connecticut refused to send troops beyond the frontier of the Connecticut Valley during the early phase of Queen Anne’s War. Connecticut disbanded its militia in 1704 without Dudley’s authorization. When told to obey the orders of the Massachusetts Governor, Connecticut refused. In late 1706 and early 17077 Dudley appealed to Fitz-John Winthrop, begging him to use his powers of persuasion to enlist the support of Connecticut in the combined provincial expedition being assembled to capture Port Royal in Acadia. Winthrop replied that the Connecticut Assembly would not cooperate because there was nothing about that expedition that would benefit the colony. Rhode Island also denied Dudley’s military authority over its militia.

Professor John Shy, a leading critic of the American colonial militia system, observed that, about 1710, “it would be wrong to idealize the New England militia, but it would be equally mistaken not to recognize that there the institution had retained its vitality.” Toward the end of Queen Anne’s War (1702-1713) Governor Joseph Dudley could boast that his militia system had achieved two goals. First, it successfully defended its own frontiers and most settlements from French and Amerindian attack. Second, it had supplied significant troop strength to assist the English expeditions against French Canada.

Plans for a Unified Military Command We may think of the Albany Plan as the first attempt to create a politico-military union among the colonies, but before the Albany Plan was proposed there were several schemes for colonial union proposed between 1643 and 1754. Most of these were schemes for regional integration, rather than plans for full intercolonial military, political, economic and social cooperation. The separate founding of the colonies, coupled with difficulties of travel, prevented effective Union until the Revolution. However, many proposals for union had grown out of the many common problems faced by the Colonies. The most continually aggravating problem was that of frontier defense against Amerindian attack.

Rivalry with the Swedes, Dutch Spanish and French exacerbated this problem.

Trade and boundary disputes emphasized the need for a common arbitrator. A common culture, mores, folkways, customs, religion, ethnic origin, traditions and allegiance provided a reasonable basis for unity. Moreover, the English home government, desiring to make the colonies a more effective unit for imperial trade and defense, in some cases, encouraged several plans for union. These plans varied widely in origin and design. There was no common agreement on the number of the American colonies to be included.

Colonial military policy had developed along relatively simplistic lines.

The colonial militias would take on the responsibility of guarding the frontiers against the Amerindians. There would be no standing armies within the colonies.

Ordinarily, colonists or their legislatures attended to the selection of colonial officers. Militia funding was the responsibility of colonial legislatures. Military units existed only as long as a crisis existed; permanent military systems were unacceptable. When there was a larger operation, British naval and military power would be brought to bear. In larger campaigns the militia would be merged with regular British forces. Militia might come under British command at any point.

While militia need not serve beyond the boundaries of the colonies, British authorities could draft militiamen into service abroad.

The United Colonies of New England was a practical plan which actually existed between 1643 and 1684. Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, Connecticut and New Haven were united in a league largely for frontier defense. It was replaced by the Dominion of New England in 1688. The British Crown superimposed this plan upon the members by making Sir Edmund Andros Governor-general of all the New England colonies, New York, East and West Jersey. New England maintained for a period of forty years its “Confederation.” Between 1643 and 1662
the members were Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, Connecticut and New Haven.

Between 1662 and 1684 New Haven, having been incorporated into Connecticut, disappeared from the records as a partner. This early system had functioned fairly effectively under the acknowledged primacy of the government of Massachusetts Bay, in the requisitioning of men and money upon the member colonies when action was required. Moreover, the Plan adhered scrupulously to the requisition principle and in its scope scarcely went beyond the New England concert of King George’s War, which under the primacy of Massachusetts Bay had to its credit the capture of the great fortress of Louisbourg.

The Intercolonial Congress, which existed between 1689-91, included New York, Massachusetts, Plymouth and Connecticut. These colonies entered into a temporary military league for frontier defense.

William Penn’s Briefe and Plaine Scheam for union was written in 1697.

Penn’s proposal for a loose confederation grew out of the conditions prevailing during King William’s War. This was an odd work especially considering the general opposition to war and military establishment espoused by the Society of Friends; and in view of the Quaker opposition to the passage of a militia act.

Another plan of union was proposed under the Earl of Bellomont.

Bellomont served between 1698 and 1701 as governor of New York, Massachu setts and New Hampshire. He was also commander of the military forces of those colonies and of the forces of the provinces of Connecticut, Rhode Island and the Jerseys. The Crown appointed Bellomont to this large command because of colonial failure to cooperate in defense. It hoped that a strong over-lord might superimpose military union and full cooperation among the several militias in defense of the frontiers.

Governor Hamilton’s Plan of 1699 was based on the production of supplies for the Royal Navy which would then guard against the designs of the French. He also proposed the construction of many strong strategic fortified positions and strongholds along the frontier. These static fortifications would prevent the incursion of large French, Indian or mixed forces. Military defensive positions were to be planned, designed, executed and built under the direction of British regular military engineers. Hamilton thought that previous fortified positions had failed because colonials were poor engineers and builders and had not the dedication, skill or will to build impregnable forts. Colonial log forts deteriorated too quickly. Hamilton made his proposals while he was serving as deputy-governor of Pennsylvania. His proposal included provision for an intercolonial assembly with the power to levy a poll tax to finance his several projects.

A Virginian’s Plan of Union of 1701, was an anonymous publication issued in London which advocated abolishing all the proprietary governments and uniting the colonies under an intercolonial Congress and governor-general. This plan was more political and administrative in conception than military, except that a unified colonial administration would have a unified military command. Unified command would include universal imposition of the Mutiny Act and brutal, but highly effective, martial law and military discipline.

Robert Livingston’s proposed his quite incomplete scheme for military union in 1701. In a letter to the Lords of Trade, Livingston proposed that the colonies be grouped into three military-administrative units, which would be coordinated by the Council of Trade for frontier defense. Again, British discipline and thorough administration would replace local discipline which nearly all agreed was quite lax as compared with standard British discipline. Livingston was principally concernd with the scarcity of militia training standards and armament.

Queen Anne’s War provided an excellent opportunity for intercolonial military cooperation, as well as full cooperation between colonies and mother country.

Beginning in 1708 Governor Vetch and others thought that a major joint venture against Quebec was being planned. But the home office changed its objective from Quebec to Port Royal. Intercolonial cooperation was quickly abandoned. Vetch called a conference at Rehoboth, Rhode Island, but New York declined to attend and the delegates from Massachusetts Bay, New Hampshire, Connecticut and Rhode Island settled for the simple expedient of sending a petition to the queen asking for an assault on Quebec. Five hundred British marines easily captured the undermanned fort at Port Royal, with colonials have little role in the action. Vetch assumed political control over the area and thoughts of formal military alliances were forgotten.

All plans for military cooperation and unity called for a centralized authority and some sort of permanent military force. The colonists might have tolerated a substantial British force in America, if the troops had been dispersed to the distant frontiers. But the British government did not want to bear this added expense. British troops permanently stationed in the American colonies during Queen Anne’s War consisted only of four companies of one hundred men each.

Their mission was to block the invasion routes along the Mohawk and Champlain valleys. The British government under-supported, even neglected and ignored, these troops. Professor John Shy noted that, at the end of Queen Anne’s War, the crown considered maintaining troops in the colonies, but only if three conditions existed: (1) inability of a particular colony or cluster of colonies to offer sufficient defense without outside help; (2) definite strategic or financial value accrued to the crown; and (3) the colonial authorities would cooperate by paying part of the costs of maintaining the garrisons.

The importance of friendship between the English and the Indians of the Six Nations, along with the Indians’ dependence upon the Crown of Great Britain were two important points in the Treaty of Utrecht of 11 April 1713. An effort was made at this Treaty to have the Indians of the Six Nations acknowledged by French to be subject to the Dominion of Great Britain. One provision of the treaty was that “the French shall give no hindrance or molestation either to them, or the other natives of America, who were friends of the English. The Treaty further stipulated that the subjects of both monarchies would be permitted to come and go freely and to trade as they wished and that the natives should also have the same freedom to move freely between the British and French colonies so as to promote trade on both sides. Some of the colonists, having been aware of the arrangement agreed to at the Treaty of Utrecht, became concerned when a considerable number of French “settled on a Carrying Place, made use of by the several Indian Tribes inhabiting that part of the country … which separated the Head of the Kennebeck River from that of the River Chandiere … .” Some colonists became even more alarmed when they also learned that the Norredgwalk Indians “had given the new French settlers upon the Carry-Place liberty to hunt any where in that Country.”

This gave rise for concern because it threatened “to disturb the tranquility of the British Provinces.” Both Great Britain and the colonists wanted the Indians to remain dependent upon the Crown, for such dependency was an effective bargaining tool.

Not until 1721 did the crown send other regular army units to the colonies.

In that year the Board of Trade authorized the deployment of eight infantry regiments on the frontier of New York, Virginia, and the Carolinas. The only other regular British troops stationed in America on a permanent basis were a few companies in the New York garrisons .Additionally, there were one hundred “invalids” in South Carolina. Invalids were pensioners who had been relieved from active duty because of infirmity, age or disability, and could be used only in case of dire emergency.

In reality, the principal factor mitigating against a general military establishment was the establishment of a general overall authority in the person of a captain general. Such an authority was designed to serve as commander in chief of all militia forces, at least during war time, on a permanent basis. This concept was anathema to the independent American colonists who loathed the idea of any standing army existing in peacetime. Nevertheless, the English authorities secretly harbored a plan for creating a captain-general with command over all the militias of all the colonies. Governors Nicholson and Hunter offered their support and endorsement to the plan. After Queen Anne’s War this idea of centralized military authority was repeated over and again in the recommendations of and to the Board of Trade.

The Earl of Stair in 1721 submitted to the Board of Trade another plan for administrative and military union. Stair’s plan included all the continental colonies and the British West Indies in a single military command under a single system of military hierarchy, discipline and command. The system was to be chaired by a governor-in-chief who was to be appointed by the crown. An advisory council of two members from each colony was to assist this official. The governor and his council could levy assessments against the colonies for defense purposes, although the legislature in each colony was free to decide the exact type of tax which would be levied to fulfill its assessed obligation. The scheme was to be established by action of the British Parliament.

The Lords of Trade proposed their own plan in 1721 which was outlined in a report given directly to the king. In its essentials, it was drawn from the Earl of Stair’s proposal.

Daniel Coxe’s offered his plan in 1722 which appeared in a book on world travel published in London. Coxe proposed a union of all the continental colonies under one governor, although there would still be a lieutenant-governor represent ing the king in each colony. The principal obligations of the over-lord governor would be military in nature. He would recruit, pay and train the basic standing military force and provide standards for militia training and armament. A great council composed of two delegates from each colony was to advise the governor.

It would also make decisions concerning the provisioning of the army and the drafting of men needed for the standing colonial defense force.

The Kennedy-Franklin Plan of 1751, was the joint effort of Archibald Kennedy, receiver-general of New York, and newspaper editor and statesman Benjamin Franklin. In a pamphlet dealing with Indian trade and frontier defense, they proposed a unified system of frontier defense. Doubtless, Franklin was seeking a method of forcing Pennsylvania to pass a militia law and to form a militia force. If the state legislature could not be convinced to act on its own in these matters then superimposition from outside might present the only feasible alternative to force the issue. The system was more oriented toward a militia system than the other later plans which had a strong element of a standing army to them. These military forces were to be directed by a superintendent to be assigned to the colonies by commissioners representing the colonial assemblies. Benjamin Franklin added some additional details in his later Albany Plan.

The following proposal, dated 1747, is one of the more practical as well as feasible and complete plans offered before the Albany Plan.

At a meeting of the Commissioners of the Several Governments of the Massachusetts Bay New York and Connecticut, at the City of New York, in order to concert and Agree upon some general Measures for carrying on the war against the common Enemy and for the Mutual defense and Security of his Majestys British Provinces and Colonys on ye Continent in North America, it is Judged after Mature consideration had of the present distressing circumstances of these three Colonys and thereupon the said Commissioners agree to Report to their Respective Constituants that they Unanimously are of opinion 1. That an Expedition be formed and carryed on against ye French Fort at Crown Point for the Reduction of that Fortress.

2. That it will be necessary that four thousand men (officers included) be raised (with as many of ye Six Nations of Indians and their allies as can be Obtained) to carry on the Said Expedition, and that it will be Necessary those troops be at Albany by the fifteenth of April Next Ready to March for the aforesaid purpose.

3. That as the Engaging the six Nations and their Allies in this and other Services against the Common Enemy, is of great importance to the British Governments, it is Judged Necessary that such of ye Indians as shall Engage in the said Expedition and go into the Service be Equipt Each with necessarys to ye value of five pounds New York currency, and be assured of a present of ye like value on their Return in case of Success.

4. That as a further means of Securing and Engaging the said Indians in the Service of the English and to prevent their being Seduced to Revolt to ye French, it is agreed that it be proposed to Each of ye said Governments that a Gunsmith be Sent to Each of ye Tribes following viz: the Oniades, Onandagas, Cayugas, and Senecas, and two men with Each Gunsmith to continue with them untill the Next Spring and that ye said persons be instructed to be as oblidging as may be to ye Indians with whom they live and converse and do all in their power to Establish and increase ye interest of ye English with them and from time to time Advise ye Governments of any thing they Shall observe Necessary or that ye Indians may want or desire to be done for yt purpose and that there be purchased Suitable goods to ye value of three hundred and Sixty pounds New York currency to be put into the hands of said Smiths (or of one of ye men who go with them Respectively) to be given to the Several Nations aforesaid (Except Sixty pounds thereof to be put into the hands of Some Suitable person for the Mohawks) to be Distributed as follows viz. one hundred and twenty pounds to the Senecas, Sixty pounds to the Oniades & Tuscarora’s, Sixty pounds to the Cayuga’s, and Sixty pounds to ye Onandaga’s and that ye Several persons Render an account upon Oath of ye Disposition of ye Said goods to ye Respective Governments and that ye Charges of ye Said Smiths and others attending them as also ye Said three hundred and Sixty pounds be born and paid in the proportion following, viz., the Massachusetts Pay Nine twentyeth parts, New York Eight twentyeths and Connecticut three twentyeths, but these proportions not to be drawn into precedent upon any other occasion hereafter.

5. That (besides what Governour Clinton has Assured the Commissioners Shall be Supplyed gratis of ye battoes cannon and warlike Stores and implements in the Province of New York provided at his Majestys Expence) the General and common Expence Necessary for Engaging and Rewarding the Indians paying the officers of ye Train of artiliry and for ye Common Store of Shot gun powder and other Military preparations Necessary for ye common Service be provided by and at the Charge of ye Governments Engaging in this Service and that the proportions and Quotas of the Governments for these Services as well as ye keeping and Supporting the Garrison (if Reduced) until his Majesty’s pleasure be known be as above mentioned & that whatsoever part or proportion either of men or money any other Governments Shall undertake to bear and furnish Shall lessen the parts of these three Governments according to the aforesaid proportion and that ye legislatures of Each Government Engaging in this Enterprize Raise Equip provide for Subsist and pay their own troops as also appoint Commissarys to take care of their own Stores. Saving that the Govemment of New York be not oblidged to raise above twelve hundred men the Massachusetts Commissioners agreeing to propose to their Constituants to Raise four hundred men to compleat ye proportion of New York the officers to be Commissioned by ye Governour of ye Said Government undertaking to provide the Same and both officers and Souldiers of Said four hundred men to Receive ye Same bounty wages Subsistance and Every other thing from ye Government of New York which Shall be given or paid by Said Government of New York to a like proportion of the twelve hundred men they Shall raise for said Expedition.

6. That the Governours of ye Massachusets bay New York and Connecticut be desired to appoint and Commission the three General Officers for the Said Expedition.

7. That Each Government appoint a Committee of one or more persons to Meet at Middletown in Connecticut on the Eleventh day of December Next or as Soon after as may be in order to Determine and ascertain the particulars Necessary to be provided at ye Common Charge of ye Governments and also to agree what particular Sorts or Species of ye Said particulars Each Government Shall undertake to provide having Regard to Said proportion.

8. That ye Commissioners here present having made Report to their Respective Constituants of what measures are hereby agreed upon the Governours of ye Massachusets bay, New York and Connecticut be Desired by ye Respective Assemblys of these Governments to apply to ye Governours of the Several other provinces and Colonys from Virginia to New Hampshire inclusive to recommend it to their Several assemblys fully to Joyn according and in proportion to their ability in this common undertaking against his Majestys Enemys and to unite with these Governments in the Mutual Defence and Security of his Majestys Colonys on the Continent in North America; and particularly Desiring them to Send their committee to Meet at Middletown aforesd to Engage in this undertaking and to agree upon what part they Respectively will provide of Men, Money and Common Stores necessary for the Engaging and Encouraging the Indians and for ye Carrying on ye Said Expedition also Requesting as Speedy an Answer as may be to ye Governours of these Governments Respectively of what their Several Governments will undertake in this important Enterprize.

9. That in the mean time while ye preparations are making for ye proposed Expedition application be made to his Majesty by ye Legislatures of Each of these Governments for Such a Naval force as may be sufficient to go up ye River Saint Lawrance and either divert or Subdue that part of ye Country and in case of an assurance of a Sufficiency to command the river and attack ye fortresses there and that it be his Majestys pleasure the Expedition be carryed on against Canada that then ye preparations and Necessarys designed more immediately for an Expedition against Crown Point be imployed and carryed on against Canada for the Reduction of the same with Such additional force as can be raised; and in that case that application at ye Same time be made as aforesaid that ye Quotas of the Several Governments be Setled and that those who are deficient be injoined to furnish the Same.

10. That in case the other Governments who have not Sent their Commissioners to this meeting to Concert measures for ye common good of his Majestys Subjects Shall after application made to them as before proposed and Notice of these conclusions and approbation thereof by these Governments Shall neglect or refuse to Joyn them in these important affairs for ye mutual defence and Security of his Majestys Subjects and interest that then application be made as aforesaid for ye Royal injunctions to be laid on ye several deficient Governments to furnish and provide their proportion and Quotas of Men & Money necessary for ye future general defence and Security of his Majestys Colonys and for ye Carrying on any proper Scheem for ye Annoyance of ye common Enemy.

11. That in case the proposed Expedition against Crown Point only go forward and no Ships of war are Sent by his Majesty to go up the River St. Lawrance for ye purpose aforesaid then a Diversion be made up said River with what vessels can be obtained from the several Governments at ye charge of ye said Governments and in conjunction with such of his Majestys Ships of war as can be procured at Lewisburgh or elsewhere and that a diversion by land be made by the direction and under the conduct of ye general officers by such of ye forces of Christians and Indians as Shall by said officers on proper encouragement be Sent out for yt purpose.

12. That the vessels goods Stores and other things sent or that shall go thro any part of the Government of New York for the forces imployed in the aforementioned and proposed Service or in garrisoning the said Fortress be free and exempt from all toll, tribute, custom and duty that is or might be imported on Such Materials by virtue of any act of ye Government of New York.

13. That if it Shall happen that the proposed expeditions Shall neither of them be carryed on the Next year or if by reason of any other Events it shall be found Necessary for the defence of his Majestys Subjects and annoying the Enemy to Send out and Maintain Scouts or Rangers that then the Governments of ye Massachusets bay, New York and Connecticut send out on proper encouragement such a number of men respectively as they Shall Judge a proportion for them in order to defend the borders of the Exposed Settlements and to annoy and distress the French and Enemy Indians in their Settlements, and in this Service to Joyn with such of ye Six Nations of Indians and their allies as will go on that design; and that ye other Governments of New Jersey, Pensilvania, Maryland, Virginia, New Hampshire and Rhoad Island be applyed to, to furnish provide and bear their proportion in men, Money or other Necessarys for the encouragement and Support of Such Scouts or Rangers and that Each Government providing and sending out such Scouts or Rangers Receive the benefit of such money or other necessarys as Shall be afforded by the other Governments not sending men, in proportion to the number of men they shall Respectively imploy in said Service.

14. That in case any attack or invasion Shall be made by the Enemy on any one or more of his Majestys Governments and application be made to any other Government for assistance, that ye Same be Speedily afforded according to the necessity and Circumstances of the case; the Subsistance only being provided by and at the Charge of the Government Requesting and receiving Such Succors. And if either of the Governments receive any intelligence of an Enemy approaching either by Sea or Land who may in danger any one or more of the other Governments that they give them the earliest Notice possible thereof by Express.

15. That the Legislatures of these three Colonys be Desired to Determine upon this agreement with all the dispatch possible and when done that each Government do signify the same to the others as soon as may be.

16. The Large numbers of men and great charges consequent thereupon as above have been come into by the Commissioners, by reason of the Distressing Circumstances of these Governments, Notwithstanding the full perswasion of the Commissioners that these burdens must be beyond the ability of said Governments if continued, they being almost constantly harrassed by invasions or incursions in their borders from the French and their Indians for Near five hundred miles an End and many of their Settlements already broken up and destroyed and divers others in the most imminent danger the case being Such that if these Governments do not lay these heavy burdens on themselves (under which, if they are not relieved, they must Sink) they must be much Sooner destroyed by their inhuman Enemys above said who are exceedingly Supported Spirited and advantaged by the abovesaid Crown Point Fort. The Commissioners being Sensible that it is as truly unreason able and Destructive to these Governments to Supply all the men and Money Necessary to defend his Majestys Subjects and interest in North america as it would be for a Small part of ye Nation to be at ye Expence of Defending the whole There being diverse more wealthy and populous Governments than we are who have been and are
defended by us and therefore in all reason ought to bear their proportion of the common defense both with men and Money.

17. The above articles we agree to recommend to and in all proper ways to Endeavour they may be ratified by the Governments to which we respectively belong none of which Shall be obligatory on any of the three Governments but Such as Shall be ratified by all. In Testimony whereof we have Signed triplicates of these presents at ye City of New York this twenty Eighth day of September in the twenty first year of the Reign of our Sovereign Lord George the Second of Great Britain, France and Ireland King &c; Annoque Domini, one thousand Seven hundred and fourty Seven.

The first Albany scheme for colonial union dates to 1750-51. Governor George Clinton, in a circular letter of December 18, 1750 to all English colonial governors, invited the them to a congress at Albany to meet with the Six Nations at a major conference to be held in June 1751. On 13 April 1751 Clinton renewed his proposal. He suggested that the commissioners draw up “a state of Indian Affairs to be laid before His Majesty” and also possibly a representation to the Governor General of Canada. Clinton repeated his invitation in April when he invited specifically Governors Wentworth, Phips, Hamilton, Glen, Johnson, Ogle, Belcher, Wolcott, and the “President of Virginia.” Discussion ensued over the proper meeting place. Glen favored a site in Virginia. Meanwhile, the various governors expressed disgust over the dilatoriness of the assemblies to take action.

This political maneuvering delayed the opening of the conference. Most of the assemblies probably balked because Clinton had requested that each colony provide presents for the Indians at the conferences. By June, Clinton announced that governors of all the colonies, except Virginia which had not yet replied, approved an intercolonial convention on Amerindian policy.

Meanwhile, French policy succeeded in igniting a war between the Iroquois and their traditional enemies, the Catawba nation. Thomas Lee, the acting Governor of Virginia, and Governor Glen of South Carolina laid the groundwork for a peace treaty to be held at Fredericksburg in the summer of 1751. Governor Hamilton of Pennsylvania agreed to attend this conference. Nonetheless, Clinton proceeded to arrange his conference, to be held at the same time. The Iroquois refused to go to Fredericksburg. When the first Albany congress convened on July 6, 1751, four colonies were represented: New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and South Carolina. William Bull and six Catawba Indians represented South Carolina. Also attending were the mayor and corporation of Albany and several officers of the Independent companies in New York. The meeting opened with a pledge “to renew the Covenant Chain, to cleanse away all Rust, to brighten it, and strengthen it so that it may forever endure … .” In reality, nothing decisive emerged from the conference. Clinton offered the unusual suggestion of sending missionaries among the Six Nations. The colonial emissaries met this suggestion with icy silence since the implementation of the suggestion required legislative funding. The first Albany conference of 1751 did not result in any great improvement in Indian affairs. Most significant was that, for the first time, South Carolina was represented in a northern intercolonial conference. Most colonial governors favored the idea of having some unified agency to deal with the Indians. In fact, the need to coordinate Indian policy was the primary reason for the general participation in the second and principal Albany Congress. Jonathan Belcher, Governor of New Jersey, had heretofore never shown much interest in Indian affairs. However, Belcher indicated that “the Alliance and Friendship of the Six Nations and their Dependance on the Crown of Great Britain must by every thinking Man be looked upon as the greatest Security the Settlers on the Northern Boundary of this Province can have to prevent the Incursions of those Nations of Indians … .” For his part, Governor William Shirley expressed optimism for the outcome of an intercolonial Indian conference. “Such an Union of Councils,”

Shirley wrote, “besides the happy Effect it will probably have upon the Indians of the Six Nations, may lay a Foundation for a general one among all his Majesty’s Colonies, for the mutual Support and Defence against the present dangerous Enterprizes of the French on every Side of them.

Virginia began building fortifications on the Forks of Ohio in order to check this encroachment by the French and to protect the Indians in alliance with Great Britain. Virginia felt the costs incurred in fortification should be borne by all the colonies in proportion to the advantage they received. Virginia felt justified in making this request because of what had been conveyed upon the colonies through the Earl of Holdernefs. The earl conveyed the sentiments of the king and council “that … all his provinces in America should be aiding and assisting each other [and] in case of invasion you should keep up … correspon dence with all his Majesty’s Governors . . and in case you shall be informed … of any hostile attempts, you are … to assemble the general assembly within your government, and lay before them the necessity of a mutual assistance, and … grant such supplies as the exigency affairs may require.”

There was much dissension among the colonies regarding the prospect of assisting one another. Most colonies were struggling financially as it was and then the thought of having to raise funds was more than some representatives wanted to require of their constituents. Governors began addressing their assemblies, requesting aid and assistance be given to those colonies which were victims of French encroachment. The encroachment continued and the king directed the Governor of New York to hold an interview with the Six Nations, delivering presents to the Indians at Albany on 14 June 1754. The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations wrote the governors of the colonies, informing them of this conference and requested that this information be considered by their respective assemblies and that they nominate Indian commissioners. They were also to appropriate money for proper gifts to present to the Indians. Most governors conveyed this message to their respective assemblies. The royal executives reiterated the importance of the friendship between the colonies and the Indians, and nearly all made “presents to them at proper times… and by observing all our engagements with them. Both the Council and House of Representatives of Boston were of the opinion that even though the number of French inhabitants on the continent at that time was considerably smaller than the English population, there were still other circumstances that could have given the French the advantage.

The French basically had only one objective upon which their policy and military policies remained focused, whereas the English governments had different interests, were disunited and when not immediately affected seemed unconcerned about events taking place in their sister colonies. The French in North America were well supported by the Crown and treasury of France, whereas the English were obliged to carry on any defensive measures at their own expense.

Most governors stressed the need for a union of all ten colonies and believed that the colonists were far superior to the French. However, unless properly articulated by a union among themselves “the colonies are in danger of being swallowed up by an enemy otherwise much smaller in strength and numbers.

Although the governors conveyed the idea of a union and stressed its importance, it was not always met with agreement by members of the Assemblies.

The New Jersey Assembly made it quite clear to Governor Belcher that they were of tine opinion that there was not yet a concerted effort on the parts of either the Maryland or Pennsylvania legislatures even though they were much nearer to the French forts. Further, they pointed out that New Jersey “had never been parties with the Five Nations and their Allies, nor have they benefited from Indian Trade.”

New Jersey’s Assembly was not alone in its opposition to union. Two members from the Pennsylvania Assembly informed Governor Hamilton “that near one-half of the members are for various reasons, against granting any money for the King’s use. Hamilton was so distressed with the sentiments of his assembly that he wrote Governor DeLancey stating that he wished he could send the commissioners from his province under instructions that were agreeable to DeLancey’s plan, but “from the particular views of some and ignorance and jealousy of others I have not been able to persuade them … .” Benjamin Franklin wholeheartedly agreed with the governors that a plan of union was of the utmost importance and conveyed his sentiments In an editorial appearing in the Pennsylva nia Gazette. Franklin described the existing situation in the colonies, including attacks by the French and the Indians. He sent messages to Pennsylvania and Virginia, notifying them that the Six Nations were recruiting warriors to fight the French before they fortified their gains. Franklin believed France’s confidence was “well grounded on the present disunited State of the British Colonies, and the extreme difficulty of bringing so many different governments and assemblies to agree in any speedy and effectual measures for our common defense and security.” At the end of this editorial Franklin added what has become known as his motto — “Join or Die” — with a wood-cut of a disjointed snake, symbolic of the divided state of the colonies. Franklin wrote,

The Confidence of the French in this Undertaking seems well grounded in the present disunited State of the British Colonies, and the extreme Difficulty of bringing so many different Governments and Assembles to agree in any speedy and effectual measures for our common defense and security; While our enemies have the very great advantage of being under one direction, with one council and one Purse. Hence, and from the great Distance of Britain, they presume that they may with Impunity violate the most solemn Treaties subsisting between the two Crownes, kills, fence and imprison our Traders, and consfiscate their Effects at Pleasure, as they have done for several Years past — murder and scalp our Farmers, with their Wives and Children, and take an early Possession of Such Parts of the British Territory as they find most convenient for them which if they are permitted to do, must end in the destruction of the British Interest, Trade and Plantations in American.

The need for a plan of union could be attributed to the discontent that existed among the colonies. The Indian Nations had become angry and went to war against certain colonies when private traders had cheated them by getting them drunk, debauching their women and taking advantages of them through crooked land purchases. The French had gained an early with the Indian tribes through intermarriages with daughters of tribal landers and through trading. In the opinion of Franklin and others, Great Britain was in danger of losing its influence over the Indian Nations.

By the spring of 1754 there were rumors that French troops were being moved to America and the winds of war were blowing strong. Sir William Johnson had argued the importance of Indian aid in a war with France, suggesting that the coming war might be lost without their help, or at least their neutrality. Northern political authorities had failed to secure the required pledges of assistance from the Iroquois. In some quarters, pessimists discussed the possibility of their defection to the French cause. Against this background, the London Board of Trade supported the call for an intercolonial conference on Amerindian affairs, beginning with a conference with the Six Nations. The Albany Congress of 1754, already deep in the planning stage, was as good an instrument for the establishment of this policy as any. Thomas Pownall stated that the Iroquois were now at a stage where they were forming into a nation and therefore some “stateholder,” who should be a man of great influence, should be appointed by the crown over the Iroquois.

Pownall’s paper was later forwarded to London with the proceedings of the Congress.

The Albany Congress, a meeting of most of the English colonies, was held from June 19 to July 11, 1754. It was an intercolonial conference was held at Albany, New York. Present were 23 delegates from New York, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Maryland, along with 150 members of the Iroquois Indian federation. The Albany Congress had been called by the English Board of Trade to deal with two pressing issues: grievances of the Iroquois against the colonies and the presence of hostile French forces and their Indian allies to the west of the English colonies. The Indians complained to the congress that land speculators were stealing their lands; that an illegal English-French trade was bypassing them, thus preventing them from acting as middlemen for profit; and that colonials were trading directly with other Indians supposedly under the rule of the Iroquois. Another Amerindian complaint was centered on the removal of Sir William Johnson from the management of their affairs. This had aroused a dangerous spirit of disaffection among the Indians.

The congress had to placate the Iroquois, because they were needed as allies against the French. Gifts and promises were bestowed and the alliance renewed, but the Iroquois went away only half satisfied. The Indian phase of the Albany Congress lasted June 18-29. The Indians were pleased with the presents they received but demanded more effort of the English in establishing forts along the frontier as the price for their assistance against the French. A treaty was signed, mutually renewing the ancient friendship and for the first time recognizing the independence of the Iroquois.

More serious was the French threat from the north. To meet it, the congress drew up a plan of colonial union. For the better defense of the colonies and control of Indian affairs many farsighted colonial leaders had long felt that a closer union was needed. Thus far there were only occasional meetings of colonial governors or commissioners. Discussion of such a union now became one of the principal subjects of the congress. Massachusetts had granted her delegates authority to “enter into articles of union … for the general defense of his majesty’s subjects.”

Principally written by Benjamin Franklin, the plan provided for one general government for all the colonies to manage defense and Indian affairs, pass laws, and raise taxes. The Albany Plan provided for a voluntary union of the colonies with “one general government, each colony to retain its own separate existence and government.” The chief executive was to be a president general appointed by the king of England. The legislature, or Grand Council, would consist of representatives appointed by the colonial legislatures. This federal government was given exclusive control of Indian affairs including the power to make peace and declare war, regulate Indian trade, purchase Indian lands for the crown, raise and pay soldiers, build forts, equip vessels, levy taxes and appropriate funds.

The colonists could not agree on a proportioning the cost of erecting of certain forts to guard the northern frontier. Some colonies offered no assistance and watched and waited, while others were willing to defend their own frontier and those of others. Few, in any, colonies were willing to do more than their share. It was a belief shared by many that “unless there be a united and vigorous opposition of the English colonies to them, the French were “laying a solid foundation for being, some time or other, sole masters of this continent … .” A plan of union was necessary in order to maintain the territory they currently held. Many hoped a union would come out of the conference with the Six Indian Nations at Albany that was scheduled for 14 June 1754. The opening date of this conference was delayed until 19 June 1754 so that representatives from all the colonies could be present. As it was, Virginia and New Jersey both declined to send commissioners.

It was on 24 June 1754 that the Albany Congress voted that a committee consisting of one representative of each of the colonial delegations be selected “to prepare and receive Plans or Schemes for the Union of the Colonies, and to digest them into one general plan for the inspection of this Board.” The result was a “Plan of a proposed Union of the several Colonies of Massachusetts Bay, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jerseys, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, for their mutual defence and security, and for extending the British Settlements in North America, ” the precise title of the Albany Plan of Union.

Franklin’s memoirs indicated that there were several people who read his various pamphlets, drafts and proposals before the Albany Congress began.

Among these was doubtless his colleague, Proprietorial Secretary of Pennsylvania Richard Peters, who had earlier prepared a scheme which carried the title “A Plan for a General Union of the British Colonies of North America.” This provided for the organization of a “Union regiment” to be formed by the contribution of a company of one hundred men from each colony, to be supported by colonial excise taxes and commanded by officers appointed by the Crown; according to this project, likewise, there was to be not only a “Union Fund” but also a “Fort Fund”; it also visualized the grouping of the continental colonies into four unions for defensive purposes, based upon geographical and other considerations. In searching for light on other union proposals available for the Committee one must omit, it would seem, that by Thomas Pownall, who was not a commissioner and who only at the last session of the Congress submitted his “Considerations toward a General Plan of Measures for the Colonies.”

There remain to be considered two surviving plans of union that are so closely related that they may be considered as essentially one. That is, one is clearly an amended form of the other. The first is entitled “Plan of a proposed Union of the several Colonies of Massachusetts-Bay, New Hampshire, Connecti cut, Rhode-Island, New York & New Jersey, for their mutual Defence, & Security, & for extending the British Settlements Northward & Westward of Said Colonies in North-America.” It proposed that the colonies ask Parliament for enabling legislation, allowing the colonies to proceed with the plan. The president-general would serve simultaneously as governor of Massachusetts and would be com mander of all troops under the council’s control; and in case of his death the lieutenant-governor of the same colony would serve. There would be a treasurer to handle the organization’s finances. The principal duty of the popularly elected council would regulation of the Indian trade and the negotiation of war, peace and treaties with the Amerindian tribes; and negotiate with the natives for all land purchases made beyond the boundaries of the thirteen colonies. Council would also offer protection to all new settlements until they were brought under some more appropriate government. Each colony would retain its own militia and have exclusive power to order it within the colony.

The second is the “Plan of a Proposed Union of The Several Colonies of Massachusetts-Bay, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, & New York, for their Mutual Defence & Security & for extending the British Settlements Northward & Westward of Said Colonys in North America.” Outside of inconsequential differences in a clause or two, capitalization and spelling, the principal differences that distinguishes the two plans is that in the first, New Jersey is included in the amendment of the text, and in the second, it is excluded.

Unfortunately, one cannot be certain whether these two plans for a union of northern continental colonies existed at the time that the Committee on a Union was appointed. Thus, one does not know if either or both of these proposals was laid before the Albany Congress. The only sure and certain thing that can be said is that Franklin’s “Short Hints” was written well before the Congress.

By June 28 the Congress arrived at its first decision. It favored the Franklin project of union as a basis for the final scheme. Therefore, in reporting to the Congress, the Committee “presented short hints of a scheme for that purpose of which copies were taken by the Commissioners of the respective Provinces.”

On June 29, according to the Journal of the proceedings of the Congress, “The details of a scheme for the Union of the Colonies were debated on, but came to no conclusion.”

Peters presented a plan that was totally ignored by the Congress and, thus, is not connected with its final proposals on a union. The two plans for a union of northern continental colonies have a most important relation to the adopted Albany Plan. In language and structure they are identical with it. There are two possibilities. One is that these two plans were drafted in the course of the proceedings of the work of the Committee on Colonial Union, or after its termination, and were a by-product, of the logical expansion by Franklin of his “Short Hints” in the direction of the finished Albany Union Plan finally adopted by the Congress. The other possibility is that at least one, and possibility both, of the plans existed prior to the time that the Committee began its work. Thus, at least one of the plans had to be digested by the group in welding various union proposals into a final harmonious scheme.

There were perhaps other plans prepared for the attention of the Committee, but of these we have no knowledge. No mention was made in the Journal of the Congress of other plans of union that were considered by the Committee. The traditional view is that Benjamin Franklin, acting alone, was the master architect of the Albany Plan. After the Congress commenced works only a very few modifications in it were required, and these were the result of discussions in Committee. Some delegates may have carried in suggestions or requirements from their respective colonies. Franklin, for his part, at no time stated that the Albany Plan was really a composite thing, and seemed to imply that the Plan was entirely his own. Such modifications as the delegates offered at the Congress were made against Franklin’s better judgment. Writing to his New York friend Cadwallader Colden on 14 July 1754, at the close of the Congress, Franklin bragged, “The Commissioners agreed on a Plan of Union of 11 Colonies … the same with that of which I sent you the Hints, some few Particulars excepted.”

In a letter to Peter Collinson, dated 29 December, Franklin enclosed a copy of the famous “Motives,” which he had drawn up in support of the Albany Plan, and with reference to the latter stated, “For tho’ I projected the Plan and drew it, I was oblig’d to alter some Things contrary to my Judgment or should never have been able to carry it through.” Again in that part of his Autobiography, written as late as 1788, he referred to his own contribution to the Albany Congress. “A Committee was then appointed, one member, from each colony, to consider the several plans and report. Mine happen’d to be preferr’d, and, with a few Amendments, was accordingly reported.”

Thomas Hutchinson reinforced Franklin’s own testimony. Writing many years later in his Diary about the work of the Congress, the Massachusetts Bay delegate said Franklin had prepared the text long before he had any contact with Hutchinson. In his History of Massachusetts, Hutchinson summarized “the capital parts of the plan.” He wrote, “The plan for a general union was projected by Benjamin Franklin, Esq., one of the Commissioners from the province of Pensilvania, the heads where of he brought with him.”

Whatever other plans of union may have survived, they were but a projection either of the final draft of the “Short Hints” or at least of an intermediate draft made by Franklin. Jared Sparks’ edition of Franklin’s work contained a document which referred to the introduction of a plan of union designed to encompass only the colonies lying north of Pennsylvania. “Another plan was proposed in the Convention, which included only New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York and New Jersey … . ” Franklin in an early redraft of the “Short Hints,” issued before Albany Congress, suggested the idea of a general union of all the continental colonies but Nova Scotia and Georgia.

The Congress on 24 June created a committee to study the various proposals and to formulate one of its own, if it chose to do so. The committee was composed of Thomas Hutchinson of Massachusetts; Theodore Atkinson of New Hampshire; William Pitkin of Connecticut; Stephen Hopkins of Rhode Island; William Smith of New York; Benjamin Tasker of Maryland; and Franklin for Pennsylvania. Franklin noted that, in addition to his own plan, “several of the commissioners had form’d plans of the same kind … . A committee was then appointed … to consider the several plans and report.” The Journal of the Congress clearly shows that when the Albany Congress voted to create a committee “to prepare and receive Plans or Schemes for the Union of the Colonies, and to digest them into one general plan for the inspection of this Board.”

Up until the evening of 29 June the Commissioners as a body engaged only in discussing the merits of the original Franklin plan. The Journal records for the afternoon of that day that, “The hints of a scheme for the Union of the Colonies were debated on, but came to no conclusion.” The copies of “the short hints of a scheme,” distributed the afternoon of the preceding day, still had the attention of the Congress. The Committee on the Union had as its single duty preparing a unified draft of union. On 1 July the Congress determined to call upon the committee to prepare a second document, known as, “a representation of the present state of the Colonies.” It then began to study “The Plan of Union of the Colonies, which, although debated, “the Board came to no resolves upon it.”

One may be reasonably sure that if the two plans providing simply for a union of the more northern colonies stemmed, in language and form, from the Franklin drafting process, they must have come into existence sometime after July 1 and also after the debates that had already taken place in the Congress on June 29 and on July 1. Franklin either at Albany or soon after leaving that city, drew up the “Reasons and Motives on Which the Plan of Union was Formed.” In the section entitled “Reasons against Partial Unions,” Franklin wrote, “It was proposed by some of the Commissioners to form the colonies into two or three distinct unions; but for these reasons [that is, those thereupon given which are six in number] that proposal was dropped even by those who made it … .”

The Plan of Union proposed at Albany in 1754 was an attempt to confront two related problems. The first was the need for joint, united action by the colonies, not only in times of war but as a matter of normal political practice. The second was the need Franklin and the delegates to the Congress perceived to insert a third governmental entity between the individual colonies and the British government. The plan would have created the first American government. But the delegates to the conference in Albany did not have the power to adopt the Plan of Union, but only to propose it, both to Parliament and to each of the colonial governments. In the end, not a single colonial government approved of the scheme.

The Albany Plan

The great plan for military union combined with a scheme to cooperate on Amerindian policy was drawn up largely by Benjamin Franklin and considered at the conference held at Albany, New York, between 19 June and 10 July 1754. The home government had advised the colonists that it preferred to have a new treaty concluded between the Iroquois Federation and the colonies in New England, New York, Maryland and Pennsylvania. Franklin’s plan had been completed before 17

March and was formally laid before the delegates of the several states on 24 June.

It is likely that Thomas Hutchinson, representing Massachusetts, had corresponded extensively with Franklin and had suggested some changes in Franklin’s original draft. As presented, only Nova Scotia and Georgia were excluded from the union.

The full text of Franklin’s Plan of Union appears below.

It is proposed that humble application be made for an act of Parliament of Great Britain, by virtue of which one general government may be formed in America, including all the said colonies, within and under which government each colony may retain its present constitution, except in the particulars wherein a change may be directed by the said act, as hereafter follows.

That the said general government be administered by a President-General, to be appointed and supported by the crown; and a Grand Council, to be chosen by the representatives of the people of the several Colonies met in their respective assemblies.

That within [–] months after the passing such act, the House of Representatives that happen to be sitting within that time, or that shall be especially for that purpose convened, may and shall choose members for the Grand Council, in the following proportion, that is to say,

Massachusetts Bay 7

New Hampshire 2

Connecticut 5

Rhode Island 2

New York 4

New Jersey 3

Pennsylvania 6

Maryland 4

Virginia 7

North Carolina 4

South Carolina 4

Total 48

[3.] -who shall meet for the first time at the city of Philadelphia, being called by the President-General as soon as conveniently may be after his appointment.

[4.] That there shall be a new election of the members of the Grand Council every three years; and, on the death or
resignation of any member, his place should be supplied by a new choice at the next sitting of the Assembly of the Colony he represented.

[5.] That after the first three years, when the proportion of money arising out of each Colony to the general treasury can
be known, the number of members to be chosen for each Colony shall, from time to time, in all ensuing elections, be regulated by that proportion, yet so as that the number to be chosen by any one Province be not more than seven, nor less than two.

[6.] That the Grand Council shall meet once in every year, and oftener if occasion require, at such time and place as they shall adjourn to at the last preceding meeting, or as they shall be called to meet at by the President-General on any emergency; he having first obtained in writing the consent of seven of the members to such call, and sent duly and timely notice to the whole.

[7.] That the Grand Council have power to choose their speaker; and shall neither be dissolved, prorogued, nor continued sitting longer than six weeks at one time, without their own consent or the special command of the crown.

[8.] That the members of the Grand Council shall be allowed for their service 10 shillings per diem, during their session and journey to and from the place of meeting; 20 miles to be reckoned a day’s journey.

[9.] That the assent of the President-General be requisite to all acts of the Grand Council, and that it be his office and duty to cause them to be carried into execution.

[10.] That the President-General, with the advice of the Grand Council, hold or direct all Indian treaties, in which the general interest of the Colonies may be concerned; and make peace or declare war with Indian nations.

[11.] That they make such laws as they judge necessary for regulating all Indian trade.

[12.] That they make all purchases from Indians, for the crown, of lands not now within the bounds of particular Colonies, or that shall not be within their bounds when some of them are reduced to more convenient dimensions.

[13.] That they make new settlements on such purchases, by granting lands in the King’s name, reserving a quitrent to the crown for the use of the general treasury.

[14.] That they make laws for regulating and governing such new settlements, till the crown shall think fit to form them into particular governments.

[15.] That they raise and pay soldiers and build forts for the defence of any of the Colonies, and equip vessels of force to guard the coasts and protect the trade on the ocean, lakes, or great rivers; but they shall not impress men in any Colony, without the consent of the Legislature.

[16.] That for these purposes they have power to make laws, and lay and levy such general duties, imposts, or taxes as to them shall appear most equal and just (considering the ability and other circumstances of the inhabitants in the several Colonies), and such as may be collected with the least inconvenience to the people; rather discouraging luxury, than loading industry with unnecessary burdens.

[17.] That they may appoint a General Treasurer and Particular Treasurer in each government when necessary; and, from time to time, may order the sums in the treasuries of each government into the general treasury; or draw on them for special payments, as they find most convenient.

[18.] Yet no money to issue but by joint orders of the President-General and Grand Council; except where sums have been appropriated to particular purposes, and the President-General is previously empowered by an act to draw such sums. [19.] That the general accounts shall be yearly settled and reported to the several Assemblies.

[20.] That a quorum of the Grand Council, empowered to act with the President-General, do consist of twenty-five members; among whom there shall be one or more from a majority of the Colonies.

[21.] That the laws made by them for the purposes aforesaid shall not be repugnant, but, as near as may be, agreeable to the laws of England, and shall be transmitted to the King in Council for approbation, as soon as may be after their passing; and if not disapproved within three years after presentation, to remain in force.

[22.] That, in the case of the death of the President-General, the Speaker of the Grand Council for the time being shall succeed, and be vested with the same powers and authorities, to continue till the King’s pleasure be known.

[23.] That all military commission officers, whether for land or sea service, to act under this general constitution, shall be nominated by the President-General; but the approbation of the Grand Council is to be obtained, before they receive their commissions. And all civil officers to be nominated by the Grand Council, and to receive the President-General’s approbation before they officiate.

[24.] But, in case of vacancy by death or removal of any officer, civil or military, under this constitution, the Governor of the Province in which such vacancy happens may appoint, till the pleasure of the President-General and Grand Council can be known.

[25.] That the particular military as well as civil establishments in each Colony remain in their present state, the general constitution notwithstanding; and that on sudden emergencies any Colony may defend itself, and lay the accounts of expense.

The proposals by certain of the Commissioners in favor of partial unions could have been made late in the proceedings of the Congress. At least one delegation came to Albany very definitely committed to the idea of two unions rather than one. The delegation of Massachusetts Bay, reporting to the Governor’s Council on October 25, 1754, after their return to the Province, noted that, Your Commissioners were in doubt, whether it might not be convenient that the colonies should be divided into at least two Districts, as the great distance of the two Extream parts of his Majesty’s Governments from each other, must render it always very burthensome to some or other of the members to give their attendance, be the place of meeting where it will and in a Government of so large an extent there will be danger of some parts being neglected or unequally considered; but as the designs of the French may probably require the united strength & Councils of the whole British Continent and as it seems to be of the last importance that all affairs Which relate to the Indians should be under but one direction, and considered without any special regard to any particular Government we were induced to prefer the present plan [that is, the Albany Plan of Union].

The scheme of union designed to include only New Jersey, New York, and New England carried with it a proposal for another union to include all the southern colonies with the exception of Georgia. It carried a second proposal, “That in the said General Union, The Ordering & Direction of the Affairs Yr of [thereof be administered by one President General, who shall be The Governour of The Province of the Massachusetts-Bay for The Time being, and a Grand Council to be chosen by the Representatives of the People of the Said Colonies met in their respective Assemblies.” It would appear that the Commissioners from Massachusetts Bay were particularly interested in establishing a connection between the chief executive of the partial union and that of the Province. New York, Attorney General William Smith, a member of the Governor’s Council, who attended the Albany Congress, reported to Governor DeLancey, “that Massachu setts acted with an aim to procure the President’s chair for their Governor, and predicted, as he well might, that it would not be much encouraged by New-York.”

The only colony that was definitely clearly to the formation of a colonial union was Massachusetts Bay. The Assembly of the Province specifically called upon its Commissioners to work for “a general, firm & perpetual union &
confederacy, for mutual assistance by men or money or both, in peace & in War.”

And the provincial legislature dispatched the delegation from Massachusetts Bay to Albany with a definite, inflexible agenda. In reviving a form of the old New England Confederation in the project of military union, Massachusetts so designed it as to include not only all of the New England colonies but the two rather weak colonies of New York and New Jersey. This act had the effect of redrawing the geographical limits of the old Dominion of New England. There were advantages to be gained by all the colonies by inclusion. In particular, New York would acquire the more than ample resources of men and money of the populous and highly prosperous colonies to its north and east. This would enable New York to defend its exposed frontiers. By showing such mutual advantage, Massachusetts hoped to overcome any natural reluctance of any one of them toward union.

Although the Massachusetts Bay delegation came with a carefully formulated plan, any plan that it brought was doubtless modified, at least in details, after the author of it had obtained access to the Franklin “Short Hints,” particularly with respect to the name of the Council. The union of the northern colonies was to be especially designed to add to the prestige of that Province. The other delegations thwarted those designs by voicing strong opposition to it. This would seem to identify the commissioners of the Massachusetts Bay with the “Plan of a proposed Union of the several Colonies of Massachusetts-Bay, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode-Island, New York & New Jersey, for their mutual Defence, &

Security, & for extending the British Settlements Northward & Westward of said Colonies in North-America,” which set forth the very ideas that the Massachusetts Bay delegation stood for.

This plan of union has been traditionally connected to Massachusetts Commissioner Thomas Hutchinson. On the last page of the manuscript copy of this plan among the Trumbull Papers in the Connecticut State Library is penned on the margin the notation in a hasty scrawl: “plan of Union opposed N. I.” The governor of Massachusetts Bay attempted to create a project of union that Connecticut might be counted on to support. If and when that goal was attained, he may well have presented this revision of the revised New England plan for the consideration of the Committee of the Congress.

The other scheme, the “Plan of a proposed Union of The Several Colonies of Massachusetts-Bay, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, & New York, for their Mutual Defence & Security & for extending the British Settlements Northward & Westward of Said Colonys in North America” would seem to represent a revision of the former unamended “Plan” by some delegate or delegates from one of the colonies other than Massachusetts Bay. It was probably also prepared after the Commissioners of the latter had arrived in Albany and had perhaps distributed their proposal. In any event, the Province of Massachusetts Bay was the only colony in the spring of 1754 definitely committed by its Assembly to the idea of a colonial union, and the only colony that instructed the delegates to work for a permanent union or confederation.

The second more limited plan of union, embracing but New England and New York, shows hostility to the idea of combining automatically the office of Governor of Massachusetts Bay with that of President General of the Union.

Instead, it provided, “That The Said General Government be administered by one President General to be Chosen & Appointed by a Grand Council to be Chosen by the Representatives of The people of The Said Several Colonies met in their Respective Assemblies… ” The Grand Council shall first meet, at such a time as shall be indicated by “The Governor of Boston,” who would preside and “Lead The Members of The Grand Council To the Choice of a President General.” The similarities include proportional representation on the Council, the payment of its members, its powers to make western settlements, as well as those that it would possess for raising and paying soldiers. The name of the legislature employed in all three of the plans is the “Grand Council.” This plan made no reference whatsoever to any plan of union for the southern colonies. The connection between the two plans is obvious; as is the connection of the two plans with the final draft of the Albany Plan; or, if not, that Franklin had prior access to the former plan before he completed his “Short Hints.” As Professor Gipson pointed out, the surviving copy of the New England plan in the handwriting of Jonathan Trumbull (or Trumble) appears to show the influence of Franklin’s “Short Hints.”

So also does the second New England plan, which was also in Trumbull’s handwriting, and it was rather clearly based upon the first document. The plan for a northern union was worked out independently before the Congress convened was modified, probably after it was brought to Albany and before the second New England plan took shape. However, the surviving amended copy of what was the original shows that, in the drafting of the latter, the authors lavished much care on the details of the proposals. That would fit in within the Gipson’s theory that the person responsible for the original draft and other members of the Massachusetts Bay delegation took their assignment from the Assembly seriously.

On July 2 the committee again considered and, after some debate, “the question was then put, whether the Board should proceed to form a plan of union of the Colonies to be established by Act of Parliament which passed in the affirmative.” Again on 4 July, the “Plan for a Union” was the subject of deliberations,” but no resolves were made thereupon.” On the following day debate continued without resolution. Other matters then diverted the attention of the Congress away from the plan for union. The matter was not again debated until the eighth. On the ninth the delegates agreed upon the plan in principle,” and Mr.

Franklin was desired to make a draught of it as now concluded upon.” On the day following the Congress approved the particulars by accepted the committee draft without significant debate or change. To what extent the project was modified at any stage after Franklin had redrafted is unknown. At some point the “Short Hints towards a Scheme for Uniting the Northern Colonies” disappeared in favor of the short title, “Plan of Union.” However, a formal and much longer title emerged at some point. It was correctly called “A Plan of a proposed Union of the several Colonies of Massachusetts Bay, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, for their mutual defence and security, and for extending the British Settlements in North America.”

The final Albany Plan of Union may be accurately described as a composite plan, perhaps even a bundle on compromises. In the “Short Hints”

Franklin favored a single union for all the colonies on the continent not under the special protection from the King. This union, to be perfectly legal, should rest on nothing less than an act of Parliament. It should also be made clear and put in legal language that this was an essentially permanent league, unlike the earlier New England associations. In his opinion the colonies ought not to be allowed to join or leave at will. A conservative and a loyalist during this period, Franklin believed in the concept of empire. Moreover, he conceived of the union being strengthened if by the Crown approved the appointment of its executive head. He also believed he was showing his loyalty by the giving of this executive, as the king’s agent, the right of veto. Once the congress adjourned, the commissioners were left with the task of presenting the proposed plan to their respective assemblies. The delegates at the Albany Congress could not agree unanimously on the content of the program.

Franklin did not neglect the powers of the council. He created a powerful union legislative council that would possess the authority to tax and control an independent treasury. This was a most important point since it would give the union the resources to wage war without having to beg funds from the often reluctant and notoriously niggardly provincial legislatures. The appointment of a union treasurer for each colony in addition to a general union treasurer-therefore providing for a complete fiscal union system provided fiscal responsibility. The plan also provided for an annual settlement of the accounts of the Union government with the provincial assemblies. He gave the council great powers to levy directly upon the property of citizens of the colonies, and to possess its own armed forces, forts, and a navy. His union would also promote western settlement.

He considered all of these features to be so fundamental and vital in nature that they were indispensable. Franklin had good reason to show pride for all his major original proposals had survived debate and had become the foundation of the Albany Plan of Union.

The most eloquent statement which sums up the work of the Albany Congress and its two principals was provided by Professor Frothingham. In reference to the Albany Congress, he wrote that, “two political schools were about equally represented in the committee … . In Hutchinson it was the vision of a clear intellect distrusting the capacity and intelligence of the people. In Franklin, it was the insight of a philosopher … determined to labor for the liberties of his Country.”

The Albany Plan was rejected or simply not acted upon by the colonies.

This plan for colonial union failed because of opposition from both the king and the colonies. Each party thought it granted the other too much power. The home government disapproved this plan because it was felt that it encroached on the royal prerogative. The colonies disapproved of it because it did not allow them sufficient independence. It was, nonetheless, a farsighted document which contained solutions that the colonies would draw upon in forming a union after independence was declared in 1776. It paved the way for the Stamp Act Congress of 1765 and for the Continental Congress of 1774. And when, during the troubled days which followed, the need of a closer union was felt, there was a definite plan to serve as a guide in the deliberations of the representatives of the colonies.

The New Jersey Assembly and Connecticut showed antipathy toward the Albany Plan. Ultimately, the plan received unanimous rejection in the assemblies of Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts Bay. Finally, Connecticut emphatically rejected the proposed plan. The Connecticut commissioners “objected to the proposed plan; and thought they were never answered or obviated.

Therefore [they] never came into or gave consent to same.”

Connecticut set up a committee to review the plan. Some of the colony’s objections had a royalist slant, that “his Majesty’s interest is in great danger.” The report continued, “His Majesty’s subjects … are a very great body … . This power and strength being brought into one point … may in time be of dangerous consequence to his Majesty’s interest.” The committee also objected to granting the power to the council to appoint officers, noting that traditionally “our officers generally are chosen out of the best yeomen” of each colony. Because there were such officers “thus chosen and commissioned, freeholders’ sons, the youth of the colony, have on all occasions, with great cheerfulness and alacrity, generally enlisted.” Their motives had been altruistic. “Their country’s good, not necessity, has led them to arms.” They viewed the plan as a scheme to allow Americans to be sent abroad and under that condition “such youths would not enlist.” Upon review, the committee rejected the plan, claiming it would “weaken and injure his Majesty’s interests,” and they found it “subversive of the just rights and privileges of his good and faithful subjects.” The committee charged that the plan encom passed too great an area, an argument that would appear later among anti-federalists in opposition to the federal Constitution of 1787. “We think it impracticable that his Majesty’s interest, and the good of his people, inhabiting so great a country, can, in any advantageous or tolerable manner, be considered.” The committee also disliked the idea of granting the power to tax to the council. The Assembly accepted the report, adding nothing substantial to the reasoning offered by the committees.

Despite a speech by Governor Belcher to New Jersey’s Assembly urging the need for a plan of Union, the Assembly rejected the Plan claiming “if carried into Practice, would affect our Constitution in its very vitals… .” If nothing else, all the Assemblies did seem to agree on one matter, that being the rejection of the Plan.

Many colonists also had grave reservations about adopting the plan of unity as proposed. One such colonist was Dr. William Clarke of Boston who was so outraged by what was produced by the Albany Congress that he had to write to Benjamin Franklin, ” … you and the rest of the commissioners at Albany have shown yourselves, by the projected plan for an union, to be arrogant blockheads .

…”

The position of New Jersey was one of disinterest, as stated by the Speaker of the Assembly. “This Colony bath not ever had anything to do with Indian Affairs out of its own limits, neither been partakers of the Benefit of their Trade.” However, he promised, with or without any formal military alliance, if any Amerindian tribes “should make war upon any of our Neighbouring Colonies, this House will, as they have hitherto done, exert themselves to the utmost of their Abilities to assist His Majesty and his Subjects against their enemies.”

The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations rejected it claiming it was too democratic, thus withholding it from the king. The Lords may have been moved by another motivation. In a letter written by William Bollan, an agent from Massachusetts Bay Colony, to the Secretary of Massachusetts, Bollan wrote that it was intended, “by some persons of consequence, that the colonies should be governed like Ireland, keeping up a body of standing forces, with a military chest there … so as to put them on the same foot that Ireland stands by Poyning’s act .

. ., No act in Ireland can pass in their parliament there till it first be assented to by the king and privy council of England … .”

Among its supporters there was some initial optimism that the plan would be superimposed by Great Britain. Charles Thomson of Pennsylvania wrote concerning news of deliberation on the plan in England, “tis thought will soon be brought to bear, an event much to be desired, since it effectually will secure us from the insults of our haughty aspiring neighbors, the French, and make our security independent of the fickle humor of our Indian allies.

Franklin had several observations or the reasons for the failure of the plan and the consequences of that failure.

On Reflection it now seems probable, that if the foregoing Plan or something like it had been adopted and carried into Execution, the subsequent Seperation of the Colonies from the Mother Country might not so soon have happened, nor the Mischiefs suffered on both sides have occured perhaps during another Century. For the Colonies, if so united, would have really been, as they then thought themselves, sufficient to their own Defence, and being trusted with it, as by the Plan, an Army from Britain, for that purpose would have been unnecessary; The Pretences for framing the Stamp-Act would then not have existed, nor the other Projects for drawing a Revenue from America to Britain by Act of Parliament, which were the Cause of the Breach & attended with such terrible Expense of Blood and Treasure; so that the different Parts of the Empire might still have remained in Peace and Union. But the Fate of this Plan was singular. For then after many Days thorough Discussion of all its Parts in Congress it was unanimously agreed to, and Copies ordered to be sent to the Assembly of each Province for Concurrence, and one to the Ministry in England for the Approbation of the Crown. The Crown disapproved it, as having placed too much Weight in the Democratic Part of the Constitution; and every Assembly as having allowed too much to Prerogative. So it was totally rejected.

During the early years of the French and Indian War, attempts at establishing colonial unity were frustrated by the existence of a series of overlapping commands. The British government named Governor Clinton of New York Captain-General and Commander in Chief of the militia, and all the forces by sea and land, within the Colony of Connecticut, and of all the forts and places of strength within the same.” The government in the spring of 1754 appointed Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant Governor of Virginia to command the colonial operations against the French in the Ohio Valley. The other northern colonies ignored his requests for contributions in mere, money and material, to serve under “my Gen’l Officer.” The Earl of Holderness ordered two independent companies from New York to serve in Dinwiddie’s command. The two New York companies and a contingent of North Carolina militia arrived too late to be of help in Washington’s initial encounter with the French. A militia company from South Carolina appeared, but its commander, a Captain Mackay, who held a royal commission, refused to take orders from a provincial colonel. Washington had little choice but to assigned the South Carolina troops to guard the stores in the rear.

With war with France still a matter of skirmishes and intrigues, but not as yet formally declared, the English government had to decide whether to send material and men to the colonists. The French might easily construe such support as an act of war. In the latter part of September 1754, the British cabinet decided to risk the displeasure of the French and move boldly. It resolved to bolster their American defenses. Major General Edward Braddock, a friend of the Duke of Cumberland, brought two Irish regiments to America. In addition, Shirley and Pepperrell were each to raise and command a regiment, with the crown bearing the expense.

In 1754 the crown had appointed Maryland Governor Horatio Sharpe to serve as commander in chief of the combined militia forces, with the assignment to renew the attack against the French. Sharpe apparently owed his appointment to certain members of the British cabinet, namely, the Duke of Newcastle, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, and the Earl of Holderness. Governor Sharpe’s appointment as commander in chief was a matter of paper command, with no real powers accruing to him, and even those paper powers were short lived. The home government ordered the other colonial governors to correspond directly with Shirley and Pepperrell “upon every thing, relative to the Present Service.” On January 12, 1755, Braddock superseded Governor Sharp. Braddock commanded that all colonial troops in service be placed under the revised Mutiny Bill, making them liable to the same martial law and discipline, as the British Forces were.

Although Braddock was commander in chief, in a sense there were two chief commanders, for William Shirley continued to organize the military force for the northern colonies. As nominal northern commander, Shirley had made advance plans for a concerted attack on the various French outposts. He exercised his authority by promoting William Johnson to the rank of major general and giving him the supreme command of the force he was then raising. Johnson had command of the militias of Massachusetts, New York, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Rhode Island “For an Expedition against the French Incroachments at crown point and upon the Lake Champlain.” For his part, Braddock confirmed Shirley’s orders without disputing his authority.

Braddock’s appointment had established the precedent of appointing a regular army officer of general rank to the overall command of all the military forces in the colonies. General officers as commanders-in-chief would continue until the Revolution. The powers of the commander in chief steadily encroached upon the governors’ military powers within their own provinces. The British commanders-in-chief usually regarded the governors as a liaison officers between himself and the various provincial assemblies. The commander-in-chief answered only to the home government. Hereafter, the colonial governors did not have military powers separate from the provincial councils.

The Newcastle ministry, undermined and disheartened by the unexpected defeat of Braddock at the Battle of the Wilderness, decided in January 1756 to try once again to create a more unified military command. The Duke of Cumberland, with the full support of other powerful Lords, recommended John Campbell, the fourth Earl of Loudoun to be commander-in-chief for the military forces in America. As commander-in-chief of all forces employed, or to be employed, in North America, Loudoun could command the assistance of all colonial governors and militia.

William Shirley, upon the death of Braddock, was de facto commander-in-chief of the royal and colonial forces. But Shirley had long had to contend with the opposition organized by Lieutenant-governor James De Lancey, the latter’s brother Oliver DeLancey and Thomas Pownall. These men, and perhaps others, made a maximum effort to have the Massachusetts Governor recalled. A sudden and wholly unexpected turn of events seemed to justify their criticism.

Royal intelligence intercepted some letters written by someone in Pennsylvania under the pen-name of Pierre Fidele to the Duc de Mirepoix in France. These letters revealed Shirley’s supposedly secret instructions dealing with military and Indian affairs. Some questioned Shirley’s judgment, even his loyalty. Besides, he had a French wife. The Newcastle ministry had no choice but to replace Shirley as commander-in-chief without delay. Since Loudoun was delayed in his departure for America, the ministry sent General Daniel Webb and General James Abercromby to assume immediate command. For a few weeks Webb was acting commander-in-chief. Abercromby soon arrived and, as Webb’s superior, assumed command. Loudoun did not reach New York until July 1756, at which time he assumed command as initially planned. In less than two months Americans had three commanders-in-chief.

The whole system of provincial military command seemed to be on the verge of collapse. Shirley continued briefly in the governorship and used his efforts to raise troops from the New England colonies for an expedition against Crown Point, making these available for General Abercromby. Shirley also offered the opinion that troops raised in the Jersies and North Carolina could be deployed anywhere in America at the discretion of the commander-in-chief. The Royal Americans replaced Shirley’s and Pepperrell’s regiments.

Loudoun soon experienced difficulties in dealing with the colonial authorities. The cabinet issued special orders that no provincial officer should rank higher than a senior captain in the regular army. This meant that the various well-known and popular colonial officers, such as William Johnson, John Bradstreet, George Washington, would be out-ranked by mere captains. Virginia protested that her troops were considered as “Irregulars” and that provincial troops should be “regularly enlisted.” Massachusetts refused to cooperate with Loudoun on grounds that military powers of the colony derived from the governor’s prerogative bestowed by the crown. Loudoun complained that a Massachusetts council of war took it upon itself to direct “the Motions of his Majesty’s Troops.”

Loudoun soon incurred the enmity of both colonial governors and populace. He threatened to force the colonial legislatures to keep up pay for the troops. His policies of quartering his troops in Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts created popular resentment. Worst of all, he was a losing general. The French captured Fort William Henry on 9 August 1757, with the loss of 1400 men. He delayed the attack on the important French position at Louisbourg, giving as an excuse that his preparations were incomplete. Loudoun, censured and recalled, left America in disgrace.

The Pitt ministry decided to create a more unified system of military command for the colonies. All provincial officers were elevated in rank so that their ranks corresponded to officers in the regular army. England would provide the colonies with sufficient munitions of war. Pitt promised that his ministry would recommend that Parliament reimburse the colonies for their supplies of men, clothes, and material. In short, the home government pledged to pay for a renewed war effort. The ministry appointed Major General James Abercromby, over the preference of Pitt, to succeed Loudoun as commander-in-chief. At the same time Brigadier-general John Forbes was named commander of the Southern District, which included Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland and the Carolinas. Forbes was to cooperate with Abercromby and coordinate his campaign against the French in the west with the commander-in-chief. The colonists seemed to be reluctant to recognize him as the supreme commander of the militias. In July 1758, Abercromby led an attack on Fort Ticonderoga. His frontal attack failed and Abercromby suffered over 1500 casualties, including 464 killed. As a result of the catastrophe, the cabinet recalled Abercromby to England, and appointed Sir Jeffrey Amherst to succeed him. Simultaneously, Pitt directed the colonial governors to work closely with the new commander-in-chief. Because of the Indian crises in the south, Amherst dispatched Brigadier General Monckton with 1300 troops to South Carolina. Pitt himself took command over the general direction and strategy of the colonial military campaign. Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania refused to place their militia under Amherst’s command. Ignoring the upstart colonials, Pitt decided to win the war with British troops alone. At the end of the war, the home government promoted Amherst and chose Major-general Thomas Gage to succeed Amherst.

The home government decided to retain the new military organization indefinitely along with the office of supreme commander. In peacetime the principal concern was regulation of the Indian trade. The general in command was to have practically unlimited powers in Indian affairs. For decades the Amerindians had urged the British authorities to regulate the trade and license the traders. The commander-in-chief was authorized to supervise the Indian agents and commissaries and control and audit all expenditures. The military establishment which the cabinet created in 1763 removed to a significant degree the competition among rival and competing centers of power in the field of military affairs.

Beginning in October 1768, a series of reports on real and alleged British outrages committed in Boston began to appear in the New York Journal and the Pennsylvania Chronicle, and eventually, in Boston Evening Post, and finally, in pamphlet form under the title of The Journal of the Times. The authorship is unknown, but among those believed to have been collaborators were Benjamin Edes, publisher of the Boston Evening Post; Henry Knox, later a general in continental service, then proprietor of a bookstore; Sam Adams, a radical patriot; William Cooper, town clerk of Boston; William Greenleaf, an employee of Edes; and Isaiah Thomas, later publisher of the Massachusetts Spy. The unknown authors advocated a union of the colonies as a way to avoid what many already thought was an inevitable war for independence. The first reason for a union was “the safety of the colonies.” They admitted that “the right of taxation is the cause of the present controversy among them” with the colonies refusing to concede that power to Parliament. The anonymous authors charged that the Parliament demanded the power to tax specifically to “avoid” this “point of union.” The British had decided to station, then quarter, troops in Boston to “change the sentiments of the people” with special reference to those “sentiments” which “were considered as strongly leading to such a union.”

Provincials and Regulars

British officers had little, if any, regard for their provincial brethren, although many other foreign observers had nothing but the highest regard for the American militias. The English could counter that the others did not have to work with the provincials, but if they did, their opinions would change dramatically. The British officers in North America almost universally regarded Americans as cowards who were ill-disciplined, given to following individual preferences over the good of the whole body, and more interested in enforcing their supposed legal rights than in carrying out their obligations to the Crown.

A German professor contradicted the prevailing British view of the New England militia. “The provinces have their own militia, maintained at their own cost … . New England has the largest and best body of militia.” One of the few sympathetic British officers noted the skill with which the New England militiamen handled their firearms. “Some Lads about 13, 14 and 15 years old … can shoot a Bird flying with any man in this Province. This adds to the Martial Spirit which seems to run through the whole of the country people.” He judged that many of these young sharpshooters would willingly join in an expedition against the French and their Amerindian allies. A Boston correspondent of the Public Advertiser boasted that four thousand Massachusetts militia marched on Crown Point; two thousand prepared to attack Fort Niagara; and that twenty thousand more militiamen were available to defend the continent against the designs of the French.

“This is a right martial spirit and seems to run through the whole of their country people.”

Sadly, most British observers generally found exactly the opposite to be true. Some argued that the militia spent too much time in training days at leisure and too little time learning military tactics and marksmanship. Orderly books of the period often show that British officers often remarked on their gross ignorance of basic maneuvers and their lack of comprehension of basic commands. When ordered to perform certain functions that the British army considered basic and fundamental to any army, the provincials responded that they could not follow the orders because they did not understand what was required of them.

One issue that divided colonial militias from their professional British brethren concerned the ranks granted to provincial officers. British Rules and Articles of War stipulated that when any provincial militia served with British regular troops, colonial officers regardless of grade, were subordinate to their British counterparts. Superior colonial officers were, at best, regarded as senior captains when serving with British troops. Hence a colonel, even a general, in the provincial militia was inferior in rank and command to the most junior major in the British army. In order for this rearrangement of rank to occur one had only to add one detachment of British army headed by an officer of the grade of major or above to a large body of militia; the actual number of British troops or militia had nothing to do with the situation.

In 1756 acting British commander in chief for North American, and governor of Massachusetts, Major-General William Shirley appointed Major-General John Winslow, one of the most distinguished and competent New England militia commanders of the pre-Revolutionary period, to recruit New England militia for a campaign into the French-held areas around Lake Champlain. Shirley thought to express confidence in his provincial charges, and to aid in the recruitment of militia, by appointing Winslow, a veteran of the Carthagena Campaign in 1740 and of many campaigns during King George’s War (1744-48). When John Campbell, Earl of Loudoun, arrived in America in July 1756 he rescinded Shirley’s orders and placed the militia and its officers in positions subordinate to the British regulars, thus effectively reducing Winslow in rank from major-general to ranking militia captain.

A related issue involved the responsibility for command of the militiamen.

As acting British commander in North America, following Braddock’s death, Shirley had promised the New England militiamen that Winslow would be their commander. The men regarded this as a contract between Shirley, acting for the English king, and themselves, and binding in both a legal and a moral sense. When Lord Loudoun and his second in command Major-General James Abercromby decided to place the militiamen under British command and British discipline, the men claimed breech of contract. To Loudoun and Abercromby this was a logical and natural move, and they certainly felt themselves immune to any contractual arrangement Shirley had made since they were now in sovereign command of all His Majesty’s forces in North America. Since they regarded the provincials as unruly, contemptuous of discipline and ill-trained, and poorly prepared for war, they thought it their duty to bring them to a state of readiness equal to that expected of the British army and troops recruited from any location serving with that army.

British command, in the minds of Loudoun and Abercromby, was far more professional and experienced than any provincial officers could possibly be. And, in their opinions, imposition of the British Mutiny Act and Rules and Articles of War were long overdue. Technically, the provincial laws were probably illegal, or at least superfluous, as the British laws concerned both the homeland and its provinces and Parliament had provided for no exceptions.

The first official notice the colonial officials had that the British government intended to apply to Mutiny Act to their militias came in January 1755.

Privy Council Secretary Robinson wrote to the governors of the several New England provinces informing them that Parliament had inserted a clause in the Mutiny Bill “enacting that all troops in America whilst in conjunction with British Forces under the command of an officer bearing His Majesties immediate commission shall be liable to the same martial law and discipline as the British forces are.” To the colonials the question was less Parliament’s power to make uniform laws and create regulations for the training and discipline of all troops, whether regular army or militia, than it was of contract. The colonials had enlisted for the expedition specifically on the premise that they would be commanded by their own officers and subjected to provincial mutiny and related acts. Shirley defended his actions as reasonable and traditional: reasonable in the sense of making more men enlist; and traditional in the sense that, on previous campaigns, militiamen had been subjected to their own provincial, not British military, law.

Winslow argued, in support of Shirley, that his militia was neither unruly nor mutinous and provincial law was more than sufficient to maintain discipline.

Indeed, in fulfillment of contract, the men would be more likely to obey their own laws than to obey the much harsher British law, with its emphasis on brutal discipline and more than occasional executions. But Loudoun and Abercromby were adamant. In this campaign the militia was going to do things according to the book, and the British officers were not about to capitulate to the whims and desires of their poor relations in the colonies.

Winslow served as the provincial’s advocate, arguing the provincial militias’ case as strongly as he knew how. The men had enlisted under provincial law, in response to a provincial governor’s call for provincial soldiers, in an army funded by the provincial governments. These men had made a covenant voluntarily, of their own free wills, and Winslow and other officers were “executors in trust” for the contractors. The army was a “properly organized body”

under law only because the men had volunteered their services under a certain, definite and specific set of circumstances. If the current British commander changed the contract that had been legally made by his predecessor, the contract was altered and was thus null and void unless the consent of the other parties, the militiamen, was given. Winslow argued that the commander had no legal or moral right to alter a perfectly valid contract. If the commander insisted on having his way, the men could hold the contract to be invalid and were thus free to return to their own homes. Winslow added that the officers had likewise been deprived of their rights under the same contract and, unless they chose voluntarily to serve in inferior positions, their obligation to serve on the expedition was also terminated.

But the officers had a moral duty to not resign until the issue of the disposition of their men had been resolved.

Shirley sent Winslow’s letter, along with a cover letter of his own, to Loudoun for a response. Loudoun was outraged, holding that Winslow had knowingly and willingly disobeyed his orders. Loudoun looked at the problem from an entirely different perspective and this marks an important difference between provincials and the British officer corps. In Loudoun’s opinion since it was Shirley who had negotiated the original contract, it fell to him, not Loudoun, to respond to Winslow. Moreover, Loudoun argued that any man who enlisted in a British cause of any sort, at anytime and at any level, implicit;y agreed to serve, not a political sub-division of the empire, but the Crown. All men served to advance the king’s cause and to protect his dominions. The king may command them as he sees fit and the men have no choice but to obey their sovereign.

Provinces are dependencies of a sovereign state, and are not themselves sovereign, nor can they ever be, or ever act as, independent contractors. They are, and will always remain, agents of the sovereign state. Using the standard argument of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Shirley reminded Winslow that sovereignty is not, and indeed cannot be, divided and so the provinces had no legal standing to dispute the Crown’s best judgment. The king was the only legally constituted authority. The issue, then, was not contractual rights of the men, but of rightful and legal obedience to their king, the only legal authority. Disobedience to lawful orders and lawful authority was nothing short of insurrect, treason, rebellion, and sedition.

Winslow was still unwilling to accept the change in conditions and legal standing of his militiamen that Loudoun required. He discussed it orally with Loudoun in early August. Neither was satisfied with the outcome of their meeting.

Loudoun contented himself with extracting from Winslow, on his own behalf and on behalf of his militiamen, an oath of loyalty to the king, but agreed to defer, at least during the campaign at hand, from implementing his initial orders. He allowed Winslow to remain in nominal command of his troops for he knew that the campaign was lost without Winslow’s militia. Winslow had won a technical victory, but knew that henceforth Loudoun would have his way and his orders would stand in future campaigns.

At this low point Winslow found an unexpected ally in Thomas Fitch, the popularly elected governor of Connecticut. He understood the position of the provincials and championed their cause. And he understood and endorsed wholeheartedly Winslow’s arguments. Fitch was more than willing to stand firm behind Winslow and the militia he commanded.

As an aristocratic conservative, Loudoun had no use for the provincials’

contractual arguments. To him Winslow was merely attempting to try to avoid his imposition of military order. It was not that he was incapable of understanding the logic. On the contrary, he understood Winslow’s arguments fully. To him these arguments simply represented lawyers’ tricks and pointless exercises in rhetoric.

The provincials succeeded in accomplishing nothing more than buttressing Loudoun’s preconceived opinion that the colonists were a lazy, insubordinate, indolent, argumentative, and mutinous lot.

Still, the provincials had several trump cards to play. The legislatures were still sufficiently independent that they could, and often did, as in this incident, refuse to offer supplies for various expeditions. The process of procuring provisions was one of the more ponderous aspects of colonial administration.

Annually, the legislatures set up committees of war which were a curious blend of private initiative and governmental interventionism. These committees procured such supplies, including arms and foodstuffs, as the legislature permitted by their funding by entering into contracts with various civilian suppliers. The committee then contracted with wagoners to haul the supplies to a central supply depot, and then to transport the same to the camp where the officers received the supplies. It was not until this last step was finished that the supplies came under military control. No commandant, provincial or British, could really do more than to make requests of the committees of war for what the provincial troops needed, for commanders had no real authority to exercise over them.

The provincial legislatures could refuse to supply men, as Pennsylvania had done until the time of the French and Indian War. They could assist or impede the recruitment of volunteers and enlistments. The British tax system in the colonies effectively raised little money, often less than the cost of the collection.

Most provincial financial support that the British government did get came from the colonial legislatures and here they acted more as independent agents offering a voluntary contribution than dependencies fulfilling a legal obligation to support the home government. The home government was usually displeased with the amount of money contributed and the length of time the provinces required to actually deliver their contributions, but it seems to have imposed no real penalties against the legislatures to bring them into conformity with its wishes. This certainly was not an ideal time for a servant of the Crown to get into a fight with the provinces over supplies, men and money.

As a military man with a sense of the need for regular deliveries and distribution of supplies, Loudoun sought to compromise with the colonial authorities. He offered to purchase all the supplies that were immediately available at a standard rate and then to supply the provincial militiamen with the same items that he gave his own men. The legislatures would then be free to supplement their own men with any items not on his list. Some colonial authorities thought this to be a trick for if the king supplied the militiamen they would have to yield to the king’s discipline.

The provinces seemed to have viewed this more as a power struggle between the commissioners of war, who, if the solution had been accepted would have had little to do, and Loudoun, than as a reasonable solution to a recurrent problem. They were also concerned that any reimbursements due the colonies from the home government would not be lost in the shuffling of papers among the several layers of authority. For their part, the enlisted men feared also coming under British control if they ate the king’s bread; and they fully supported the contractual arguments of Winslow and Fitch, for, as mostly Puritans, they had been steeped in contractual arguments since birth. The commissioners of war had little difficulty convincing the legislatures of Massachusetts, Connecticut and New Hampshire to reject Loudoun’s proposal.

Loudoun also disliked the apparent provincial disregard for hierarchy and command. As a career soldier in the British army Loudoun had no respect for any challenge to authority. Others should do as he did, which was to give full, unquestioning and complete obedience to orders received from his superiors. The enlisted men formed the base of his hierarchical pyramid and they must never question any order, if only out of fear of punishment. The men must be made to fear their officers even more than the enemy’s guns and bayonets. The provincial enlisted men were lower even than their British brethren, and the provincial officers were not much better. Provincial officers were disobedient, independent and, perhaps worst of all, concerned for the welfare of their men. They fraternized with the men and their offices depended upon their election by the men, rather than upon talent, origins, birth or financial ability to purchase offices. All of these things mitigated strongly against their ever functioning as the British officers did, or integrating themselves into the British military machine. The vocabulary of the various New England officials was wasted on Loudoun and his class. Why would he be at all interested in “the rights of soldiers” when all gentlemen knew enlisted men had no rights?

Much of their behavior had to do with the fact that New England society was neither class-conscious nor hierarchical and it had no real experience with an established, professional military organization. The New England militia, as we have seen, was the only real line of defense in the colonies which had no standing armies. On the other side, Loudoun was the product of a society in which class had its privileges and success in the professional military was based on class. The British militia was, at this time, at best a relatively insignificant adjunct to the standing army. Any officer who risked his own career, court-martial or fortune in defense of his men had to be harboring some ulterior motives or democratic designs. Only an American would think of his officers and government as entrepreneurs and the enlisted men as workers and a contractual obligation between the two. And, having admitted an employer to employee relationship, if only for the sake of argument, only an American would assume that there was some reciprocity involved in that contract, or paternalistic obligation of employer to one’s employees.

Against this background, and with continuing debate at a most inopportune time for the British commander, Loudoun had little choice but to back off. The main loser was Shirley, not Loudoun. To the minds of the colonists he had apparently broken his word to allow the provincials to fight under their own commanders and rules. In Loudoun’s mind Shirley had undermined his orders, meaning legitimate authority, by patronizing of the colonists. Had Shirley not made the deal Loudoun would not have been stuck with trying to contradict and repudiate it. Shirley’s actions had made the colonists all the more independence-minded and more likely to rebel against realistic military discipline in the future.

Loudoun was a European officer forced to fight a war with a cast of Americans who knew nothing of civilized warfare. He deeply resented Shirlery’s laxity for he had to depend on the provincials because his best troops were already committed elsewhere and the role assigned to them was an important and integral part of the overall campaign.

Loudoun never understood the American provincial mind, nor did ever intend to try. His job was not to understand but to coerce the recalcitrant New Englanders. To his mind, and those of most, if not all, his subordinates, it was high time to bring the Americans back into the fold. Shirley understood, if only because he had served for a quarter-century as governor of the most populous colony. He also wanted to understand his charges and that made him, arguably, the most successful and accomplished of the colonial governors.

Martial Law and Military Discipline

Militia discipline was never as severe in the colonies as it was in the British army. In New England the emphasis was on correction rather than punishment. With typical Calvinist religious teachings as a background, New England’s militia leaders thought that punishment would not make a good man better, so they saw little use to the application of the cat o’nine tails to man’s bare back. Emphasis was on spiritual rehabilitation rather than corporal punishment.

When a militia unit was faced with flagrant abuses, typically an officer would assemble the men and deliver a puritanical sermon on the dangers of leading a dissolute life-style and recommending that men correct their evil ways. There were exceptions to the emphasis on spiritual rebirth. Some crimes were so heinous that officers approved physical punishment for their performance. Fornication, adultery, blasphemy (which included profane and obscene language), homosexuality, bestiality, and indulgence in any “unnatural abuses” invited brutal discipline.

Blasphemers could have a hole bored through their tongues with a red hot iron.

One known case of attempted homosexual seduction brought symbolic, although not real, execution. The man who attempted to entice another into “unnatural acts”

was beaten and driven from camp with a noose tied about his neck. The New England militiamen and officers were much shocked by the sinful behavior of others, thinking that officers should discourage fornication and swearing.

After 1757 the New England militia was subject to their own provincial laws because in that year Lord Loudoun placed all New England men in arms under the Rules and Articles of War and the British Mutiny Act, thus subjecting them to a wholly different system of punishment and courts-martial. The awful punishments which New England militiamen had witnessed when they were inflicted on unfortunate British soldiers were now regular fare for the militiamen as well. Loudoun would have preferred placing the provincials under British law immediately upon his arrival in America, but found that practically he could not because his predecessor William Shirley had promised the colonists that they might fight under their own laws and according to their established customs. When Loudoun could finally implement British style discipline, he did so with a vengeance. He was undoubtedly looking hard for examples of provincial misbehavior precisely so that he could show that he meant to implement the English laws that were already well-established in the regular army.

Central executive control over all military forces had been well established in British law long before Loudoun’s time. William Blackstone, the greater authority on English law, argued that the Lord Protector Cromwell’s Instrument of Government of 1653 had established the principle of executive control of all militia. Likewise, Blackstone argued, both Charles I and Charles II of England had rightfully claimed control over the nation’s militia. The king alone may command, discipline and order the militia, army and sea power, that is, “all the forces by sea and land, and of all forts and places of strength, ever was and is the undoubted right of his Majesty and his royal predecessors, kings and queens of England.”

Moreover, Blackstone argued, “both or either house of Parliament cannot nor ought to pretend to the same.” Control of the militia is an executive, not a judicial, function. The principle was well established in the legislation governing the order and discipline of the militia, the Mutiny Act. Executive control of the militia “is immemorial” and can only be disputed “contrary to all reason and precedent” as Thomas Hobbes had argued a century earlier. The king appoints all officers who then serve in his name, and they carry with their appointments the full color of his authority. No mere provincial law could interrupt this long-standing precedent.

The Mutiny Act has interesting English historical roots in the seventeenth century. When William III of Orange assumed the throne, accompanied by his Dutch guards, he chose to send to Holland those troops he suspected of harboring loyalty to James II, under a treaty of alliance with “the United Colonies” dated 8

March 1689. Some 800 of those being deported arrived at Ipswich, accompanied by four cannon, declared James II to be the true king and that they were willing to die for him. Commons, in order to be able to punish these rebellious men, enacted a Bill to Punish Mutiny and Desertion, to be in force only for a limited time. The bill cleared the House of Lords and was granted royal assent on 3 April 1689. In this, its earliest form, the bill still granted certain protections, meaning that a subject upon becoming a soldier does not cease to have rights. “No man may be prejudged of life or limb, or subjected to any kind of punishment by martial law .

. . in any manner than by the judgment of his peers.”

Under George I, the Mutiny Act expressly applied to troops within the kingdom and in the colonies overseas. Lords objected that the act seemed to grant to the king the exclusive power to determine what acts in peace as well as in war were punishable by courts martial and in peacetime. George’s response was to incorporate the Articles of War under the Mutiny Act, increasing both the number of crimes punishable in peacetime and the severity of the penalties. In 1748 Lords declared that no person should suffer any punishment under the Articles of War in peacetime except as were noted expressly as punishable offenses under the Mutiny Act. Despite this legislative wrangling, as the Mutiny Act appeared in America, all persons who were subject to the Mutiny Act were also held to be subject to the Articles of War, and vice-versa, and thus could be punished for offenses under either act, even in peacetime. George I’s Mutiny Act authorized the summoning of courts martial for any of a long catalogue of offenses, with punishment to include whipping and execution. This was the first authorization of capital punishment in the army in peacetime, although offenses that might be punished by forfeiture of life in civilian life, such as murder, carried that potential punishment but it was imposed heretofore in the civilian not in the military courts.

The crime of desertion in wartime had long been punished by execution, but the Mutiny Act extended capital punishment to desertion in peacetime.

Another capital crime was refusal to obey an order from a superior officer, without any restriction placed upon the legality of the order. Between 1718 and 1749 the language of the law provided for obedience to “lawful commands,” although the few cases of record show preference was universally given to the word of the officer issuing the order. The principle of law was clear: “no soldier may judge the danger, propriety, expediency, or consequence of the order he receives; he must obey.” The crown was most anxious, however, to allow it to offer extensive physical punishment, usually whipping, in place of execution. Lords especially opposed granting the crown the power to override courts martial and extend clemency, preferring to have the board that held the hearing and knew all facts in the case be the final judge of punishment.

In the British army and in most other militias discipline was enforced against obvious abuses which no military would permit, such as desertion, desertion in the face of the enemy, sleeping on watch duty, giving false alarm of enemy action, disobedience to a lawful order, striking an officer and theft of company property. Theft of civilian property, gambling, and rape were among the acts which the army would not tolerate. Conversely, the British army, and the militias of states south of New England, rarely punished adultery, fornication or blasphemy, and swearing.

It is a well established principle of law that courts martial must distinguish between those offenses that are purely military, and thus within the provenance of military tribunals, and those which are civil and political, and thus are properly the jurisdiction of civil courts. Lord Loughsborough commented on this point. “All the delinquencies of soldiers are not triable by courts-martial, but where they are ordinary offenses against the civil peace they are triable by the common law courts.” He pointed out that even treason committed by the soldiers in England against William III were tried by common law courts. Nonetheless, under the Mutiny Act, such non-military offenses as immoralities, misbehavior, disgraceful conduct, swearing and denying some religious tenet, have been tried by the military. Courts martial commonly tried soldiers for all offenses committed against the person, estate or property of any subject. Technically, the Mutiny Act applied only to offenses soldiers committed in their military capacity, but the theory was far removed from practice.

In his excellent study of the New England militia during the Seven Years’

War, Fred Anderson recorded twenty incidents of mutinous behavior by provincial troops between 5 July 1755 and 13 November 1759. Of these, five might be considered serious cases of desertion or riot, and all occurred before the full imposition of the British Mutiny Act upon the Americans, that is, during the time that the officers and men had delayed Loudoun’s orders and while the discipline was still covered by the provincial laws. In the other cases, men had refused to carry out special, additional duties unless granted additional pay. Still, under the British Mutiny Act they might have been severely whipped, shot, or hanged for refusing to carry out a lawful order, irrespective of their reasons. Such had been the case for many unfortunate regular soldiers. The principal difference between New England and British discipline lay in the severity of sentences administered.

There were two levels of courts-martial which could be held, corresponding to the different levels of authority. Regimental courts-martial exercised jurisdiction over relatively minor matters, such as neglect of duty or minor cases of theft. Proceedings here were convened by the commanding officer, ordinarily a colonel or lieutenant-colonel, and consisted of a captain and three or four lieutenants or ensigns. Their authority extended to whipping and other corporal punishment. In an army which had, on occasion, assigned as many as 900
to 1200 lashes of the whip, regimental courts-martial usually gave out less than 200, and more likely, less than 50 lashes. A general court-martial was convened at the command of a general and was comprised of a colonel and as many as 14
other officers, usually ranking captain or above. These proceedings covered major infractions, such as striking a superior officer; refusing to obey his commands, especially in battle; desertion and cowardice in the face of the enemy; or murder or major incident of theft. General courts-martial rarely imposed sentences of less than 300 lashes of the cat o’nine tails and could impose the death sentence. Rarely was a man found not guilty, there were no appeals, and sentences were imposed almost immediately after pronouncement.

English criminal law generally, and martial law specifically, was based on three principles: justice, terror, and mercy. In the English-speaking world the law assumes a life of its own, reigning above all other considerations and factors.

Based on human understanding of divine law, English law has the characteristic of immutability. Justice requires that the law be universally applied to all by a constant and perpetual will. At least theoretically, the same penalties and punishments must be made to apply to all men irrespective of class or position.

Judges, steeped in the majesty of the law, spoke with the voice of God. The criminal stood naked and helpless before the law. His was the role of the tragic actor, the center of a great melodrama while being able to do anything for himself to better his role.

The military represented class interests well, in apparent defiance of the principle of universality. Officers were never flogged or made to ride the wooden horse. If an officer was executed, it would be unlikely that he would be subjected to any public humiliation before the enlisted men. Crimes that brought severe punishment for enlisted men would more likely bring censure, demotion, or forced retirement among the officer class. But this was understood, even if it seemed unfair. In New England most officers associated freely with their men. Strong fraternal bonds were commonplace if only because New England militiamen generally elected their own officers, and elections were as much a recognition of popularity as of competence. After 1757 the system faced a crisis for Loudoun’s unification of military and militia-volunteer standards worked only when there was an unbridgeable gao between enlisted men and officers, yet the militiamen thought it their absolute right to continue to elect their officers.

In the military, flogging and whipping, being forced to run the gauntlet, confinement in the stocks, branding, and other physical mutilation and being shackled were among the punishments permitted to local militia companies, with virtually no right of appeal to any higher authority. The higher level of courts-martial could inflict even more terrifying punishments, including capital punishment almost at will. Whatever his punishment, the accused man would suffer it in front of his peers. He was to be the example to all others that, if they wished to avoid his awful plight, they must avoid making his mistakes or committing his sins. The impact of seeing a man fall from the gallows or being shot (and thus be sent to his maker and final judge) was designed to strike terror in the hearts of all enlisted men. Perhaps even more sickening was seeing a man whipped, even unto death. The British officer corps was dedicated to the proposition that their men must be forced to obey their orders in combat, no matter how absurd the orders, only if it was because they feared the officers more than they feared the enemy.

Physicians or military surgeons often, but certainly not always, attended the imposition of physical punishment. They were officers, and with typical class consciousness, rarely sympathized with the men. One of their principal obligations lay in keeping a man sensible while he was being whipped. The surgeons might use a stimulant to revive a man who had fainted. It did not take long for a man being struck simultaneously by the nine strands of the whip to have his flesh stripped from his entire back. Still, he could expect no greater mercy from the physician in attendance than from other members of the officer corps. It was a rare instance when the application lash was stayed before sentence had been carried out.

The law had the power to offer mercy. Reprieves and pardon were possible. The law could, if it chose, delay, mitigate, even forgive the harsh sentence. Many regarded the extension of mercy as a sign of inherent goodness in the state. One always had hope that, even on the gallows or before the whipping post, one might be excused from the punishment. On occasion, a punishment was carried out symbolically. For example, as we have seen in the provincial militias, a man condemned to the gallows might have a noose tied about his neck and then be drummed out of camp instead of actually being executed.

New England militia officers found their own way of following the dictates of conscience and religion while nominally accepting Loudoun’s orders.

The easiest way to practice justice was to consider the punishment that the officers thought truly fitted the crime and then charging the evildoer with a crime that carried that punishment. It became a sort of game, one in which the officers’ sense of Christian ethic and morality set the rules. Thus, if an enlisted man fell asleep on duty, a capital crime under British law, he might be charged only with neglect of duty, which brought only physical punishment. Even with this, many officers thought that the least punishments required under the Mutiny Act were still too great.

Most New England colonial rules, like those used in Massachusetts, allowed the imposition of no more than thirty-nine lashes, whereas even minor infractions, as we have seen under British rules, brought perhaps one or two hundred lashes. A well circulated pamphlet, allegedly authored by a “prominent clergyman,” argued that Deuteronomy limited corporal punishment to forty strokes and that to ensure one did not violate God’s law, one ought to remit one stroke. This anonymous author reasoned that God had placed this limitation “lest their brother should seem vile unto them, even as if he was a dog.” If a number of strokes in excess of forty was offensive to God, how must one interpret the imposition of “1000 or 1500 lashes?” The preacher noted that he personally knew of men who committed suicide or who had begged for death rather than yield to a vast number of lashes of the whip. “When such punishments are decreed as threaten life,” the man of God wrote, “the Sixth Commandment is broken and all concerned are guilty of killing the victim, tho’ he should not die under the operation.” He lamented that God’s law “with regard to whipping” was “religiously observed by the civil authority” was violated in large scale by the military who relied upon the argument of necessity of maintenance of discipline. But that argument in support of “military cruelties” failed because it is “always necessary to keep God’s laws” and necessity “can never be introduced to break them.”

On 13 May 1755, the British authorities at Fort Cumberland, Maryland, convened a court martial against three soldiers of the 48th Regiment, James Fitzgerald, James Hughes, and Thomas Connelly, for having stolen a jog of beer.

The officers imposed 900 lashes on Connelly and 800 each on Fitzgerald and Hughes, to be imposed at the rate of 300 lashes per day until punishment was complete. Sentence was passed on 14 May and punishment commenced on 15 May just outside the fort. Reaction among the local inhabitants and provincial militiamen ranged from disgust to outrage to anger.

During the time between the Seven Years War and the Revolution the use of corporal punishment was a major issue among the people of New England.

They objected both to its severity and its continuance in peacetime. The Boston Evening Post made many references to the harshness of whipping, both of provincial militia and the regular British soldiers stationed there. On 14 October one Rogers, “a New England man” was condemned to receive a thousand lashes at the hands of a black drummer. The Evening Post editorialized that the spectacle of Rogers being whipped was “shocking to humanity” even though he received “only 170 lashes” on that occasion. It quoted one observer as judging that “only 40” of the strokes were laid on as hard as the typical stroke he had seen when men had received 500 lashes in one session in other regiments. It seemed as outraged at the indignity of having a black drummer apply the whip as the fact that the man had been sentenced to receive a thousand strokes.

In December 1768 in Winchester, Massachusetts, after a British sergeant of the Fourteenth Regiment had received one hundred and ninety lashes, the surgeon warned that if he suffered more he would surely die. He was released and carried to the guard house “where having languished a few days, his back began to mortify, and the mortification soon reaching his kidneys, he died delirious.” The coroner held an inquest and chose to indict the officer for willful murder. The officer escaped punishment, having claimed that he had acted within the scope of the Mutiny Act.

In February 1769 a black drummer was sentenced to receive one hundred and fifty lashes for the offense of having “adventured to beat time at a concert of music given at the Manufactory House.” He passed out at the hundredth stroke and the remainder was remitted. This whipping was only one of many administered in the winter of 1768-69. It was abundantly obvious that the people of Boston, not accustomed to seeing such levels of physical punishment imposed, were outraged by the British system of military discipline. Doubtless, they were moved by charity and humanitarianism, and by a generalized moral outrage, but they probably thought also that, when war came again, it would be their sons and brothers who would receive the same levels of whippings.

In Boston on 31 October 1768 the first soldier in memory was executed in peacetime for having deserted his post. Richard Ames [or Arnes] had taken refuge among the tradesmen of a town just outside the city where the king’s men in disguise located him. He was court-martialed and sentenced to death. To the Americans, the temptation, let alone the opportunity, for desertion would not have existed had not the English stationed troops in the homes of the local citizenry.

Roles of the Militia The New England colonies maintained a politically stable militia system during the pre-Revolutionary War years. There was virtually no standing army but all the provincial governments were able to provide large numbers of militiamen when and where they were needed simply by drafting them out of the town militias.

The New England colonies lost some territory and many men during the last quarter of the seventeenth century, but the political authorities never lost administrative control.

Each town effectively became an advanced military base from which the provincials could maintain a defensive posture or launch an attack on the enemy aborigine. New England towns had a military organization that was sustained and implemented locally with a minimum of outside interference. One authority argued that the relatively loose and decentralized control that the provincial officers maintained in New England towns was a principal cause of the maintenance of political cohesion by the legislature and governors. Most towns had sufficient supplies in the community store houses to support the local militia and quite a few other militiamen for at least a short time. Other towns could draw on similar supplies to sustain the war effort. In King Philip’s War the aborigine were defeated more by shortages of supplies than by acts of war.

New England militia often supplemented the ordinarily and common civil authorities, such as the sheriffs, police and town patrol or watch units. During the British occupation of Boston with the king’s troops a series of clashes occurred between militia and civil authorities on the one side and the British forces operating as military conservators of the peace, on the other side. The Boston Evening Post editorialized that so great were the offenses of the military conservators that in Boston there had been “a late vote of council of this town calling upon the inhabitants to provide themselves with arms for their defence.” It thought that this was “a measure as prudent as it was legal” because “it is a natural right which the people have reserved to themselves, conformed by the [English] Bill of Rights, to keep arms for their own defence.”

New England militia seldom went into actual battle as whole units, although they engaged in skirmishes and pursued marauding Indian war parties as whole units. Men were selected for their particular skills in tracking, sensing danger, marksmanship, and other useful military skills and then especially trained to become frontier rangers. The general political authority raised and paid for special combat forces in times of trouble, using the general militia as a reservoir of supply for these volunteers. These select militiamen were the voluntary and democratic counterpart of the Anglo-Saxon select fyrd. The latter usually had no choice but to accept the additional training that separated them from the general (or great) fyrd, the militia comprised of all able-bodied males. Whether for principle or pay, the long term and mobile New England militia volunteered to serve in these select militia forces. The volunteer element also removed from concern one potential problem, that being the question of whether the general militia could be deployed outside their home counties or colony.

Serving in a regiment did not excuse a man from guard duty, for within a regiment, there were five distinct types of guard duty on which a man might have to serve. In a quarter guard a regiment provided its own police, usually with a subaltern, drummer and as many as forty men. They patrolled the perimeter at night and held prisoners awaiting courts-martial or punishment. The provost guard provided additional police functions via detachment of forty-five men under a subaltern. It carried out punishment, including executions. The piquet guard was composed of a captain, two subalterns and as many as 50 men. It was designed to hold a line upon attack until the whole regiment could form. The main guard was the company-size force which provided external security for the whole camp and consisted of a company drawn from the entire body of men on a rotational basis. Officers of the rank of general were entitled to a personal guard, which varied by rank. A lieutenant-general had thirty-three guards; a major-general, twenty-three; and a brigadier-general, fifteen. Typically, as many as a quarter of the men assigned to a regiment or camp might be assigned to guard duty; or, a man might expect to serve on guard duty every fourth day.

There was a fundamental difference between the British regulars and the American militiamen regarding camp life. The American militia viewed the camp as a temporary aberration, a place to stay away from home, having no permanence.

They did only the bare minimum required to stay for a brief period. There was no question that, no matter how fine military quarters might be, the men would gladly trade them at any point for their own homes. English soldiers, from both personal desire and because they were driven by brutal discipline, made the camp as perfect as possible. They cleared stumps, set drainage and permanent latrines, levelled the land if at all possible, and then set their camps according to a pre-arranged plan, and with a define sense of order. To those men, the army was a way of life and the camp was as close to a permanent home as they were likely to come, for most had been impressed or enlisted for life. To the British troops, the militiamen were a disorderly group possessed of no pride of accomplishment. To the Americans, the English fetish for camp orderliness was the result of the officers’ insistence on discipline for its own sake and decision to make the men work to keep them from mischief.

Illness and malnutrition were the two great enemies of all in the field on military assignments. The standard diet of the enlisted men was adequate to maintain health and normal activity. The diet, by standards of the time, were reasonably well balanced. Problems occurred when food was not supplied as the manual required or when men were assigned to especially arduous tasks, such as felling trees, building roads, forts or bridges and carrying supplies or boats.

Massachusetts Governor Francis Bernard reported to the board of Trade in 1763
that, “I was surprised to see what havoc disease made alone among the provincial soldiers.” We need not dwell here on the woeful state of medicine, the inferior training of physicians and surgeons, poor sanitation, lack of real hospitals and drugs, presence of lice and rats and other disease carriers, inability to diagnose diseases and ailments correctly, lack of sterile instruments or the lack of understanding of how diseases were caused and spread. Dysentery, typhus, typhoid fever, pneumonia, smallpox, diphtheria, malaria, measles, mumps, and other virulent disorders frequently caused more deaths than engagements with the enemy.

A man injured in an accident or wounded in combat could count on virtually no medical help. Amputation was standard treatment for shattered limbs. Bodily wounds or internal injuries were generally untreated because of the lack of skill and hospitals. Professor Anderson found that, during the French and Indian War, New England militia and volunteers suffered a mortality rate of between 40 and 66.7 per thousand and a total casualty rate of 283.5 per 1000, for a period of about three months.

The English regarded the American militiamen as substitute manual laborers who were especially well suited, if for nothing else, for building and maintaining roads and bridges, driving wagons, building boats and then carrying these across portages, cutting firewood, building and maintaining latrines, and in general performing such distasteful physical tasks as fell on the British soldiers when there were no militia available. As Colonel John Robertson explained, the provincials were suited only “to work our boats, drive our wagons, and fell our trees, and do the work that, in inhabited counties, are performed by peasants.”

Perhaps most odious of all duties was that of cutting trees and doing other attendant work to build roads. This work required enormous physical stamina, for first growth trees of the virgin forests provided a significant obstacle and among the many considerations of British civil engineers, the amount of physical toil required was the least. Next in line as a physically demanding task was the building of fortifications. Forts required the digging of large holes, felling and cleaning large trees and dragging these to the proper place and setting the posts in the holes; and locating, extracting, shaping and setting large stones. Many period records show that the British officers enlisted, drafted, recruited, and, if all else failed, hired, provincial tradesmen to serve as masons, sawyers, carpenters, millwrights, wheel-wrights, or (that all-purpose term), “artificers.” Provincials also hunted game to supplement the standard fare of salt beef, pork, cod, or mutton.

There was no socio-economic discrimination practiced in New England militia as had been the case with the English militia. Regular British officers who served in North America and who knew little, if anything, of prevailing social conditions, and often cared to know even less about the national customs, misunderstood the colonial way of fighting and preparing for war. They did not care to understand the fraternity and socializing that marked militia training days.

To them, the American provincials were woefully disorganized, completely inefficient and hopelessly democratic. Officers socializing with the enlisted men and militiamen electing their own officers necessarily precluded discipline, organization and efficiency. In an army where officers made it a practice to refuse to learn, let alone address men by, their first names, the fraternization they saw among provincials was disgusting. Surely, mutiny and desertion would follow from such lax discipline. Here, poor citizens and indentured servants joined with their commercial and propertied brethren. The New England militia certainly represented a far greater cross-section of society than did the contemporary English militia.

A prominent Tory compared the militia to Falstaff’s army; it was “poor and bare.” Another Tory said that many of the militia had entered battle wearing “breeches that put decency to blush.” The Earl of Loudoun complained to Lord Cumberland about his militia. “[A]s to the complaints of the ill usage of the Militia, it rather appears to me that the Militia came rather slow up, and when they arrived to the number of 2000, the desertion from that time on was equal to their Acquisition by the arrival of new reinforcements.”

As we have seen, at least Englishmen did show respect for the colonial militia and their unique ability to wage war effectively in the hinterland of America. After the catastrophic defeat of General Edward Braddock’s army at the Battle of the Wilderness, the London-based Public Advertiser caustically observed that “300 New England Militia men would have routed this Party of Indians.”

One British officer commended the New England militia to the exclusion of the others.

In all military Affairs it seems to belong to the New England Provinces to set a proper Example. All agree that they are better able to plan and execute than any of the [other]

British Colonies. We put no Confidence in any troops other than theirs; and it is generally lamented that the British Veterans were not out in Garrisons and New England Irregulars [Militia] sent to the Ohio. Their men fight from Principle and always succeed… . Instead of the Devastations committed by the Troops in 1746, not a Farmer has lost a chicken …

.

Americans were only too willingly to support this kind of endorsement.

The Public Advertiser’s American correspondent, writing on 18 August 1755, related an account of an ambush that had occurred “150 miles off … a few days ago” in which an Amerindian war party numbering three hundred had attacked a party of eighty New England militia. “The Indians fired first and killed one Man; the New England Men took to the swamps and woods after them and killed 40 of them.” A private letter written by a Boston correspondent in August 1755 in the same newspaper recounted the success of the New England militia in “the late fight at Nova Scotia.” An “Old England Officer, Colonel Monckton” had ordered the militiamen to march in European-style close “Army Order” which they did, but only so long as they were not under attack. “When the Indians fired on them out of the Woods they broke their Ranks and ran into the Woods after them.”

Monckton was outraged and accused them of misconduct, saying “the Devil was in them.” But the militiamen had the last laugh. “They soon returned and shewed him several Indian heads and scalps, [saying] ‘This is our Country Fighting.’” This lesson had been lost on British commanders and because Braddock had insisted on fighting as Monckton had, he “fell sacrifice to his Onstancy.” After the British surrender at Yorktown, Sir Henry Clinton referred to the New England militiamen as “warlike, numerous and formidable.”

Training Days

Each colony in New England set aside one or more days for training and disciplining the citizen-soldiers. This custom had been inherited from medieval England where similar days had been set aside for like purpose in each shire.

When training day laws went unenforced the militias lapsed into mobs that were unable to coordinate their activities on the field of battle and were unwilling to obey their officers. Occasionally, part of the training days was set aside to repair and build fortifications. A chaplin opened and closed the day with a prayer and occasionally with a sermon. The minister also enforced morality laws to such a degree that public drunkenness was all but unknown and the camp followers that commonly accompanied men in arms were also nowhere to be found.

During the French and Indian War a New York correspondent of the London-based Public Advertiser praised the moral character of the New England militiamen.

We put no Confidence in any other Troops than theirs; and it is generally lamented that the British veterans were not put into Garrison and New England Irregulars sent to the Ohio.

Their men fight from Principle and always succeed. The Behaviours of the New England Provincials at Albany is equally admirable and satisfactory. Instead of the Devastations committed by the [British regular] Troops in 1746, not a single Farmer has lost a Chicken or even a Mess of Herbs. They have five Chaplains and maintain the best Order in Camp.

Public Prayers, Psalm-singing and Martial Exercises engrossed their whole Time at Albany.

Twice a week they have Sermons and are in the very best frame of Mind for an Army, looking for success in a Dependence upon Almighty God … . Would to God the New England Disposition in this Respect were catching.

The number of annual training days was fixed by law and varied considerably according to time and place. In 1631 the Massachusetts militia was so enthusiastic about training days that it mustered weekly. Within a year the enthusiasm waned and musters were then held monthly. By 1637 the interest had continued to decline and consequently drills were held only eight times a year.

Subsequent changes in the law reduced the obligation to six times a year and then just four. Emergencies changed the militiamen’s minds and prompted them to take muster more seriously. During King Philip’s War the Massachusetts militia mustered every Sunday and one additional day per week.

Training days became social occasions. Whole families attended. The women folk prepared the means which were taken in common. The children enjoyed a rare opportunity, at least in rural areas, to socialize and to play with large numbers of other children. Many young, single men met their future wives at these gatherings. Occasionally, a church or public building had to be repaired and this was done as a part of, or adjunct to, training days. A British officer described New England training under the watchful eye of five chaplains who assumed responsibility for the morality and general decorum.

To Jeffery Amherst’s seasoned, professional officers the Americans were utterly ill-mannered and ungentlemanly. They ignored class distinctions which were all important among the British officer corps. They reported to Amherst that the officers joined their men in carousing and carrying on, often into the wee hours of the morning. The militia officers were as bad as the men, engaging in all manner of outrageous behavior. They often wore costumes and unacceptable, non-military clothing. Many officers failed to wear insignia or distinctive uniforms that would identify them amongst their men. Moreover, they failed to obey even the most rudimentary rules of sanitation. Men and officers alike stank for they failed to bathe or change and wash their clothing.

In 1759 General Jeffery Amherst, preparing at assault the French fort at Ticonderoga, reviewed the colonial militia and volunteers. He was so disturbed by the New England militia’s lack of basic military knowledge that he ordered them trained with British regulars using the same handbooks, training manuals, and standards used with regular army recruits. Only by applying universal training standards could Amherst expect to integrate them with his own forces and deploy them as a single combat team. Amherst ordered that all regiments of volunteers and militia be given a copy of Humphrey Bland’s Treatise of Military Discipline.

Throughout the long campaign in upper New York and into Canada the New Englanders struggled to become acquainted with the unfamiliar rules and procedures of British military routine.

Additionally, Amherst was amazed to discover that many militiamen had only the most rudimentary knowledge of how their firearms worked. He expected to find the fabled “nation or riflemen” but instead discovered to his dismay that many of the urban New England militiamen possessed only the faintest knowledge of how their arms operated and how to care for them. Many men had fired, at the most, a few rounds of ammunition, and these on rare occasions at militia musters when musket practice was held. Amherst immediately gave orders that the marksmanship training and instruction in the manual of arms be given top priority at future musters and that volunteers in his army be trained with his own men in standard British military fashion. To his mind, militia training days were a sham.

All militia required discipline and organization. These were based on, or obtained from, some standard infantry field manuals and books of instruction on military drill. The standard drill manual for British troops was The Manual Exercise as Ordered by His Majesty in 1764, printed as early as 1766 in the colonies, but it had never been officially adopted for militia exercise. Thomas Simes, a young British officer in 1772 had written a Military Guide for Young Officers, reprinted in 1776 in Philadelphia. It proved to be among the most popular manuals in the colonies in the years immediately preceding the War for Independence. Sir Humphrey Bland had produced a work on military discipline which proved to be popular in the colonies. On the eve of the Revolution there was no shortage of manuals upon which the American militia officers might draw.

But Americans seemed inclined to produce their own manuals, influenced though they might be by British works. Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts was always interested in military matters as he was a militia officer, and in 1775 he published a militia training manual, An Easy Plan of Discipline for a Militia. Later, Washington, recommended him to Congress for the office of Adjutant General, commending him in these words, “He is a great military genius cultivated by an industrious attention to the study of war.” Pickering’s book was based upon a similar work known as Norfolk Discipline, written in 1757 for the use of the militia of Norfolk County, England. That work was the text book used by the militia of Rhode Island; and was, in fact, the basis for the training of most of the New England militia. Massachusetts for a time instructed her militia with William Windham’s A Plan of Exercise for the Militia of the Province of Massachusetts, written in 1771. Windham’s book was based upon the Norfolk work. In the preface to his manual, Pickering listed his sources: Norfolk Discipline; Exercises Ordered by His Majesty; Memoirs of Saxe; The Young Artillery-Man, by Barrisse; Exercises of the Army; Regulations for the Prussian Infantry; Bland’s Military Discipline; General Wolfe’s Instructions for Young Officers; The Cadet; and Young’s Essays on the Command of Small Detachments.

There were few major engagements fought in the new world. Battles on the European continent and in the West Indies rarely touched the colonists. The wars came and peace again reigned and there were long periods of rest in between the wars. The Revolution was a different matter.

All battles in the Revolution were fought on American soil, save only for a few, relatively minor, naval engagements. There were no regular army units to fight the war, save for those ultimately drawn from the militia. The militia was constantly on the move, fighting against both the English and the Amerindians.

Frontier militiamen who served far away from their homes had real reason to worry about the fate of their families at home, especially after the Six Nations entered the war with a vengeance. Men were away from their homes and farms or other occupations for extended periods of time. Women and children at home might make do with the principal bread-winner being absent for one season, but continued absence over several years took a horrible toll. Since most farms had operated essentially on a subsistence level, it meant that fewer people had to raise more food to feed more people. Someone had to grow the food to feed those in the armed forces.

During the first two years of the Revolutionary War there were few problems. By 1777 the war was taking a toll on the patriots. Men were tiring of the war. Taxes were high and the currency depreciating at a rapid rate. High inflation and high taxes placed many father-less families at the mercy of money lenders. Some taxes went unpaid. Militia fines were substantial, and providing a substitute was beyond the means of the typical household. Since the lame, halt, blind and others who were handicapped or disabled had to procure a substitute each time they were drafted, this obligation fell heavily on a segment of society which was ordinarily unable to sustain the cost. Wages of the enlisted men, whether in the continental line or militia, were insufficient to support a family. The pay of soldiers in 1776 was given in paper money which exchanged freely on par with silver. In January 1777 silver brought a premium of 25% and by January 1778
silver was valued at four times the stated value of paper money. In 1780 silver was worth sixty times the face value of the depreciated currency. By May 1781 it was essentially worthless and had ceased to circulate for virtually no one, the most ardent patriots included, would accept it.

The British regulars assigned to North America were generally well trained and subjected to the most harsh discipline known among military organizations anywhere. During the many wars with France, many times the British army stood against savage assaults because of this discipline. The colonial militias never accepted such discipline because of the egalitarian spirit that pervaded the colonies.

The militia failed to work effectively as regular combat units for several reasons. Few, if any, militiamen were interested in prolonged campaigns far from home. Training had long been oriented toward serving short-term home guard service. The militiamen were especially ineffective as garrison troops in various fortified areas, as they became bored quickly and had little interest in such service.

When a man served a tour of duty far from home he remained concerned for the protection and economic well-being of his family. Most militiamen could ill afford the costs of leaving home, farm, business, or shop. The Amerindians, Tories and British were a constant threat to their property.

Perhaps the most important reason for failures of the militia can be traced to the volunteering and drafting militiamen. Those who were most interested in the military life volunteered first. Militia units preferred to send their best men to the Continental Line. With the ranks depleted, the militia units were increasingly filled with those least interested, or least able to serve, in military service. By the end of the war grizzled, and often semi-invalided, veterans mixed with young, raw recruits, and those who had, by some device or another, escaped regular state or national service.

Local boards and militia officers were under constant pressures to increase their procurement of men for regular army service. With each passing month there were fewer volunteers, but more calls from the states and the Continental Congress for men. The most ardent patriots had already enlisted for the duration of the war.

Others with more modest pretenses of patriotism had also volunteered, or at least not resisted a draft, for shorter terms of service. Most of those left at home by 1777 either preferred to fill their responsibilities at home, were reluctant associators or were handicapped in some way. Some may have been so worried about the safety of the home folks that they did not choose to abandon their responsibilities to their families and neighbors.

In truth, by 1781, after nearly six years of uninterrupted warfare, neither units of the continental line nor militia units were up to their full and expected strengths. Many times partial companies, battalions and regiments of each took the field, seriously undermanned. Few were the able-bodied men who had not served on active service in some way or another. Many had come away horrified by the realities of war or repelled by army life in the field. Many had developed such a strong dislike for military duty that they paid large fines rather than even attend militia muster. Some had seen their families reduced almost to financial ruin during their service and would not place them in jeopardy again. Others had feared for the safety of their families during their absence and were unwilling to serve except in local tours of militia patrols again. Thus, even the militiamen often resisted short periods of duty outside their home counties.

Appeals to sentiment and patriotism began to fall on deaf ears. Military discipline was extremely harsh and British rule could be viewed as humane when compared with military discipline. Officers were a generally intolerant lot, allowing few deviations from a strict regimen which repulsed many who had become accustomed to the enjoyment of freedoms at home. There was little freedom of thought or of action. Moral discipline was imposed even on those with few moral principles. Much of military life was reduced to drill and camp routine which was monotonous and boring. There was much military routine and preparation for each day of battle, especially for those in the militia, on garrison duty or standing watch. Sheer boredom as well as homesickness were greater enemies than the opposing armies.

All of these things might be said of the soldier’s life at any period, but it was at least as great during the Revolution as at any time in human history. Its greater burden may be found in the context of the time which allowed for far greater freedoms than had heretofore been the case. The fact that all these factors were at work throughout history makes it none the easier for those undergoing it in the present.

The militia worked well as an emergency force, deployed for a limited time, in a limited operation, operating near home and for a short duration. Indeed, under these circumstances there may be no formidable military force. It certainly is well used as an auxiliary force to protect the home-front while the majority of eligibles are serving in the regular armed force. In the case of prolonged war conducted throughout a large geographical area the primary use of a militia is to serve as a definable register of those available for a draft into a regular military unit. Some militia training is certainly advantageous to the regular army for it introduces military drill, use of arms and general military regimen to civilians. The American War for Independence marked the end of the militia as the primary fighting force in America and the beginning of the emergence of a regular army as the primary military and defense force of the nation. The emergence of a regular force might have come much sooner had it not been for the continual presence of the British army in North America.

Arms and Strategy Arms figured prominently in the development of America from the earliest years. Guns were important for hunting, but indispensable for warfare. Warfare between European colonists and the native aborigine was simply a clash between the stone age weapons the Amerindians possessed and the products of modern technology that the colonists possessed. The colonials had brought over with them, and offered for sale, iron hammers, hatchets, knives, swords, lances and tomahawks. The impact of these superior weapons was overwhelming. But nothing had as great an impact as firearms. The impact of firearms and especially cannon was overwhelming beginning with the shock value of the noise these arms made.

The weapons of the colonists had changed remarkably in the two centuries which preceded the colonization of America. The pike which had been the standard infantry weapon of all of Christendom was replaced by the musket. The original European firearms were wheel-locks and matchlocks. Some European armies in the mid-seventeenth century still used matchlocks, but wheel-locks had all but disappeared. The mechanisms of wheel-locks were much too complicated to be salable. These arms worked on the same principle as a watch. The mechanism was wound with a key. When discharged the wheel, in which iron pyrites were fastened, ground against an iron pan, releasing a shower of sparks which detonated the priming charge, eventually igniting the gunpower in the barrel.

Wheel-locks were quite expensive and were usually highly decorated and were the hunting arms of the wealthy. They were largely the property of nobility.

The majority of the original military firearms were matchlocks which were both cumbersome and unreliable. These arms used a burning match which was positioned away from the touch-hole in the barrel. To fire a matchlock one moved the burning match inward to the touch-hole. These arms were not especially satisfactory either. The arm was not useful unless the match was already ignited.

The burning match was visible, especially at night, and gave off an odor which helped to reveal the user. One had to have flint and steel wherewith to ignite the matches which burned for only about twenty minutes before they had to be replaced. Ignition was especially difficult in damp or wet weather. The arm was difficult to reload. By 1675 the matchlocks, snaphaunces and wheel-locks were rapidly being replaced with the superior common flintlock and dog lock mechanism equipped firearms. Unlike the Amerindians the settlers could repair, and if necessary, manufacture firearms, ball and gunpowder. The first reports of bayonets dates to 1687 and soon after nearly all the colonials’ muskets and many fowling pieces and rifles were now equipped with the bayonet.

The invention of the flintlock, c. 1650, proved to be the turning point in arming infantry. By 1675 most colonies required that flintlocks, usually called firelocks in period literature, replace the old matchlocks as the standard infantry weapon. Most flintlock muskets fired a round ball of .75 (3/4 inch) diameter. The flintlock was little changed in substance from its introduction through the American War with Mexico. Until well after the War of 1812 no enemy might be expected to have weapons of superior nature or firepower, at least in quantity.

These arms weighed about ten pounds. An experienced shooter could discharge the weapon three to four times a minute, although the speed rapidly diminished as the bore fouled with black powder residue. The musket was generally reliable, although there were a few drawbacks. The large bores used up individual supplies of gunpowder and lead rapidly. Flints had a useful life of about thirty shots before they required replacement. A broken, damaged or inferior flint might not produce the requisite spark. Touch-holes, holes drilled in the barrel near the flash-pan which allowed the spark to enter the chamber wherein the gunpowder laid, occasionally became clogged. Poor quality, wet or deteriorated gunpowder might not fire properly. Introduction of the waterproof pan improved reliability of the musket in bad weather. A misfire required that a shooter thread a pointed worm on the tip of his ramrod, screw the worm into the lead ball and then empty out the gunpowder.

By 1680 flintlock muskets were equipped with bayonets. No longer did the soldier equipped with a firearm have to carry a pike or other cutting or slashing weapon. By 1710 the bayonet-equipped musket had become the standard infantry weapon of all European armies. While regular troops nearly always had bayonets, and many times charged an enemy only with a bayonet attached to the an empty musket, colonial militia only rarely had bayonets, especially if they were armed with their own guns. Adaptability to the bayonet was a primary reason why states sought to equip as many militiamen as possible with muskets rather than rifles or other civilian arms.

Muskets were intended for mass fire and were highly inaccurate at distances greater than fifty yards. Most had no rear sights and were designed to be pointed in the general direction of one’s enemy rather than aimed at an individual target. Training with muskets, or their civilian counterparts called fowling pieces, did not emphasize marksmanship. One might occasionally hit a man-size target at 100 yards, although effective range was perhaps 50 to 60 yards. In practice, those firing muskets held the muskets roughly parallel to the ground and discharged in mass in the general direction of an advancing, opposing force.

Rifled arms were much more accurate, but the rifling fouled much more rapidly than the loose fitting musket barrels. Only a few marksmen, usually hunters, could begin to gain any great advantage from the rifling. Most rifled barrels were of smaller calibre than muskets and were certainly not uniform. Each rifleman had to cast his own bullets to fit the diameter of his barrel, and weigh his own powder charge to fit his own gun’s requirements. Prepared charges of powder, wadding or “patches,” and bullets could only be prepared on an individual basis, rather than being issued by an arsenal. Most rifles were of more decorative design and far less sturdy than heavy muskets. Rifles were rarely made to mount, and only occasionally could be modified to accept, bayonets. The rifle was used most effectively as a sniper’s, or skirmisher’s, weapon. Its long distance shock value was great for riflemen generally chose their targets carefully, especially marking enemy officers as prime targets. They were slower to load for several reasons. Rifled bores were of value if the ball fitted tightly in the bore and so a patch of leather or cloth was used to assure a tight fit and to accept the rifle grooves. Tight fitting patched balls reacted to the slightest fouling of the bore, an inevitable result of the use of black powder. One of the perennial problems with firearms was their almost complete lack of uniformity. There was no standardization of caliber and most companies found that no more than a few men used the same size musket or rifle ball. Many militiamen carried fowling pieces, slim single barrel shotguns, used by civilians with shot to kill birds and with a patched ball to kill deer. Because of their light construction throughout they were especially unsuited for military application, and none was sufficiently heavy to use as a club or to mount a bayonet. None of the colonial militia laws had never required that men provide themselves with military arms. Each man had to provide his own ammunition, which was easily interpreted to mean that each man could supply whatever arm he wished so long as he had the proper ammunition. Lack of uniformity plagued the colonies throughout the various colonial wars. Most volunteers and draftees in the colonial period received standard military arms from the English or were equipped from the rather limited colonial stores of English weapons. Colonial gunsmiths manufactured very few militia muskets; their work on military arms seems to have been confined to the maintenance and repair of arms manufactured abroad.

During the Revolution the best equipped units, whether Continental Line or militia, used English Brown Bess or French Charleville pattern muskets. Since these two standard military arms of the great European powers used the same ball and load there was no problem presented here. As the war continued these standard military arms were supplemented with imported arms of many descriptions as European nations emptied their arsenals of obsolete and damaged equipment. Additionally, American gunsmiths offered some arms of local manufacture. The best equipment, naturally, went to the Continental Line and militia units lucky enough to have standard military weapons found that the Line took these weapons with draftees or simply confiscated them. Militia officers, in turn, bought or impressed civilian arms, adding to the variety of bores and ammunition.

While firearms, especially snaphaunces, matchlocks and other early “firelocks,” were in general use, the pike was still a popular weapon. The simplified manual of arms in use in the third quarter of the seventeenth century gave instructions for the use of the pike. The pikeman was required to know only eleven positions in the manual whereas those armed with firearms were to know no less than 56 positions. Fathers with a large number of sons often chose the pike for their offspring. Men at the time were responsible for arms their sons between ages 16 and 21. In 1681 a Massachusetts militiaman named John Dunton discussed the reasons for the use of the pike among inexperienced militiamen.

I thought a pike was best for a young soldier, and so I carried a pike, and between you and I reader, I knew not how to shoot off a musket. But t’was the first time I ever was in arms; which tho’ I tell thee, Reader, I had no need to tell my fellow soldiers, for they knew it well enough by my awkward handling of them.

A few pikemen were outfitted in archaic helmets and corselets, but most wore buff colored padded coats. They carried knapsacks, utility belts and some edged weapon, such as swords or hatchets. In his diary, Samuel Sewall, Chief Justice of Massachusetts, recorded in his diary his observations on the instruction of young men in the use of the pike, the half-pike and halberds. A good pike, Sewall recorded, cost about 40 shillings, far less than a good gun. He described a pike carried by one officer, “headed and shod in silver” and inscribed “Agmen Massachusettense est in tutelam sponsae, Agni 1701.” As late as 1706 there are records of the purchase of new halberts for the foot militia. King Philip’s War in New England, 1675-1676, marked the end of the pike as a principal militia weapon. Amerindians were much more intimidated by the thunder and novelty of firearms than they were by pikes which resembled their own spears. Armor was little used after 1650.

Americans, accustomed to firearms since birth, realized the importance of good guns. As they developed their own arms, made by cottage industry gunsmiths, they disdained the poorly made, often obsolete or obsolescent weapons the Europeans dumped on the colonies from the backrooms of their arsenals. In 1747 an American militia wrote to the New York Gazette to complain of the poor quality of arms shipped to the New Jersey militia. “The Lords of Trade had sent “300 Guns, or Things in the Shape of Guns, which were condemned by the Gunsmiths at Albany as not the value of old Iron.” There was a reason why the guns were so poor. The writer charged that “those very arms had been in Oliver Cromwell’s Army.” He added, tongue in cheek, that the Commissioners had sent the guns because they knew that, in Cromwell’s day, these guns had killed the French and they were frightened by them, so the issuance of the guns in 1747 was designed expressly to frighten the French away rather than forcing the Americans to kill them

Between 1688 and 1745 European military strategists developed new military formations and doctrine. By the time of the War of Spanish Succession (1702-14) European armies abandoned the tactics that had been useful when soldiers were armed with pikes and various cutting weapons and developed linear tactics more adapted to firearms. Common soldiers rarely carried swords in battle, as non-commissioned and minor commissioned officers carried halberds and officers were issued spontoons. All these weapons were essentially ceremonial symbols of little practical value in fighting.

Instead of massing their men, as in previous times, commanders spread them out in long lines across a substantial front. Instructors learned that lining infantry three deep was the optimum way to deploy soldiers armed with muskets.

Each line fired in turn, and by the time the third line had discharged its muskets the first line was loaded and ready to shoot again. Because of the inaccuracy of their muskets, soldiers usually formed battle lines about one hundred yards apart. Field commanders thus marched their men to the clearly defined field of engagement and waged a war of attrition. Opposing armies continued to fire until one withdrew or was decimated or surrendered.

Lord Loudoun introduced a number of innovations adapted to warfare in North America. One notable departure from the standard European practice was allowing militiamen, whether armed with rifle or musket, to fire from the prone position. Firing from that position was useful primarily to riflemen, but, before the Revolution, only a small number of rifles had been issued, or even permitted, among troops in the British service.

The last quarter of the eighteenth century also saw the introduction of mobile field artillery. The colonists generally used artillery to great advantage.

They did not have a kill large numbers of Amerindians with it in order to make a point. There was nothing in their code of war which required them to stand against such overwhelming firepower. The sound and smell and awesome destructive power of cannon were in and of themselves often sufficient to cause the warriors to retreat from firepower which they could not begin to match. Older cast-iron artillery was used primarily to batter down enemy fortifications at distances of 200
yards or less. Artillery was massed close enough to the target to concentrate its fire. They were rarely very accurate, due in large to irregular casting of both barrels and balls and to wear from use. Of lighter construction and smaller bore than siege cannon, the new cannon often had brass or bronze barrels instead of iron. By the French and Indian War, the French had mastered new artillery strategy and had developed superior hardware. The new cannon had improved construction and design from barrels to carriages. By the Revolution, artillery could be used effectively against massed troops at ranges up to 1000 yards. Light artillery could be used somewhat effectively by militias, but the use of larger cannon was a highly developed specialty.

The Dutch and Swedes had given the Amerindians cannon, but they had been rendered useless for lack of shot, cannon gunpowder and spare parts after these two nations withdrew from North America. Generally, the Amerindians chose merely to destroy cannon they captured because they really did not understand its use or deployment. But others began to supply the Amerindians with swivel guns which they mounted on the walls of their forts. These arms may be viewed as very large calibre rifles or small cannon, with bores about one to one and a half inches in diameter and loaded with multiple shot.

The militia systems in most colonies were in full vigor by 1650. In Maryland, for example, the militia was divided, according to the European manner, into the general militia, including all free male inhabitants between ages 16 and 6O, and the Trained Bands, consisting of specially trained and fully armed citizen-soldiers. Each citizen bore the cost of bearing arms himself. There was a “clawse enjoyning every person to bring a good fixed Gunn … to the trayning … for the service of the Lord Propy [proprietor].” The public treasury bore the cost of both purchasing and maintaining the extra equipment used by the Trained Bands.

Maintenance and storage of these arms were the responsibility of the sheriffs of the Maryland counties. Despite having been founded as a haven for Roman Catholics, by 1670 Maryland was effectively disarming Catholics. In many other colonies, bearing arms was restricted to those who would deny the doctrine of transubstantiation.

Connecticut provided for a muster-master in each county whose function it was to inspect the arms of the militia and Trained Bands, for the able-bodied free men “by lawe are required to provide armes and ammunition” for themselves.

Clerks were empowered to maintain records of militia equipment for each inhabitant. Trained Bands were “to be in readiness upon an bower’s warning for a march; who are to have their armes well fixed and fitted for service.” The law provided that smiths were to give priority to repairing arms of the militia over all other work. It also provided penalties for citizens who failed to pay the smiths for such work, as it was a primary obligation of citizenship.

Militia as a Reservoir The militias of Colonial America worked best when they were given limited assignments of short duration within the province from which the men were drawn. In most cases, the legislative calls issued to the militias were specific as to unit (usually based in a town or district), number of men required, and duration of service. The greater the distance of the service from the town where the units originated the greater the probability that some men would be drafted from the unit for service; the closer the service to home, the greater the chance that all men would be mustered.

Legislative mandates assigned the various towns their quotas and allowed each governments to decide how to fill the quota. In most cases, the governments first allowed the militiamen to volunteer and filled any deficiencies by a general draft from the militia companies.

One of the problems which developed between the colonial militias and the British army lay in the British method of conscription of men from the militias.

British recruiters often enlisted the men for life, in standard British practice. Few Americans, especially illiterate backwoodsmen, seemed to have understood that they had signed for such a term of service. In 1755 Lieutenant John Winslow protested when a British recruiting officer attempted to enlist a group of New England volunteers serving in Nova Scotia without telling them that they would be signing on for life. He argued that the provincial political authorities must step in and stop the practice and force the release of those already enlisted. Winslow argued that lifelong enlistment would have a deleterious effect on the development of the colony. To allow this enlistment practice to remain, will be a most impolitical step, as these men are sons of some of the best yeomen in New England, who encouraged them to understand this expedition … and on like occasions the men have been returned at the end of the time limited, and [it] was expected by the governor and people [that this] would have been the case [in this instance again]. And if [they are]

disappointed and their children [are] kept, there will be an end put to any future assistance, let the extremity be what it will.

The central governmental authorities occasionally laid specific assessments for manpower upon the provincial and state governments. In each of England’s several wars with France the home government assigned quotas to be filled within each colony.

The rather standard practice was to recruit as many as might be enlisted by paying small bonuses. The provinces and towns often offered bonuses that were paid in addition to those which the home government offered. If enough men were not forthcoming, the towns and provinces offered even greater bonuses. The authorities could offered bonuses in land (usually in French Canada) as well as in money. Other leaders offered clothing, blankets, equipment, or firearms. Bonuses varied greatly from time to and place to place, with governments attempting to recruit as cheaply as possible while the men were trying to obtain as much as possible for their services. Considering that governments rarely paid veterans bonuses or death benefits to families which had lost wage earners and the sources of support, one certainly cannot blame the men for getting all they could as enlistment bonuses.

Volunteers were often recruited from among the lowest echelons of society, including free-booters, Amerindian traders, runaway apprentices and servants, criminals on the lam, and derelicts. In harsh economic times, many poorer men enlisted because there was no other work to be had.

If there were still insufficient men then the provincial legislatures might authorize a draft. The militias served as the reservoirs from which the legislatures might draw for men. Most of the real work of drafting men was left to the towns and militia districts. The lucky men drafted into service might serve home or fortress guard duty, maintaining some static fortification of strategic location.

Boredom was the great enemy here.

The unlucky draftees might be sent to the West Indies for long service.

Many fell to enemy fire and many more died of diseases and injuries. Others were recruited into service in Canada against the French. I have not found any instance in which the home government assigned quotas to the American provinces for service on the European continent.

The towns and districts had no choice but to comply with a legislative or executive call for manpower. They could not refuse to respond. If the towns failed to fill their assigned quotas, the selectmen or other local political authorities could be held responsible, fined, and even imprisoned for failure to perform. The towns themselves might be assessed fines or penalties, to be paid out of local taxes.

Towns often appointed local committees to secure the necessary volunteers, using the militias as the reservoir from which to draw volunteers. Later, during the Revolution especially, the towns were free to set bounties which might be much larger than those offered by the Continental Congress or the states.

Conversely, towns might be credited with volunteers, especially those in excess of the assigned levy, and receive bonuses from the provincial or home government. So hard was it to recruit men during the Revolution that state legislatures assigned bonuses even for fulfillment of their legal quotas. This practice occurred primarily after the long war for independence had exhausted patriotic sentiments and the states were having great problems with recruitment of men to fill the quotas assigned to them by the Continental Congress for men to serve in the Continental Line.

In reality, none of the wars between France and England had made exhausting demands upon the New England militia. Men were rarely away from their homes and farms (or other occupations) for extended periods of time.

Militiamen rarely missed both planting and harvesting seasons and it was truly a rarity when a farmer missed planting and harvesting in two consecutive years.

Military actions during the struggle between France and England for supremacy in North America were largely of two types. There were the sporadic raids, conducted by French courriers de bois, a handful of French military and bands of Amerindians. The second type of actions were those involving larger numbers of men, including regular French troops, and directed at some important outpost or strategic fort.

In the first case, raiding parties sought to harrass the frontier settlements and isolated cabins. Here the French had no permanent objective in mind although they did take captives who were held in virtual slavery or were used as hostages to be exchanged for French captives held by the English or Americans. The raids were designed to strike terror in the hearts of those inhabitants who were so bold as to bring civilization into the wilderness. Perhaps certain trade temporary trade prerogatives were at stake. These incursions were perfectly suited to militia action.

The ranging units might pursue the Amerindians back into Canada, even to follow the raiders into their villages, in an attempt to rescue captives and perhaps to win a war of attrition. No regular military unit was nearly as well adapted to the war in the deep woods as the rangers who had been drawn from among the frontiersmen.

In the second case the French sought to capture and hold some point of strategic significance. Among the important sites were: Ticonderoga, which controlled the Hudson River Valley and Lake Champlain; Niagara, gateway to the west and the Great Lakes; Port Royal and Louisbourg, which commanded the eastern seaboard and the St. Lawrence River; and DuQuesne which controlled the three rivers and was the link between the great western plains and the east via the Ohio River complex.

In actions at strategic points the method of warfare was generally quite simple. The warring party enlisted sufficient manpower to drag heavy cannon and mortars sufficient in firepower to breach the walls of the fort. Regular miliary sappers were augmented by various tradesmen, often including ships’ carpenters, carpenters and wood cutters. They cut a road through the forest while the colonial militia, teamsters, and wagoners dragged artillery pieces, gunpowder, and shot to the outer perimeter of the fort. It all became very simple thereafter. If a relief force appeared, or the number of troops within the fort were sufficient to sortie out and destroy the siege force, those in the fort won. If the number of soldiers holding the fort was insufficiently large to engage the enemy, and if no relief force appeared, the force besieging the stronghold won by battering down the walls, or by inflicting damage sufficient to compel the fort’s surrender. American warfare was thus a throw-back to the siege warfare that ended the reign of castles in Europe in late feudal, and early modern, times. Unlike European warfare of the same period, armies rarely engaged on an open field. The militia had more physical exertion in these engagements in bringing up the supplies than in actual combat. Artillery was a specialization of the regular army, although a few militia companies had mastered artillery.

The regular British army units from England fought in nearly all battles of the colonial period. These well-trained and equipped units provided most of the shock troops, with volunteers, conscripts and militia largely acting as back-up and auxiliary units. The outcome of the major engagements were largely in the hands of the army, not the militia. Casualties, especially among the New England militias and volunteers, were relatively light. Most authorities agree that the professional army suffered far more casualties than the provincial militias and volunteers, but the Americans suffered their share also. In the abortive campaign against Ticonderoga in 1758 the forty-second and forty-sixth British regiments were slaughtered by French gunners, while the militia, being held in reserve, suffered few casualties. In some cases the regulars were fully protected while in siege whereas the militia were held in unprotected close reserve. At Ticonderoga in 1759
and during some other actions the French defensive cannon fire inflicted more casualties among the provincials being held in reserve than the actual assault inflicted upon the British attacking army.

The New England militia could muster large numbers of men if necessary.

A French observer in Canada reported in 1756 that the English had gathered a large army at Fort Lydius [Fort Edward] and Fort George [Fort William Henry], consisting of ten thousand to twelve thousand men, of whom six thousand to eight thousand were New England militiamen under General Winslow.

Militia of the French Enemy In mid-seventeenth century the entire white population of Canada probably did not exceed 3000 adults. Although the French king had about 100,000
men in arms, he was loathe to send more than 2000 to Canada. Louis regarded Canada as a fur farm and warehouse and had little interest in colonization or exploration. He only reluctantly allowed Samuel de Champlain to establish colonies at Port Royal, Acadia [1605], Quebec [1608] and Montreal [1611]. To his favorites the king granted seigniories, medieval land grants from which the seignores earned fortunes by charging the rentiers for everything from rent to milling fees. The seigniories formed the base on which militia units were recruited.

In 1665 he sent 24 companies consisting of 1500 men under Colonel de Salires to build several forts wherewith to guard the trade routes. The forts were strategically located to block the Iroquois war routes. In 1666 the governor of Canada, de Tracy, sent a handful of these French troops and nearly all his militia against the Mohawks in New York. The Mohawks sued for peace and the majority of the French troops returned to France.

The French countered the New England militia with Canadian militia of their own. In 1756 Louis Antoine de Bougainville noted in his diaries that “everyone quit work at four o’clock so that the workers may drill.” By mid-summer 1756 there were 2500 Canadian militia and 1800 Amerindian warriors available to the French army. The Montreal militia alone numbered 300. The home government provided the militia with 1800 muskets and 400,000 shot, an appropriate number of cartridge boxes, flints and gunpowder, hospital supplies and artillery. They also gave the militia 150 special grenadier muskets. On 8 August 1756 they marched 800 militia to Frontenac as an advanced guard. On 29 July 1757 Bougainville provided a list of militia in the king’s service in Canada. There were 3170 militia and 300 volunteers under Villiers.

The regular winter equipment issued to French-Canadian militiamen and regulars included: an overcoat, a blanket, a wool cap, two cotton shorts, pair of loose leggings, a breech-cloth [regular army had breeches and drawers instead], two hanks of thread and six needles, an awl, a tinderbox, a butcher’s knife, a comb, a worm [for musket], a tomahawk, two pairs of stockings, two pocket-knives, a pair of mittens, a waist-coat, two pairs of deer-hide moccasins, a dressed deer-hide, two breast straps used in hauling boats over portage, a drag rope, a pair of snow-shoes, a bear-skin, and one tarpaulin per four men or one per officer. Each item was valued and a militiaman might accept cash payment in lieu of the item. Each man also received twelve days’ rations of bread, salt pork and peas. At appropriate times, men might be given sleds and a few were issued horses.

The French under siege in the spring of 1758 suffered as the English had, from malnutrition and hunger. Bougainville noted that the soldiers could not function fully on a ration of two ounces of bread, a half-pound of beef or horse-meat, a half-pound of salt pork, and a quarter-pound of salt cod. Poor food and irregular pay and a dearth of able-bodied men made recruitment of additional volunteers and militia almost impossible. Most recruits were of the lowest sort and did more to weaken the army than to strengthen it. By 1 January 1758 the French had activated all reserve and active militia and were able to report only 2108 men in arms under Marquis de Vaudreuil.

On the Other Side When the American War for Independence began, the patriot (or Whig) cause was not supported by everyone in the thirteen colonies. Two classes stand out: the loyalists, also called Tories or United Empire Loyalists; and the pacifists, primarily Dunkards, Moravians and Quakers, or members of the Society of Friends.

Most of the pacifists were wholly apolitical and avoided assisting or supporting either side in any way. The Friends not infrequently expelled members of the sect for joining the army on either side. The loyalists were opposed to independence and withdrawal from the empire. They generally argued that the American Revolution was a civil war and they were free to choose sides without penalty.

Tories existed everywhere, but were most numerous in the mid-Atlantic and southern states. Incidence of loyalism was highest among the Anglican clergy, crown officials, southern planters, socio-economic elites and cultural minorities, although they came from all religious, ethnic, socio-economic, class and occupational groupings. Many merchants and upper class tradesmen, such as goldsmiths, espoused the loyalist line.

Many colonists remained loyal to the British Empire and were willing to fight for it. Some men, seeing that they would be forced by patriotic militias to choose sides, chose to join the royalist militia, the side which they sincerely believed to be right. The patriots called them Tories and the English knew, and later honored and compensated, them as United Empire Loyalists. They represented a broad cross-section of colonial American society and came from all levels of the socio-economic classification. There is no question that, because of pressures from the patriots, and their great zeal in ferreting out loyalists, many loyalists left rather than submit to a cause in which they did not believe.

America lost some of its outstanding conservative political leaders and men of property and commerce. The patriot response to the real and presumed Tory activities was brutal and direct. Their property was confiscated and sold at public vendue, with a value of no less than 10,000,000. They were forbidden to practice their trades and professions and denied basic judicial protections. They were often convicted by rumor in non-judicial bills of attainder. Some suffered severe physical abuse as well, including the traditional “tarring and feathering.”

Others kept their views secret and collaborated with British occupation forces on appropriate occasions. When the king’s troops withdrew the loyalists usually had to retreat with them, for they enjoyed little, if any, protection from the patriots.

Lacking organization and good leadership, their impact was not commensurate with their numbers. Three factors motivated the tories: fear of loss of their property; general patriotic loyalty to the king; and pride in the Empire.

Patriots loathed the tories. They confiscated their land, homes, estates and even their working tools and condemned them by bill of attainder. Patriots considered them traitors and subjected them to all forms of discrimination and persecution. Radical patriots were generally more successful than Tories in recruiting among the undecided faction. As the flames of revolution grew many neutrals chose to follow the new course.

Estimates of the numbers of American Loyalists differ enormously and there seems to be little way of reconciling the estimated figures with the truth. One good estimate is that the nation was divided into roughly equal thirds. One-third were active patriots; one third were staunch Tories; and one-third wavered in their loyalties. Another scholar estimated that during the Revolution there were perhaps 500,000 active tories among the colonists, or about twenty percent of the white free population. Perhaps another twenty percent of the population were passive tories.

By the end of the war probably 200,000 loyalists had died in British service, been run out of the country by patriots, or had become voluntary exiles somewhere within the British Empire. The number of exiles was above 100,000, out of a total caucasian population for the thirteen colonies of 2,100,000. These 100,000
tories represented about two and one-half percent of the free white population, that is, 24 exiles per 1000 people. In contrast, the French Revolution drove less than one-half of one percent of the population into exile, or five people per 1000. About half of the refugee tories fled to Canada, most settling in New Brunswick which was created in 1784 expressly to accommodate them. Others moved to Florida, the West Indies and back to England. After the war only 4118 tory requests for compensation were approved by the Royal Claims Commission, although these people were paid approximately 3 million.

As with the patriots, it was often most difficult to distinguish between militia and enlisted regiments of the regular army. Many Tory militiamen enlisted in British units, so the British authorities used their militia as did the patriots, as a reservoir for the filling of regimental vacancies. It served British purposes to keep the distinction between regular army and militia units vague, in large part because the militia sounded somewhat more populist and suggested voluntary popular support for the royal cause. As British policy developed following the defeat at Saratoga, the loyal militia was to be divided into two classes. The one would act offensively in concert with, and generally under the leadership of, the British army.

The second class, consisting of the invalid corps, men over age 40, and those with large families, was to maintain domestic order, quell local insurrections and invasions and act as occupation troops.

By the end of 1775, when the British authorities were giving little attention to the loyalist faction, only about 1000 loyalists had enlisted in militias.

Perhaps as many as 60,000 Tories served as militiamen and enlisted soldiers in the English cause. Rosters exist for the years 1779 and 1780 which show an average of 9000 to 10,000 men in His Majesty’s Provincial Forces in North America. Some have claimed that in 1780 some 8000 tories were serving in the British army, although other estimates are considerably lower. Many, if not most, of these tories had been drafted or recruited from tory militia units. By contrast, Washington’s army at the time numbered only 9000. While an exact count is impossible, there were 19,000 men who served in forty known tory units. Loyalist historian Lorenzo Sabine listed twenty five Loyalist military organizations, mostly militia, each with sufficient strength to be commanded by a full colonel. Other authors have listed thirteen major tory organizations. Another list showed 312 militia companies and at least 50 distinct provincial corps. By far the most complete list is found the publications of the Royal Institution of Great Britain where there are forty such organizations noted. These numbers do not count tory marauders and irregulars.

Initially, the British had thought that they could win a quick victory. No one in either military high command or the Home Office thought that the colonists could possibly win, and none were prepared for a prolonged and expensive campaign. All that was necessary for the quick victory was one great, all-out battle, and that would come when the British forces trapped Washington and forced him to do battle. Therefore, the British authorities and strategists paid little attention to the Tory militia companies that spontaneously formed in the early months of the revolution. They had assumed that quelling insurrection was the work for the regular army, just as it had been in numerous rebellions in the home country.

Recent experience with Jacobites had proven that their initial successes were quickly forgotten once the army forced a real battle with all the modern implements of war, such as the bayonet, cannon and massed troops. The British leaders thought tory militia would be of little value except in information gathering and in occupation of urban areas. There was no reason to believe that the tory militias would be any better trained, or form any better fighting force, than their patriot brethren for whom the English had so little regard.

The tories played a more significant role in the War for Independence than has been reported in many sources. They supplied badly needed manpower for the British army. Volunteers came from the tory militias to swell the ranks of the army as they had in earlier wars. They also supplied the occupation authorities and police for cities, operating under the shield of the British troops. The English found it expeditious to have tories stand watch and perform other duties that running municipal government required. Other loyalists, theoretically assigned temporarily to militia duty, but wishing to serve more meaningful tasks, were assigned to foraging, reconnaissance and fire watch and like boring and monotonous duties. The aristocratic class, offered prestigious upper level commissions, were frozen in place because the regular army, in which promotions to ranks of colonel and general were given only after long service, or sold for huge prices, would not be made available to militia. We may recall that, under orders from Lord Loudoun, all militia officers were considered inferior in rank to even a second lieutenant in the regular army. Actual enlistments of tory soldiers, although not officers, fell short of official estimates and expectations. This was disappointing because the British had assumed that the rebels constituted only a tiny portion of the colonial population and therefore expected that a vast number of loyal volunteers would materialize, motivated only by thoughts of patriotism.

The first, and perhaps greatest failure, of British policy in America was the assumption was that most Americans wanted to retain their loyalty to British rule. Overall, British policy remained recalcitrant in the belief that most Americans wanted to live under the king’s rule. As late as 1779 General James Robertson, testifying before the House of Commons, insisted that “more than two-thirds” of Americans were loyal to the crown. Once freed from patriot rule, the vast majority of Americans would run to the safety of benevolent British rule.

A second major British failure was based in the maintenance in force in North America of the British Mutiny Act. Americans, especially those in cities, had witnessed the horrors of the imposition of corporal punishment of unimagined intensity among the occupying troops. This brutal discipline may have meant little to the upper crust of society, those who would occupy the officer corps, but it was utterly frightening to those who might serve as enlisted men and thus be subject to the law. Other loyalists doubtless saw other inconsistencies, irregularities and abuses among the occupying troops.

A third failure of British recruitment policy, clearly related to the second, was the reduction in authority of militia commissions as compared to regular commissions. When Loudoun first imposed the Mutiny Act during the Seven Years War, it had the effect of placing all provincial officers under the command of all regular officers beginning with second lieutenant. Thus, any militia general, in actual command, was under the authority of any regular officer. Even after 1779, militia officers, irrespective of experience or service, were inferior to regular officers of the same grade. Provincial militia officers were ineligible to receive permanent rank or half pay upon reduction.

A fourth failure, related to the third, was the failure of the English authorities to develop a uniform policy in regard to enlistment bounties. Initially, officers received commissions based on their ability to recruit men to serve in regiments they were raising. Each provincial unit had to negotiate its own terms of support, and since most aristocratic loyalist officers cared little for their enlisted men, adequate provision of the men was rarely a great concern. Other loyalist officers, seeking to fill the ranks to secure their own commissions and ranks, made vague promises and commitments, or made promises they were essentially powerless to carry out. A few wealthy officers made good on their promises from their own resources. By late 1778 the home government began to clarify the arrangements and conditions of provincial enlistments, but by then it was too late for word had spread of the many unfilled bounties and unkept promises. Only after 1781 did the home government agree to offer a number of inducements, bounties and promises to loyal men who might be recruited. In 1776 the British home government had prepared supplies for 10,000 men, while enlistments were probably about 7000.

The system of by offering commissions to those recruiting men had been well established in British colonial practices even before the Seven Years War.

During the American Revolution the British army operated even more closely than in the past with the provincial militias. Any prominent loyalist who could raise a tory militia troop of almost any size could receive a commission from the king.

Those who were most active in recruitment of provincial militia regiments and companies were men who held rank and wealth before the revolution. Provided they recruited a sufficient number of tories, these officers could nominated the commissioned officers of inferior rank. Some tory officers believed, correctly or not, that they had been authorized to offer grants of land of 50 acres to enlisted men and 200 acres to non-commissioned officers. Provincial militia recruits commonly agreed to serve for two years or the duration of the war, if less. Many British army officers objected to this custom, claiming that this practice promoted the staffing of regiments with wholly unqualified officers. The Inspector-General of Provincial forces rationalized the army’s official position.

I have found … several persons to whom warrants had been granted to raise Corps had greatly abused the confidence that had been placed in them, by issuing warrants to very improper persons as inferior officers, the consequence of which was that numberless abuses had taken place, and among many others, Negroes, Mulattoes, Indians, Sailors and Rebel Prisoners, were inlisted, to the disgrace and ruin of the provincial service.

After 1780, because of the irregularities in enlistment procedures, each militiaman recruited in the southern campaign was issued a certificate expressly limiting his service and guaranteeing him exemption from service beyond a pre-arranged territorial limit. The men were granted the right to elect their own officers rather than having officers commissioned by fulfillment of enlistment quotas. The authorities established an inspector to superintend militia enlistments, training and discipline. The inspector was charged with preventing any acts of frauds in enlistments and to prevent the patriots from drawing out suspected tories by falsely representing themselves as loyalist recruiters.

A fifth failure may be seen in the treatment accorded recruits by both the British regulars and the provincial militia officers. W. O. Raymond studied the papers of Muster Master General Edward Winslow. Edward Winslow, Jr., had served as a guide for Lord Percy when he went to relief of Pitcairn at Lexington on 19 April 1775. Winslow fled with the British army when it evacuated Boston and went to New York city where many of his friends and business associates joined him in forming a tory militia. In July 1776 he was appointed muster-master of all “Provincial troops taken into his Majesty’s service within the Colonies lying on the Atlantic Ocean from Nova Scotia to Florida inclusive.” Winslow chose as his assistant Ward Chipman, a fellow graduate of Harvard. Their duty was to enlist additional militiamen into the king’s service. Raymond wrote of Winslow’s efforts, “There can be not the slightest doubt that the haughty demeanor of the British regulars toward the provincials, combined with the ill treatment of Loyalists by the Army, lost to the royal cause thousands upon thousands of friends and well wishers in all the colonies.”

It is not especially surprising that, while enlistments of privates remained relatively low, nearly all loyalist militias had a full complement of officers. One recent researcher commented that the most striking feature of loyalist militias was “the very high proportion of officers to men.” It took the English a long time to realize that most loyalists were of a rank in life superior to the class from which enlisted men were usually drawn. Treating enlisted men with great discourtesy did nothing to improve on the number or quality of enlistments of common militiamen.

British and Hessian troops often treated the Americans with brutality.

Alleged looting and rapine was reportedly especially widespread in New Jersey, but was reported throughout the former colonies. British raiders also reportedly looted and burned the property of tories and patriots alike.

Adding to the other British problems there developed rivalries between former officers, former colonial officers and current colonial officers still in office, especially in Canada. For example, Governor Francis Legge of Nova Scotia resented the recruitment of loyalist refugees on his turf by Joseph Gorham and Francis Maclean. Legge wanted to create a regiment in order to secure his own commission, but the others had the military reputations that he lacked and so recruits avoided Legge and signed in with Gorham and Maclean. Legge pulled political rank, appealed to Lord Dartmouth and received support from the home government for his won regiment along with a commission as colonel.

Another reason for the failure of British efforts to recruit tories was the development of British policy to encourage Amerindian raids of the patriots, especially those families living on the vast western frontier. Even the home government and its opposition in the House of Commons had some grave reservations about this barbarous practice. Americans who were closer to the frontier and who had seen or heard reports of Amerindian atrocities were usually much disturbed and resentful. Awareness of the practice of buying scalps was widespread and received almost universal rejection.

The regular army wanted to share virtually nothing with their provincial brethren. Home office policy before 1778 was never made it clear if the provincials were to draw supplies from army stores, so the army’s commissary was rarely cooperative. The provincials were rarely accorded the privilege of the regimental orderly rooms, hospitals, ambulances or nursing care. Those wounded who were unable to return to duties received no allowances, nor were there provisions for widows or orphans of those provincials killed in action. Initially, the army had opposed both the enlistment of loyalists into their units and the incorporation of loyal militia into the overall British military force.

In the first two years of the conflict, nearly 1500 tories enlisted in a dozen loyalist provincial militia units. Later, some loyalists joined these and other provincial militias because there was no real alternative. Militia service offered the displaced loyalists one of the few opportunities for employment. Others were alienated by patriot brutality toward their own families and confiscation of their property and that of their fellow tories. Still others thought the British effort was going well and that the patriots were retreating, so they chose to support the winning side, perhaps in hope of receiving rewards after the crown restored its colonial rule. For these men, the patriot victory at Saratoga in October 1777
proved to be a major shock, diminishing their belief in British victory. When news of Burgoyne’s surrender arrived in London on 2 December 1777, followed shortly by news of the entry of France in the war on 13 March 1778, the home government realized that it was faced with a real crisis. The government surmised that it would become necessary to increase enlistments in the provincial militias. In the beginning, the British had done very little recruiting among the loyalists; loyalists themselves had initiated the formation of all loyal militias. One recent author expressed the judgement that “Before British policy was reformulated in 1779 . .

. three years of confusion and sharp practices had destroyed much of the respect which Loyalists had for Great Britain.”

After the unfortunate turn of events, the British needed provincials more than ever. Troops at home were in short supply. Because France posed a true threat to Britain’s colonial outposts it was not among the reasonable policy choices to consider withdrawing troops from the other colonies. In the wake of the obvious failure of the government’s colonial policy Lord Howe’s resignation was accepted on 4 February 1778. Lord George Germain urged the new commander General Henry Clinton to attempt to recruit more colonials. Germain offered his resignation soon after. To expedite recruitment Germain suggested instituting a new policy.

By December the Board of General Officers had addressed most of the earlier deficiencies. It recommended offering three guineas as bounty for each new recruit, a guinea reward for apprehension of loyalist deserters, and an annual allowance of 40 for hospital expenses for each loyalist regiment. The home government sweetened the pot by offering permanent commissions to officers along with half-pay retirement or permanent disability. Clinton opened recruitment to runaway criminals excepting only those who had been under penalty of death; to indentured servants and apprentices; and to escaped slaves.

The results of Germain’s and Clinton’s new policies were disappointing.

In 1779 there was only a small increase in enlistments, perhaps twenty percent; while in 1780 and 1781 new recruits barely replaced desertions and those whose enlistments were expiring. A discouraged Clinton wrote Germain in December 1779, “So many attempts to raise men have totally failed of success and some corps which at first promised to be of importance have remained … in so very weak a state that there is little encouragement to undertake anything moire in this line.”

As time passed, the loyalists became ever more an excuse for British presence in the colonies. The costs of the war were taking a huge toll on British finances and opinion in and out of Parliament was turning decidedly against continuing the war. Landed gentry were reeling under increased taxation and the government was borrowing heavily again. To respond to its critics, as the government’s parliamentary majority decreased, North looked for evidence of tory suffering and readiness to contribute to the war effort. The opposition accused the government of inventing stories of persecution against the tories just to shore up their efforts when the war was going poorly. Without loyalist support both the government and the king feared that they would have to abandon the colonies, at least until the war with France was over.

By late 1778 the British colonial policy came under attack in what is known as the Howe Inquiry. The opposition in the House of Commons, wishing to embarrass the government, spent most of the parliamentary session between November 1778 and July 1779 challenging the policy of continuing the war. On 6 May 1779 General William Howe was called as a witness and immediately the government was placed on the defensive. But the better witness for the opposition was Howe’s second in command, Major-general Charles Grey, who declared that “I think that with the present force in America, there can be no expectation of ending the war by force of arms.” No cost effective way to end the war was available. Only protection of the loyalists and their property and interests could provide a reason for continuing the war.

Several of the first provincial militia units created differed substantially from other provincial regiments. They were led by qualified officers who had accumulated considerable experience in earlier wars. Recruitment was done far from patriot strongholds and especially among expatriates and loyalist refugees.

They included many experienced former soldiers and militiamen, especially Scotch Highlanders. Recruits were allowed to assist in selecting their own officers.

Bounties for land served as inducements for enlisting. The British expected these early militia units to perform the same duties and functions as regular army units.

They were special units specifically chosen to perform certain duties in clearly defined areas. The home government did not intend to replace any army units with provincial militia as a matter of general policy. Among the early provincial militia units were Maclean’s Royal Highland Emigrant Regiment and Gorham’s Royal Fensible Americans. Joseph Gorham was a former frontier ranger and Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs. In December 1775 Gorham bragged that he had enlisted 300 former patriot riflemen into the tory militia. General Francis Maclean was himself a Highlander who had been an officer in the Seven Years War who had remained in America.

When British troops occupied a town, township, county or city they ordinarily sought out the loyalist leaders and urged them to form a militia. Like their patriot brethren they mustered on a regular schedule, set by the muster-master.

Commonly they practiced six times a year and had mini-musters once a month.

Even though most loyalists were members of the Church of England they usually had no association with the church, as especially their calvinist-puritan brethren had in New England.

Most Tory militia were urban, although Indian Affairs Superintendent John Stuart and Sir John Johnson (1742-1830), son of Sir William Johnson, and Colonel Guy Johnson ( -1788), nephew of Sir William, were somewhat successful in raising several loyalist militia companies on the frontier. Sir William Johnson, known widely as the Lord of the Mohawks, had died in 1774 and neither his son John nor his nephew Guy had quite the influence over the Six Nations that William had enjoyed. Sir John assumed the position of Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Both of the second generation Johnsons had left New York with an appropriate number of Iroquois retainers and migrated to Canada. They constantly pressured Canadian Governor Guy Carleton to assist them in raising a large of warriors from the Six Nations and united empire loyalists and to equip them for a punitive expedition against the rebellious colonies. They were quite confident that a mixed Tory and Amerindian force of considerable size might be recruited.

Carleton, knowing something of Amerindian outrages against caucasians, refused and Guy Johnson left for England. Lieutenant-colonel John Butler assumed Guy Johnson’s position as Deputy Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Butler sided strongly with John Johnson (1742-1830) and worked very hard to increase the respect and friendship of the Iroquois nations. In May 1777, with the war entering its third year, and dreams of swift victory long vanished, the home government decided to accept the Johnsons’ proposal. It ordered Carleton to give his fullest cooperation to their plan. The Johnsons and Butler were joined by John Boxstader who led a combined Tory and Amerindian force near Currietown and Ourlagh, New York, massacring and scalping frontiersmen.

Atrocities occurred on both sides, especially when undisciplined militia captured militiamen of the opposite side. Some loyalists considered the patriots to be traitors and, when in command of loyalist volunteers or militia, treated them accordingly. In New York City, during the British occupation, many tories and their families gathered. In 1780 many American loyalists, huddled together under British protection in New York City, organized into an association independent of British military control called The Honorable Board of Associated Loyalists. This unit was commanded by William Franklin, once royalist Governor of New Jersey.

William Cunningham of New York city was Provost Marshal and a dedicated Tory.

When given care of captured patriot militia or regulars, he provided as little care as was humanly possible to give. He privately hung 250 patriots and was responsible for the deaths of another 2000 who died of exposure or starvation while under his care.

Some patriots reacted to this violence with violence of their own. When tory militia and regulars were active in Virginia the legislature assigned local militia units to the task of minimizing the damage. The leader of one of these patriot militias was Colonel Charles Lynch (1736-1796) of Bedford County. His reputation grew as the most successful Tory hunters and the legend grew that he regularly hanged (“lynched”) Tory incendiaries and looters, although it is probable that he had most of them flogged rather than hanged. The term lynching applied ever after to an extra-legal execution. Georgia militiamen took a Lieutenant Kemp, an officer in the King’s Rangers. They stripped and then killed him along with nine of his men for refusing to renounce the king. Eleven of the patriots who took Kemp were later taken by prisoner by tory militiamen and hanged. Militia captured a Captain Jones, member of Ganey’s Tory Militia, initially treating him as a prisoner of war. Having determined to their satisfaction that he was a bandit, they killed him in front of his family and burned his house. Colonel Grierson of the Georgia Loyal Militia, was initially made prisoner of war, but later executed at Fort Cornwallis, allegedly in retaliation for the murder of some patriot prisoners of war. Private citizens often acted like lynching mobs, literally applying tar and feathers, as in the following.

The 6th of December at Quibble Town, Middlesex County, Pisquata Township, North Jersey, Thomas Randolph, Cooper, who had publickly proved himself an Enemy to his Country, by reviling and using his utmost Endeavours to oppose the Proceedings of the Continental and Provincial Conventions and Committees, in Defence of their Rights and Liberties; and he being adjudged a Person of not Consequence enough for a severer Punishment, was ordered to be stripped naked, well coated with Tar and Feathers, and carried in a Waggon publickly round the Town — which Punishment was accordingly inflicted; and as he soon became duly sensible of his Offence, for which he earnestly begged Pardon, and promised to atone as far as he was able, by a contrary Behavior for the future, he was released and suffered to return to his House in less than Half an Hour. The Whole was conducted with that Regularity and Decorum, that ought to be observed in all publick Punishments.

Tories carried on a ceaseless system of irregular warfare, accompanied by relentless devastation, following the methods of the savage Amerindians with whom they were frequently allied. Most military authorities have concluded that the war was decided by the regularly organized forces, and these irregular operations served primarily to embitter and prolong the struggle. At times, however, the activities of irregulars assumed special importance. In the South, Tarleton’s men were victorious until the Battle of Cowpens, and the presence of some many loyalists shaped to a large degree British military policy and planning there. In southern New York, Royalist Governor Tyron carried fire and sword through the Hudson Valley and into Connecticut and New Jersey. In northern New York, Sir John Johnson and Colonel Butler made incursions into the Mohawk, Schoharie and Wyoming valleys, retiring into Canada when necessary.

At its height of power Butler’s Rangers was 700 men strong.

The war produced a significant number of notorious tory marauders.

Claudius Smith of Orange County, New York, was a leader of a merciless band of marauders who sided with the loyalists. His one son was killed while raiding settlers’ homes on Long Island. Smith was captured on Long Island and hanged.

His surviving son Richard swore revenge, vowing to kill six patriots for every tory hanged. Another maurading band was led by John and Robert Smith of Pennsylvania. Their tory irregulars murdered the tax collector of Chester County.

So vicious were their raids that continental authorities offered a $20,000 reward for their capture. In May 1780 they were arrested in Monmouth County, New Jersey, and there executed. A reward for the capture of David Sproat, also of Pennsylvania, was posted because of his torture and ill treatment of Whigs taken prisoner.

Thomas Terry, a local leader of tory resistance in the Wyoming Valley of Pennsylvania, reportedly killed his own mother, father-in-law and children in a raid. One of the nastiest marauders was a Colonel Scophol, described as “illiterate, stupid, noisy blockhead” who led a band of 300 to 400 irregulars, named after him, called the Scopholies.

Evan Thomas recruited and commanded a company of loyal militia in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. He worked in close cooperation with the Queen’s Rangers. Valentine Shockley, a native of Maryland, a bandit and counterfeiter, led an irregular force in the area of York County, Pennsylvania, until captured and executed in 1779. Mordecai Daugherty was a notorious horse thief turned tory plunderer in Bucks County. Tory militia Lieutenant-colonel Jeromus Lott of Long Island, New York, was infamous for his cruelty toward Whig captives and prisoners of war. Weart Barta was a noted tory marauder, formerly a common thief, who escaped to Shelburne, Nova Scotia, as patriots closed in on him. One of the most notorious tory raiders was a murderer known variously as Burke and Emmons who operated out of deep pine woods in New Jersey. William Hovendon was a captain in both the Queen’s Rangers and Tarleton’s Legion. His irregular militia’s raids in and near Philadelphia deprived the colonists of badly needed clothing and supplies. Jacob James, a captain in the British Legion, was a raider and horse thief near Philadelphia. His real specialty was kidnapping patriots for ransom. After the local patriot militia began to track him, he moved south and joined Tarleton. He was captured and executed in North Carolina.

One of the major functions of the loyalists was to mobilize opposition to the war for independence among the patriots. This policy makes a great deal of sense when we recall that one of the crown’s erroneous presumptions was that most Americans were truly loyal to the king and mother country and had been induced to rebel only because of pressures brought upon them by radicals like John Hancock and Samuel Adams. On occasion the British were successful in recruiting militia from among the American prisoners of war. Brigadier Hammell, once aide to General James Clinton, was converted to the loyalist cause by Sir Henry Clinton.

The British charged Hammell with raising a regiment of American militia deserters. John McNee was hanged in 1778 for recruiting tories for loyalist militia service in New Jersey. His principal crime was attempting to induce patriots to desert Washington’s army during the winter of 1777-1778. Beginning in early 1779 Sir Henry Clinton offered 0/22/6 to each European who deserted from Washington’s army.

Still, the two principal functions of the loyalist militias remained unchanged throughout the war. First, they were to fill the ever increasing need for manpower. As their numbers dwindled, many loyalists were incorporated within regular army units. The Caledonian Volunteers were raised in Philadelphia, and, in 1778, had as their commander Sir William Cathcart. Later this body was composed of both cavalry and infantry and was known as the British Legion.

Attached to it was a troop of the 17th Regular Dragoons, who continued to wear their old uniform while the legion cavalry had a special uniform with green facings; and for that reason were known as Tarleton’s Green Horse after their last and best known commander. The legion sailed for Charleston with Clinton and surrendered at Yorktown with 24 officers and 209 men. Lord Rawdon raised in Philadelphia in 1777 the Volunteers of Ireland, composed chiefly of Irish-American deserters and Loyalists. This body was present at Hobkirk Hill and Camden. De Lacey’s Brigade was raised around New York early in the war and consisted of three battalions of 500 men each. Two of these battalions in November 1778, joined Colonel Archibald Campbell in Georgia.

Second, the loyal militia were to work on the frontier with those Amerindians who were loyal to the crown, functioning as terrorists. One of the Tories’ principal contributions, especially in New York and Pennsylvania, was the recruiting of Amerindians to raid the patriots. Donald McDonald, a loyalist of New York, was killed leading his mixed band of tory raiders and Amerindians on an assault on Herkimer, New York. McDonald carried “a silver mounted tomahawk on which 30 notches for scalps taken were engraved.”

Toryism in New England and New York

The British authorities expected to obtain little support in New England, especially among the Calvinist Protestants, but entertained somewhat more optimistic concerning New York. Some Boston merchants, high art tradesmen and Anglican clergy supported the home government, while other loyalists from all over New England gathered in Boston under the protection of the occupying army.

When the patriots forced the English army out of Boston, nearly all active loyalists accompanied them, most emigrating to Canada. In New York, Anglicans and aristocratic English emigrants had prospered from the time that the Duke of York had captured the city. The loyalist population was sufficiently large to support a newspaper, the Royal Gazette, at least as long as the British troops occupied that urban enclave. Probably more loyalist militia were recruited in and around New York City than anywhere north of the Carolinas. Still greater promise for royal support appeared among the Iroquois of New York.

In early 1776 an American tory correspondent wrote to a London newspaper, claiming optimistically that “we have 60,000 [men] now in pay; besides twice as many militia.” Another American wrote to his friend in London that “5000 men are constantly at work” in New York and were in a “warlike posture.”

In addition, “there is also 15 or 20,000 men ready to go to their assistance.” These were in addition to 5000 to 6000 men in Quebec and 2000 in Boston. In 1777
the Tory newspaper of Philadelphia, the Pennsylvania Ledger, boasted that the New York counties of Albany, Westchester and Dutchess had supplied 6000
loyalist militiamen. In December 1777 both Rivington’s New York tory newspaper, The Royal Gazette and the Philadelphia tory Pennsylvania Ledger urged loyalists to join the tory militia and fight for what was rightfully theirs and to defend their homes, families and property. They urged Tories to join, claiming that they constituted a majority in urban New York, as well as in other urban centers, and that a small show of force would convince many faint-hearted loyalists to join their militia. In November 1777 Clinton received information that there were “thousands” of loyalists within the territory which the British occupied. “They should be immediately armed,” Theophilus Bache wrote, each company should be consist of 50 privates.” In Queens alone there were already 1500 loyalist militiamen and this was only a tiny portion of those who might be enlisted.

Clinton agreed that there were many potential loyalist militiamen, but he thought they would be useful in case of extreme emergency, such as invasion by Washington’s army because they were merchants and tradesmen who had businesses to attend to. Clinton failed in large to follow up on the ideas and suggestions to improve the New York loyalist militias. By October 1782 there were far fewer militiamen than loyalist had planned, with only 2958 names still active on the rolls. Colonel Walton claimed 651 and Colonel Leake had 514, but most other lists were sorely depleted. The tory newspapers served as recruiting agents for loyalist units. As late as August 1782 William Brant was seeking men for loyalist units in Rivington’s New York newspaper.

In the last decades before the war for independence New York politics was dominated by up-state manor-lords living a semi-feudal life along the Mohawk and Hudson Rivers. Two political parties vied for control of the colony. The established church and tory interests were represented by the DeLancey faction, while the Presbyterian and whig faction was headed by the Livingston family.

When an anti-rent revolt of impoverished farmers broke out in 1766 the two factions joined to suppress it with a vengeance. Both parties opposed British policy after the Seven Years War to some degree, although power remained with moderate conservatives. New York City politics was controlled by wealthy merchants, many of whom profited from the Indian trade, and upper level tradesmen, tavern-keepers, free professionals and clergy of the Church of England.

Later, when war came, both the New York City and the up-state Livingston and Delancey factions generally became tories. New York City remained the tory stronghold as the British army occupied it, giving haven to loyalists from all the former colonies throughout the war.

After the war, when loyalist claims were submitted to the British government, there were 1106 claimants from New York out of a total population of 203,747 in 1776. This figure made New York seventh of the thirteen colonies in population. New York thus had the highest percentage of loyalist claims of any colony, suggesting a large loyalist population. The state supplied approximately 23,500 men for loyalist militias and the British army, the largest number by far of all the colonies.

The most famous of all tories was Benedict Arnold (1741-1801), a hero of early Whig campaigns. As early as May 1779 Arnold, recipient of much patriot criticism for his administration as military commander in the Philadelphia area, had begun to correspond with the British authorities. General Clinton in New York sensed the opportunity to demoralize the patriots by recruiting one of their most able and popular commanders, personally supervised the negotiations. It is certain that on 23 May, Arnold sent Clinton information on Washington’s troop movements and deployment. In late July, Clinton denied Arnold’s request for a bounty of 10,000. On 26 January 1780 a court martial found Arnold guilty of mismanagement in Philadelphia and on 6 April, General Washington officially reprimanded Arnold. On 15 June he informed Clinton that he expected to be placed in command of West Point, a vital fortress commanding the Hudson River.

On 12 July he wrote Major Andr, Clinton’s adjutant, that he was prepared, upon receiving command, to surrender West Point to Clinton. On 5 August, Arnold officially took command of West Point and on 21 September, he met with Andr.

On 23 September, Andr was captured in civilian clothes (against Clinton’s specific orders) along with incriminating papers. At this point Arnold was not under suspicion and the New York militiamen who had captured Andr sent word of Andr‘s plot to Arnold. Arnold fled to the British man o’ war, Vulture. Andr was tried as a spy and executed on 30 September. Arnold received 6315 in cash, an annual pension of 500 for his wife, the former Peggy Shippen, army commissions for his three sons by a previous marriage and annual pensions of 100 for Peggy’s five children.

Arnold led raids in Virginia between December 1780 and April 1781; and against New London, Connecticut, on 6 September 1781. Thomas Menzies of New York (1733-1831) had commanded a loyalist regiment, the American Legion, but yielded command to Arnold after the latter’s defection.

Some New York loyalist militia units raided into New England, especially into the coastal towns of Connecticut, during the most of the war, and in 1780-81, into the Carolinas. Between December 1776 and October 1779 tory militia from Kingsbridge and Flushing Fly served as troops of occupation in Rhode Island.

Tory militia served with Lord Percy at Newport. In March 1778 Captain Michael Martin of Massachusetts formed a tory militia in Rhode Island under British protection and sponsorship. One of the more interesting tory militia units of the Revolution was Whitmore’s Greencoats. The first important authority on the loyalists described this unit as being comprised of 127 “deserters and refugees from the Whigs.” It was reported to be an occupation force in Rhode Island, but any other service is unknown.

Montefort Browne, former lieutenant-governor of West Florida, was commissioned a brigadier-general and given the charge in July 1776 to raise a militia regiment which he named Prince of Wales American Volunteers. Aided by Stephen Hoit of Norwalk, Connecticut, within a few months Browne had over 300
men. On 25 April 1777 Browne’s militia joined Major-General William Tryon’s expedition against Danbury, Connecticut. They lost 20 killed, 90 wounded and 20
captured, while destroying some patriot supplies. Tories joined Browne’s force in large numbers during the summer of 1777 so that its strength was then recorded at 466 men. One group of wealthy gentlemen even declined pay. In August 1778

General Clinton arrived in Newport to relieve a patriot siege. He found that the patriots had left the day before he arrived, but he left a fresh tory militia, the Prince of Wales American Volunteers, in occupation of Newport. In the autumn of 1779

Colonel Thomas Pattinson became the new commander. At that time there were 459 militiamen in the unit. Pattinson attacked patriot forces at Flushing Fly, Long Island, and then departed in April 1780 to assist loyalists in the Carolinas.

A loyalist reporter presented the tory position early in the conflict, immediately following the events of Lexington and Concord. The correspondent’s hero extolled the virtues of his hero, General Timothy Ruggles (1711-1795).

Ruggles had been a mandamus councillor who initially had taken refuge in Boston.

He was Associate Justice of the Massachusetts Court of Common Pleas and a veteran of the Seven Years War. Ruggles had proposed creating associations of Royalists throughout the country with constitutions binding the signers to oppose at risk of life the acts of all unconstitutional assemblies, such as committees and congresses. Nothing came of his plan. Now a brigadier-general, Ruggles had fought with Sir William Johnson, joined John Johnson’s sons’ band of tories.

Ruggles also attempted to recruit loyalist militia in Boston and fled the city when the British army left. He formed a loyalist militia of 300 men in Nova Scotia, although the unit saw little action in the war. General Howe, while in Boston in 1775, raised the Royal American Associators under General Ruggles and the Loyal Irish Volunteers, commanded by Colonel Forest. These tory militia did guard duty in the city.

The American correspondent of a London newspaper expressed his view that General Gage had been too lenient with the patriots and that had he given them a whiff of gunpowder early on, the whole rebellion might have been prevented.

Brigadier General Ruggles of the Massachusetts, Colonel Babcock of Rhode Island and Colonel Fetch of Connecticut, are staunch to government; the first, you know commanded and was the senior officer in the provincial service with us under Sir Jeffery Amherst; the other Gentlemen are at the head of the provincials. Most of their officers that served last war are ready to serve under their old Colonels. I make no doubt things will wear a new face here, especially when your sentiments of the Ministry’s firmness are authenticated… . Men of property, whom Most sensible people here, I should suppose, [are] interested as much as any in the matter, [and] are of this opinion, and say that one master is better than a thousand, and that they would rather be oppressed by a King than by a rascally mob. ‘Tis not only reducing everybody to a level, but it is entirely reversing the matter, and making the mob their masters… . in America, the distinction between Whigs and Tories prevail as much at present as ever it did in England. Every man who will not drink destruction to his King, is a Tory, and liable to tar and feathers. In the east and southern provinces they are in actual rebellion, raising troops, and seizing ammunition in the most daring manner; the common people are mad, they only hear one side of the question, and believe they are oppressed because they are told so, which is all they know of the matter. As the fever is very high, a little bleeding is absolutely necessary. General Gage is by far too lenient in his measures, and had a few been killed at first, the rest would have been quiet; now multitudes must un-avoidably suffer. Was the royal standard hoisted, thousands would flock to it, that are as yet afraid to declare their sentiments. It is expected in a little time, and should it happen before we quit the continent, I would not be the last to repair to it. If I must light a match, it shall be for King George. I do not wish it but I think I would not shun it.

New England may have been a hotbed of patriot agitation for independence, and the site of the first clash between English troops and patriot militiamen, but it also had its loyalists. Some of these Tories assisted New York loyalists in conducting raids against the smaller coastal towns of New England.

The first loyalist militia raised in the colonies was raised in the fall of 1774 by Colonel Thomas Gilbert in Bristol County, Massachusetts, at the request of General Thomas Gage who had replaced Thomas Hutchinson as governor of the province. Gilbert was a veteran of the French and Indian War and a member of the provincial assembly. He was best known for his strong opposition to the Boston Tea Party of 1773, and introduced resolutions in the assembly condemning this as an act of treason and rebellion. In the autumn of 1774 he asked for and received 300 stands of arms from Gage for his militia which was stationed at Freetown. In March 1775 Gilbert wrote a letter to James Wallace, commander of the royal ship Rose, stating that he expected to be attacked at any moment by “thousands” of patriot militiamen, and asking for help when that attack came. Gage promised to send 300 men if needed. The letter to the Rose was intercepted and read in April before the Congress of Massachusetts which condemned Gilbert as an enemy of the province. Patriot militia attacked his house and took his militiamen prisoner.

Gilbert escaped to the Rose. He then fled to Boston. The English press reported, One Colonel Gilbert, a high Prerogative man in Boston Government, … with 60 or 70 of his neighbors, armed himself; they agreed to defend themselves from the insults of the Sons of Liberty; but some Militia men, zealous in their cause, went in chase of them. The colonel took refuge on board a man of war in the harbor. The others, except 20, made their escape; these 20 are now confined in Providence Gaol, where they were conducted yesterday evening. What will be the event, time must discover.

Shortly after the clash between British troops and American militia men at Lexington, loyalists flocked to Boston and joined there to create four militia organizations, Loyal Irish Volunteers, Loyal Associated Volunteers, Loyal North British Volunteers and Loyal American Associators, which cooperated closely with one another. Two of the leaders were Sir William Pepperrell and Colonel Abijah Willard of Worcester County. Pepperrell, a Harvard graduate and lawyer, fled to Boston and by late 1775 to England.

Patrick and James McMaster was merchants of Boston and Portsmouth, New Hampshire. In the five years prior to the Revolution they imported goods from Britain valued in excess of 15,000. They pledged a significant portion of their wealth to the Loyal North British Volunteers. The scheme failed and they departed, never to return to the colonies. In March 1776 Patrick left with the British troops to go to Halifax, Nova Scotia. James resettled in Shelburne, Nova Scotia, with a number of other merchants and professionals. Another leader of the Loyal North British Volunteers was William McAlpine, a printer and bookbinder who operated a large stationary store in Boston. Realizing that patriot spies had reported him and that he would be arrested after the British left, he accompanied them to Halifax and the moved to Scotland, leaving behind property valued at 1800.

James Forrest, a wealthy Boston merchant, not only recruited the loyalist company known as the Loyal Irish Volunteers, he financed it. He chose a white cockade worn in the hat as the militia company’s distinguishing mark. Eventually it numbered 97 men who were assigned to evening and night guard duties in Boston. In 1776, while on a return voyage from the West Indies with military supplies, a patriot privateer captured Forrest who was imprisoned in Philadelphia.

The Loyal New England Militia consisted, at peak strength, of 112 men, divided into three companies and included a small group of tory militiamen from New Hampshire, Connecticut and Rhode Island. It was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Wightman and was usually noted as in training on Long Island.

On their first attempt to attack Bedford their boat was blown off course and ended up at Falmouth instead. They bombarded the town, but did little damage. Their second attack was likewise unproductive, so on 19 June they withdrew to New York city. At the end of March 1779 the Loyal Associated Refugees and other provincial loyalist militia under the command of Edward Winslow, and acting under general orders from British General Richard Prescott, prepared an attack on Bedford, Long Island. Additional loyalists militia deployed included Wentworth’s Volunteers and the Loyal New England Militia [or Loyal New Englanders.

Elisha Jones was the colonel of the Middlesex County militia and in 1774
he commanded a troop of militia which opposed the patriots who were becoming active in his county. After Lexington he moved to Boston and worked with the loyalist militia. He left Boston with the British troops and was active in the New York loyalist militia. Most of his recruits were educated men, several being Harvard graduates. He helped train four companies of New York loyalist militia.

Crean Brush of Cumberland County, New Hampshire Grants, in January 1776 approached Sir William Howe in Boston. Brush claimed that he could enlist at least 300 men in a tory militia and asked for arms, supplies and official authorization to do so. Howe agreed and on 10 March Howe instructed him to proceed with the confiscation of property of certain designated rebels. Brush and his militia carried their plunder onto Howe’s ships in Boston harbor. Seeing Brush plundering in the name of the British government, other lawless elements joined in, not from conviction, but from the sheer delight of securing stolen merchandise.

Quite a few warehouses, many not on Howe’s list, were sacked in the final days of the siege of Boston harbor. Patriots captured one ship filled with plunder to the value of 100,000, the Elizabeth, and Brush himself. Brush was confined in jail for 19 months, ending the threat from his Tories.

In January 1775 Captain Nesbitt Balfour in Boston received word that a tory militia some 200 strong had formed in Marshfield. They were under threat of attack from patriots, so they requested arms and supplies from Balfour. On 23

January Balfour and 100 British troops marched to their relief. A few days after Lexington the militia and Balfour returned to Boston. Several thousand patriots pursued them, but the Tories and the British troops embarked on ships and, after the evacuation of Boston, went to Halifax.

In the spring of 1775 Lieutenant-Colonel Allen MacLead raised the Royal Highland Emigrants, a regiment of Scotch and old British soldiers, which operated from Canada. Governor Tryon of New York, in 1776, recently promoted to provisional major general, raised a force of 1300 men and a troop of light horse.

His lieutenant-governor, Philip S. Kene ( -1810), a surveyor by profession, and militia commander and hero of Crown Point in the Seven Years War, raised a loyal regiment of militia in the Philadelphia area. Henry Thomas (1746-1828) recruited and commanded another troop of loyalist militia. A former judge of the Court of Common Pleas, Elijah Miles (1752-1831), served as a tory militia colonel, working with DeLancey’s Third Battalion. Lieutenant-colonel John Turnbull commanded the New York Volunteers, also called the Third American Loyal Regiment. He and his militia distinguished themselves at the Siege of Savannah in 1779 and in 1780 at Rocky Mount, North Carolina, and Ninety-Six, North Carolina.

When General John Burgoyne invaded New York he brought with him Jessup’s Corps of Loyal Militia which operated from Canada into New York.

Peter’s Loyalists’ Corps took part in the Battle of Bennington. Barry St. Leger, in his advance on Albany, brought with him Johnson’s Royal Greens.

In mid-July 1776 a British naval officer, Captain John Bowater, aboard H. M. S. Centurion reported that “Governor Tryon landed and has summoned the Militia who has sent their arms to him on Board [H.M.S. Duchess of Gordon] lest they should fall into the hands of the Rebels.” Nonetheless, Bowater thought the Tory militia “now emboldened and in high spirits.” The patriots “are said to have 40,000 Men in Arms, but I don’t give them credit for half that number.” Many of the first rebels “desert to us hourly and what is better still, they bring their arms with them.” The reason was simple. “General Howe has let them know that he will give a 10 Reward for Rifle guns.” In the winter of 1776 another naval officer, Lieutenant William Fielding, recorded that in November 1776 “two light companies of militia under Major Batt, Royal F Americans, sailed out at 5 o’clock in the morning [from Halifax] and surprised the Banditti Rebels and Indians in their Camp” on Long Island.

Benjamin Thompson organized on Long Island and commanded the King’s American Dragoons in 1780. Later, he raised the Loyal American Regiment which he took to Charleston where he attempted to neutralize Francis Marion’s partisans.

Colonel Edmund Fanning formed on Long Island a provisional regiment of 460
men called the Associated Refugees which operated around Huntington.

One of the most distinguished Loyalists corps was the Queen’s Rangers, originally raised in New York and Connecticut by the old frontier ranger of the Seven Years War, Major Robert Rogers. Rogers made several attempts to secure a commission from the patriots, although the exact details are unknown. In early 1776 Rogers offered to raise a loyal regiment to be called the Queen’s Rangers.

Rogers, following established colonial policy, offered commissions to any man who could recruit a specified number of men. Regular army commanders objected, arguing that there was no proof that any of Rogers’ officers were qualified to command men in battle. The unit first mustered on Staten Island, New York, in August 1776. It drew heavily on loyalists from New York, New Hampshire and Connecticut. Rogers’ fame helped him recruit over 400 men. Under extreme pressure from British command, he was eventually forced to resign and 23 of his officers were relieved of duties. Rogers went into retirement in England. His militia, under Major John Graves Simcoe, joined Howe in Philadelphia. It was part of Howe’s force at the Battle of Germantown. The Queen’s Rangers was later commanded by colonels French and Wemyss.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Graves Simcoe succeeded Rogers as the commandant of the Queen’s Rangers. This corps claimed the exclusive privilege of recruiting in addition to Americans, the “old countrymen” as Europeans were then called, and many American deserters were found in its ranks. First it was an infantry Organization but Simcoe formed a troop of hussars. The foot were distinguished by their green coats and white breeches; the hussars were entirely in green, armed with swords, pistols and daggers. This corps while operating around Philadelphia in 1777 had 270 foot and 30 horse and they also had an Amusette, a piece of artillery already described. They were with the Charleston expedition and were with Benedict Arnold in Virginia; surrendering at Yorktown with a strength of 39 officers and 273 men.

To neutralize the power of the loyalists, several New York patriot organizations ordered seizure of arms owned by suspected tories. These arms were issued to patriot militias, although the committees at least initially intended to pay for the arms. At this point their purpose was more the disarmament of the tories than the confiscation of their property. In the autumn of 1776 Brigadier-General Timothy Ruggles of Halifax began training tory militia on Long Island and Staten Island. He claimed to have between three and four hundred recruits. Two tory militia regiments, recruited in large in New York, were sent to the West Indies in 1777. They were especially successful under Banastre Tarleton’s leadership in the Carolinas. Three large tory militia detachments served in the autumn of 1778 in Georgia. By early 1779 four additional Tory militia regiments had gathered in British Florida and then joined the tory militia already stationed in Georgia.

John Johnson, son of Sir William Johnson, raised in Canada the King’s Royal American Regiment of two battalions, each consisting of 500 men. New York contained many Loyalists. Thomas Millidge (1735-1816), former surveyor-general of New Jersey, served as a major in loyalist militia. The King’s Royal American Regiment had recruited a number of Mohawk Indians. The impact, brutality and fury of their raids compelled Washington to send General John Sullivan into the Indian country to neutralize them.

General Burgoyne invaded New York in the late spring 1777 from Canada, planning to descend the St. Lawrence River, cross Lake Ontario and advance through the Mohawk Valley on Albany. “Gentleman Johnny’s” army of 3700 men included over 300 loyalist and Canadian militiamen and a large group of Amerindians. One of the primary reason for Burgoyne’s defeat was his failure to make connections with Barry St. Ledger’s tory militia, and to utilize properly other loyalist militia. St. Ledger commanded a force of about 1800, primarily loyalists and Amerindians, who were advancing from Oswego on Lake Ontario westward. On 3 August St. Ledger’s force surrounded Fort Stanwix where Colonel Peter Gansevoort (1749-1812) commanded a force of 750 militia and regulars.

General Nicholas Herkimer (1728-1777) led a relief force of 800 militiamen toward Fort Stanwix, but on 6 August at Oriskany it was ambushed by a mixed force of loyalists and Amerindians led by Mohawk sachem Joseph Brant (1742-1807). In this, Brant was aided by a Dutchman, Barent Frey, who was influential with the Mohawks. Herkimer was wounded almost immediately, but took the high ground and fought effectively. The battle attracted Gansevoort’s attention and he made a sortie from the fort. The Amerindians retreated and Herkimer withdrew, with his force reduced by half. Benedict Arnold raised a force of 1000 volunteers and soon after St. Ledger called off the attack at Fort Stanwix, retreating to Oswego on 22 August. On 17 October 1778 Burgoyne surrendered his remaining force of 5700 men. Among those of Brant’s recruits killed was Charles Smith, a notorious renegade. Smith was scalped and the trophy was sent to General John Stark.

There were, in fact, numerous loyalist militiamen awaiting orders in the upper Connecticut Valley. Loyalist militia had conducted raids in the backwoods of Vermont and New Hampshire. There were many Tories in the Upper Connecticut River Valley, in or near Claremont and Haverhill. There the Church of England was established in opposition to calvinistic teachings found elsewhere in New England. Among the leaders of loyalism were Samuel Cole and Ranna Cossit, both Episcopal priests. By November 1775 the Provincial Congress at Exeter had heard of the tory activities and had ordered the Committee of Safety of Claremont to “Examine sundry Persons who were suspected of being inimical to the Liberties of America.” The local committee sought and received help from the neighboring towns of Hanover, Cornish and Lebanon. The Committee interrogated 26 suspected tory leaders and they agreed to surrender their firearms and ammunition. The initial intimidation of potential tory leadership did much to prevent significant tory action and recruitment of tory militiamen.

As the home government had suggested to Canadian Governor Guy Carleton, it would be highly desirable to create a diversion on the frontier, to bring great pressures on the national government of the rebellious colonies and to squeeze the already hyper-extended resources of the Continental Army.

Amerindian and tory raids on the vast frontier offered a most desirable and relatively inexpensive way to implement this policy decision. English presents and offers of virtually unlimited supplies and firearms enticed the Six Nations. Colonel Guy Johnson returned from England, bringing the arms, gunpowder and other gifts and supplies as promised. Colonel John Butler and Sir John Johnson had spun their web well and the Indians chose to take the war path. Butler, meanwhile, had been equally active among the Tories, talking with and enlisting both those still in the new nation and those who had already fled to Canada. With the armament of the mixed tory and Amerindian completed, Butler sortied out in late 1777, staging at first only sporadic raids in New York and Pennsylvania. With increasing intensity these raids would continue for five years and had the desired effect.

In March 1777 Butler received the long-awaited permission of Governor Carleton to form the Tory militia. He recruited its membership primarily from among the loyalist refugees. Recruitment was bolstered by Carleton’s offer of a bounty to all who enlisted, including 200 acres of land. In September Butler added six companies of Tory rangers to his marauding Amerindian band. By September 1781 Butler had recruited no less than ten companies of Tory rangers.

Butler surmised that his greatest chance of success lay in moving into the two areas known to harbor the largest number of loyalists and to recruit among these people to augment his strength. Moreover, loyalists in these areas would be likely to provide supplies. In the Wyoming Valley in northeast Pennsylvania there had been a bloody and bitter confrontation between Connecticut and Pennsylvania authorities over ownership of the land. Tories in this area usually identified with Pennsylvania’s claims over the ardent Connecticut patriots. In the southwestern corner the dispute over land title involved Pennsylvania and Virginia. Those who had identified with Virginia often refused to sign the oath of allegiance to Pennsylvania and thus were marked as Tories. The disputes had been settled but there was still much disaffection among those who lost land titles and who otherwise suffered from the settlements. Butler received support from Colonel William Plunkett, an Irish robber who had found safety in America about 1750.

His base of activity was Sunbury, Northumberland County, Pennsylvania.

In the summer of 1778 Butler and the Johnsons felt sufficiently confident in their force to begin to wage real war. Between 3 July and 11 November 1778

Sir John Butler and Sir John Johnson led a mixed force of Indians and tory militia against the white settlers of New York and Pennsylvania. The attack originated on the New York frontier, and quickly turned south into Pennsylvania. In a major sweep through the Wyoming Valley of Pennsylvania, Butler’s men killed hundreds of settlers and their families. On 3 July the Battle of Wyoming, known better to patriots as the Wyoming Massacre, took place with a resultant heavy loss of life among the patriot settlers. On 11 November the Johnson’s force, which included Joseph Brant’s Indians of the Six Nations, destroyed settlements in the Cherry Valley, New York, massacring 40 persons after they had surrendered. The war was so intense that Congress diverted badly needed troops from the main war effort to come to the rescue of the beleaguered settlers. It dispatched General John Sullivan in the summer of 1779 to contain the Tory militias and their Amerindian allies. On 26 August 1779 Sullivan met the enemy forces near present day Elmira, New York, and defeated them soundly. He also burned forty Indian villages and destroyed an estimated 160,000 bushels of corn.

In New York city a considerable number of loyalists served as militiamen, primarily deployed in garrison duty in and around the city in forts, redoubts and checkpoints. Some were Tories who had fled Boston with Howe’s army and now operated in and around New York city. In March 1777 Lord Howe commissioned Colonel George Wightman of Rhode Island to raise a regiment of Loyal New England Militia in New York. Edward Winslow raised a tory militia in Rhode Island in March 1779 in association with James Clarke of Rhode Island and George Leonard of Massachusetts. It was called the Loyal Associated Refugees. Clarke was secretary for the Association of Loyal Refugees, formed at Newport, Rhode Island, in March 1779 to “retaliate upon and make reprisal against the inhabitants of the several Provinces in America in actual rebellion against their Sovereign.”

He worked with the British commander in Rhode Island, issuing commissions in the militia. Winslow formed a loyalist naval militia late in the war. During the summer and autumn of 1779 it was responsible for capturing 18 vessels, 10 of which were loaded with supplies the patriots sorely needed. They also reported having seized 3000 heads of livestock and captured 35 patriots. They sold their plunder for 23,400.

Toryism in the Middle Colonies

The middle colonies had a substantial loyalist population. Several prominent loyalists, including Daniel Leonard, drew up a plan for establishing a loyalist stronghold on the eastern seaboard. Leonard was a prominent, if aristocratic, Boston lawyer and was one of the most able and literate of the loyalists. He had expounded the tory cause in a series of papers addressed to “the Inhabitants of the Province of Massachusetts” and signed with the pen name Massachusettensis. His arguments were drawn heavily on Thomas Hobbes. John Adams had considered these papers worthy of his attention and had responded in papers signed Novan-glus. Should such a safe haven be created, with peace guaranteed by the British army backed by tory militia, Leonard believed that many loyalists would defect and enter the safe zone and there be gathered as his majesty’s loyal subjects. Leonard considered several sites for his loyalist community, among them the eastern shore of Maryland, Delaware and the greater Philadelphia area. The first key ingredient was a successful British invasion of the chosen area. Second, the British must secure the area so that all Tories could gather organize in an atmosphere of relative security. Third, the British must transport known loyalists from other areas and resettle them in the secure zone. Finally, the loyalists must themselves form a strong protective wing, a powerful and well-armed militia. The plan suggested that a minimum number of militia would have to be 10,000 to 12,000 men.

There were about 5000 tories in New Jersey during the Revolution, of which about 1200 were determined to have openly aided, or fought for, the enemy. This was one of the largest and most influential loyalist groups of loyalists in the new nation. There had been no sharp class distinctions or incidents of abuses by the wealthier citizens, so most inhabitants were neither disposed to support independence nor exert themselves to preserve union. As in most colonies, citizens chose sides merely on whim of the moment, according to successes of one or another side, or because of friendships and other loyalties.

There is strong evidence that in some counties, such as Bergen, that loyalists may have constituted a majority of the population.

As late as July 1774 the colony’s political leadership was loyalist in sympathy. A state convention called to nominate delegates to the Continental Congress on 21 to 23 July resolved that the people “are, and ever have been, firm and unshaken in their loyalty” to the crown. Further, they “detest all thoughts of an independence” from the mother country. Governor William Franklin, natural son of Benjamin Franklin, became irrevocably alienated from his father over the issue of independence. Franklin’s addresses of 3 and 13 February 1775 renewed the state’s oath of loyalty to the crown. As late as 30 November 1775 the Assembly pledged its commitment to reconciliation with England, and expressed a desire to retain and support Franklin as the legitimate executive. By 13 January 1776, the legislature had debated disarming loyalists and to take into custody those who refused to sign an oath of loyalty or report for duty in the state’s patriot militia.

Soon, loyalist property was confiscated and those persons joining tory militias or the British army were to be treated as traitors.

New Jersey was a major battleground in the earliest years of the war, as Howe chased Washington’s army deeper into the state. As Washington retreated, loyalism became more evident. In 1776 Washington noted that incidents of desertion from his army were greatest among troops from New Jersey because the men from that state frequently changed loyalties, perhaps under great pressures from home. By laws of 1777 and 1782 any person entering an enemy camp, or otherwise holding conversation with the enemy, without high level, explicit permission might be sentenced to death. On 27 June 1777 the Council of Safety ordered that wives and dependents of loyalist militiamen and other persons detained for suspicious activities be deported to British lines, from which they were to leave America.

Defections may have still greater at later dates had it not been that both the British and Hessian troops stationed in the state committed such great and well publicized outrages against both the patriot army and the civilian population. Even friends of the king complained of many outrages having been perpetrated against them by troops they considered to be “on their side.” Later, as the focus of the war shifted south, and the British army no longer shielded the tories, loyalism in New Jersey receded.

In 1780 William Franklin organized a loyalist association which operated independent of British military control. It was called The Honorable Board of Associated Loyalists. William Franklin recruited several of his royal authorities to form loyalist militias, including his former Attorney-general Cortlandt Skinner (1728-1799). Skinner attempted to recruit 2500 loyalists, offering the men the opportunity to elect their own officers. This force was well armed at government expense, but they clothed and equipped themselves. They raided the shores of Long Island, Connecticut, and New Jersey, and owned many sloops, whale boats, and private men of war. They formed three distinct corps, one of which was mounted. Skinner’s New Jersey Volunteers was the largest of the tory militias.

Governor Franklin commissioned Colonel Van Dyke to raise a loyalist militia in New Jersey. Van Dyke signed 306 men. John Coombs (1753-1827), a second lieutenant in the British army, was a recruiter for the New Jersey loyalist, raising volunteers for the First New Jersey Loyalist Volunteers. James Cougle (1746-1819) of Pennsylvania, a former officer in the militia, served as captain of the New Jersey Loyalist Volunteers. Robert Drummond ( -1789) was commissioned a major in the Second New Jersey Volunteers. He recruited some 200 of his neighbors into tory militia units. Many of them later served as volunteers in South Carolina and Georgia, raiding out of Florida. John Purvis (1757-1811) was initially commissioned to raise two companies of Whig militia, but decided to desert, leading most of his men to the tory side. Tory efforts in New Jersey received unexpected support from a mulatto slave named Titus, called Captain Tye, once the property of John Corlies. Titus recruited a band of about 60
raiders. He died of wounds received in raids in 1778.

It had been home government policy from the beginning to try to draw Washington’s army into one large, hopefully decisive, battle. It was equally Washington’s policy to prevent such a massive confrontation and to fight a prolonged war of attrition. Having failed to entrap and confront the patriot army, on 23 January 1779 Lord George Germain instructed Sir Henry Clinton to attempt to restrict Washington’s army to the wilderness. The home government expressed the greatest concern for the safety of the loyalists and ordered Clinton to try to secure safe haven for them on the eastern seaboard, especially in the cities and in New Jersey and Delaware.

Tories in the Middle and Southern States Incidents of tory activity in Pennsylvania were highest in the backwoods where loyalists were uncommonly successful in enlisting the assistance of several Indian traders and general renegades; and on the eastern seaboard, especially among Philadelphia merchants. On the other hand, the long tradition of religious freedom and ethnic diversity, especially including Germans of Calvinist orientation, worked against toryism. Because it had always been a proprietary colony, Pennsylvania had only a partially pre-formed royalist political party. The proprietary party was led at the time of the revolution by John Dickinson, an ardent patriot; and Benjamin Franklin, another dedicated whig, was the most influential political figure in the colony. During the two decades preceding the war for independence, most influential inhabitants opposed British crown policy. One main ingredient in Pennsylvania toryism, which grew as the war dragged on, was the idea of establishing a tory safe haven somewhere along the eastern seaboard.

Many loyalists from Philadelphia and the contiguous counties of New Jersey had welcomed the British occupation of the Quaker city in 1777. The Friends had generally not expressed any preference for one government over the other. The loyalists and many neutrals had suffered enormously when the British withdrew from Philadelphia. Those who evacuated with the English lost all they had left behind; and many who stayed found themselves being attaindered by the provisional legislature.

Loyalism in urban Pennsylvania was, as a general rule, more intellectual than practical. The state produced some of the best and most subtle loyalist minds of the period. Many religious and other dissenters, in refusing to sign an oath of allegiance, were categorized as loyalists, and thus as traitors, when, in reality, they were politically neutral. Some patriots adopted the simplistic view of pamphleteer Thomas Paine, that those who were not with the patriots were necessarily opposed to them and thus were their enemies and must be punished. This silly argument forced some fine citizens to flee with the British or to be needlessly and unjustly black-balled and ostracized. Others, angered by the pressures, reacted by joining and supporting the loyalists.

At the beginning of the war for independence the most prominent tory leader was Joseph Galloway (1731-1803). During the Seven Years War, Galloway had united strongly with Franklin in seeking royal instead of proprietary government in Pennsylvania. Their party had dominated the colony’s politics between 1763 and 1775. A former speaker of the Pennsylvania Assembly and delegate to First Continental Congress, Galloway concluded that the colonial leaders would settle for nothing less than full independence and he preferred submission to Parliament to the destruction of ties with England. He advocated the establishment of a tory haven, following Daniel Leonard’s suggestion. He proposed a loose association in his “Plan for a Proposed Union between Great Britain and the Colonies,” which drew heavily on Franklin’s Albany Plan.

Galloway had assisted the British army of occupation in 1777 in Philadelphia, pointing out patriots and recruiting loyalists. He had also given them military, economic and political advice. At one point during the occupation Galloway had claimed that he could raise 10,000 tory militiamen in and around Philadelphia if the British army would assist in getting it set up and then supplying them with arms, supplies and money. The prominence of Galloway in Pennsylvania and Leonard in the north lent much credence and popular support to this idea and helped to draw into the conspiracy a number of less-prominent tory militia leaders.

Galloway had complained bitterly that he had received virtually no support from British authorities while they were occupied Philadelphia, and that many troops, especially Hessians who read no English, had hassled loyalists as badly as they had the patriots. The plan for a stronghold would work only in the loyalists enjoyed the full protection and support of the British authorities. Galloway found new reason for complaint when Sir Henry Clinton decided to evacuate his army of occupation from Philadelphia. Galloway was certain that, had he enjoyed Clinton’s full support, within a year he would have recruited and armed sufficient loyalist militiamen to carry out his plan. If Clinton had only waited another year before withdrawing from Philadelphia he would have left in full control by proxy of one of the most troublesome and strategically important areas of the colonies.

Both Galloway and the Home Office had decided that Britain’s best opportunity for pacification lay in reconquering the colonies piecemeal, beginning with areas with the greatest tory concentrations. What they differed on was which area should be selected first. Galloway believed that the continued occupation of Philadelphia would have been a more much more wise than the invasion of the Carolinas and Virginia. The Home Office, for reasons best known to it, decided instead on seeking loyalist support in the southern colonies and establishing there, instead of in the middle colonies, the king’s peace. Galloway argued that the primary reason Lord Cornwallis had experienced difficulties in recruiting loyalist militia in 1780 in the southern colonies was the general and widespread knowledge of his abandonment of the loyalists in Philadelphia in 1777.

Galloway returned to his initial plan of union between the thirteen colonies and Great Britain in 1778 and 1779. He began with the premise that the American people were weary of the war and would welcome any reasonable proposal of peace and reconciliation. If a good peace plan was combined with the formation of a strong tory militia system the war could terminate. The political part of his program was simple. Britain would offer a written constitution with a legislature and a bill of rights. The civil government would be guaranteed by the tory militia.

John Smyth, a friend and associate of Galloway, offered a more detailed program for creating a tory safe area. He suggested moving a sufficient naval force into the Chesapeake Bay. A fully funded and equipped loyalist militia system covering the seaboard areas of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, New York and Delaware, would enlist upward of 12,000 men. The regular officers would select, say, 8000 of the best and train them completely. Select militiamen and British, but not Hessian mercenary, troops would board the fleet, strike at selected patriot ports and towns, and reconquer certain areas. The bulk of the tory militia would then land and act as occupation troops. None of the friction that accompanied the previous occupations, such as in Boston and Philadelphia, would be found here, since the peace-keepers would be sympathetic fellow Americans.

The middle colonies would be liberated first, followed by New York, and finally the southern colonies. New England would then capitulate without a British invasion. The patriots would be isolated in the hinterland, cut off from supplies and from their French allies. They would either collapse after a slow death or offer to do battle and have it all over with quickly. In any event the days of rebellion would soon be ended. Smyth was willing to subject the New England colonists to a long period of tory militia occupation “with a rod of iron” because that area had been the seat of the treason.

Urban Pennsylvania loyalists numbered in the thousands and often collaborated with loyalist Amerindians in attacking frontier outposts and isolated settlements. English officers enlisted many willing recruits who were either motivated by loyalty to the crown or by the hard currency offered by English recruiting officers. Rosters of three troops of loyalist Pennsylvania militiamen were discovered in 1910. There were many collaborators in Philadelphia during the British occupation of that city, including merchants who sold goods that might have helped General Washington during the awful winter at Valley Forge. They preferred to receive English hard coin and uninflated currency rather than take a risk by receiving inflated colonial currency and promissory notes of dubious value.

In Philadelphia a recently arrived comb maker named Isaac Atwood headed one of the largest and most influential bands of Tories. John Kersey, a physician and surgeon who had lived in Philadelphia for about forty years, introduced Atwood to the loyalist circles. The active core counted about fifty Tories, but they boasted that, had they the arms, they could soon raise 3000 men who would collaborate with the British army. Their scheme never got much beyond the planning and wishful stage. One Tory who carried his designs into execution was James Molesworth. He was caught trying to recruit loyalist river pilots to guide British troop ships up the Delaware River. He was the first man to be tried and convicted and hanged as a spy in Pennsylvania.

James Humphreys, Jr., a former minor functionary in colonial government, published a staunchly loyalist newspaper in Philadelphia. The British recruited loyalist militiamen using advertisements and editorials in Humphreys’

Pennsylvania Ledger. Humphreys was an ardent Protestant as well as loyalist and strongly opposed the patriot alliance with Roman Catholic France. He reported some of the more interesting lies to be found among the Tories. For example, he reported that an American attack on British forces in Rhode Island had been abandoned because the militiamen threatened to shoot their officers if they were forced to fight their English Protestant brethren. He worked hard at seducing American militiamen to desert, especially in the winter of 1777-78, when reported the awful suffering of the patriot forces outside Philadelphia. Certainly some of his reports and interviews were based in fact, but others were quite fanciful. He reported that the 5000 volunteer militia recruited by North Carolina Governor Caswell for relief of General Washington’s beleaguered forces had either deserted or were far under the strength reported in the American press. He reported that Caswell and all other patriot governors and other political authorities were having to use force to recruit militiamen and that they refused to deploy them out of fear of open rebellion. He also reported that the Pennsylvania militia was filled with bandits, pirates and other undesirables. An example of their pillage and rapine was the burning of the home of British General de Lancey. By February 1778, Humphreys reported, over 40,000 rebels had died either in battle or of disease in camp. The last issue of the Ledger was 23 May 1778.

Eventually, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had to decide how tories were to be treated. Were they prisoners of war or traitors and criminals? If they were on the water, were they pirates? The court decided that those who had not taken the oath of loyalty to the new nation who were captured were prisoners of war. The court held that a man was free to choose to join the new political entity or remain loyal to his previous national commitment. The war was civil, not foreign as the patriots had claimed. Thus, no man was legally obligated to renounce his former loyalty and pledge obedience to the new regime. Only those who had taken the oath of loyalty to the new government could be treated as a traitor.

Judge C. J. McKean wrote his opinion to President Reed. It is unclear precisely when the new government began to function, but the king’s authority had ceased to exist no later than 14 May 1776. “Treason, being an offense against Government and tending to its dissolution, could not be committee in Pennsylvania until a new Government was formed, and then [only] by persons owing allegiance thereto.” No charges of treason could be brought without appropriate legislation.

The Convention had established an ordinance treating of treason, “but as they were chosen by the people for another purpose, and I do not find that their Ordinance has since confirmed or recognized by the legislature” the Convention’s action was invalid. In the final analysis, McKean thought,

Upon the whole I think it the safer course in so unprecedented and doubtful a case to consider all the late inhabitants of this State taken in open war as enemies and prisoners of war, who did not on the eleventh day of February 1777, or since, owe allegiance to this State, as Treason was not accurately defined or declared by the Legislature until that period.

Pennsylvania did prosecute and execute tories who waged war against the state, usually under laws covering theft and robbery, wanton murder, rapine and pillaging for McKean’s opinion did not extend to their exclusion or defense.

Certain inhuman acts, including the above plus piracy in its various forms, were punishable under English common and statute law and the nation of nature and nations. One prominent tory marauder who was hanged was James Fitzpatrick, executed in 1778 after being convicted of burglary and larceny.

British successes near Philadelphia in 1777 gave courage to some Pennsylvania loyalists. On 11 September Howe’s British army defeated Washington at the Battle of Brandywine, and, fifteen days later, contained the whig counter-attack at the Battle of Germantown. Howe then occupied the city while Washington’s little army was encamped in the Valley Forge. Howe entertained the cream of Philadelphia society while Washington suffered enormously. Still, for strategic reasons, Howe abandoned Philadelphia in June 1778, and most Pennsylvania tories withdrew with him. Tory activity on the seaboard came to a virtual standstill and the scene shifted to the frontier where tories worked with Amerindians.

Successes and failures of loyalist efforts in western Pennsylvania were directly tied to the dealings and intrigues of these several Indian traders. If the British were to have success on the western frontier, Tory militia would have to ally with large numbers of Amerindian warriors. In the western part of Pennsylvania the infamous Girty family of Indian traders and Alexander McKee and Matthew Elliott, also traders, led the Tory efforts to recruit a loyalist militia.

Butler especially wanted to recruit Alexander McKee into the Tory cause because he believed that no man knew the Delaware and Wyandots [Hurons] better than McKee. If anyone could bring them into the war on the same side as their traditional enemies the Six Nations it was McKee. Butler had a prime prize to offer McKee: the superintendency of Amerindian affairs.

Alexander McKee was a son of Thomas McKee ( -1755). He also had a son named Thomas who was a trader among the Ohio Indians. From 17 October through 24 October 1767 Alexander McKee was a clerk for Baynton, Wharton &

Morgan at Fort Pitt. He compiled a list, on orders from Colonel Bouquet, of traders taken by French Indians in Ohio. In 1769 McKee owned 300 acres near Fort Pitt. In 1771 Alexander McKee was a justice of the Court of Quarter Sessions in Bedford County, Pennsylvania; in 1773 he held the same judicial post in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania. In 1774 he served as deputy Indian agent with Sir William Johnson in New York. As early as 1768 he had been an Indian trader at Fort Pitt in partnership with Alexander Ross. In April 1776 McKee was accused of Loyalist leanings and ordered to no longer represent patriot interests among the Amerindians. He was accused of being on a secret payroll of Lieutenant Governor Hamilton of Detroit. The accusation soon extended to a reported plot in which McKee was allegedly involved to surrender Fort Pitt to the Tories. After an abortive Tory uprising at Redstone Fort [Brownsville], General Hand ordered McKee to report to take the oath of loyalty to the colonies, which he did. Hand trusted McKee, but others did not. Hand ordered McKee to report to him at York, but McKee deserted his land holdings in Lancaster County and moved to Pittsburgh where he had extensive business investments. Exasperated at the refusal of the patriots refusal to believe him, he deserted. On 28 March 1778 McKee led a small contingent to the English. That party of turncoats included Simon Girty and two slaves.

At the urging of Butler, the English granted McKee the rank of captain in the army and made him deputy Indian agent at Detroit. On their behalf he distributed goods among the Shawnee valued at 835/5/6. He was also active in recruiting Tory militiamen on the western frontier. Thomas McKee, II, was a son of Alexander McKee, deputy Indian agent for the English in western Canada.

Thomas served as a trader and diplomat among the western Amerindian tribes.

Thomas accompanied Simon Girty, distributing gifts on behalf of the British among Little Turtle’s Delaware warriors in Ohio.

Matthew Elliott ( -1814), of Protestant Irish ancestry, before 1774 was a trader at Fort Pitt. In Dunmore’s War at the Battle of Point Pleasant the Shawnee used him to interpret and to carry messages of peace. On 6 August 1774 John Penn reported, “a young man of the name of Elliott who has been trading at Shawnee Town and lately came from thence, has offered his services to carry any messages from the government to the Indians and may be a very proper person to employ.” In October 1776 he traded on the Muskingum River in Ohio. His goods were stolen by the Wyandots at Dresden. Despite the fact that he spent much time among the Amerindians he hated them and they considered him to be an unfair and dishonest trader. In March 1777 he went to Fort Detroit where the English accused him of spying for the patriot cause, but released him on his parole that he would not aid the patriots. He returned to Fort Pitt, but on 28 March 1778
he deserted to the English along with Simon Girty and several other traders.

Elliott was instrumental in convincing McKee to desert, reminding him that the colonists would never trust him. Since he was known to be the key to Amerindian affairs on the western frontier, Elliott told him, the Americans would assassinate him rather than permit him to desert. On behalf of the English, Elliott distributed goods valued at 47/6/9 to the Shawnee for the English. In 1781 he was reported working with the Moravians at Upper Sandusky, Ohio. In 1785 he assisted James Moore, a Shawnee captive, to escape. The British rewarded Elliott for his loyalty.

In the 1790s he was an Indian agent for the British in Canada. In 1796 through 1798 and 1808 through 1814 he was a superintendent of the British West Indies.

The Girty family of Indian traders were the most notorious of all Indian traders. Most were ardent loyalists. Those of the Girty family whom we meet during the Revolution were sons of Simon, Sr. ( -1751). George Girty (1745-1812) from 1756 through 1759 was held by the Delawares, but he was returned to the English after the French withdrew from western Pennsylvania. He was a trader among several Amerindian nations, most frequently the Delawares. On 6 February 1778 the patriots commissioned him a second lieutenant. He served in the Ohio territory and down the Mississippi River. He served through 4 May 1779 and then deserted to the English. They engaged him as an interpreter among the Shawnee.

On one occasion he distributed goods valued at 75/17/0 among the Shawnee on behalf of the English in an attempt to enlist their aid in the war on the frontier. In 1781 he led a mixed force of English and tories that engaged militia under the command of Colonel Archibald Lochry of Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania.

All but a very few of the 100 men in Lochry’s command, including the colonel, were killed or captured. A survivor reported that Alexander McKee had led a band of 300 Delaware and Wyandot warriors in the ambush. McKee, in cooperation with Simon Girty, was also reported to be planning an assault on Forts Laurens and Bedford with a mixed Tory and Amerindian force. In June 1782 George Girty led the Amerindian force opposed by Colonel Crawford on the Upper Sandusky River, in what is now Crane Township, Wyandot County, Ohio. After the Battle of Blue Licks in August 1782 he gave himself up completely to the life of the Amerindians, living out his life among the Delawares.

James Girty (1743-1817) before the Revolution was a trader among the Shawnees. From 1756 through 1759 James Girty was held by the Delawares, but he was returned to the English after the French withdrew from western Pennsylvania. He assisted Reverend David Jones in making a translation of the Bible into the Shawnee language. He assisted Colonel George Morgan, the Indian Agent for the Middle Department for the Middle States, as an interpreter. As early as July 1775 he was under suspicion as a potential traitor, and soon after he did desert to the English. In August 1778 his brothers induced him to ally with the English. The price of his treason was a new rifle, 3 horses, saddles and rations.

Pennsylvania accused James and Simon Girty of high treason. In 1779 the English Lieutenant Governor Hamilton used James Girty to distribute gifts among the Shawnee. In the 1780s he was a trader in Ohio and was quite financially successful. He married a Shawnee maid named Betsey. In 1782 he was a leader of the British-Amerindian force that laid siege to Fort Henry, now Wheeling, West Virginia. That was his last fight against the patriot forces. He moved to St. Mary’s on the west branch of the Miami River, in what is now Auglaize County, Ohio. He founded Girty’s Town where the English granted him a monopoly of seven years in the Indian trade for his support of their cause. He lived in the first decade of the nineteenth century in Gosfield Township, Essex County, Ohio, where he made a will dated 1804. His last trading post was on Girty’s Island near Napoleon, Ohio.

He died on 15 April 1817.

Simon Girty, Jr. (1741-1818) in 1756, at age 15, was captured by the Delawares and by 1759 was delivered up to the Senecas. He saw his step-father burned at the stake. He was five feet, nine inches tall, and had black, penetrating eyes. He learned several Indian languages, including the tongues spoken by the Six Nations, Wyandots and Shawnee. He was an interpreter for the Virginia officials during Dunmore’s War. On 11 August 1774 he met and traded with David Owens and twelve other traders who were returning from Upper Shawnee Town. During the French and Indian War he lost trade goods valued at 300/18/6. In 1771 he voted in the first election in Bedford County, Pennsylvania. In 1776 he was an interpreter for the Six Nations at a meeting at Fort Pitt. On 11 August 1776 he sent a bill to the Continental Congress for extra services as a smith at Fort Pitt. On 28 March 1778 he deserted the patriot cause and joined the English. He took with him Alexander McKee, two slaves, Matthew Elliott and an Indian trader named Higgins. In 1781 he fought with the Wyandots at Upper Sandusky, Ohio. He was seriously wounded by a sabre slash given by Captain Brant [Thayendanega].

On 12 April 1782 Girty delivered on behalf of the English to the Wyandots one hundred pounds of gunpowder, 200 pounds of lead balls and eight dozen scalping knives. He was present at the torture and assassination of Colonel Crawford on 10 June 1782. It is alleged that as Crawford was writhing in pain, he asked Girty to kill him. Girty supposedly responded that he had no ammunition. Butterfield argued that Girty had tried to secure Crawford’s release and could not, and that had he killed Crawford, Girty himself might have been killed. He was responsible for the deaths of David Rogers and 42 others and the capture of five soldiers in action against the patriots. On 13 July 1778 a group of English led Amerindians destroyed the town of Hanna’s Town, then county seat of Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania. On 19 August 1782 Bedford County political leader Bernard Dougherty wrote to the Pennsylvania officials, “the noted Girty has for some years past threatened the town of Bedford with destruction in like manner as he has that of Hanna’s Town.” Butterfield argued that Girty had nothing to do with the Amerindian attack on Hanna’s Town. In 1784 he married Catherine Malott, a white captive taken by the Muncy Clan of the Delawares in 1780 when she was a teenager. Catherine died at Cochester South in January 1852. He moved to, and afterward operated out of, Essex County, western Canada. In 1787 he assisted James Moore in getting his sister back from the Shawnees. In the 1780s he was employed as an Indian agent by Alexander McKee. In June 1785 he assisted in securing the release of Mrs. Thomas Cunning from the Shawnee. In 1791 he was a participant in the Amerindian defeat of General Arthur St. Clair’s army near Fort Jefferson, Ohio. In 1794 he acted as an interpreter among the Shawnee for the English. He helped to secure the release of Mrs. Joseph Kinan, sister of Jacob Lewis, at Detroit. In 1794 he fought his last battle against the U.S. at Tallen Timbers. At that battle the army under General Anthony Wayne broke the power of the Amerindians in Ohio. He took no part in the War of 1812. By 1816 he was blind.

In August 1778 an American force of regulars and volunteer militia led by Lachlan McIntosh (1725-1806) penetrated the frontier as far west as the Tuscarawas River in Ohio. At the same time George Rogers Clark had successfully invaded what is now Indiana, capturing a British fort at Vincennes.

In late summer 1779 Colonel Daniel Brodhead, who replaced McIntosh, led a mixed party of regulars and volunteer militia up the Allegheny River from Fort Pitt and into Seneca territory in New York. Brodhead’s expedition was time to correspond with General John Sullivan’s invasion of New York from the east.

Some western Amerindian tribes, aware of patriot gains and victories, were considering entering the war on the side of the new nation. Upon Brodhead’s return to Fort Pitt a party of Delaware, Shawnee and Wyandots awaited him, prepared to talk peace. They informed him of British fears of an attack on Fort Detroit. Brodhead was a military man and not a diplomat and the peace talks dragged on without conclusion. At this point Governor Guy Carleton sent Alexander McKee to the Shawnee, Delaware and Wyandot camps to dissuade them from making peace. On 27 September 1778 Simon Girty led a mixed force of Tories and Amerindians in the destruction of a Virginia supply train near the falls of the Ohio River. The train was moving up from St. Louis with supplies needed to keep the western campaign moving. Combined with McKee’s diplomatic successes, this destruction of five large boatloads of supplies seriously disrupted the war effort and brought to an end this successful surge against the Amerindians on the frontier.

In April 1778 a party of American soldiers deserted from garrison duty at Fort Pitt. When they were captured the patriots found them in the company of a small band of Tories. On interrogation they revealed the existence of a major Tory plot to disrupt the frontier. A party of Tories from Standing Stone [Huntingdon]

had crossed the mountains to join an even larger Tory party at Redstone [Brownsville]. They were to receive uniforms from Butler and McKee and then were to join the Amerindians on an attack on the forts between Pittsburgh and Bedford. By the time the Tories had gone to meet the Amerindians at Kittanning they numbered no less than 150 militiamen. Something happened between the Tory leader and an Indian chief at Kittanning which the captured Tories did not understand. The Amerindian struck the Tory dead with a single blow of his hatchet and the meeting broke up. The thirty Tories from Huntingdon were returning home when they were captured. General Hand ordered his second in command, William Crawford, a judge in civilian life, to hold a military court martial. The civilians claimed that a military court held no jurisdiction over them, but the trial was held. Several leaders were executed and several more were whipped and then confined to jail for the duration of the war. The others were whipped and then dismissed, or simply let go on their parole to spread the word that the Tory design had been frustrated.

The Rein family was one of the oldest, established families in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. The first man to carry the name Michael Rein arrived in Philadelphia on 11 September 1732 and soon after settled in Earl Township, Lancaster County. Initially, the family seemed to be ardent patriots, enlisting in the county militia, serving in and around Philadelphia in support of General Washington’s army. Various members of the family also held political offices of importance, such as membership on the Committee of Observation and Inspection.

Lieutenant Henry Mansin, a German speaking officer in the Queen’s Rangers, entered Lancaster County, searching for recruits, horses and general support for the loyalist cause. On his second trip, in February 1778, several farmers caught Mansin and several of his co-conspirators stealing horses. They implicated John, Michael and George Rein, saying that the family had offered them aid and comfort and had offered to sell them horses. A black-and gunsmith named Englehart Holtzinger and a few others among the conspirators, including John Rein, escaped to General Howe’s lines in Philadelphia. His property, along with that of two members of the Rein family, was confiscated and sold at public auction. Henry Mansin and a man named Wendel Myer were hanged. John Rein and several of the others apparently fought with the loyalist militia and British army during the remainder of the war. Christian Fouts, a lieutenant-colonel in the loyalist militia, may have aided the loyalists in the Rein Affair since he was a native of Lancaster County.

Toryism in Maryland, Delaware and Virginia

English troops occupied none of the cities in Virginia, Delaware or Maryland, so loyalists could find no protection and little encouragement from the mother nation or its troops. Whatever royal support there may have been never really developed. Delaware had no frontier, but tories did manage to arouse the Amerindians to massacres in the other two states.

Delaware had a substantial loyalist population, reliably estimated at about half the population. Most of Delaware’s population had been moderate in its politics in the pre-Revolutionary era. The pre-war legislature remained loyal but was circumscribed by a larger patriot climate of opinion. There are strong claims that as many as half of the people were loyal to the crown.

Several incidents are often cited in support of the high incidence of loyalism. In June 1776 loyalists collected some 5000 signatures on a petition opposing the Declaration of Independence in Kent County while patriots could barely manage to gather 300 signers. An ensuing major insurrection in Kent County cost over $100,000 to quell. When Governor Caesar Rodney asked his militiamen to sign a petition for independence only 26 of 68 men present were willing to commit. When other loyalists attempted to deliver it to Congress they were mobbed. Robinson gathered 1500 loyalists to restore order. Having no arms they appealed to Sir Andrew Hammond, skipper of the Roebuck, for support.

Hammond stayed aloof and 1500 patriot riflemen arrived on orders from the Philadelphia Council of Safety. There were few strong statements of loyalist sentiment in the state which was not directly occupied. There were, however, some active loyalists in Delaware. Colonel Alfred Clifton was a Catholic Delaware loyalist who successfully raised a troop of loyal cavalry.

In September 1777 the British army invaded Delaware, bringing many loyalists to declare in favor of king and country. Many of the active Delaware loyalists defected to the British while Howe controlled Philadelphia and left with him when he withdrew from the city. President Rodney received complaints of tory activity in Murderkill Hundred, Duck Creek, Dover and Kent County.

Anglican minister Daniel Currie helped to persuade many of the righteousness of the royalist cause. In September 1778 Methodist preacher Freeborn Garretson attempted to preach a loyalist sermon in Dover, but a mob accused him of being a tory and a follower of Cheney Clow.

The notorious tory Cheney Clow in April 1778 had led a tory revolt near Kenton. The Delaware militia responded to a call from Colonel Pope, located more than a hundred tories entrenched in a fortified position and prepared for an assault once the full company arrived. Clow retreated. The militia burned his fort and captured about half of his followers who were forced to enlist in the patriot army.

Finally, in 1782 a sheriff’s posse, with some militia as reinforcements, captured Clow. He claimed protection as a prisoner of war since he had a British commission with the rank of captain. In May 1783 a jury found him guilty of robbery, plunder and murder and ordered him to be hanged. In this case did Delaware witness significant popular support for the tories.

Following Lord Cornwallis’ withdrawal from the Carolinas, Sir Henry Clinton received a proposal from William Rankin of Pennsylvania to use force to establish a loyalist haven. Rankin, a loyalist militia colonel, believed that there was a substantial reservoir of royalist sentiment in southeastern Pennsylvania, southern New Jersey and Delaware which, if properly cultivated, could serve to augment his majesty’s forces. Both Clinton and the home government were, at this moment, grasping for any evidence that royal government could be reestablished.

Cornwallis, having been falsely seduced into believing similar promises about the Carolinas, opposed the idea, for he saw in it nothing that convinced him that it was in any way superior to the Carolina plan. Clinton liked the idea and thought to implement it in the autumn of 1781, which is why Clinton retained Cornwallis’

army in Virginia. Although the northern army had comparatively little to do after 1778, and Clinton possessed the authority and resources to attempt to implement Rankin’s plan without Cornwallis, nothing came of it. The appearance of the French navy in the Chesapeake Bay made the operation too dangerous to attempt.

Most loyalists in Maryland were white, first-generation English immigrants, engaged in business as merchants, free professionals, small tradesmen, artisans, inn-keepers and mariners. Most lived in Baltimore or Annapolis, with a few others from Frederick. Despite the fact that Maryland had been established as a haven for Roman Catholics from England, political power for many decades before the revolution had been firmly held by a conservative, aristocratic Protestant minority. In the last decade before the revolution, the court party had defended its own powers more readily than the king’s prerogatives. In the years immediately preceding the war for independence the royalist court party, which became the core of loyalism after war came, saw its power draining away. The governor in the last royalist years (1769-1776), George Chalmers, was partially sympathetic to the American complaints and did little to oppose independence. And, as elsewhere, the Anglican clergy remained firmly royalist. The popular lower house of the legislature and the minor and local governmental officers supported the cause of independence. The British army never captured or occupied any major Maryland city, so loyalism had little chance of spreading among the timid or undecided citizenry.

Moderate loyalists defended the king’s powers with pen. Daniel Dulaney had produced a refutation of the patriot arguments of the Stamp Act Congress.

James Chalmers offered Plain Truth in refutation to Tom Paine’s Common Sense.

Reverend Jonathan Boucher attacked those fellow clergymen, notably Episcopal, who sided with the patriots.

Maryland also produced some loyal men of action. Hugh Kelly formed the Maryland Royal Retaliators which, by 1781, had raised at least 1300 men. The patriots captured Kelly, effectively closing out this chapter in Maryland loyalism.

The British army commissioned James Chalmers a lieutenant-colonel, sent him to Maryland and ordered him to raise a loyalist militia. He failed to raise his quota, bit appeared in British service as late as 1782, with the notation that his militia was “deficient in numbers.” In September 1783 he fled to New York and from thence to St. John, New Brunswick.

Virginia, with Massachusetts, led the patriot cause. Its House of Burgesses had established a remarkable record of independent action. Nathaniel Bacon’s Rebellion may have been the first incident of armed American resistance to British rule; and both colonial and state governments had issued proclamations bordering on claims of sovereignty long before 1776. The last royal governor Lord Dunmore initially resisted independence, was defeated at Great Bridge in 1775 and abandoned Virginia completely in July 1776. Virginia contributed heavily to the patriot cause in the early years while suffering few depravations except joint tory-Amerindian raids on the frontier.

Loyalism was as weak in Virginia as anywhere in the former colonies.

Two classes of men led the loyalists in Virginia: the Anglican clergy and the wealthier seaboard merchants. Most Scots living in Virginia sided with the crown.

Loyalism was found primarily in the Norfolk area, which the British raided but could not afford to occupy. Additional loyalists came from Williamsburg, Petersburg and Portsmouth. Among the loyalist units formed in Virginia was the Queen’s Own Loyal Virginians, later incorporated into the Queen’s Rangers.

In the spring and summer of 1780 a general Tory revolt took place in western Virginia and spread to Redstone and Fort Pitt. Important lead mines in Montgomery County, Virginia, were disrupted. By September, Colonel Brodhead feared an attack upon Fort Pitt by a combined force of Tories from the western counties of Pennsylvania and Virginia and British regulars and Amerindian warriors allegedly advancing from Fort Detroit. No such force materialized, despite continual rumors, and by the spring of 1781 many of the Tories had fled to British protection at Detroit.

The British authorities recruited John Connolly, a physician from Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, who lived near Pittsburgh. They charged Connolly with raising a mixed force of Tories and Amerindians to be called the Loyal Forresters. This unit was active as late as 1782 although Conolly was captured before he could lead any effective raids. Lord Dartmouth, upon the recommendation of Virginia’s last royal Governor Dunmore, had commissioned Connolly as a lieutenant-colonel in the Queen’s Royal Rangers on 5 November 1776. Dunmore immediately sent Connolly on a secret mission among the Amerindians on the western frontier, inciting them to rise against the settlers in violation of treaty provisions. Dunmore hoped that Connolly could incite a bloody war on the frontier, moving southeastward from Detroit to Pittsburgh toward Alexandria, where Dunmore would join with him. Connolly had implemented his orders by hatching a plot, Washington wrote, to join his militia, now being formed in Quebec, with Sir John Johnson’s 3000 Amerindian warriors and Tory militiamen, and invade south along the Allegheny River. The object of Connolly’s attention was to be Fort Pitt. Meanwhile, Connolly, Johnson and McKee had sent spies and agitators, which may have included Elliott and one of more of the Girtys, among the inhabitants of the western frontier of both Pennsylvania and Virginia to seek support, supplies and men. Brodhead and General William Irvine brought in artificers and engineers and volunteers from the patriot militia who strengthened Fort Pitt’s defenses. The bitter winter, combined with reports reaching Connolly and McKee of the strength of refurbished fort, persuaded the Tories to wait.

Connolly was captured in Maryland while trying to line up additional support among the Amerindians there. General George Washington wrote to Brodhead, informing him that a notorious Tory leader, John Connolly, whom Continental authorities exchanged on 25 October 1780, was now in western Canada, recruiting militia among the loyalist refugees. The attack never took place and by the early autumn of 1782 Sir Guy Carleton had issued orders forbidding any attacks on the frontier from originating in Canada. Peace talks had begun and Carleton had never been an enthusiastic supporter of the strategy of using the Amerindians to attack the patriots.

Why Lord Cornwallis decided to abandon the most southerly colonies and march northward to Virginia is still the subject of much speculation. Howe still believed that occupation of South Carolina, Georgia and perhaps North Carolina would bring forth a torrent of loyalist support, and, more importantly, of sorely needed manpower. He thought this policy merited a fair trial. Retreat into Virginia made no political sense for it was the state least likely of all former colonies south of Massachusetts to support tory revolt. But Cornwallis probably made his decision for military, not political, reasons, wishing to use Virginia as a base for future military actions. He had also come to distrust the tories politically and as a potential source of military enlistments. He thought that British policy after defeat at Saratoga to reestablish political control through tory assistance was not feasible based on his own observations and experience in the south. For Cornwallis, reliance on loyalists to produce substantial armed forces ended at the Battle of King’s Mountain. His march into Virginia merely emphasized his opinion.

Lord Cornwallis continued to believe that Virginia should be the focus of British efforts to recapture the colonies. He had rejected any thought of an attack on Philadelphia, or of establishing a loyalist safe haven along the Chesapeake Bay.

For uncertain reasons, Cornwallis thought more loyalists could be found in Virginia. As it was, fate took a hand and following his entrapment and subsequent surrender at Yorktown, he was never able to prove his theory about liberation of Virginia.

Toryism in the Southern Colonies

After 1778 the British command decided to concentrate its major efforts to the American south, largely because of the resurgence of loyalism in those states.

Southern campaigns had only half-heartedly been planned and executed before 1778. Anticipating substantial help on every front and in every way, the British commanders thought to ease the burden on the hard pressed army. Having failed to force Washington’s army into a major engagement, Clinton, under orders from the home government, was to reduce operations in the north, except for naval raids on ports from which privateers sallied forth to raid British shipping, and concentrate on reducing patriot forces in the south. The home government still believed that, at least in the southern colonies, the vast majority of Americans were loyal to the crown. Intelligence reports alleged that a considerable and constantly increasing number, of southerners wanted to reunite with the mother nation. At the very least, the British and the loyalists both believed, the southern colonies could be separated from the other colonies and perhaps reconstituted as his majesty’s loyal subjects under royal government.

The home government’s plan, as devised on 8 March 1778, was relatively simple. The British army would first liberate Georgia, move north against South Carolina, secure Charleston, and give encouragement to the planters who they believed were the mainstay of loyalism in the south. The loyalists were to be an integral, indeed vital, part of the operation. Against that expectation, the home government sent a considerable supply of arms, accoutrements and supplies for the recruits. The army would enlist as many regular soldiers as possible, while others, those who did not wish to commit to service for a long period of time, would serve in loyal militias. Simultaneously, diversionary actions and naval operations in Maryland and Virginia would prevent supplies and reinforcements from moving southward. Such operations would destroy the tobacco trade, damaging the colonies’ finances.

A southern campaign was politically expedient. The government was under increasing pressure from both the king and the opposition in Commons.

Since the war in the northern and middle colonies had been unsuccessful, and intelligence reported great chances of success in the south, the need for some victories moved the ministry to support a full southern campaign. If the tories were correct, the cost and demands for manpower would be minimal since the loyalists would swell the ranks and provide needed relief for the army. Former royalist governors, Lord William Campbell and Sir James Wright, and their lieutenant-governors, William Bull and John Graham, reassured the government of the existence of a vast reservoir of loyalist support in the south. Change in British command was important. Clinton supported the idea of a campaign in the south whereas Howe had not. Additionally, Indian Affairs Superintendent John Stuart assured his superiors that they could count on support from the native Americans at the small cost of a few gifts and some guns.

When news reached London of France’s formal declaration of support for the colonies on 13 March 1778, Germain revised the instructions sent to Clinton on 8 March, ordering Clinton on 21 March to send 5000 troops to capture French colony of St. Lucia, and to divert others to the protection of the British West Indies.

Three thousand additional men were sent to the protection of Florida. Clinton and his remaining 8000 men were to evacuate Philadelphia, defend New York, Rhode Island, Nova Scotia and the remainder of Canada, especially the naval facility at Halifax. Germain instructed Clinton to consider plans for evacuating the thirteen colonies completely. A new pessimism pervaded the ministry.

The instructions had little impact on Clinton’s actual conduct of the war.

He did not send the expedition against St. Lucia, did not change his focus to the West Indies and did not send any fleet against the American ports. He did evacuate Philadelphia as ordered in the second dispatch, of 21 March, and did deploy Lord Cornwallis in a southern campaign as decided in the first dispatch, of 8 March.

Failure to have mounted a southern campaign would suggest that the government was abandoning the loyalists, bringing ever increasing defections to the patriot cause among them. A large expedition against St. Lucia and to the West Indies would convince them that their suspicions were correct. For the next several years the main focus of the war was on Cornwallis’ campaign, as initially decided. In December 1778 troops moved into Georgia.

As the strategy of 8 March envisioned, a number of significant tory leaders emerged to assist the British army. Lieutenant-colonel Henry Rugely gathered a company of tory militia for service in his native South Carolina, but, soon after enlisting men, was captured at his plantation along with his 103
militiamen. Samuel Tynes of South Carolina led a substantial tory militia, but was captured by Francis Marion in 1780.

Georgia was an excellent choice as the first base from which to launch an invasion of the southern colonies. The state harbored many tories, drawn especially from the free professions, planters, Anglican ministers and former royalist officials. Scots, although not numerous in Georgia, were largely loyal. In the ten years, 1766 to 1776, preceding the war for independence, the population of Georgia had doubled, from 10,000 to 20,000. Many of the newly arrived English settlers retained strong ties to the crown. A significant portion of the state’s population lived in Savannah.

On 27 November 1778, Howe sent Lieutenant-colonel Archibald Campbell with 3000 British and Hessian regulars and four battalions of loyalists to accomplish the reduction of Georgia. On 23 December Campbell arrived at Tybee Island near Savannah and was unopposed. The patriot army crossed into South Carolina. Meanwhile, General Augustine Prevost, marching northward from Florida, captured the remaining patriot militia and army at Fort Sunbury on 10

January 1779. Having eliminated both regular army units and patriot militia as a factor in Georgia, Campbell was uncertain what to do next. The home office had wished to test its theory that the tories of the southern states were just waiting to show their loyalty, and would do so in considerable numbers. So Campbell decided to spread his command and seek out loyalist supporters.

Assisting Lieutenant-colonel Archibald Campbell’s invading British army of 1778 was Captain Daniel Murray, commander of Wentworth’s Volunteers. His unit had been drilled, perhaps formed, on Long Island. In the spring of 1780, when it was stationed at Jerusalem, New York, it had 41 militiamen and officers. In the late autumn it numbered forty and was at Lloyd’s Neck. Its primary and most important service was during the early stages of Cornwallis’ southern campaign, beginning in Savannah, Georgia. Assisting in the British fortifications at Savannah was Lieutenant-colonel James Moncrieffe ( -1791), an engineer by profession, and uncle of General Montgomery and brother-in-law of John Jay. John Thomas of Georgia received a commission as a lieutenant-colonel and ordered to recruit support among the Cherokee nation.

Campbell and 1000 men soon moved toward Augusta and captured the post without loss. The government’s best hopes were fulfilled when 1400 men took the oath of allegiance to the king and the recruiting officers signed enough men to fill twenty companies of loyalist militia. Heartily encouraged, Campbell made additional sorties into the back country of Georgia, but these proved to be as fruitless as the first was productive. The patriot militia retaliated, some 4000
strong, with sorties into the back country. Campbell withdrew, not wanting to be caught up in guerilla warfare against the backwoodsmen on their home turf.

Without the protection of the British army, and left to their own devices, Campbell’s tory militias evaporated to suffer their fate at the hands of the patriots.

Since most tories were men of property, the patriots knew how best to pressure them. Patriot militias burned many of their homes and fields.

Since Campbell and his deputy Lieutenant-colonel John Hamilton were themselves Highlanders they were able to recruit among the Scots in South Carolina. A certain Colonel Boyd recruited about 700 loyalist militia and marched south to join Campbell. After a minor and indecisive skirmish, Colonel Andrew Pickens surprised the tories at Kettle Creek, killed Boyd and about forty of his men, wounded and captured another 150, and scattered the remainder. Campbell sent out a relief column which was successful only in rescuing about 300 tories.

Pickens took his prisoners back to South Carolina where five leaders were hanged as traitors, another 65 condemned but pardoned, and others forced to take an oath of loyalty to the republic.

Native to Georgia was James Robertson (1751-1818), Attorney-general in the last royal cabinet and member of the Council and the Commission of Claims.

He joined the tory militia as an officer immediately after the war began. Now his time had come with the arrival of Campbell’s army. Robertson’s men took full revenge on the patriots.

Leaving Campbell in command at Savannah, Prevost moved northward into South Carolina. Meanwhile, Major-general Benjamin Lincoln rallied the patriot army and moved to Purysburg, about fifteen miles from Savannah. The swamps surrounding Lincoln’s army inhibited Prevost’s movements, and not wanting to become entrapped in such hostile territory, Prevost sent Major Gardiner to Port Royal Island. Lincoln sent General William Moultrie who led the Georgia militia against Gardiner who withdrew and returned to Savannah.

Prevost made another unsuccessful foray into South Carolina, which did have the effect of causing panic in Charleston and of drawing Lincoln’s troops out of Georgia to the defense of Charleston. Still, the British controlled only the area immediately surrounding Savannah and the tories had been disheartened. When a party of the king’s officials arrived from London to reestablish royal rule they found little support. As one authority noted, Britain’s inability to restore civil government completely in captured colonies remained both a continual embarrassment and a patent weakness of her military policy with the Loyalists.”

Other tory units served in Georgia. As we have seen, Montefort Browne, former lieutenant-governor of West Florida, had been commissioned a brigadier-general in July 1776 with instructions to raise the Prince of Wales American Volunteers, which served primarily in New England. After Prevost moved against Georgia, the unit was sent to occupy Savannah. Another important tory, Captain Howell of Georgia was killed and his entire unit destroyed in 1781 by Georgia militia.

Prevost wanted to expand his operations, but had been unsuccessful largely because he lacked a sufficiently large force to undertake the occupation of Georgia and South Carolina, and his tory allies were insufficiently powerful to occupy liberated territory on their own. Sir Henry Clinton understood the situation, and wished to support Prevost, especially after he received word of the ease with which Savannah had been captured and heard of initial enlistments in tory militia.

But he could send no more troops south until his own command was reenforced.

Either General James Grant’s force would have to be withdrawn from the West Indies or the home government would have to send more troops from Europe if Clinton was to support his southern army. Were such troops to arrive, he planned to land them at Port Royal and march on to liberate Charleston.

Josiah Phillips of Princess Anne County, Virginia, received a commission from the last royal governor, the Earl of Dunmore, to form a loyalist militia company. He ignored the rules of war and formed a vigilante band which burned, looted, raped and burned homes and committed other crimes. The Virginia House of Burgesses passed an act specifically aimed at inducing Phillips to surrender or otherwise reducing his activity. The state’s Attorney-general asked for and received an indictment in absentia on the charge of wanton murder. Finally, in late 1778 the Whig militia captured Phillips and he was hanged.

During the spring of 1779, Commodore Sir George Collier and Major-general Edward Mathew, following explicit orders of the home government to Sir Henry Clinton, raided into Virginia, to disrupt the state’s economy, destroy privateers and their docks, capture and destroy food and military supplies and prevent aid from being sent to South Carolina and Georgia. When a large number of loyalists appeared, Collier and Mathew were pleasantly surprised, but concerned. They had been ordered to raid, not occupy, parts of Virginia’s seacoast.

They were not prepared to rescue or stand and defend these tories. They recommended creating one post, perhaps Portsmouth, to which tories could flee for protection. Perhaps such a post would encourage so many to defect that the post could be maintained by tory militia. No matter how much recruitment of Virginia’s loyalists might be desirable, Clinton had no troops to spare to create the haven.

North Carolina was a hotbed of tory activity. The colony may have had more tories in proportion to its population than any other state, although at least one writer argued that claims of loyalism were exaggerated. Shopkeepers, planters, wealthier farmers, tradesmen and free professionals constituted the bulk of the tories here as elsewhere. Perhaps half or more of the Scots in the state had loyalist leanings. No city of significant size yet had developed in North Carolina, although tories appeared in some towns such as Wilmington as Cornwallis crossed the state in his flight northward into Virginia. After the Battle of Moore’s Creek, loyalism all but disappeared. Still, there were periodic cruel raids organized by Colonels Edmund Fanning and John Hamilton, giving rise to the belief that, at least on occasion, a state of civil war existed in North Carolina.

As early as 1776 a large number of tory militiamen was captured at the Battle of Cross Creek and taken to Philadelphia via Halifax, North Carolina.

Among the most successful tories in North Carolina was Lieutenant-colonel John Moore of Tryon County, who joined the British cause in 1779. His militia’s distinctive uniforms were decorated with green pine twigs. Moore enlisted 200
tory militiamen, but his force was defeated at Ransour’s Mills by patriot militia. He led the thirty survivors to the British lines at Camden, South Carolina, where they were absorbed into the army.

Sabine wrote that Lieutenant-colonel James Hamilton ( -1817) was the “very crest of the Tory organization in the South” and that “the British nation owed more to Col. Hamilton of the North Carolina Loyal Militia than to any other individual Loyalist in British service.” As commander at St. Augustine, Florida, he was “engaged in nearly every action in the three southern colonies.” Another northern loyalist unit that moved south was commanded by Colonel Edmund Fanning. The King’s American Regiment was recruited, trained and initially served at Conanicut Island, Rhode Island. Fanning, a native of Staten Island and a Yale graduate, had raised 3000 from loyalist New York merchants and businessmen to support his militia. By November 1777 Fanning had recruited 481 militiamen.

This unit accompanied General Tryon’s raids on Fairfield and Norwalk and plundered the town of New Haven. Patriots counter-attacked and inflicted over a hundred casualties on the Tories. As they retreated to Fairfield patriot opposition increased and Tryon ordered that the town be burned in retaliation. This unit was then transferred to Savannah, Georgia, where its eight infantry companies were active, largely as guerrillas and raiders, as late as June 1782. To most Carolinians, Hamilton and Fanning were the epitome of a heartless raider and marauder who terrorized the civilian population.

John Pile was another colonel who was successful in recruiting loyalist militia in North Carolina. Royal Governor Martin authorized Donald McDonald to raise a body of tory militia. McDonald was probably the most successful of all tory militia commanders in the Carolinas and was rewarded for his efforts by being promoted to captain-general. North Carolina militia under General Moore defeated McDonald’s force, demoralizing tory recruitment efforts in the Carolinas. Moore sent McDonald to Philadelphia, where he was exchanged and left for England where he lived after the war. Lieutenant-colonel Kay had attracted a substantial number of loyalist militiamen before the Battle of King’s Mountain. He retreated following the battle, joining the British army at Hillsborough. Governor Martin also commissioned James Glyn to enlist tory militia in the Carolinas.

South Carolina, too, had its staunch tories, again with heaviest support from among the merchants, free professionals and high ranking members and clergy of the Church of England and wealthy planters. Of the southern colonies only Georgia had as high a proportion of tories as South Carolina. Charleston was the southern city which offered the greatest opportunity for royalist occupation and recruitment of men. When the British army left Charleston in 1782 more than 4000
loyalists joined them, although not all were natives of South Carolina. Patriots had much cause for worry with the vast numbers of slaves, the long stretch of unprotected seacoast and the constant threat of Cherokees and other Amerindians on the frontier. Certainly the recruitment of Amerindians to massacre frontier families alienated many tories.

The first attempt to occupy Charleston came in June 1776, although the patriots were successful in fending off the invasion. At the same time, frontier militia defeated the Cherokees who had been recruited by tories and British agents.

The British continued to seduce the native aborigine with presents and arms throughout the war, while the army made no further attempt at invasion until Clinton captured Charleston in May 1780. The British occupied Charleston from May 1781 until December 1782.

Colonel McNeil commanded a large contingent of loyal Carolina militia along with David Fanning. In 1781 at Hillsborough, North Carolina, Fanning and McNeil surprised a poorly organized band of state militia, handily defeating them.

They took some 200 prisoners and threatened to kill them unless Governor Burke released 60 tory prisoners from jail. As the tory militia retreated toward Wilmington, other patriot militia ambushed the tories and killed McNeil.

Patrick Ferguson was one of the most important leaders of tory militia.

After General Howe dissolved his first rifle corps, Ferguson became a provisional lieutenant-colonel and organized in New York and New Jersey the American Volunteers. This group of loyalists were known also as Ferguson’s Sharpshooters.

The strength of this body was approximately 7,600 men and it was sent with Clinton to Charleston. After the defeat of the tories at King’s Mountain, nine of Ferguson’s men were executed

Colonel Daniel McGrath, a native of South Carolina, originally an ardent patriot, deserted to the loyalists, swearing vengeance for some unknown presumed injustice done him by patriots. Working out of Florida, he was a marauder in Georgia and South Carolina, raiding mostly isolated homesteads. He amassed a huge fortune from his raids, but was captured, imprisoned, but pardoned after his health failed. He returned to South Carolina, living out his final years in poor health and with the scorn of his neighbors.

By mid 1780 Cornwallis was having serious doubts about the efficacy of Howe’s plan to recruit and enlist loyalists in the British army. Howe’s plan called for establishing save havens for loyalists at a number of strategic posts in Georgia and the Carolinas, including Savannah, Augusta, Charleston, Ninety-Six, Georgetown and Camden. Howe ordered Cornwallis to select the sites and maintain a presence with the British army. He was convinced that many loyalists would enter the secured areas and join the British army or loyal militia. Thus, Britain, with loyalist help, could maintain order in the southern colonies with a minimum armed force. Some militiamen would be deployed to occupy the liberated areas while others would assist the army in the war effort. The remainder of his forces could then be deployed elsewhere to accomplish the same mission.

But Cornwallis had seen the failure of the grand scheme. By the end of July the loyalists in the Ninety-Six District had recruited some 1500 men to fight with the army and others to act as reserves and occupation troops. Additional men were recruited at Little Peedee and in the Orangeburg District. Charleston supplied 400 occupation militia, freeing British regulars for other duties. But in other districts, such as Camden, Cheraw and Georgetown the patriot militia was successful in suppressing loyalist enlistments. Taken as a whole, the policy was a failure. Howe had expected to enlist two full battalions and failed. Cornwallis was beginning to realize that Howe’s estimates of tory support were grossly exaggerated. Moreover, he considered most loyalists to be politically unreliable.

They made poor soldiers and new orders coddled them, preventing their full regulation and training. Adding to his other problems was the scarcity of arms and horses. Without guns that were to have been sent from England he could not equip his loyalist militiamen. Mounted troops were a necessity to combat the very mobile patriot guerrillas, but the Americans had managed to prevent the purchase of these animals.

It is generally agreed that looting, rapine and pillaging was nowhere as widespread as in the Carolinas. Banastre Tarleton’s American Legion shouldered much of the responsibility, but Thomas Browne’s and other corps also bore much responsibility. Many Americans, especially those in the backwoods of the Carolinas, who had remained unscathed by the war, excepting only a few incursions by Amerindians, suddenly had to choose sides. The dastardly deeds of loyalist raiders, and even of the army, against civilians convinced many to adopt the patriot cause.

Disheartening news arrived at Cornwallis’ headquarters. Patriot militia had defeated the loyalists at Ramsaur’s Mill on 20 June. The principal historian of the war in South Carolina wrote, “The effect of this affair was completely to crush out the Tory element in that portion of the state and they never attempted to organize again during the war.” Having won one comparatively easy victory, the patriots pushed forward, and in a dozen small skirmishes in July and August, effectively removed all vestiges of British control from the back country.

Initially, Cornwallis did not perceive the problem the loss at Ramsaur’s Mill presented. By 2 July he heard from Lord Rawdon, commanding at Camden, that loss of all outlying posts was imminent. Next he learned that Morgan Bryan’s loyalist militia of 800 men had fled to the protection of the British army in South Carolina. Then Colonel Nisbit Balfour reported that he must either reinforce the loyalist militia in North Carolina, allow them flee or lose them. So Cornwallis decided to take bold action by moving in force to Camden and reinforcing Rawdon. Since his main supply depot was at Camden, Cornwallis could use that base to arm the loyalists and move against the rebels.

Conscientious Objectors Throughout history, and in virtually every civilized nation, there have been those who objected to serving in any kind of military organization because of religious convictions. America attracted more than its share because the colonies became the refuge to various religious dissenters from all over Europe. Pacifism was not in fashion in any European nation during the period of colonization because this was an age of incessant warfare among all the major, and some minor, nations of Europe. Most European nations were so delighted in finding an easy way to rid themselves of these often wildly dissident, although usually peaceful, groups that they often assisted them in emigrating. Most nations regarded their causes as blessed by God, especially when the clash was between Protestant nations like Great Britain and Roman Catholic ones like Spain and France. The authorities believed that one did God’s work by fighting not by refusing to bear arms. If a war was truly holy it was the Devil’s work to be a pacifist. Kings alone cannot be blamed because the churches often agreed and worked in close support of the political authorities in waging holy wars. Since medieval times and the crusades many clerics as well as laity had believed that to die in a holy war guaranteed immediate remission of sin and entrance into heaven. Refusal to serve in a just war for a godly cause was more than sufficient reason to draw grave disapproval, even ostracism, from the body politic.

In an attempt to attract Calvinist religious dissenters from Central Europe to settle in its colonies Great Britain had adopted legislation “exempting the Moravians, or congregations of the Unitas Fraternum in America, from Military Duties … .” The specific legal exemption was extended by custom and usage to members of the Society of Friends (Quakers), Dunkards, Mennonites, certain members of the Brethren, Jews and others. Although the question of religious and moral conscientious exemption from military service was more than occasionally debated in colonial legislatures, the general principle was universally upheld and sustained.

Many of the colonists rejected the arguments made by those who determined that the founder of the Christian religion rejected war. Perhaps because a religious and moral issue was involved, and because it was clearly within their area of expertise and responsibility, ministers entered the debate on pacifism and conscientious objection. Few agreed with the position and conclusions of the Society of Friends, Moravians and other pacifists. Most condemned the pacifist rhetoric strongly and without hesitation or reservation. According to Nathaniel Appleton of Massachusetts Bay, war “is an affair with the Prince and the Council of a Nation; and the Soldier is to presume that the Government have good Reasons to justify their proclaiming and engaging in a war.” Cotton Mather, one of the Puritan’s most important theologians, argued that, “Men have their Lives, Liberties, Properties, which the very light of Nature teaches them to maintain by stronger arms against all Foreign Injuries. Christianity never instructed men to lay down that Natural Principle of Self-Preservation.” In 1776, Reverend John Cushing argued that all able-bodied men must bear arms in God’s causes so that “her will build up Zion — that he will avenge the innocent blood of our brethren, inhumanly shed … that he will render vengeance to his and our adversaries — and one day restore tranquility to our county… . I am convinced that it is a privilege that Christ hath allowed to mankind, to defend and preserve their religion and liberties by arms.” Reverend Richard Price wrote that all men must be “vigilant, ready to take alarms and determined to resist abuses … to defend our country against foreign enemies … and in such circumstances to die for our country.” Reverend Peter Thatcher wrote that it is folly

which a people discover, and the danger to which they expose themselves, when they live in a state of security, unprepared to resist an invasion or defend themselves against the attacks of an enemy. But how are we to defend ourselves when our country is invaded, and we are threatened by the loss of every thing we hold dear, by the violence and fury of an enemy? By declaring with the Quaker, that we may not resist any force which may come against us, because our holy religion forbids us to fight? … Shall we send the ministers of religion to meet an army of invaders, and to tell them that they are not doing as they would have done by; that they act inconsistently with the religion of Christ, and that God will punish them for their injustice? … Am I obliged to deliver my purse to a highwayman, or my life to a murderer, when I am able to defend myself? Does the religion of Christ enjoin its votaries to submit to the violence of the first ruffian nation which will attack them; and to give up their liberty, and the liberty of their children, to those who would make them “hewers of wood and drawers of water?”

And Reverend Peter Case argued that the

objection which is so much relied upon by Quakers and those [others] who disown all use of war and arms, in any case whatsoever, will not conclude that Christ’s kingdom is not to be defended and preserved by resistance of all such who would impiously and sacrilegiously spoil us of it in this world, because it is not of this world, for then all would be obliged to suffer it to be run down by slaves of hell and satan and antichrist’s vassals… . Hence that old saying may be vindicated, prayers and tears are the arms of the church. I grant they are so, the only best prevailing arms, and without which all others would be ineffectual, and that they [are] spiritual arms of the church… . but the members thereof are also men, and as men they may use the same weapons as others do.

The advocates of non-violence and non-intervention often clashed with the law and with militia officers, but nearly all remained adamant about their conscientious objection to war. In September 1675 Captain Thomas Townsend of New York lodged a complaint with the governor about members of the Society of Friends in Oyster Bay about the refusal of Quakers to accept militia duty. “Many of ye Inhabitants there being Quakers & refusing to beare arms, they are also disabled from keeping a strong watch as is required.” Others complained that they ought not to have to serve in the militia or be required to keep watch. The Governor, while sympathetic to Townsend’s position, upheld the right of the Friends to avoid military service of any kind, respecting their religious objections to military service.

In April 1707 the Lord Proprietor of Maryland ordered that members of the Society of Friends be exempted from actual military service. They were required to contribute liberally to the support of the militia.

In North Carolina most pacifists were Moravians, most of whom had moved there from Pennsylvania. Like members of the Society of Friends, Moravians were known to be scrupulously opposed to war. Nonetheless, they were enrolled in the militia, but were placed in special companies and given principally non-combattant duties, such as care of ill, wounded and dead militiamen and foraging and commissary duties. They were liable to bear arms in emergencies.

If they refused they were fined 10. By 1680 Moravian and other Calvinist religious dissenters had begun to move into the Carolinas. They were as opposed to military service as their Quaker brethren in Pennsylvania, and in 1681, decided they had sufficient strength and support to oppose reenactment of the North Carolina militia law. As a period history of the colony said, they “chose members [of the legislature] to oppose whatsoever the Governor requested, insomuch as they would not settle the Militia Act” evewn though “their own security in a natural way depended upon it.” Another contemporary history confirmed that the dissenters were “now so strong among the common people that they chose members to oppose … whatsoever the Governor proposed [especially] the Militia Law.” By 1770
conscientious objectors were wholly exempted from militia service, except in case of grave emergencies. The province did allow exemptions from all militia service for most Protestant clergy. At first, only priests of the Established Church were exempted. Later, with the influx of Scots, the exemption was extended to Presbyterian ministers. Finally, on the eve of the Revolution, the exemption was extended to virtually all clergy of recognized and established churches. In April 1776 the North Carolina Provincial Congress

Resolved that as there are a number of persons called Quakers, Moravians and Dunkards, who conscientiously scruple bearing arms, and as such have no occasion for FireArms, that they be informed that it is the sense and confident expectation of this Congress that they will dispose of their FireArms to the said Commissioners, they receiving full value thereof; but that no compulsion be exercised to induce them to that duty.

South Carolina exempted conscientious objectors only if they paid the usual fines for non-attendance. Failure to pay such fines could result in seizure of property or imprisonment in a debtor’s prison.

Rhode Island, in planning for its revitalized militia in December 1754, recommended that the legislation be drafted, “particularly so as not to oblige any persons to bear Arms who are or may be conscientiously scrupulous against it.”

Pennsylvania was founded on pacifist Quaker principles and, by creed, the sect conscientiously opposed all use of firearms against their fellow human beings. However, some Quakers were willing to allow for a military-police force to stop the illicit rum trade among the Amerindian tribes because of the terrible damage liquor did to the natives. Early in the colony’s history there were no less than a dozen offenses which were punishable by death, including riotiuous assembly, an act usually suppressed by militia or other military force. They opposed enactment of any militia law. Soon after the colony was founded the Duke of York and the Stuart monarchy superimposed such a law. As we have seen, above, the Friends were highly successful in resisting the enactment of subsequent militia acts until mid-eighteenth century. When it first debated a militia law the Pennsylvania Assembly,

in the Year 1742 … exempted from military service all members of the Society of Friends (Quakers). This was a special exemption granted by the colony. Neither the Charter of Privileges, or any laws then existing, gave them such Right of Exemption from Military Service, and that it was observed that the Proprietor was no more obliged to be at the Expence of defending them in Case of Emergency than the Governors of other Colonies.

When the militia law was finally adopted in Pennsylvania it made quite adequate provision for conscientious objectors. One interesting point made in the law was the claim that Parliament had mandated exemption of Moravians, or Unitas Fratrum, although this specific exemption is not found in the militia law of other colonies. North Carolina had a substantial Moravian community, and there is no evidence that its members were mustered in that colony, or later, in the state, but the North Carolina militia law made no specific reference to them of the act of Parliament. “And for as much as the Parliament of Great Britain has thought fit to exempt the Church or Congregation called Unitas Fratrum or United Brethren from bearing Arms, or personally serving in any Military Capacity upon their paying a reasonable Equivalent or Compensation for such Service.”

There are divers other religious Societies of Christians in this Province, whose Conscientious Persuasions are against bearing Arms, who are nevertheless willing and desirous to promote the Public Peace and Safety: Therefore be it enacted by the authority aforesaid. That the Captain of the Company of each District in every County of this Province shall within Six Months after he receives his Commission, cause his Clerk to make out a fair Duplicate or true Copy of the Return made by the Constable and his Assistant, of each Township of his District which was delivered him by the Sheriff, marking thereon every Persons name that is on his Muster-Roll and also distinguishing those so who belong to such religious Societies whose conscientious Principles are against bearing Arms; which said Duplicate or Copy of Constable’s Returns, after so marked and distinguished, the said Captain shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the Commissioners of his County, chosen by Virtue of the Act for raising County Rates and Levies: And the said Commissioners of each County of this Province, within. Twenty Days after the Receipt of the Duplicates aforesaid, shall meet together and cause their Clerks to make out fair Duplicates of the Names and Sir Names of all and every Person… . Persons in each District or Division, [are to be] marked and distinguished as aforesaid to belong to such Religious Societies, whose Principles are against bearing Arms.

Although Pennsylvania exempted all religious dissenters from bearing arms in the militia, nonetheless it made an effort to recruit them into non-combattant duties in times of invasion or insurrection. The law noted specific functions that the legislators believed that the pacifists could engage in without violating their religious convictions.

Whereas there are in this Province a great number of Persons of different religious Persuasions, who conscientiously scruple to bear Arms, and yet in Time of Invasion and Danger would freely perform sundry Services equally necessary and advantageous to the Public, Therefore be it provided and enacted by the authority aforesaid, That all Quakers, Menonists, Moravians, and other conscientiously scrupulous of bearing Arms, who shall appear on any Alarm with the Militia, though without Arms, and be ready to obey the Commands of the Officers in the following Particulars, that is to say, in extinguishing Fires in any City or Township, whether kindled by the enemy from without, or by traitorous Inhabitants within; in suppressing Insurrections of Slaves or other evil minded Persons during an attack; in carrying off and taking Care of the Wounded; in conveying Intelligence as Expresses or Messengers; in carrying Refreshments to such as are on Duty, and in conveying away to such Places of Safety as the Commanding Officer shall ap point, the Women and Children, aged, infirm and wounded, with the Effects that are in Danger of falling into the Hands of the Enemy; Such Persons so appearing on any Alarm, and performing the Services aforesaid; when required, shall, and they are hereby declared to be free and exempt from the Penalties of this Act, inflicted on Persons refusing to appear under Arms on such Occasions.

During the Seven Years War it was the Moravians not the Society of Friends that came under scrutiny in New Jersey. In a letter to Lieutenant-governor Pownall, Governor Belcher wrote, “it appears to me the People called Moravians are as Snakes in the Grass and Enemies to King George and His Subjects.” He decided to disarm them. “I shall give immediate orders that all Arms and Ammunition among the Moravians in this Province be seized and kept in safe Custody.”

New Jersey also contained a significant Quaker minority so the first state convention allowed conscientious objectors to avoid militia duty provided only that they paid a fee of four shillings per month. There was no clear religious test for conscientious objectors, as in many colonies which stipulated regular attendance in one a limited number of specified sects which firmly held that all wars were evil.

Because of the failure to limit religious exemptions the number of eligible men in the militia was substantially reduced. In August the Provincial Congress made specific reference to the Society of Friends, suggesting that contribute liberally to the relief of their “distressed brethren.” It took note of their “peculiar religious principles” and suggested that generous contributions would be in keeping with their charitable sentiments. By October 1775 the law required that those exempted for religious reasons had to pay the cost of maintaining an enlisted man, 40 shillings per month. As Governor William Livingston came under increasing pressure to increase participation in the state militia, he responded as if the criticism was aimed at the exclusion of religious objectors. In a letter to General Israel Putnam, Livingston wrote that he would defend their right of conscience.

As we shall see in a later volume, on 25 November 1755 the Pennsylvania Assembly finally passed its first militia law in more than a hundred years. The Society of Friends (Quakers) had opposed any sort of military action. Much pressure was brought to bear on the Assembly by frontiersmen. The latter group had brought to, and dropped off at, the Friends’ Meeting Houses the bodies of settlers massacred and mutilated by the Amerindians. The law passed the legislature almost immediately after the Friends announced their intention to abstain from voting. They found an ally in Benjamin Franklin who argued the Friends’ case. Let those who wish to bear arms do so; let those who are conscientiously opposed to war be exempted from bearing arms. The Friends, Franklin wrote,

condemn the Use of Arms in others, yet are principled against bearing Arms themselves; and to make any Law to compel them thereto against their Consciences would not only be to violate a Fundamental in our Constitution but would also in Effect be to commence Persecution against all that Part of the Inhabitants of the Province … . [A]ny Law to compel others to bear Arms and exempt themselves would be inconsistent and partial … . [G]reat Numbers of People of other religious Denominations are come among us who are under no such Restraint, some of whom have been disciplined in the Art of war, and conscientiously think it their Duty to fight in Defense of their Country, their Wives, their Families and Estates, and have an equal Right to Liberty of Conscience with others … . [Those who are willing to bear arms] are willing to defend themselves and their Country, and [are] desirous of being formed into Regular Bodies for that Purpose, instructed and disciplined under proper Officers … .

While religious dissenters such as members of the Society of Friends had long been exempted from actual service as soldiers, their role in secondary positions remained a topic of debate. Should religious dissenters serve in hospitals and as paramedics? Should they supply the troops with food, clothing and forage?

The Pennsylvania Council of Safety on 7 July 1775 resolved that, As there are some people who, from religious principles, cannot bear arms in any case, the Congress intended no violence to their Consciences, but earnestly recommend it to them to contribute liberally in the time of universal calamity, to the relief of their Distressed Brethren in the several Colonies, and do all other services to their oppressed country, which they can do consistently with their religious principles.

The members of the Society of Friends were not the only pacifist religious persons in Pennsylvania. The Mennonites, Dunkards and many of the Moravians, Brethren in Christ, refused to carry arms based on religious teachings of their communities. In Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, problems arose as early as the spring of 1775. Some Mennonites and other pacifists were accused of paying bribes to the Committee of Safety, in amounts as large as 1500, to avoid militia duty. The Lancaster Committee of Safety denied the charge of bribery and tried to satisfy both sides. It ended pleasing neither. Most pacifists refused to take the oath of loyalty after independence was proclaimed, citing a general obligation to avoid the taking of oaths, or a religious scruple against swearing or affirming loyalty to any earthly kingdom, regardless of its good intentions and design. Non-associators were generally held to be disguised Tories and were treated with disdain and even open hostility by their patriot neighbors.

The province of Pennsylvania on 25 November 1775 enacted a tax of 2/10/0 on non-associators who failed to attend militia muster. The tax applied to all those who were unwilling to bear arms for the province, whether motivated by political opposition to the impending struggle with Great Britain or by religion.

The tax was to be levied each time a man missed a drill. However, if the non-associator had a change of conviction and decided to attend a drill as a militiaman he was to receive a refund of two shillings for each drill attended. The impact of the law was felt most heavily by the religious dissenters.

Most Friends and Mennonites in America lived in Pennsylvania. No state legislation specifically named these or any other pacifistic sect, but the Friends and Mennonites thought themselves singled out for special consideration. They objected strongly, protested visibly and refused to pay the tax. They had no intention of supporting defense efforts irrespective of the form that support might take. The Pennsylvania Assembly on 5 April 1776 responded by increasing the non-associator’s tax to 3/10/0, while also increasing the allowance for attending a drill to three shillings.

In August 1776 the Philadelphia Committee of Safety prepared a loyalty oath of 32 “Articles of Association in Pennsylvania,” and ordered all militiamen to subscribe to it. Thirty companies of Philadelphia refused to sign. In response to the repeated demand for their signatures by their officers, the men drew up a petition of grievances. They elected a spokesman, James Cannon, professor of mathematics at the University of Pennsylvania, to state their objections. Simply stated, the privates’ association argued that all citizens should contribute equally to maintenance of liberty. All male inhabitants between the ages of 16 and 50 must immediately be enlisted into the militia. They provided exemptions only for the disabled and clergy and, perhaps, elected officials. They objected to the exclusion of those opposed to war on religious grounds because they who took no risks profited from the risk-taking of those who did serve. If the patriots won the pacifists would gain enormous profits, some from supplying food and forage during the war, and if the patriots lost the Quakers would remain in the good graces of England because they had not been belligerents. Those who refused to bear arms in defense of the new nation must pay a penalty for their pacifism. Any exclusion of pacifists must make adequate provision for the “Dangers, Loss of Time and Expence incurred” by those who did defend the nation. Sensing a strong sentiment among so many enlisted men several county Committees of Safety concurred in the sentiment and argued against the exclusion of so many men from the ranks of the associators.

The Quakers, placed on the defensive, struck back with legal arguments.

They had been exempted from military service for over a hundred years by terms of Penn’s Charter and by laws of the provincial legislature. Their position, they argued, was known to all men of good will. Their religion taught that they could not “bear Arms, nor be concerned in warlike Preparations, either by personal Service, or by paying Fines, Penalties or Assessments, imposed in Consideration of our Exemption from such Services.” They had come to Pennsylvania, they argued, precisely to avoid such persecution as the patriots now wished to impose on them, and that forcing one to do those things that were opposed to his principles were violations of the law of nations and God’s law. In the autumn of 1776 the tax was again increased. Every non-associator between the ages of 16 and 50 was subjected to a tax of 1 each month that he failed to attend muster. Additionally, property owners over the age of 21 were subjected to a tax of four shillings per pound of assessed property valuation. On 25 November 1776 the legislature passed new legislation which required registration of all able-bodied males, ages 16 to 50. The listing was to be submitted to both the county Committees of Safety and the provisional legislature. All who failed to register would be subject to a fine of 2/1/0. By October 1779 the failure to register subjected a pacifist to a fine of 100 to 1000.

In the summer of 1777 Pennsylvania called a constitutional convention.

Among its many concerns was provision for the state militia. It resolved that all able-bodied men between 16 and 50 were to be enlisted in the militia. All who refused to be inducted into the militia were to be disarmed as well as fined. The legislature was empowered to punish all non-associators who showed the slightest inclination to support the enemy. Their property could be confiscated, they might be imprisoned or even executed and their estates placed at public vendue. In August 1777 the Committee of Safety at Philadelphia received word that about 200

German religious dissenters, probably Dunkards, had organized in opposition to the militia fines. In an odd display of violence, they reportedly threatened to kill anyone who attempted to enlist them, collect a militia fine or make them muster.

In May 1779 the Philadelphia militia demanded that the state assembly either confiscate a portion of the estates of non-associators or “leave it to the Militia . .

. to Compell every able Bodied Man to join them.” Those who had given their lives, they argued, “at least in the humbler grades, had as yet earned nothing, but poverty and contempt; while their wiser fellow citizens who attended to their interests, were men of mark and consideration.” Throughout the summer of 1779
the militiamen complained of high prices of all basic commodities, blaming the merchants who were non-associators. The militia threatened “our drum shall beat to arms” if these wartime profiteers were not forced to bear their fair share.

General Washington, writing from Valley Forge on 19 January 1778, complained to the pacifists, “From the quantity of raw materials and the number of workmen among your people, who being principally against arms, remain at home, and manufacture, I should suppose you had more in your Power to cover [cloathe]

your Troops well than any other state.”

The patriots in Pennsylvania treated conscientious objectors badly on occasion. Outspoken Christopher Saur, Jr. (1721-1784), bishop of the pacifist German Baptist Brethren [“Dunkards”], opposed the war in his newspaper, Pennsylvanische Staatsbote, and in open debate. He complained in the summer of 1777 that patriot militiamen had stripped him naked, painted him with red and black oil, and cut his hair and beard.

John Roberts was a gunpowder maker, 1776-78, in Lower Merion Township, Philadelphia County. In February 1776 George Lsch reported that he was operating the gunpowder mill owned by John Roberts, about 10 miles from Philadelphia. In July 1778 there was an explosion of about 150 pounds of gunpowder, injuring no one, but demolishing the building. In August Richard Sill was trying to clean the mortars with a chisel and sixty pounds of gunpowder exploded killing Sill and blowing the roof off the building. In 1779 the powder mill was operated by John’s son Thomas. Despite this service to his nation, in a time of grave need for gunpowder, in September 1778 Roberts, listed then in official proceedings as a miller, and a carpenter named Abraham Carlisle, were convicted of treason for assisting British General Howe during the occupation of Philadelphia. Roberts at this time was almost 60 years old and had nine children.

Both Roberts and Carlisle were Quakers and neither had betrayed military or state secrets or borne arms against the patriots. Technically, Roberts had violated Quaker principles by engaging in the very dangerous occupation of making gunpowder, or at least, in allowing munitions of war to be made on his property.

Roberts’ crime was evidently only that he had assisted in finding forage for the British army’s horses. Both men gathered the signatures of many reputable citizens, including patriots and clergy, attesting to their high moral characters. The men might have escaped punishment had they withdrawn with Howe’s army, as many others had done. The Committee of Safety refused to consider any petition and both were hanged on 4 November 1778.

Quakers were ambivalent toward the American cause and undecided what they must do to remain true to their religion while generally supporting independence.

Up to the commencement of the Revolutionary War, the Society of Friends had maintained a controlling influence over public affairs in Pennsylvania… . Many members of the Society warmly espoused the American side of the question. An armed resistance against the tyrannical measures of the mother country had but few advocates in the beginning … . The Society of Friends, having maintained a testimony against war and bloodshed, it was not to be supposed that its members would advocate a policy … certain to produce this result.

When it became necessary to resort to “carnal weapons” the Quakers who had before been active, withdrew from the controversy, and a very large majority of the Society assumed and maintained a position of passive neutrality throughout the war. Still there was a considerable number who openly advocated a resort to arms … . [in Delaware County, Pennsylvania] 110
young men were disowned by the Society for having entered military service … . its proportion of Tories was greatly exaggerated.

Members of the Society of Friends and other religious objectors had only been exempted relatively late from military service in Virginia. An amendment passed in 1766 exempted Quakers from serving in the militia under the act of 1757.

The 1766 act renewed the list of those exempted from militia, adding physicians and surgeons, Quakers and other religious dissenters, tobacco inspectors at public warehouses, acting judges and justices of the peace. Quakers were not required to buy a complete set of arms for public use, although the others exempted came under that obligation. Quakers had to present a certificate from their meeting houses certifying their membership, and if a Quaker was excommunicated or left the sect, he immediately became liable to militia service. In times of emergency Quakers were required either to muster or to purchase the services of a substitute, on the penalty of 10.

On 17 July 1775 the Third Virginia Convention excluded “all Quakers and the people called Mononists [Mennonites]” from “serving in the militia, agreeable to the several acts of the General Assembly of this colony, made for their relief and indulgence in this respect.” The measure proved to be unpopular. On 19 June 1776 the Committee of Safety of Frederick County sent a memorial to the Fifth Virginia Convention setting forth its objections. Why, the petition asked, would it not be fair and equitable to allow any man to avoid militia service by claiming he was a conscientious objector? Why should the legislature not allow any man to pay a small fee and escape risking his life in militia service?

[We] beg leave to represent the injustice of subjecting one part of the Community to the whole burthen of Government while others equally share the benefits of it that they humbly suggest that if in lieu of bearing Arms at general and private Musters the said Quakers and Menonists were subjected to the payment of a certain sum to be annually assessed by the County Courts and in case the Militia should be called into actual Service they should be draughted in the same proportion as the Militia of the County and on their refusal to serve or provide able bodied men to serve in their places respectively that they were liable to the same fines as other Militia men in like cases are subject.

When Congress passed the national militia registration law on 28 October 1775, it provided that, “such persons only [are to be] excepted whose religious principles will not suffer them to bear arms, who are hereby particularly exempted therefrom.” The Continental Congress advised the states that “individual religious scruples be respected.” The Congress had no power to implement these recommendations.

Catholics were expressly forbidden to keep and bear arms in both Pennsylvania and Maryland. They were not granted exemptions from appearing at musters merely because they could not possess arms. There is a certain irony in the prohibition in Maryland because it was founded as a haven for Catholics. The Pennsylvania Militia Act of 1757 provided,

Whereas all Papists and reputed Papists are hereby exempted from attending and performing the Military Duties enjoined by this Act on the Days and Times appointed for the same. And nevertheless will partake of and enjoy the Benefit, Advantage and Protection thereof, Be it therefore enacted by the authority aforesaid, That every male Papist or reputed Papist, between the age of Seventeen and Fifty five Years, within the several Districts or Divisions so to be made by the Sheriff of each County within this Province, shall and they are hereby enjoined & required to pay on Demand to the Captain of the Company of the District in which he resides, the Sum of Twenty Shillings to be recovered of him. in case of his Neglect or Refusal, in the same manner as the Fines and Forfeitures of the Persons enrolled in the Militia, are hereby directed to be recovered, and applied to the same Purposes as the said Fines and Forfeitures are directed by this Act to be, applied. And that the Parents of every such Male reputed Papist, above Seventeen Years of Age, and under Twenty-one, shall pay the said sum of Twenty Shillings for every such Minor under the Age last aforesaid.

On 6 April 1776 the Continental Congress debated legislation dealing with “non-associators.” The speakers distinguished between those who had refused to bear arms on account of their religious beliefs and those who had simply refused to associate with the new nation. Congress voted to disarm all non-associators other than religious dissenters. “Resolved, that it be earnestly recommended by this House to all well affected Non-Associators who are possessed of arms, to deliver them to Collectors … as they regard the freedom, safety and prosperity of their country.”

The exemption of conscientious objectors who were members of known religious sects that were opposed to war carried over to the constitutional period.

When, on 8 June 1789, James Madison introduced a series of amendments to the new national Constitution, his article providing for the right to keep and bear arms provided that “no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person.” Elbridge Gerry objected, not to exempting religious objectors, but to the language of the proposal which might be interpreted so as to deny arms to religious minorities.

The New York Constitution exempted Quakers from bearing arms, but required them to make monetary donations in lieu of actual service. However, it made no provision to exempt other persons who were conscientiously opposed to military service. The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 provided exemptions from military service for those who, by reasons of conscience and religion, were opposed to bearing arms. Conscientious objectors, however, had to bear the costs of hiring replacements.

The Continental Militia The idea of some sort of national militia, or at least national control over the provincial militias, had been advanced in the several early plans for military alliance or union discussed at length, above. Especially after Braddock’s defeat, and as the colonies approached armed rebellion to establish their independence, American leaders from all over emphasized the traditional role of the militia as the primary defense of the nation. Moreover, it was the one and only military institution which exemplified a virtuous citizenry. A vigorous militia proved the virtue of the sturdy American agrarian yeomen, whether rural farmer or urban tradesmen. Such a sturdy and virtuous force could carry any war against any opposition, the best standing armies included.

During the Revolution, the United States had 395,858 men enlisted in its armed forces, of which 164,087 were militia. At no point did the British army ever have more than 42,000 troops stationed in its former colonies. The role of the national government in establishing and maintaining some sort of citizen militia or formal reservoir of trained manpower was, at this point, absolutely minimal.

Several authorities have pointed out that the primary role played by militia lay in securing land and population, denying them to the oncoming British and Tory forces. They have also noted that the Revolution, in effect, was won before it had begun because its leaders, with the assistance of the militia, had secured control of the instruments of coercion and authority. These leaders controlled the militia which acted as agents of government, to a degree as posse comitas, to maintain that vital political control throughout the entire war.

On 23 March 1775 the Continental Congress debated the use of the militia. It resolved,

That a well regulated Militia, composed of Gentlemen and Yeomen, is the natural strength and only security of a free Government; that such a militia … would forever render it unnecessary for the Mother Country to keep among us, for the purpose of our defence, any Standing Army of mercenary forces, always subversive of the quiet, and dangerous to the liberties of the people, and would obviate the pretext of taxing us for their support. That the establishment of such a Militia is at this time peculiarly necessary, by the state of our laws for the protection and defence of the Country … .

The Continental Congress discussed at length the difference between the militia and a standing army. Its conclusion and observation reads as follows.

And here lies the distinction between the Militiamen and Regulars: the former, at the hazard of their lives, are to execute no unjust, unnatural, unconstitutional orders; the latter, even at the peril of their lives, must implicitly and unhesitatingly obey every order they receive from their commanding officers, even if it were to lay the whole City of London in ashes this very moment, or to rip open the bowels of every pregnant woman in the Kingdom, their own Mothers not excepted.

The twelve other colonies reacted to the confrontation between patriots and British soldiers in Massachusetts by mobilizing their own citizen-soldiers. A correspondent from South Carolina wrote to his friend in London, discussing events of the time, military preparations and American morale.

In consequence of the action of the 19th ult. (so disgraceful to the King’s troops) the Provincial Congress immediately voted a standing army of 30,000 men, of which 12,800 are to be of the province of Massachusetts, the rest from Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island; and have appointed General Ward Commander in Chief; Major General Putnam, of Connecticut, was ready with 6,000 troops, and it was supposed would be the second in command. Sixty thousand men were in arms at Cambridge, and the Congress sent word to all the inhabitants of the sea ports to remove immediately, or expect no protection.

The town of Boston capitulated to lay down their arms, and march out on the 25th. They have accordingly laid down 2,500 stand, and no injury had been done to the inhabitants.

The resolution was, to attack the town and castle on the 29th, in confidence that they should carry it. The General was removing his best effects out of the town; and when the Tories resorted to him, to know where they were to be protected, if he surrendered the town, he only d– them a parcel of vermin, who had abused him in the representations of those people.

The mode proposed to advance to the fortifications, by General Putnam, was by fascines made of hay, pressed into bundles, and pushed forward upon jacks. Three days after the engagement two of General Gage’s most able engineers deserted and came over to the Congress. Lord Percy said at table, he never saw anything equal to the intrepidity of the New England minute men. Marblehead was blocked up by a man of war, and Capt. Allen (who brought us the above intelligence in 13 days) was chased out to sea when he left Salem.

In short (he says) nothing could equal the spirit and firmness of the province. I am afraid before this day thousands may be slain on both sides. We do not fear all the force that can be sent against us, for we have a just cause in hand, and no doubt but we shall meet protection in a merciful God… . Our companies of artillery, grenadiers, light infantry, light horse, militia, and watch are daily improving themselves in the military art. We were pretty expert before, but are now almost equal to any soldiers the King has. It is talked of raising a company of Split Shirts immediately.

The Second Continental Congress on 14 June 1775 voted to raise ten rifle companies: six from Pennsylvania, two from Maryland and two from Virginia.

These men were armed with rifled guns of their own, in various calibers and sizes.

In the period of the American Revolution the musket was the military weapon. It was unrifled in the gun barrel, thus somewhat inaccurate beyond fifty yards, and suitable for mounting with a bayonet. Only the state or colony owned muskets.

Unrifled arms used by civilians in their own homes were called fowling pieces, a sort of single barrel shotgun; or “smooth rifles,” a translation of the German term, meaning that the gun was configured as a rifle, but with large, unrifled bore. John Adams showed the lack of knowledge of rifled arms that we might expect of a city dweller. He was amazed at the accomplishments of the frontiersmen. He wrote, They have voted ten companies of riflemen to be sent from Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia, to join the army before Boston. These are an excellent species of light infantry.

They use a peculiar kind of musket, called a rifle. It has a circular … grooves within the barrel, and carries a ball with great exactness to great distance. They are the most accurate marksmen in the world.

Leaving no doubt as to the cause of the conflict between the colonies and the mother nation, on 6 July 1775 representatives from Massachusetts introduced to the Continental Congress a document drafted by Thomas Jefferson and John Dickinson, the “Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms.” The document described how General Gage’s troops disarmed the compliant citizen-soldiers of Boston.

The inhabitants of Boston being confined within that town by the general their governor, and having, in order to procure their dismission, entered into a treaty with him, it was stipulated that the said inhabitants having deposited their arms with their own magistrates, should have liberty depart, taking with them their other effects. They accordingly delivered up their arms, but in open violation of honour, in defiance of the obligation of treaties, which even savage nations esteemed sacred, the governor ordered the arms deposited as aforesaid, that they might be preserved for their owners, to be seized by a body of soldiers; detained the greatest part of the inhabitants of the town, and compelled the few who were permitted to retire, to leave their most valuable effects behind. By this perfidy wives are separated from their husbands, children from their parents, and the aged and sick from their relations and friends, who wish to attend and comfort them, and those who have been used to live in plenty and even elegance, are reduced to deplorable distress.

On 26 October 1775 the Continental Congress “recommended to the Several Provincial Assemblies” that they export to the West Indies and elsewhere “produce except horned Cattle, Sheep, Hogs and Poultry” so that they might exchange or sell these items to obtain arms and ammunition wherewith to arm their own militias and men of the Continental Line. On 28 October 1775 the Congress passed a national militia law. That law directed,

That each and every Captain in the Colonies within 10 days after the publication hereof shall make out a list of all persons residing in his District capable of bearing Arms, between the ages of 16 and 50 years, … to enroll themselves by signing a Muster Roll … . And it is further Resolved, That every person directed to be enrolled as above shall, at his place of abode, be also provided with one pound of Powder and three pounds of Bullets of proper size to his Musket or Firelock … [and] to furnish himself with a good Musket or Firelock, and Bayonet, Sword or Tomahawk, a steel Ramrod, Worm, Priming Wire and Brush fitted thereto, a Cartouch Box to contain 23 rounds of Cartridges … under the forfeiture of two Shillings for the want of a Musket or Firelock … .

The Continental Congress recommended that the states recruit all free, white American citizens between the ages of sixteen and sixty years into their militia units. It suggested that states not enlist apprentices or indentured servants without the consent of masters. It also suggested that no man under 5‘5” tall or over age 50 be recruited or drafted from the militias. Few states used these congressional guidelines.

On 26 December 1775 the Continental Congress sent a circular letter to the various state Councils of Safety, advising on policy on an unusual problem. It had come to the attention of members of the Congress that men had sought to avoid both militia service and draft or other induction from the militia into the Continental Line by contracting debts and then failing to pay these debts so that they were thrust into debtor’s prison. Other men may have been imprisoned for debts honestly contracted and unpaid because of circumstances beyond the control of men who had no intent to deceive. It recommended that the states not imprison any militiaman or soldier for debts less than $35. It also suggested that the states check prison and court records to ascertain what men might have already escaped service in this manner and release, perhaps enlist or draft, them. “It has always been found necessary in Time of War to regulate and restrain a Practice of such pernicious Tendency.” Congress thought that the practice of imprisoning men for debts was most reprehensible, whether on the part of debtors or creditors, while brave men were dying.

By mid-1776 the Continental Congress had seen the folly of enlisting men for short periods of time, the terms of draftees to expire in from 30 to 90 days. The militiamen had insufficient time to drill and gain even minimal battle experience before their time of enlistment had expired and they were replaced by an even more inexperienced group of recruits and conscripts from state militias. While state militias may have offered their best men in the first few drafts, the incentive, after a time, was to send out the worst of their numbers. We must recall that the state militias had great responsibilities to their own citizenry. The state militias were all that stood between the generally unarmed civilians and invasions from both English and Amerindian invasions and incursions. The state militias had to garrison various fortified positions and actual forts, protect lines of transportation and communication, guard the seacoast and maintain the seacoast watch, and protect military stores and vital manufactories which supplied arms, munitions clothing, food and other supplies. Although most states theoretically used a lottery system to draft militiamen into the regular army, we may reason that the militia officers and local political authorities had some input into the actual selections.

In June 1776, Congress, realizing that many urban militiamen were not accustomed to the use of firearms, and were unlikely to hit a target, ordered the use of multiple balls in the arms. Specifically, Washington suggested that “they load for their first fire with one musket ball and four or eight buckshot, according to the size and strength of their pieces.” Congress then ordered a quantity of buckshot, then called swan shot.

In early June 1776 Congress apportioned among the states the numbers of men required to serve in the militia for defense of the nation. Congress ordered six thousand of the militia, to reinforce the army in Canada, and keep up a communication with that province. Massachusetts is requested to furnish of their militia, for that purpose, four battalions, 3,000; Connecticut, two battalions, 1,500; New Hampshire, one battalion, 750; New York, one battalion, 750. To reinforce the army at New York, there are ordered of the militia, 13,800; Massachusetts is requested to furnish thereof, 2,000; Connecticut is requested to furnish thereof, 5,500; New York is requested to furnish thereof, 3,000; New Jersey is requested to furnish thereof, 3,300

Soon after, Congress ordered a flying camp to be formed, to consist of ten thousand militia, and to be furnished as follows: Pennsylvania, 6,000; Maryland, 3,400; Delaware government, 600. The Congress also empowered General Washington to employ in Canada, Indians, 2,000

On 15 September 1776 Richard Henry Lee wrote to Patrick Henry, governor of Virginia, from Philadelphia, reporting on the disposition of the British army. “The enemies’ force is very considerable,” he wrote, “being by best accounts about 24,000 men, besides their Canada army, which is about 7000.” As of the date of his letter, Lee said that the American army consisted of only 13,000 men under General Horatio Gates. Lee complained of the “large frequent desertions of the militia” which had weakened Gates’ force. Soon after George Washington lodged a similar complaint, noting that the militia “as soon as they are fairly fixed in camp are impatient to return to their own homes.” Moreover, Washington said, the militia had “an utter disregard of all discipline and restraint among themselves”

and who were “too apt to infuse a like spirit in others.”

In September 1776 the Continental Congress voted to raise 86 battalions of the Continental Line, with 726 men in each battalion, bringing the total enlistment to about 63,000 men. Initially, the Congress ordered that men be enlisted for the “duration of the war,” but strong pressures and political realities forced it, on 12 November 1776, to reduce the term to three years maximum service. Congress assigned quotas to the states based upon state population, based in large on militia enrollment lists. Massachusetts and Virginia were initially assigned fifteen regiments, later increased to eighteen regiments. New Jersey and New York had quotas of four regiments. Rhode Island had a quota of two, later increased to three. Connecticut and New Hampshire were assigned three regiments. Pennsylvania was to recruit a dozen; Delaware and Georgia, one; Maryland, eight; North Carolina, nine; and South Carolina, six. Voluntary enlistments were rewarded with a bounty of 20 and an additional promise of 100 acres of land upon completion of enlistment. The states were to clothe and equip their men and they were given considerable latitude in selecting the color and style of uniforms. States were expected to draft troops from their militia lists, in any way they chose, if necessary to fill their quotas. Virginia was so successful that it quickly filled its quota and Governor Henry allowed John Wood, governor of Georgia, to recruit men in Virginia to fill its quota. Other states had more difficulties, and by 1779, Virginia was having its problems with recruitment.

Congress and the states both came to realize the truth of General Washington’s observation made to Virginia Governor Patrick Henry on 4 October 1776 that voting regiments was a materially different thing from actually raising troops. He wrote to the committees of safety on 22 December 1776, demanding reinforcements to be allocated from the state militias. Washington pointed out that “in less than ten days from this time, my army will be reduced to a few from Virginia, and one Maryland regiment, Colonel Hand’s, and the regiments lately under Colonel Miles, all very thin.” By 1779 Congress had raised the bounty for volunteers from 20 to $200.

The Continental Congress had begun to consider an instrument of government as early as 7 June 1776, and on 15 November 1777 it had prepared a draft which it sent to the states. Nine states had approved it by July 1778, although it was not approved by all the states until 1 March 1781. One provision of the Articles of Confederation dealt with the militia. It required that, Every state shall always keep up a well regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutred, and shall provide and constantly have ready for use, in public stores, a due number of field pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition and camp equipage.

Throughout the nineteenth century European armies deployed in clear lines, usually three deep, to maximize firepower from the increasingly valuable flintlock musket which was best discharged in volleys. The lines remained tightly packed in order to be able to ward off cavalry charges. In North America there were far fewer cavalry units to be feared, so the densely-formed lines were not required as they had been in Europe. In dense frontier areas troops which stood shoulder to shoulder and threw unaimed volleys against invisible enemy fighting from behind rocks and trees had little impact, but offered inviting targets. The British army learned only slowly from Braddock’s defeat, but the notable exception to that lethargy was Sir William Howe. An advocate of light infantry tactics, he had added a company of light infantry to every battalion. He also thought that lines engaged in colonial warfare could be placed at least arm’s length from one another and lined only two deep.

At the beginning of the American Revolution opinion was divided between those, like George Washington, who preferred to create a true, professional army, and those, like Charles Lee, who preferred to retain a militia system. In general, political power in the state governments lay with those who were opposed to the creation of a standing army which, after the war, might be equally dangerous to states’ rights as to individual liberties. The states generally adopted a paradoxical stance. On the one hand, they wished to have the national government be responsible for as many bills and expenses as possible. On the other hand, they did not wish to cede powers and prerogatives to the national government, and most especially, remained throughout the war adamantly opposed to granting to the national government any power to tax. They also opposed granting too many powers to the national government, and among those powers they denied to it, were especially the powers to draft state militiamen or call the state militias into national service, appoint state militia officers, establish standards for training of militia and provide for the use and disposition of the militia. Among the most significant decisions Washington made during his long and distinguished career was that which insisted on the creation of a European-style army. As one authority wrote,

[I]t is characteristic that Washington and the cautious men who shared military leadership with him placed their principal military reliance not on a mass rising but on the hope of building a professional army… . In the end he succeeded. His Continental Army did become a force whose best units were comparable to the British regulars… . For years it was Washington’s maintenance of a body of Continental regulars that kept the Revolution alive.

While the issue was not fully decided in favor of the standing army as the mainstay of American defense until long after Washington was dead, the trained army was created during the American Revolution.

Washington had little regard for the typical recruit from militia to the army. On 20 July 1775 he wrote to his brother from Boston, “I came to this place the second instant & found a numerous army of Provincials under very little command, discipline, or order.” During the French and Indian War he found that the militia conscripts were “loose, idle persons that are quite destitute of House and home.” As early as 1775 Washington expressed his reservations about relying on the militia during a war with Great Britain. He complained to Joseph Reed of Pennsylvania, of “the dearth of public spirit and want of virtue … in this great military arrangement.” So troublesome was the militia that he told Reed, “Could I have foreseen what I have, and am likely to experience, no consideration upon earth should have induced me to accept this command.”

The inglorious retreat from Lexington and Concord, the Battle of Bunker Hill, and like “victories” were only minor skirmishes for the British. They served as morale boosters for the rebels, but Washington recognized that their primary value was in including recruits to enlist in the colonial forces. These victories did not produce the needed recruits and Washington lamented that without more men “the game will be pretty well up.”

Further, Washington knew that these successes would not be repeated, unless the British made catastrophic mistakes. And even a series of such mistakes would inevitably lead to change of command, better leadership and more precise strategy. In the meanwhile, militia victories would lure the Continental Congress into a false sense of security and given the militias undue prestige. These things would tend to prolong the creation of a true army. As the war dragged on, Washington would have more difficulty in maintaining his forces, for the militias served ordinarily for brief periods of service of six months or so, and were notorious for deserting in whole companies when the campaign was not going well.

Overall Washington thought the militia was a bad influence on his regular soldiers.

Charles Lee urged the patriot leaders to fight a wholly guerilla war. He knew that the British regular army could occupy the seaboard cities at will and there would be precious little he, Washington or anyone else could do about it. He thought that the development of a sufficient professional army able to meet the British army head on would, in the long run, become a power beyond the ability of the legislature to control and potentially destructive of civil liberties. Had the leaders chosen to withdraw to the impenetrable mountains they would been yielding not only a large amount of territory and many people to the British army, but would be granting to the British the political control of the both and also the rich agricultural fields of the east. In any event Lee’s proposal was impolitic and had support from neither Congress nor Washington’s staff.

General Horatio Gates was another voice among those who held the militia in high esteem and willing to publicly dispute Washington on that point.

“washington would suffer greatly without their aid,” Gates mused. Gates argued that the best of men wished to escape permanent military service and were willing to serve in the military only for short stretches of time and to achieve limited purposes. They loathed garrison and frontier duty. They had too much to do regarding their own businesses. Only the meanest derelicts and chronically, although sometimes temporarily, unemployed sought enlistment in an army as a means of earning money. Anyone who sincerely sought employment in a time of war could find it as there was much to be done and few to do it. Gates did wish for some additional militia discipline, but thought that militiamen merely needed direction whereas soldiers in standing armies, because of their usual idleness and lethargy, to say nothing of their inferior character, needed harsh discipline and constant supervision from dedicated officers.

Washington was quite correct in his assessment of the militia. As a system of military organization the militia had always been tied to a professional army. The medieval fyrd was necessarily related to the houscarl. The semi-trained militia, the fyrd, had been called up exclusively for short periods of time, had been allowed to return to their home in time for planting or harvesting, and enjoyed considerable freedom and independence in battle. Only rarely were they used in major and important service, and it was accepted strategy for an attacking army to ferret out of the militia lines and then to launch a major attack there in hopes, generally fulfilled, of causing an overall rout of the opposing forces. So unreliable had the militias in Europe become that, by the end of the sixteenth century, they had been wholly replaced by trained professional.

At a meeting of the Board of War, January 30, 1777, agreed to report to Congress: “That the several Councils of Safety, Governors of legislatures of the respective States take the most effectual steps to collect from the inhabitants not in the actual service, all Continental arms, and give notice of the numbers they have so collected to General Washington. That all Arms and Accoutrements belonging to the U. S. shall be stamped and marked with the words UNITED STATES on the barrels and locks and bayonets already made and those to be hereafter manufactured in these States; and all arms or accoutrements so stamped or marked shall be taken wherever found for the use of the States.”

Not long after independence had been declared General George Washington embarked on a campaign that he knew entailed risking total defeat. In the summer and early fall of 1776 he lost one engagement after another. Possibly, he was gambling on being defeated on paper, while being able to escape with remnants of this tattered army. If that was indeed the case, British General William Howe played directly into Washington’s hands, for he failed completely to follow up on his victories. Perhaps Washington read Howe’s mind all too well. In the late fall and winter 1776-77 Washington was able to salvage a few victories, sufficient, at least, to stave off total defeatism in his army as they settled down for the winter.

This warning of probable defeat should we retain a fundamentally untrained army of citizen-soldiers fell on partially deaf ears as the Congress was quite willing, for the most part, to fight a war of attrition, hoping to grind the British down to the point that a stalemate would bring recognition of our independence. Besides, the French might intervene on our behalf, ensuring victory.

A year later the prospects for the criterion of a true army were as dismal as before and Washington was managing to the satisfaction of the Congress. Washington’s argument that jaegers, skilled marksmen, riflemen and even light infantry bend to, even flee from, advances of a solid regular line. If the political and military authorities wished to hold the eastern cities they had to match the British army.

Events turned more toward the colonists daily. Howe’s enclave theory had resulted in the occupation of cities, such as Philadelphia, but without producing tangible results. The British knew they could continue to occupy the cities almost at will, but that they could only venture out into the countryside in brief, and wholly indecisive, forays. The wilderness campaign of “Gentlemen Johnny”

Burgoyne had ended in disaster, and this with militia forces. Burgoyne complained that where there had been no discernible forces only hours before, thousands of militiamen had assembled, as if arising from the earth fully grown and equipped.

Burgoyne commented, “wherever the King’s forces point, militia to the amount of 3000 to 4000 assemble within twenty-four hours.” A Swiss military observer wrote, “The Americans would have been less dangerous if they had a regular army.” A French officer assessed the implications of Burgoyne’s defeat.

Such are the conditions upon which Burgoyne surrendered: 5500 men have therefore marched past foaming with rage and cursing their General, to whom they have said that they would sooner be reduced to two ounces of biscuit a day than surrender; and they have turned over 6000 excellent firearms, 40 pieces of cannon and the best munitions which have yet been seen on this Continent. Never will the Englishmen wipe out this shame; 5500 men of the best troops surrendered at the discretion to less than 10,000 militia.

The American rifleman continued to impress the Europeans. An officer in a Jaeger unit attached to Colonel Tarleton’s American Loyalist corps observed the superior marksmanship of the American militiamen with their rifles. He wrote, I never in my life saw better rifles (or men who shot better) than those made in America . .

. . I am not going to relate anything respecting the American war, but to mention one instance, as proof of the most excellent sill of an American rifleman. If any man show me an instance of better shooting, I will stand corrected… . A rifleman passed over the mill dam, evidently observing the two officers, and laid himself down on his belly (for it is in such positions they always lie) to take a good shot at long distance … . Now observe how well this fellow shot … . Colonel Tarleton’s horse and mine, I am certain, were not anything like two feet apart… . [T]he bugle-horn man behind us and directly central jumped off his horse and said, ‘Sir, my horse is shot.’ The horse staggered, fell down, and died… . I can positively assert that the distance he fired from, at us, was full 400 yards.”

The London Chronicle in 1775 had noted the prowess of the American citizen-soldiers.

This Province [of Pennsylvania] has raised 100 riflemen, the worst of whom will put a ball into a man’s head at a distance of 150 or 200 yards, therefore advise your officers who shall hereafter come to America, to settle their affairs in England before their departure.

A correspondent who signed as “A Democratic Federalist” entered the federal debate of 1787. His later day observations reflected much of American libertarian (or Anti-federalist) thought in 1776 or in 1787. He made these observations on the early American revolutionary citizen-army, Had we a standing army when the British invaded our peaceful shores? Was it a standing army that gained the battles of Lexington and Bunker’s Hill, and took the illfated Burgoyne?

Is not a well regulated militia sufficient for every purpose of internal defense? And which of you, my fellow citizens, is afraid of any invasion from foreign powers, that our brave militia would not be able immediately to repel?

Had Washington been given a regular army early on, the results might have been far less fortunate. Richard Henry Lee was delighted. A standing army, once created, would be impossible to dismiss, and, as we all knew, a standing army is the greatest danger to our liberties. We could not afford to win the war only to entrench a new tyranny. Lee wrote of the militia,

A militia, when properly formed, are in fact the people themselves, and render regular troops in a great measure unnecessary … . [T]he militia shall always be kept well organized, armed and disciplined , and include … all men capable of bearing arms, and that all regulations tending to render this general [unorganized] militia useless and defenceless, by establishing select corps of militia, or distinct bodies of military men [standing army or organized militia], not having permanent interests and attachments in the community to be avoided.

Indeed, Lee was convinced that America could only win its war for independence by fighting what a later age would call a guerilla or partisan war.

The patriots would operate out of mountain enclaves on the frontier, harassing the British forces in their enclaves in the eastern seaboard cities. He preferred decentralized political power and diffusion of command among state and local leaders. In a letter to Patrick Henry, Lee expressed his sentiments.

Mr. Howe will not be gratified with the possession of this city [Philadelphia]. And if he gained 20 such cities, still he would be short of gaining the point mediated over America.

You remember, Sir, we told them from the beginning that we looked on our Cities and Sea Coasts as devoted to destruction, but that ample resources were still left for a numerous, brave and free people to be content with.

Lee was supported by such libertarians as Patrick Henry and Samuel Adams. Adams wrote,

A standing army, however necessary it may be at some times, is always dangerous to the liberties of the people. Soldiers are apt to consider themselves as a body distinct from the rest of citizens. They have their arms always in their hands. Their rules and their discipline is severe. They soon become attached to their officers and disposed to yield implicit obedience to their commands. Such a power should be watched with a jealous eye.

Thomas Paine had come to their philosophical support, arguing what would become the main support of the French and other liberal European revolutions: that the best warfare for independence involved the whole aroused and armed population. Nothing was more powerful than the dedicated citizenry fighting arm-in-arm with their relatives and neighbors for a heartfelt ideological clause. An army could be defeated, but never an entire nation. And Paine in “The Crisis” and elsewhere had shown the world how to arouse an entire population.

George Mason argued that the nation must preserve a militia comprised of all the people and reiterated the common libertarian fear of creating a standing army which might not be easily disbanded.

The militiamen proved to be effective as shock troops. They wreaked havoc in the British lines at the Battle of Bunker Hill by picking off a disproportionate number of their officers. One British Marine wrote to his brother, “Many officers have died of their wounds and others [are] very ill; ‘tis astonishing what a number of officers were hit on this occasion; but the officers were particularly aimed at.” Another Lieutenant of the British Marines observed, [I]it is very uncommon that such a great number of officers should be killed and wounded, more than in proportion to the number of private men: the following discovery seems to account for it. Before the entrenchments were forced, a man, whom the Americans called a marksman, or rifleman, was seen standing upon something near three feet higher than the rest of the troops … . This man had no sooner discharged one musket [actually probably a rifle] than another was handed to him, and continued firing in that manner for 10 or 12
minutes. And in that small space of time … it is supposed that he could not have killed or wounded less than 20 officers, for it was at them particularly that he directed his aim … .

George Hanger, a well known British rifleman and himself an expert shot, on one occasion was assigned to the Loyalist regiment in the Carolinas commanded by Banastre Tarleton. He wrote several passages in his diary attesting to the prowess of the American rifleman. He expected them to hit targets with great regularity at distances of up to three hundred yards. On one occasion, in the company of Tarleton, some four hundred yards away they observed several American riflemen, possibly of Daniel Morgan’s rifle company. Hanger observed, A rifleman passed over the mill dam, evidently observing two officers, and laid himself down on his belly; for in such positions they always lie, to take a good shot at a distance.

He took a deliberate and cool shot at my friend and me, and the bugle horn man … . A rifle ball passed between him and me; looking directly at the mill, I evidently observed the flash of the powder … . [T]he bugle horn man behind us, and directly central, jumped off his horse, and said, “Sir, my horse is shot.”

Unable to counter the riflemanship of the rural American citizen-marksmen with sufficient numbers of their skilled marksmen, the British turned to German mercenaries. The London Constitutional Gazette announced that the Government has sent over to Germany to engage 1000 men called Jaegers, people brought up to the use of the rifle barrel guns in boar hunting. They are amazingly expert. Every petty prince who hath forests keeps a number of them, and they are allowed to take apprentices, by which means they have a numerous body of people. These men are intended to act in the next campaign in America … their being a complete match for the American riflemen.

The standing army of the Revolution, known as the Continental Line, in reality, differed little from the state militias which it had superseded as the major military of the thirteen states. We must recall that, in the beginning, the line was created out of activated militia companies and volunteers recruited from the militia acting as a reservoir for the line. Regiments varied enormously in size and some were never fully brought up to strength. All regiments were clearly identified with specific states, with men from one jurisdiction rarely being found in lines identified with another. As we have seen, everywhere the line was filled by drafts of some sort from state militias. Extant rosters show clearly that most early regiments of the Continental Line were simply select, or the better trained, militia companies fighting under a new name and a new banner. Since the Congress had little money, even when expenses were charged or chargeable to the national government, it was still generally the states which supplied the payroll, arms, supplies and equipment.

Congress could issue appeals to state governments, but had no real power, beyond moral suasion, to compel compliance.

As with state militias, the national army had three main arenas of operation. Most troops merely served garrison duty, awaiting a British operation against the area which they were assigned to protect. When engaged in actual combat they assumed a defensive posture. Frequently, that meant strategic withdrawal. Some troops were assigned to offensive action, against the British or the Amerindians, in campaigns designed to relieve some threat to American independence. Third, guerilla operations consumed a certain amount of energy and attention. This was a final resort, chosen primarily when the forces were too weak to engage the enemy directly.

In 1790 the Secretary of War Henry Knox (1750-1806) reported that the number of soldiers in the continental line was greatest in 1777, when there were 34,820 available to General Washington. At war’s end the number had dwindled to 13,892. Desertions, fulfillment of terms of enlistment, injury, illness, deaths and wounds had all taken their toll.

During the first two years of the war there were only a few problems with recruitment of soldiers. By 1777 the war was taking a toll on the patriots. Men were tiring of the war. Taxes were high and the currency depreciating at a rapid rate. High inflation and high taxes placed many father-less families at the mercy of money lenders. Some taxes went unpaid. Militia fines were substantial, and providing a substitute was beyond the means of the typical household. The obligation to serve in the military fell most heavily on the segment of society which was ordinarily unable to sustain the cost. Many families had lost several successive harvest and planting seasons because the men had been called into military or militia service. Fields lay in ruin because of neglect or Amerindian or tory deprivations. Families had to borrow money to save themselves from destitution.

Interest rates were high because of the ever inflating currency. Many soldiers returning home were cast into debtors’ prisons because they had contracted debts which they could not service, all in support of their families during their service in the patriot cause.

Wages of the enlisted men, whether in the continental line or militia, were insufficient to support a family. The pay of soldiers in 1776 was given in paper money which exchanged freely on par with silver. In January 1777 silver brought a premium of 25% and by January 1778 silver was valued at four times the stated value of paper money. In 1780 silver was worth sixty times the face value of the depreciated currency. By May 1781 it was essentially worthless and had ceased to circulate for virtually no one, the most ardent patriots included, would accept it.

The national and state governments had printed money because they had no reserves of bullion, but the men refused to accept the worthless currency.

Some men deserted the patriot cause and returned home, enlisted or were drafted a second time, often so that they could obtain the bonuses offered for enlistment. Penalties for such behavior were severe, but many men, faced with the prospects of financial ruin, were willing to chance desertion and a second enlistment, while hoping to escape the consequences of their actions.

As the war ended, many reflected on the difficulties experienced in coordinating the activities and deployment of the state militias. By 1787 each state’s virtual autonomy over its militia had resulted in considerable diversity and even serious neglect. But the overwhelming sentiment of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, most state authorities and other influential persons remained fixed on the maintenance of a state militia system as the nation’s guardian in peacetime.

No one expressed the general distrust of a standing army better than better than Charles Pinckney (1746-1825) of South Carolina, speaking at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, when he said, “a dissimilarity in e militia of different States had produced the most serious mischiefs … and believed that “there must also be a real military force. The United States had been making an experiment without it, and … [would] see the consequence in their rapid approaches toward anarchy.” Governor Edmund Randolph of Virginia believed “there was not a member in the federal convention who did not feel indignation at such an institution.”

We can see that the national militia meant very little during the War for Independence and that, under the American system of divided sovereignty, the militias were viewed as properly the concern and responsibility of the states. There was neither a suggestion that a national militia be formed or that those enrolled in state militias ought to take an oath of dual allegiance to the national government in addition to one’s home state.

The concept of dual enlistment had to wait more than a century to come to fruition. Incidents of the militia refusing to serve outside the borders of the nation were raised in the War of 1812 and the Mexican War of 1846-1848. It was not until the enactment of the National Defense Act of 1916 that Congress established the a enlistment provision while simultaneously converting state militias into national guards. The National Defense Act Amendment of 1933
advanced the “one army” concept under which national guard units were considered to be integral parts of the United States Army. The roots of the current national guard system may be found in the embryonic national militia of the American War for Independence.

Notes